

Determining an Optimal Threshold on the Online Reserves of a Bitcoin Exchange


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Overview

- Central question: how to store Bitcoin in a way that reduces impact of theft events
- Key concepts
 - Bitcoin ownership
 - Hot/cold wallet storage
 - Hot – online (e.g. file on computer, smartphone app)
 - Cold – offline (e.g. hard drive locked in safe, paper wallet)

Problem Formulation



Motivation

- Prevalence of high profile Bitcoin theft
 - 45% of exchanges ever operational shut down (2013)
- Theft nullifies advantages of using Bitcoin
 - Subsidized by higher insurance premiums and exchange fees
- Theft undermines public trust in Bitcoin
 - Influences exchange rate, funding climate, community growth

Related Work

- Companies (e.g. Coinbase) implement security heuristics
 - Data encryption, safe storage, geographic diversification
 - Practices don't generalize, aren't necessarily optimal
- Significant research on improving Bitcoin wallets
 - Extensions to core protocol, cryptographic innovations
- What's missing: system analysis at a *given level of security*
 - Goal: better high-level designs for storage systems


Related Work

coinbase

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SECURITY FOR YOUR PEACE OF MIND

We take careful measures to ensure that your bitcoin is as safe as possible.



NEW Online Funds Are Now Covered by Insurance - [Read more](#)

Up to 97% of customer funds are stored offline

Offline storage provides an important security measure against theft or loss.
We distribute bitcoin geographically in safe deposit boxes and vaults around the world.

Approach

- Goal: maximize hot/cold wallet balance at arbitrary time T
- Formula for expected total balance
 - By linearity of expectation

$$B(T) = Ex[D - W] - k_1\mu - \frac{k_2}{\mu}$$

- $D - W$ represents net arrivals (deposits minus withdrawals)
- $k_1\mu$ represents losses due to hot wallet theft
- k_2/μ represents losses due to cold wallet theft

Approach

- Determine optimal hot wallet threshold μ

$$B(T) = Ex[D - W] - k_1\mu - \frac{k_2}{\mu}$$


- Optimize $B(T)$ by setting first derivative to 0 and solving for μ

$$\frac{dB(T)}{d\mu} = -k_1 + \frac{k_2}{\mu^2} = 0$$

$$\mu = \sqrt{\frac{k_2}{k_1}}$$

Approach

- Experimental evidence that optimal μ can be found



Theory

- Series of models, each a larger subsystem of original setup
 - Model 1: Hot wallet only. No thefts.
 - Model 2: Hot wallet only. Hot wallet theft with rate λ_{ht}
 - Model 3: Hot and cold wallet.

Theory

- The result

$$Ex[B] = (\lambda_d - \lambda_w) \frac{X_\mu}{p_{t_c}} - (\gamma\mu) \left(\lambda_{t_h} \frac{X_\mu}{p_{t_c}} \right)$$

Mean rate of net arrivals $\lambda_d - \lambda_w$

Expected time to cold wallet theft $\frac{X_\mu}{p_{t_c}}$

Average hot wallet balance $\gamma\mu$

Expected number of hot wallet thefts $\lambda_{t_h} \frac{X_\mu}{p_{t_c}}$

- Gives hot/cold wallet balance after long time T
- Must only look at events *since last cold wallet theft*
 - First term - expected net arrivals
 - Second term - losses due to hot wallet theft


Expected time to empty hot wallet (C→H refill) $\frac{X_\mu}{p_{t_c}}$

Probability of cold wallet theft λ_{t_h}



Theory

- How to find X_μ (time to empty hot wallet)
 - Model hot wallet balance as *continuous time random walk*



<u>Event</u>	<u>State Transition</u>	<u>Probability</u>
Deposit	$X_k \rightarrow X_{k+1}$	$\lambda_d t$
Withdrawal	$X_k \rightarrow X_{k-1}$	$\lambda_w t$
Hot Wallet Theft	$X_k \rightarrow X_0$	$\lambda_{ht} t$
No Event	$X_k \rightarrow X_k$	$1 - (\lambda_d + \lambda_w + \lambda_{ht})t$

Theory

- How to find X_μ (time to empty hot wallet)

