

FAMILY LAW CHILDREN BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD allocation of parental responsibility with whom children shall live - children have lived with mother since separation where the father was charged with possessing child abuse material where the charges were dismissed where allegations of sexual abuse against another member of the family prior to the marriage where it is found that the father did sexually abuse another member of the mother's family prior to their marriage evidence that father may lack capacity to provide for the children's psychological needs presumption of equal shared parental responsibility not applied sole parental responsibility allocated to the mother father to spend supervised time with the children. FAMILY LAW PROPERTY where it is just and equitable for the court to make orders altering the parties' property interests where both parties earn a reasonable level of income where there is an adjustment made in favour of the wife on account of s 75(2) factors. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 69ZT(3), s.75(2) Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) Maluka & Maluka [2012] FamCA 373; (2012) 47 Fam LR 272 MRR v GR (2010) 263 ALR 368 M v M (1988) 166 CLR 69 W & W (Abuse allegations: unacceptable risk) [2005] FamCA 892; (2005) FLC 93-235 N & S & the Separate Representative (1996) FLC 92-665 Stanford v Stanford [2012] HCA 52 APPLICANT: Mr Blan RESPONDENT: Ms Faulconer Blan INDEPENDENT CHILDRENS LAWYER: Legal Aid NSW Sydney Central FILE NUMBER: SYC 2791 of 2013 DATE DELIVERED: 17 October 2014 PLACE DELIVERED: Sydney PLACE HEARD: Sydney JUDGMENT OF: Stevenson J HEARING DATE: 29, 30 May 2014, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13 June 2014 REPRESENTATION COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Mr Kearney SC SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Abrams Turner Whelan Family Lawyers COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: Ms Druitt SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: Matthews Folbigg Pty Ltd COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDRENS LAWYER: Ms Falloon SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILDRENS LAWYER: Ms Power ORDERS Parenting Orders (1) That all existing orders herein in relation to the children: E BLAN born on ... 1998 F BLAN born on ... 2001 K BLAN born on ... 2003 are discharged. (2) That the mother have sole parental responsibility for E, F and K, on condition that she: 2.1 advises the father in a timely manner of any issue in relation to the long-term care, welfare and development of the children and the decision which she proposes to make and 2.2 considers and takes into account any views expressed by the

father concerning such issues and 2.3 advises the father in a timely manner of her decision. (3) That the children live with the mother. (4) That the children F and K spend time with the father as follows: 4.1 until the commencement of the 2017 school year, for a period of five (5) hours once per calendar month in the presence of the paternal aunt Ms O or such other person as the parties may agree in writing from time to time, with the father to provide to the mother not less than fourteen (14) days written notice of the proposed time and date of such occasions and 4.2 thereafter, from 10.00 am until 5:00pm each alternate Sunday 4.3 at such other times as the parties may agree in writing from time to time. (5) That the mother ensure that E, F and K are able to communicate with the father by Skype, email and telephone at times of the choosing of the children. (6) That both parties are entitled to attend events at the children's schools to which parents are invited from time to time but excluding sports fixtures. (7) That both parties do all things and execute all documents necessary to ensure that the father receives copies of school reports, photograph order forms, notices of parent/teacher meetings, school assemblies, sports and swimming carnivals and other significant events which are normally attended by parents. (8) That the mother inform the father as soon as reasonably practicable of any illness or injury suffered by the children which requires admission to a hospital. (9) 9.1 That both parties do all things and execute all documents required to cause K to commence attendance at X School for Year 7 in 2016. 9.2 That each of the parties pay one half of K's school fees and incidental educational expenses. (10) That order 4 commence operation only when: 10.1 the mother, the Independent Children's Lawyer and the children's psychologist, Ms N have conferred upon and agreed as to information to be provided to the children, or any of them, as to the court's orders and reasons for judgment. (11) That pursuant to s.65DA(2) and s.62B, the particulars of the obligations these orders create and the particulars of the consequences that may follow if a person contravenes these orders and details of who can assist parties adjust to and comply with an order are set out in the Fact Sheet attached hereto and these particulars are included in these orders.

Property Orders (1) That, within 28 days of the date of these orders, the wife pay to the husband a sum of \$28,524. (2) That, simultaneously with such payment by the wife to the husband 2.1 the wife shall do all things and execute all documents necessary to cause the transfer to the husband of the

whole of her right title to and interest in the Mazda ... motor vehicle registered number ... and 2.2 the husband shall do all things and execute all documents necessary to cause the transfer to the wife of the whole of his right title to and interest in the property situate at and known as Z Street, Suburb U in the State of New South Wales. (3) That, in the event that the wife fails to make payment to the husband in accordance with order 1, both parties shall do all things and execute all documents necessary to effect the sale, for the best price reasonably obtainable, of the property situate at and known as Z Street, Suburb U in the State of New South Wales and to distribute the proceeds of such sale as follows: 3.1 in payment of agent's commission and expenses 3.2 in payment of legal costs and expenses incidental to the sale 3.3 in payment of all monies necessary to discharge the mortgage, line of credit and everyday account owed to the National Australia Bank 3.4 in payment of an amount equal to 91% of the balance then remaining to the wife 3.5 in payment of the balance to the husband. (4) That the wife indemnify the husband and keep him indemnified in respect of all liabilities arising pursuant to the mortgage, line of credit and everyday account owed to the National Australia Bank. (5) That all material produced on subpoena be returned. IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym *Blan & Faulconer* has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY FILE NUMBER: SYC 2791 of 2013 Mr Blan Applicant And Ms Faulconer Blan Respondent REASONS FOR JUDGMENT THE PROCEEDINGS Mr Blan (the father) and Ms Faulconer Blan (the mother) are in dispute as to property settlement and parenting orders in relation to their children: E Blan born in 1998 (15) F Blan born in 2001 (13) K Blan born in 2003 (11). A specific issue in dispute was whether K should attend X School and, if so, what arrangements should be made for payment of the resultant fees and incidental expenses. Ultimately the only order which the father sought in relation to the child E was that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility. The mother sought an order that she have sole parental responsibility for all three children. The father sought no orders for E to spend specified times with him and was content for her to make her own decisions and arrangements. The mother sought orders to the effect that the children spend no time with the father and that he be restrained by injunction from approaching or