- Can write recurrence relation


$$X_k = t + (\lambda_d t)X_{k+1} + (\lambda_w t)X_{k-1} + (\lambda_{th} t)X_0 + (1 - (\lambda_d + \lambda_w + \lambda_{th})t)X_k$$

- LHS — expected time to reach 0 BTC from k BTC
 - RHS — t + expected time to reach 0 BTC after passage of small time t
 - Solve recurrence
 - Write/solve characteristic polynomial
 - Impose boundary conditions (X_0 and X_μ)

Theory

- How to find X_μ (time to empty hot wallet)
 - Solution

$$X_\mu = \frac{1}{\lambda_{t_h}} + \frac{1}{\lambda_{t_h}} \left(\frac{\lambda_w(x_2 - x_1)(x_1 x_2)^{\mu-1}}{[\lambda_w(x_1 - 1) + \lambda_{t_h} x_1] x_1^{\mu-1} - [\lambda_w(x_2 - 1) + \lambda_{t_h} x_2] x_2^{\mu-1}} \right)$$




Experiment

- Event-driven simulation
 - Set values for $\lambda_d, \lambda_w, \lambda_{ht}, p_{ct}$ (e.g. 80/hour, 78/hour, 0.01/hour, 0.01/access)
 - Set simulation parameters — threshold μ , timespan T , iterations i

```
while (time < T) {  
  
    Event nextEvent = drawEvent( $\lambda_d$ ,  $\lambda_w$ ,  $\lambda_{ht}$ )  
    switch (nextEvent.Type) {  
        case (Event.DEPOSIT):           deposit()  
        case (Event.WITHDRAWAL):        withdraw()  
        case (Event.HOT_THEFT):         emptyHotWallet()  
    }  
    if (hotBalance == 0)                 refillHotWallet( $p_{ct}$ )  
  
    time += nextEvent.Time  
}  
  
print( $\mu$ , hotBalance + coldBalance)
```

Results



Theory

$$Ex[B] = (\lambda_d - \lambda_w) \frac{X_\mu}{p_{tc}} - (\gamma\mu) \left(\lambda_{th} \frac{X_\mu}{p_{tc}} \right)$$

Simulation


Average over 1000 iterations

Optimal Threshold

Theory	$\mu = 112.88$
Empirical (abs. maximum)	$\mu = 114$
Empirical (poly. interpolation)	$\mu = 111.05$

Applications


- Calibrated threshold
 - Exploits periodicities in transaction frequency
 - Organization maintains *history block*
 - Record of last k hours of deposits, withdrawals, thefts, C→H transfers
 - Capacity of hot wallet (i.e. μ) computed and updated dynamically



Further Work

- Multiple wallet systems

- Goal: separate servicing from storage
- Pyramid model
 - Layers of security
 - Wallet W_k overflows into W_{k+1} and refills W_{k-1}
 - Lower layers hold majority of reserves
- Question: optimal threshold for each level?



References

Special thanks to our reviewers and to WEIS for hosting this event

Papers

- T. Moore and N. Christin, “Beware the Middleman: Empirical Analysis of Bitcoin-Exchange Risk,” in FC 2013, Springer, 2013, pp. 25-33.

Books

- A. Narayanan, J. Bonneau, E. Felten, A. Miller, and S. Goldfeder, *Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Technologies*, Princeton University, 2015.

Images

- <https://www.coinbase.com/security>
- <http://organofcorti.blogspot.com/2014/11/daily-and-weekly-bitcoin-transaction.html>
- <https://pixabay.com/en/pyramids-layers-blue-3d-305074/>

See <https://github.com/SamvitJ/WEIS2016-Programs> for simulation code

Appendix

- Expectation

- Sum rule (linearity)

$$\text{Ex}[A + B] = \text{Ex}[A] + \text{Ex}[B]$$

- Product rule

$$\text{Ex}[AB] = \text{Ex}[A] \cdot \text{Ex}[B]$$

- Poisson processes

- Linear rate scaling

λ expected arrivals in time 1
 $T\lambda$ expected arrivals in time T

- Memorylessness

Time to next arrival *not*
dependent on time waited