communicating with them. Alternatively, the mother proposed that the children spend time with the father, under professional supervision, from 10:00 am until 2:00 pm on one occasion in each school holiday period. In final submissions, counsel for the mother indicated that she agreed to supervision on these four occasions by the father's sister, Ms O. The father proposed that the children F and K spend time with him on a graduated basis, commencing with day periods only each Sunday and leading to five nights per fortnight and half of all school holidays. In relation to property settlement, it was common ground that the wife have an opportunity to retain the former matrimonial home at Z Street, Suburb U upon payment of a sum of money to the husband. He sought orders to the effect that the wife pay to him an amount of \$194,082 and she proposed a sum of \$22,000. The parties agreed that their contributions as at the date of trial were equal and that an adjustment in favour of the wife was warranted on account of section 75(2) factors. The substantial issue in relation to alteration of property interests was the quantum of that adjustment. The mother and the Independent Children's Lawyer (the ICL) contended that the children would be exposed to an unacceptable risk of sexual and psychological harm in the unsupervised care of the father. Counsel for both the mother and the ICL contended that there should be a finding that the father wilfully accessed child pornography. On behalf of the mother it was submitted that a finding is open that the father sexually abused her brother, Mr FF, when he was aged approximately 11 to 15 years. Counsel for the ICL contended that the father's admitted conduct with the mother's brother illustrated his propensity to overstep personal boundaries, as was identified by the single expert Associate Professor J. The ICL submitted that the father's difficulty in understanding personal boundaries constitutes an additional risk to the children. The father conceded that he accessed consensual adult pornography but denied any interest in or viewing of material involving children. He admitted that he engaged in skinny dipping, viewing of pornography and discussions about sexual matters with the mother's brother when he was aged between 11 and 15 years. Otherwise, the father denied the allegations made by the mother's brother as to his conduct. These allegations are considered in detail below in these reasons. The father proposed that K attend X School from the commencement of Year 7 in 2016. In 2012 the parties both signed an enrolment contract but the mother is now opposed to K's attendance

at this school. The Evidence and Witnesses The applicant father relied on the following affidavits: Mr Blan (the father) sworn on 16 May 2014 Ms L (the paternal grandmother) sworn on 16 May 2014 Ms O (a paternal aunt) sworn on 16 May 2014 Mr R (the father's treating psychologist) sworn on 22 May 2014 Mr NN (computer forensic specialist) sworn on 27 May 2014 Financial Statement verified by affidavit of the father sworn on 18 February 2014. With the exception of Mr NN, all of these witnesses gave oral evidence. Mr NN and Mr T, a computer forensic specialist retained by the mother, conferred and produced a joint statement dated 12 June 2014. (exhibit 18) They reached agreement in relation to all questions submitted to them by the legal representatives of the parties and the ICL. Accordingly, neither of these experts was required for cross-examination. The respondent mother relied on the following affidavits: Ms Faulconer Blan (the mother) sworn on 8 May 2014 Ms FF (a maternal aunt) sworn on 7 May 2014 Mr FF (a maternal uncle) sworn on 6 May 2014 Mr T (a computer forensic specialist) sworn on 27 May 2014 Financial Statement of the mother verified by affidavit sworn on 12 February 2014. With the exception of Mr T, all of these witnesses gave oral evidence. Senior counsel for the father objected to the admission of the affidavit of Mr T on a number of bases, including late service. I elected to receive the affidavit of Mr T and indicated that I would set out my reasons in this judgment. I do not now consider it necessary that I do so, as the two experts reached full agreement. Senior counsel for the father objected to the affidavit of the mother's brother, on the basis of relevance and because its probative value was said to be outweighed by its prejudice to him. It was contended that the allegations have no relevance because the supposed events took place between 1991 and 1995/1996 and were described in broad and general terms. I elected to receive the affidavit of Mr FF. I took the view that I could not simply conclude that allegations of sexual conduct directed at an 11 to 15 year old boy by a man aged between 27 and 31 were irrelevant to the parenting issues in these proceedings, albeit that the alleged events took place in the 1990s. I considered that senior counsel for the father was well able to test the allegations made by the mother's brother. Additionally I was conscious that these allegations were addressed by both Dr J and Mr R, who had read the evidence of Mr FF. As appears below, however, I acceded to an application by senior counsel for the father pursuant to s 69ZT(3) of the Family Law Act 1975

(the Act) that the rules of evidence apply to two issues in these proceedings. One of those issues was allegations as to the husband's behaviour in relation to [Mr FF]. Senior counsel for the father then successfully took objection to numerous particular words, sentences and passages in the affidavit. Consequently, a considerable volume of material in this affidavit was excluded from the evidence. I had the benefit of a report dated 18 December 2013 and oral evidence from a single expert psychiatrist, Associate Professor J (Dr J). Prior to the commencement of the trial, I granted leave for Mr R to be provided with the report of Dr J. As noted above, senior counsel for the father made an application pursuant to s69ZT(3) at the start of the trial. He sought that the rules of evidence apply in respect of the following two issues: The allegations as to the husband's possession and/or access to pornographic material and The allegations as to the husband's behaviour in relation to [Mr FF]. This application on behalf of the father was supported by counsel for the ICL. She submitted that the [mother's] application would see an end to any normal relationship between the children and the father, so the rules of evidence should apply. Counsel for the mother opposed the application and, by implication, contended that the proceedings should be governed entirely by the provisions of Division XIA of the Act. As noted, I acceded to the application on behalf of the father. I am loath to make findings in relation to two highly significant issues in the proceedings other than in accordance with the rules of evidence. I am satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist for the purposes of section 69ZT(3)(b) of the Act. I agree with the contention of senior counsel for the father that the findings which I make in respect of these two issues are likely to impact significantly upon the court's determination of these proceedings such that it would appear to be unsafe to afford inadmissible evidence any significant weight in the exercise of the court's fact-finding functions: *Maluka & Maluka* [2012] FamCA 373; [2012] 47 Fam LR 272. Background The father was born in 1964 and is currently aged 50 years. The mother was born in 1965 and is presently 49 years of age. The mother's brother, Mr FF, was born in 1980 and is now aged 34 years. The parties married and commenced cohabitation in 1987. The father was then employed in the IT industry. The mother worked in the public service, while undertaking a university degree on a part-time basis. Upon graduation in 1993, the mother undertook professional practice requirements. She worked for

the public service in Sydney and Brisbane until 1997. The mother then commenced work in the private sector. In 2007 she established her own business as a professional practitioner. At the date of marriage neither party possessed any significant assets. They lived on a rent-free basis in an apartment at Suburb Y owned by the father's brother-in-law. For approximately six months in 1989 they occupied a holiday home on the Central Coast, which was owned by the father's family, on a rent-free basis. They rented accommodation until late 1992/early 1993 and then moved into the father's mother's home on a rent-free basis. In 1991 the parties purchased an investment property in Brisbane for \$82,000. The purchase money came from their savings, a payout which the mother received from the public service and a mortgage advance. The parties sold this property for approximately \$67,000 in about 1999. In 1993 the parties purchased a property at Suburb V for \$216,000, utilising savings and a bank loan of \$205,000. The parties lived in this property until they moved to Brisbane in 1995, when it was leased until sold in 1999. The parties then purchased a property at Suburb RR in Brisbane for \$250,000, utilising the sale proceeds of the home at Suburb V and a mortgage advance of \$205,000. The RR property was sold for approximately \$325,000 in 2002. Early in 2001 the parties left Brisbane and returned to Sydney. They lived in rented accommodation for approximately twelve months and then purchased the former matrimonial home at Z Street, Suburb U for \$670,000. The purchase money came from the sale proceeds of the RR property, a gift of \$10,000 from the father's mother and a mortgage advance of \$545,000. The father was made redundant in April 2005 and received a payout of \$12,500, which he deposited into the mortgage account. He received a redundancy payment of \$37,000 in 2009 and again deposited these funds into the mortgage account. After drawdowns in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010 the mortgage balance stood at approximately \$691,800 as at the date of separation. As noted, in 2007 the mother commenced a business as a professional. For some six years she saw clients in serviced offices at Suburb W and Suburb HR and otherwise worked from the family home. Since 2013 she has leased office space for her business at Suburb W. The father contended that, in 2010, the mother informed him that she suffered sexual abuse as a child. The mother's version of these events was that, when she was six or seven, the son of a cousin who was eight or nine years old

insisted that she touch his penis. The mother maintained that she did not tell her parents on account of threats made by this boy and his brothers. She suggested that the main issue for her in relation to these events was that she experienced the conduct of the boy and his brothers as a form of bullying. In 2009 the parties attended a series of three Landmark courses, independently of each other, with the hope of improving the quality of their relationship. It was common ground that sexual intimacy was a longstanding problem in their marriage. By his own admission, the father engaged in conduct of a sexual nature which he concealed from the mother for many years during the marriage. He participated in on-line chats with sexual content between about 1995 and 2008, in particular with a woman named AA in Perth. The father and AA engaged in telephone sex on one occasion. He participated in cybersex with approximately twelve women over an eight year period. Between approximately 2006 and 2008 the father met four women for sexual encounters on five to six occasions. The father proffered that he started to visit pornography websites during the 1990s, accessing movies, still pictures and text stories. He found a website called XXX, from which he downloaded text stories. He deposed that usually he downloaded 50 to 60 stories, using his work laptop computer. He then saved this material to a drop box folder on his computer. The drop box then synchronised these stories to all devices which were connected to this service, including a 27 inch and a 24 inch Mac computer in the family home and the father's iPad. It was common ground that the mother knew nothing whatsoever of these sexual activities of the father until the events which precipitated the parties' separation. She deposed that he told her on about five or six occasions that he had no interest in pornography. According to the mother he said to her: 'I'm not like other men, I have no interest in porn and porn does nothing for me.' The father concealed these activities from the mother, in what can only be regarded as a comprehensive and long-term deception of her, over several years. In 2011 the child E commenced high school and currently attends OL School at Suburb U. Early in her high school career, the parties were made aware of a severe impairment to her reading ability. The father read with her each night for approximately eighteen months, so as to improve her level of skill in this area. According to the father, in about 2011 two incidents took place which involved the child K and another child being in a partially undressed state. The father

maintained that he and the mother discussed these incidents, which they elected to characterise as ordinary behaviour and typical of children's general curiosity around sexuality and nakedness. On 30 May 2012 the parties attended a meeting at X School in relation to K's proposed enrolment in 2014. He was offered a place and the parties signed an acceptance, paying a security deposit of \$4,000. The father maintained that the mother said to him in late August/early September 2012: [Ms S] says that [M] told her that [K] doesn't know how to play mothers and fathers properly. [Ms S] said that when she asked what she ([M]) meant [M] told her that [K] asked her to lick his penis. Apparently this happened when we were all together ... for Christmas last year. Ms S is the mother's sister and M is her daughter, who was then aged three and a half years. The child K was approximately eight years of age at the time of this alleged event. Mr FF maintained that he was prompted to reflect on his experiences with the father when he became aware of the alleged events involving K and M. He deposed that he decided to inform the mother of the father's conduct toward him in mid-November 2012. He gave permission for his sister, Ms S, to provide information to the mother. The mother deposed that her two sisters, Ms S and Ms FF, arrived unexpectedly at the former matrimonial home on 21 November 2012. Ms S is a psychologist and Ms FF a police officer. The mother deposed that she spoke to her brother on 21 November 2012, although she said in her oral evidence that the conversation could have taken place on the following day. She deposed that her brother said to her words including: It started pretty harmlessly, just talking about sex. Then he started showing me pornography, magazines and movies. Things just developed to skinny dipping and touching and masturbating. It ended in a fight when he wanted to give me oral sex. In his oral evidence, the mother's brother said that his first telephone call with the mother in relation to these matters was of approximately 90 seconds duration. He said that he did not believe that he told her about skinny dipping, touching, masturbation or the father's wish to give him oral sex on that occasion. He said that they had a longer conversation within about a week. According to the mother she was unable to sleep that night. At approximately 1:15am she entered her home office and logged on to the father's account on a Mac computer. She opened a folder entitled Misc. and she observed file names such as the stepdaughters, my nieces, ... and the first time. The mother copied the contents of the Misc.

folder onto a thumb drive. During the next two days, she accessed the XXX website. Ms FF deposed that, on 22 November 2014, she observed approximately 60 text files on a Mac computer in the former matrimonial home. She opened some of these files and saw titles including my stepdaughter, girl next door and my slut. Upon opening each of these files, she saw a paragraph headed XXX followed by a warning that there would follow sexually explicit material. On 22 November 2012 the mother telephoned the father at his office. The father gave this account of their conversation: [The mother] said to me I have just learned that you sexually abused my brother, I don't want you to come home. Please go and stay with your sister until I work out what I am going to do next. I was unaware as to what, or even which of [the mother's] brothers, she was talking about. I was shocked by the allegations and I said to her, what?. [The mother] repeated the allegation to which I then said, I don't know what is going on here but I have never abused anyone let alone your brother. [The mother] then said to me again words to the effect, I don't want you here. You are not to come back to the house. I then said to [the mother], It is my home too, we need to talk about this, it is a very serious allegation. [The mother] then replied, I don't want you at home or anywhere near the kids, stay away. I said I am going to come home so we can talk about this. The mother and the children left the former matrimonial home on 22 November 2012 and stayed at a hotel that night. They spent 23 and 24 November 2012 at Town A, in the company of the mother's sister Ms FF. On 25 November 2012 the mother and Ms FF attended Suburb B Police Station. The mother provided a statement and a police officer took out an apprehended violence order (AVO) against the father in respect of the mother and the children. The AVO was served upon the father by police officers at approximately 8:30 pm on 25 November 2012. The provisions of this order prohibited the father from making any contact with the mother or the children. He left the former matrimonial home when served with the AVO and has since stayed at the homes of his sisters, Ms Q and Ms O. With the permission of the mother, police officers collected a 27 inch Mac computer from the former matrimonial home on 25 November 2012. On 26 November 2012 the mother delivered to police twelve additional computer data storage devices, including a 24 inch Mac computer. On 27 November 2012 she delivered to police three additional computer data storage devices. At 7:15 am on the child Es birthday, the mother emailed

the father and his sister Ms O. The mother offered her consent to the father telephoning E at 7:30am but he did not receive the email until 8:30am. Subsequently, the mother consented to the father speaking to the children by telephone on 30 November 2012, 1 December 2012, 2 December 2012 and 3 December 2012. On 4 December 2012 the AVO proceedings came before the B Local Court. The conditions of the orders were varied so as to allow the children to initiate telephone contact with the father on three occasions per week, with Skype and Facetime as permissible alternatives. On 17 January 2013 the parties agreed that the children would see a psychologist. They began to consult Ms N in early February 2013 and continued to see her at the time of the trial. On 28 February 2013 the father was charged with three counts of produce, disseminate or possess child abuse material. He entered a plea of not guilty on 30 April 2013 and the proceedings were listed for trial in September 2013. Judgment was reserved and the charges against the father were dismissed on 15 October 2013. The AVO proceedings were adjourned to 3 February 2014, when the father consented to a final order in relation to the children until 14 December 2014 on a without admissions basis. On 1 March 2013 the father began to attend upon Mr R, pursuant to a referral from a psychiatrist. He continued to consult Mr R at the time of the trial. On 15 July 2013 the mother indicated to the father for the first time that she wished to postpone Ks enrolment at X School. On 17 October 2013 staff at X School informed the parties that Ks placement could be deferred only if they both provided their consent. On 31 October 2013 a Registrar made the following interim parenting orders after a contested hearing: That these orders prevail to the extent that any inconsistency over any AVO. The children spend time with the father for three hours each alternate Sunday on a supervised basis. 3. That the husband pay the costs of supervision. The parties are restrained from discussion of any criminal, family law or any other issues arising from the marital breakdown with the children except in accordance with professional advice. The father have telephone or Skype contact for a reasonable period between 6:30pm and 8:30pm each Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday. The mother filed a Review and sought to stay these orders. A Registrar dismissed the mother's application for a stay on 8 November 2013. On 20 January 2014 the same interim parenting orders were made on the hearing of the Review application. On 16 November 2013 the children began to

see the father each fortnight undersupervision of staff at the H organisation. Contact reports (exhibit 4 and annexures to the affidavit of the father) demonstrate that these occasions are enjoyable for the children and that the father acts entirely appropriately on these occasions. Parenting Orders

Approach To These Proceedings

In making a parenting order, the court is governed by a determination of what arrangements are in the best interests of the child who is the subject of the proceedings. Part VII of the Act sets out a number of mandatory considerations which prescribe the pathway to that decision. Section 60CC sets out primary and additional considerations, to which the court must have regard in determining what orders are in a child's best interests. The court must have regard to the objects of Part VII, as contained in section 60B(1) and the principles underlying those objects, as set out in section 60B(2). Section 60B(3) makes particular provision for the right of an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander child to enjoy his or her culture. Section 61DA requires the court to apply a presumption that it is in a child's best interests for his or her parents to have equal shared parental responsibility. This presumption does not apply if there are reasonable grounds for the court to believe that a parent (or a person who lives with a parent) has engaged in abuse of the child (or another child who was a member of the parent's household) or family violence. The presumption may be rebutted by evidence which satisfies the court that it would not be in a child's best interests for his or her parents to have equal shared parental responsibility. If a parenting order provides for equal shared parental responsibility the court must consider whether it is in the child's best interests, and reasonably practicable, for him or her to spend equal time with each parent (section 65DAA(1)). If there is no order for equal time, the court must consider whether it is in the child's best interests, and reasonably practicable, for him or her to spend substantial and significant time with each parent. The concepts of substantial and significant time and reasonable practicability are defined in sections 65DAA(3), (4) and (5). There is no temporal definition of substantial and significant time. In *MRR v GR* (2010) 263 ALR 368 the High Court of Australia said: [8] Subsection (1) of s 65DAA is headed Equal time and provides: If a parenting order provides (or is to provide) that a child's parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child, the court must: (a) consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents would be in the best

interests of the child; and (b) consider whether the child spending equal time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and (c) if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents. Subsection (2) makes provision for where a parenting order provides that a child's parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility for the child (para (a)) but the court does not make an order for the child to spend equal time with each of the parents (para (b)). In such a circumstance the court is obliged to: (c) consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents would be in the best interests of the child; and (d) consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time with each of the parents is reasonably practicable; and (e) if it is, consider making an order to provide (or including a provision in the order) for the child to spend substantial and significant time with each of the parents. Subsection (3) explains what is meant by the phrase substantial and significant time. [9] Each of subss (1)(b) and (2)(d) of s 65DAA require the court to consider whether it is reasonably practicable for the child to spend equal time or substantial and significant time with each of the parents. It is clearly intended that the court determine that question. Subsection (5) provides in that respect that the court must have regard to certain matters, such as how far apart the parents live from each other and their capacity to implement the arrangement in question, and such other matters as the court considers relevant, [10] in determining for the purposes of subss (1) and (2) whether it is reasonably practicable for a child to spend equal time, or substantial and significant time, with each of the child's parents... [13] Section 65DAA(1) is expressed in imperative terms. It obliges the court to consider both the question whether it is in the best interests of the child to spend equal time with each of the parents (para (a)) and the question whether it is reasonably practicable that the child spend equal time with each of them (para (b)). It is only where both questions are answered in the affirmative that consideration may be given, under para (c), to the making of an order. The words with which para (c) commences (if it is) refer back to the two preceding questions and make plain that the making of an order can only be considered if the findings mentioned are made. A determination as a question of fact that it is reasonably practicable that equal time be spent with each parent is a statutory condition which must be fulfilled before the

court has power to make a parenting order of that kind. It is a matter upon which power is conditioned much as it is where a jurisdictional fact must be proved to exist. If such a finding cannot be made, subs (2)(a) and (b) require that the prospect of the child spending substantial and significant time with each parent then be considered. That subsection follows the same structure as subs (1) and requires the same questions concerning the child's best interests and reasonable practicability to be answered in the context of the child spending substantial and significant time with each parent.... [15] Section 65DAA(1) is concerned with the reality of the situation of the parents and the child, not whether it is desirable that there be equal time spent by the child with each parent. The presumption in s 61DA(1) is not determinative of the questions arising under s 65DAA(1). Section 65DAA(1)(b) requires a practical assessment of whether equal time parenting is feasible.... A leading decision on the approach of the court to allegations of sexual abuse of children is that of the High Court of Australia in *M v M* (1988) 166 CLR 69. Their Honours said (at page 76): ...the resolution of an allegation of sexual abuse against a parent is subservient and ancillary to the court's determination of what is in the best interests of the child. The Family Courts' consideration of the paramount issue which it is enjoined to decide cannot be diverted by the supposed need to arrive at a definitive conclusion on the allegation of sexual abuse... and at page 75: ...the ultimate and paramount issue to be decided in proceedings for custody of, or access to, a child is whether the making of the order sought is in the interests of the welfare of the child. The fact that the proceedings involve an allegation that the child has been sexually abused by the parent who seeks custody or access does not alter the paramount and ultimate issue which the court has to determine, though the court's findings on the disputed allegation of sexual abuse will naturally have an important, perhaps a decisive, impact on the resolution of that issue. In *M and M* (at pp 76-77) the High Court identified the relevant standard of proof in these terms: In considering an allegation of sexual abuse, the court should not make a positive finding that the allegation is true unless the court is so satisfied according to the civil standard of proof, with due regard to the factors mentioned in *Briginshaw v Briginshaw* [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 at p.362. There Dixon J said: The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent likelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or

the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters reasonable satisfaction should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences. The Briginshaw test is now encapsulated in section 140 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), which provides: 140(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities. (2) Without limiting the matters which a court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account: (a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and (b) the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding; and (c) the gravity of the matters alleged. The High Court in *M and M* addressed the issue of unacceptable risk of sexual abuse and said (at page 77): In resolving the wider issue the court must determine whether on the evidence there is a risk of sexual abuse occurring if custody or access be granted and assess the magnitude of that risk. After all, in deciding what is in the best interests of a child, the Family Court is frequently called upon to assess and evaluate the likelihood or possibility of events or occurrences which, if they come about, will have a detrimental impact on the child's welfare. The existence and magnitude of the risk of sexual abuse, as with other risks of harm to the welfare of a child, is a fundamental matter to be taken into account in deciding issues of custody and access. In access cases, the magnitude of the risk may be less if the order in contemplation is supervised access. In *W and W* (Abuse allegations: unacceptable risk) [2005] FamCA 892; (2005) FLC 93-235 the Full Court (Warnick, May and Boland JJ) discussed the unacceptable risk test, and said: 111. In summary, the law is well settled as to the standard of proof required to make a positive finding of sexual abuse, and that such a finding should not be made unless a trial Judge is satisfied to the highest standard, on the balance of probabilities abuse has occurred. We accept, as a matter of practice, a trial Judge will almost inevitably be required in a case where sexual abuse allegations are raised to consider whether abuse has been proven on the balance of probabilities as well as considering whether or not an unacceptable risk of abuse exists. The High Court in *M and M* recognised the difficulty in defining with any degree of precision what constitutes an unacceptable risk and the cases determined after that

decision testify to the difficulty. However, the questions posed by Fogarty J in N and S, and referred to by us in paragraph 105, do provide a structure or framework which may assist a trial Judge to assess future risk to a child. The Full Court in W and W cited with approval the following passage from the judgment of Fogarty J in N and S & the Separate Representative (1996) FLC 92-665: In asking whether the facts of the case do establish an unacceptable risk the Court will often be required to ask such questions as: What is the nature of the events alleged to have taken place? Who has made the allegations? To whom have the allegations been made? What level of detail do they involve? Over what period of time have the allegations been made? Over what period of time are the events alleged to have occurred? What are the effects exhibited by the child? What is the basis of the allegations? Are the allegations reasonably based? Are the allegations genuinely believed by the person making them? What expert evidence has been provided? Are there satisfactory explanations of the allegations apart from sexual abuse? What are the likely future effects on the child? I would respectfully observe that this series of questions is a useful, practical tool for a court to utilise in assessing whether there exists an unacceptable risk of sexual abuse of a child. The Allegations as to the Fathers Behaviour in Relation to Mothers Brother After proper objections were taken to the contents of the affidavit of Mr FF, the following allegations as to the fathers conduct remained in evidence: on numerous occasions he spoke to the mothers brother about his (the brothers) experience, when he was 11 years old with another boy of the same age which involved nudity and looking at the others genitals he provided alcohol and condoms to him when he was about 15 years old, after the mothers brother said that he may have sex with a girlfriend and then asked him how did you go? he and the mothers brother skinny-dipped together on at least ten occasions when he was aged between 11 and 16 years he and the mothers brother played strip pool on no less than twelve occasions when he was aged between 13 and 16 years. This game involved the loser of a game of pool removing all of his clothes. during these games of pool he and the mothers brother touched their own and the other persons penis and scrotum on three or four occasions during games of strip pool he and the mothers brother licked the other persons penis and genitals. This evidence remained in the mothers brothers affidavit after objections: 28. I recall a

trip to [SS] Island in either 1995 or 1996. [The father] and I had been for an evening skinny-dip at the beach and had gone back to the campground (just behind the dunes) to go to bed. We had a couple of beers. We went into the four person tent and lay down (on or in the sleeping bags). We were looking at ...magazines. I cannot remember the exact course of events but I recall that [the father] said: I want to suck you off...till you come...please can I...please can I...come on I won't tell anyone...

29. I was extremely uncomfortable and said no... 30. [The father] rolled over to be right next to me. I had shorts on. He tried to persuade me. He said again: Please can I....come on...no-one will know...I have always wanted to know what it felt like for someone to come in my mouth. 31. I said no several times and pushed [the father] away from me. 32. Soon after the incident at the beach I stopped talking to [the father]. I felt very angry and confused and embarrassed about the situation. I did not talk to anyone or tell anyone. I stopped going to the beach and playing pool with [the father]. He still attended family functions (as did I) but I avoided him. In his oral evidence the mother's brother said inter alia: I have a very clear recollection of what happened in that tent and some are slightly more vague. I am less clear about the number of times things occurred. Skinny-dipping became commonplace. After the 1995/1996 incident I exchanged pleasantries with [the father] at family functions. I don't believe that we necessarily hugged or shook hands. I avoided him after 1995/1996. I chose not to be alone with him. I went to family events because there were the other people there. Yes it was a long time ago. I am not exact on the number of times things happened and I am not clear on dates. I have a clear recollection of things happening around the pool table and skinny-dipping. It is not correct that I did not discuss sexual matters with him until I was 14 or 15. I was about 12. I remember the first memorable one was walking along the headland at Port Macquarie. I viewed pornography. I have no recollection of him walking in on me but that is not something which would necessarily stick in my mind because [the father] and I often shared pornography. [The father] bought me alcohol on numerous occasions. Strip pool in my parents home very much added to the colour and excitement. It occurred more than once that we touched each other's genitals with hands, tongues and other parts of the body. In my mind there was a clear distinction between fooling around at the pool table and full blown oral sex. I was very ashamed.

The mother's brother explained that he admired the father, whom he regarded as a brother, and generally enjoyed spending time with him. He said that they became re-acquainted in 1997, when he began a relationship with his now wife P. He and P socialised with the mother and the father. The mother's brother explained that our friendship with [the mother] and [the father] meant that [P] and I could spend time together chaperoned but without our parents. He said that he and the father had quite a close friendship after their acquaintance. In response to questions from counsel for the ICL, the mother's brother said that he and the father camped at SS Island for three nights in 1995/1996. He said that he thought that the father requested oral sex on the second night. He described the third night as awful and explained that he knew nobody at the campground and had no way of contacting anyone. He said: I had resolved the situation and I did not want to tell anyone that I had a homosexual encounter with a man. In his affidavit the father made these admissions as to his conduct toward the mother's brother: he skinny dipped with the mother's brother on two occasions he twice viewed pornography with the mother's brother he purchased alcohol for the mother's brother on one occasion. The father claimed that the mother's brother told him that he and his friends intended to steal alcohol from a bottle shop to take to a party. The mother's brother denied this allegation convincingly in his oral evidence. The father made the following admissions in relation to his conduct toward the mother's brother in his oral evidence: We talked a lot about sex. We did view porn together. We went skinny-dipping twice, once at a beach and once at home. If I need to apologise I will because I did not tell his parents or [the mother] about porn and skinny-dipping. I acknowledge that my behaviour was inappropriate. The age gap suggests something other than what it was. If it has had an effect on his development, I sincerely apologise for that. I concede that even what I admit to may have created problems for him. The father otherwise denied all of the allegations made by the mother's brother. He agreed with the mother's contention that he said to her, on 27 March 2013,: I crossed a line [mother's first name]...but I never hurt [brother's first name]. Doctor J discussed with the father the allegations made by the mother's brother. She was provided with the brother's two affidavits but did not interview him. Dr J reported as follows: Regarding [the mother's brother's] allegations, [the father] is in two minds whether there is anything behind it. [The father] had nothing to do with any of

the allegations; it is crystal-clear; possibly [the mothers brother] is misleading everyone to assist his sister. (note: [Mr FFs] disclosure came ahead of [the mothers] move to end the marriage). Possibly something did happen to [the mothers brother] in that he suffered a serious blow to the head in a skate-boarding accident when he was 15 or 16; he was in ICU. [The father] wonders whether that can cause misdirected memories. The other possibility is that there is really nothing in it. There is the thinnest veneer of truth in [the mothers brothers] story. They did play pool together but never naked; I have never touched his genitals; I have never suggested oral sex. They did have conversations of a sexual nature, but I never asked about his fantasies. [The father] did show [the mothers brother] porn, but this was in the context of: two occasions when I came across [the mothers brother] viewing porn and so I participated too so he didn't feel in the wrong. It was not erotic for me; it was nice being available so he could talk. Our talks were informational. There were two episodes of skinny-dipping, once at the family home, after one of those times when [the mothers brother] was looking at porn, and another time, earlier, at the beach on a family holiday. I meant nothing by it at the time but in retrospect I realise it probably wasn't wise. [The mothers brother] has said they argued over oral sex and that he then stayed away from me; that is strange because it is not true. [The father] had never noticed any estrangement between them. From around age 16 to 17 [the mothers brother] was spending more time with his friends but that seemed normal for his age. When [the mothers brother] was 16 and 9 months [the father] contributed to helping him learn to drive and after that the two of them went to [SS] Island on a four-wheel drive. Doctor J was asked for her opinion of the significance of the fathers admission that he watched pornography twice with the mothers brother and that they skinny-dipped together on two occasions. She replied: without more, I would say that is possibly grooming behaviour. Doctor J was asked to comment upon the breakdown in the relationship between the father and the mothers brother in 1995/1996, and followed by a rapprochement in 1997, in circumstances where they again spent time alone together. She said: I did not know about weekends away alone but I knew about the joint socialising. I think that what happened to [the mothers brother] is of concern because what the father admitted to was inappropriate and may be grooming, a violation of boundaries and trust with another family. Doctor J

was asked to comment on the significance of the fathers acknowledgement that he behaved inappropriately with the mothers brother. She said: I have concerns about his response, saying a head injury may have caused [the mothers brother] to say these things, no sense that he may have caused for example confusion for [the brother]. I don't think it was an effort to understand, it was an effort to justify or dismiss, that is not to value the concerns of the other person. Doctor J said also: What [the mothers brother] describes is grooming. What [the brother] says indicates a long period of grooming. Grooming is a strategic assault as it is intended to have a particular outcome. Doctor J was asked to comment on the fathers contention that the mothers brothers allegations were part of a conspiracy with the mother to enable her to move to Brisbane with the children. She said: This is what I was alluding to earlier, dismissiveness and lack of empathy for the victim. There are chiefly two explanations, a genuine belief and a way of dismissing what other people are saying. Mr R discussed with the father the allegations of the mothers brother. He reported: In reference to [the mothers brothers] sex education, he said that he wanted to normalise that experience. He regarded himself as an older brother to Mr [FF], and thought he was helping him. [The father] was in his mid-twenties at the time; however, in hindsight he now believed that it was not his role. Mr R reported further: In reference to [the mothers brother], [the father] stated he could recall the skinny-dipping incident. He stated that nudity was common within the family environment in some situations. He said that he saw his father-in-law ... naked during a camping holiday when he was showering. He thought nothing of the skinny-dipping incident. He again denied a sexual attraction toward [the mothers brother]. Mr R reported that the father informed him that the mothers brother suffered a head injury at the age of 16. He opined that [The father] demonstrated empathy toward [the mothers brother] and expressed concern that [the brother] might have been sexually abused by someone and misidentified him ([the father]) as being the perpetrator. Mr R disagreed with Doctor Js conclusion that the father lacks empathy. He wrote in his report: In my opinion [the father] does not manifest a lack of empathy. In my opinion he dismissed the allegation by [the mothers brother] because he does not believe he committed a sexual offence of [the brother]. Senior counsel for the father submitted that a conclusion is unavailable that these allegations are made out or that there is an unacceptable risk. It

was contended that there was doubt about the extent of his recollection without the assistance of others. It was suggested, in effect, that he discussed his recollections with his wife and his sister Ms S. Senior counsel for the father maintained that he had a series of conversations with [Ms S] in the context of him responding to her enquiries. It was submitted that a *Jones v Dunkel* inference is available because Ms S gave no evidence in the case for the mother. It was submitted that there were differences between the interim and final affidavits of the mother's brother. He was criticised because he said he had a very clear recollection of events in the tent but his recollection of other incidents was more vague. Senior counsel for the father pointed to the continued relationship after the summer of 1995/1996 between the mother's brother and the father. The suggestion seemed to be that this relationship was inconsistent with conduct on the part of the father as alleged by the mother's brother. I found the mother's brother to be an impressive witness, who appeared to be telling the truth to the best of his recollection. I can envisage no reason why he would provide false evidence as to the father's conduct toward him, and subject himself to rigorous cross-examination, purely to bolster his sister's case. On the other hand, the father appeared to me to be a witness who made limited admissions in relation to the mother's brother's allegations for strategic purposes. I prefer the evidence of the mother's brother to that of the father. I am unpersuaded that Mr FF's conversations with his sister Ms S affected the reliability of his evidence or his veracity. I could identify nothing in the evidence to suggest that these conversations added any material to his independent recollection. In my view, it is unremarkable and insignificant that the mother's brother's recollection of events on the camping trip in 1995/1996 is much more vivid than is the case with other incidents. Mr FF gave convincing evidence that he perceived a significant difference between skinny dipping, strip pool, the viewing of pornography and discussion of sexual topics on the one hand and oral sex on the other. He conceded readily that he has a poor recollection of dates and the number of occasions when incidents occurred between himself and the father. I am unable to give weight to alleged differences in the contents of the two affidavits of the mother's brother. His first affidavit was not included in the evidence placed before me. I do not regard the resumption of a relationship between the mother's brother and the father as indicative that the former fabricated his allegations as

to the conduct of the latter. The relationship prior to the summer of 1995/1996 was one between the father and the mother's brother. The relationship after 1997 was, to a significant extent, one between two couples and was convenient to Mr FF and his now wife. Additionally, the father and the mother's brother remained connected by family ties. I attach little or no significance to the inconsistencies in the evidence of the mother and her brother concerning their telephone conversations in November 2012. No doubt the mother was considerably disturbed by information which she received at that time. It would be unsurprising if she now has a less-than-perfect recollection of the details of her telephone conversations with her brother. Certainly, I do not consider that these inconsistencies bolster the suggestion of the father that the mother and her brother concocted these allegations to assist her case. Senior counsel for the father submitted that it was to his great credit that he admitted to skinny dipping, viewing of pornography and purchase of alcohol and that he now says that he recognises inappropriate behaviour but he had no intent to groom or be malicious; at the time he acted in good but misguided faith. I respectfully disagree with that contention and take the view that the father made strategic admissions of only a few of the less serious allegations made by the mother's brother. It may well be that the father, who is an intelligent man, considered that this tactic would appear to be more credible than a blanket denial of every allegation made by the mother's brother. Accordingly I find, to the requisite standard, that the father directed the following behaviour toward the mother's brother: he discussed sexual matters from a time when the mother's brother was approximately eleven years old he provided alcohol and condoms to the mother's brother when he was about fifteen years old, after he indicated that he may have sex with a girlfriend, and later asked how did you go? he skinny dipped with the mother's brother on at least ten occasions when he was aged between approximately thirteen and sixteen years he viewed pornography with the mother's brother he played strip pool with the mother's brother on at least twelve occasions when he was aged between thirteen and sixteen, which involved the loser removing all of his clothes during games of strip pool, he and the mother's brother touched their own and the other person's penis and scrotum on three or four occasions during games of strip pool, he and the mother's brother licked the other person's penis and genitals during a camping trip in

the summer of 1995/1996 he asked the mothers brother for oral sex in the manner set out in paragraph 68 of these reasons. The Allegations as to the Fathers Use of Pornography, Including Material Relating to Children As noted, the father admitted that he accessed adult pornography and downloaded stories from a website known as XXX. In his affidavit the father deposed: I admit I have previously accessed the website known as [XXX] in the past. I would estimate that from about early to mid-2011, I began to search online for erotic stories for couples. All text files from [XXXs] collection that I had stored on my computer were either downloaded by me directly from the website or from a zip file on a USB given to me. I adopted a pattern where I would: (a) Download a large volume of stories, based primarily on selecting stories which had multiple parts to them. (b) Over time, I would start reading the stories and once a story was finished or I formed the view that I was no longer interested, either because it was poorly written or did not involve a subject in which I was interested, then I would delete the file. After I had obtained stories, I occasionally scanned the titles and file names and clicked open the story to read the synopsis. There were stories that I knew immediately would not interest me and I deleted those. I do not recall that I saw any titles which suggested that there were text files of a paedophilic/child abuse nature or even involving underage children. Had there been any which were immediately obviously as containing such material, I would have deleted those as well. I would not have deleted any stories because I understood them to be illegal, as I was not aware that a text file could be categorized as child abuse material or that there was a criminal element in possessing such files, but I would instead have deleted those files as I was not interested in stories involving that sort of material. On the occasions that I went online to download more stories, I often had not reached the end of the stories downloaded from the previous occasion. I would download new stories which would be stored in the same place as the stories already there and I would then gradually read through them. I did not work through them in any order such as date of download or title name but instead randomly selected a story to read. I did not save stories. Each story was deleted once I had read it or had formed the view that it was not of interest to me. The storage of text files in about February or March 2013, I experienced some space problems with Dropbox due to the limited space

available with their free service. That limited storage space arose because Dropbox was used by me to store and share information across my devices. My Dropbox folders contained not just the stories I was downloading but a wide range of other material such as files relating to household matters, finances, baseball statistics, Radio Controlled Modelling and various other topics. The children did not have access to anything stored in the Dropbox folders. As a result of the space limitation, I created a folder called HOLD which was then compressed into a zip file called Hold.zip. This compressed all the text files which were in the HOLD folder at that time. The effect of this was to create more space in Dropbox. I named it HOLD as my intention was that the file would hold material for later reading. After this, I continued downloading files from online and I believe exclusively [XXXs] collection but I am unable to say for certain. When I downloaded a text file, I would right click, save the file in the MISC folder in Dropbox and then I would either:- (a) move it into the hold.zip file for later reading; or (b) Open the file in the MISC folder and read it straight away. (c) If it was read straight away, then it would be deleted at the end of the story or at the stage that I determined I did not want to continue reading it. At various times, I would move files back from the Hold.zip folder into the MISC folder. I would do this as I most typically accessed the stories for reading from my iPad and an iPad cannot read a zip file and therefore the files would need to be in the MISC folder to be accessible. If I finished reading a story on the iPad, or lost interest, I would delete the story directly from the iPad. Courtesy of the Dropbox service, this would mean the file was also removed from all other devices. In or around June/July 2012, the storage issue was no longer an issue as Dropbox began providing greater space for free as part of an upgrade to the service. That meant I no longer needed to move files in the Hold.zip file anymore. From the point onwards, I believe I was only ever extracting and deleting files from the HOLD.zip file. Of the ten stories, that I was charged with, five were in the Hold.zip file and five were in the MISC folder. The five in the Hold.Zip file had not yet been opened and read and were awaiting me to open them. The remaining five which were in the MISC folder had either been: (a) Moved from Hold.zip to MISC and not yet read to the point that I could determine their nature; or (b) Not opened at all as yet. There was no particular pattern to my selection of which story I would move across to the MISC folder from the .zip file. I did

not use the oldest files, or go by anything more than random choice and which filename happened to catch my attention at that point in time. Accordingly, I would sometimes move a file across that had been only recently downloaded and on other occasions, I might move a file that had been in the .zip file for several months. I also used an application called Notepad++ on my PC. This application would allow multiple files to be opened simultaneously each appearing under a separate tab similar to a web browser. Only one of the files would be readable at once however all files would show as having been opened. This may have resulted in the metadata showing that a number of files would appear as having been opened even if they had never been read. I acknowledge that I could certainly have been more vigilant in screening the files that I was in possession of by November 2012. At that stage I was unaware that I was in possession of files that allegedly contained child abuse material and I was also unaware that to be in possession of such material in textual form potentially represented a criminal offence. I was not aware of this until [the mother] provided me with the references to the NSW crimes act in late February 2013. Allegations I changed my passwords

Our computer set up at home was established so that [the mother] and me, as well as the children, each had our own log in. This was necessary because [the mother] operated her business from home and stored on the computer under her user name were her files relating to her work. The 27 Mac was intended to only be used by [the mother] and I. The 24 Mac was for use by the children as well. I changed my password in mid 2012 because:- (a) I had on a number of occasions suggested to [the mother] that the children not be given our passwords or permitted to use her main work machine in order to avoid a situation where the children either inadvertently deleted files or accessed client information or material related to [the mothers] work that perhaps they should not see. Unfortunately I became aware that in mid 2012, [the mother] had provided [the child E] with my password and I therefore took steps to change it. After I changed my password, I made [the mother] aware that I had changed it, the reason why and I gave her the new password. (b) The other reason was that we used a service from openDNS to provide internet security and to ensure that the children were not exposed to websites that were age or content inappropriate. The setup we used relied on each of the children accessing the computers via their own individual log in. I therefore changed my password to

ensure that [E] used her own login rather than using mine which would offer her unrestricted internet access. I had a double password set up on the routers themselves. The double password arrangement occurred after I became aware that someone had been piggybacking on our Wi-Fi network without permission. I already had the Wi-Fi connection password protected so I added in MAC address access lists known as whitelisting. This meant I had to specifically allow any device to connect to the network and therefore required the use of two passwords. Deleting files I had no reason to delete the files on my computer at 3.00 a.m. If I had deleted files, I have the necessary knowledge to do so properly and that would have included emptying the trash properly such that they were not left behind and were securely deleted. In 2 to 3 hours, I would have been able to completely wipe the entire hard drive, reinstall the operating system and return all normal files to their previous locations. It would not have taken me till 3am to complete this exercise. The material on the computers was not hidden from [the mother]. I can say this because of the following: (a) [The mother] knew all of my passwords and was able to freely access all of the files located in my area of the computer or on the various storage devices (b) The .ZIP file that contained the bulk of the files was completely open. If I had wanted to hide it, it would have at least been password protected (c) The MISC folder was also completely open. If I had wanted to hide its contents, I would have password protected that directory/folder. Doctor J discussed this issue with the father and reported as follows: [The father] volunteered: Any issues about information on my computers have been dealt with: there were text stories, no videos, no recordings. Asked what his interest was in these stories, [the father] said he was struggling with intimacy issues and came across the website: It was a very generic website, there were all kinds of stories of it; my intent was in adult information; it was part of an exploration to deal with my own intimacy issues and it got derailed; I got too interested in it. There was no child abuse stuff in them. Ten stories were found on his computer that did have some child abuse material in them but they were part of a larger number of about 200 files that he had downloaded; he wouldn't have looked at them because, once I read them, I discarded them; I didn't have a need to keep them; so if they were still on my computer it meant I hadn't got around to reading them yet. Asked what he understands about [the mother's] concerns in this regard, [the

father] said he is not sure; possibly all of this is motivated by her desire to go back to Queensland. Initially the father was charged by police in relation to 73 text files which were located on the 27 inch Mac, the 24 inch Mac computer and an external Seagate hard drive. The prosecution withdrew the charges in relation to the files on the Seagate hard drive on the first day of the criminal trial because the father's legal representatives ascertained that this device was the property of Ms FF. The father was found not guilty in respect of the remaining charges. Senior counsel for the father made detailed and careful submissions as to whether a finding is available, to the requisite standard, that the father knowingly was in possession of child pornography. For the purposes of both the criminal trial and these proceedings, the father maintained that he did not knowingly download or possess child abuse material. On the father's behalf it was submitted that he accepts that he may well have downloaded this material unknowingly but that does not establish intent, interest or excitement. Mr NN and Mr T agreed inter alia, as follows: [NN]: On the issue of the relevant files being opened, I state the following. On the iMac27 computer, someone using the user account named [Mr Blan] opened two files named [Mary].txt and usherette.txt in the TextEdit program. The file [Mary].txt matches the second one listed on page 1 of Mr [T] Appendix O v2, indicating that it was opened from a removable device with no volume label, from within a folder named Misc on or before 25 Nov 2012. The file usherette.txt matches the one listed at the bottom of page 13 of Mr Towers Appendix O v2, indicating that it was opened from the local folder /Users/.../Dropbox/Misc on or before 22 Nov 2012. On the iMac21 computer, someone using the user account named [Mr Blan] opened two files named [Mary].txt and myhappyday1.txt in the TextEdit program. The file [Mary].txt matches the one listed towards the bottom of page 14 of Mr [T] Appendix O v2 (first entry of the section coloured red), indicating that it was opened from the folder /Users/.../Dropbox/Misc on or before 29 April 2014. The file myhappyday1.txt matches the one listed towards the bottom of page 14 of Mr [T] Appendix 1 v2 (second entry of the section coloured red), indicating that it was opened from the folder /Users/.../Dropbox/Misc on or before 29 April 2014. It is important to note that the last accessed timestamp of a file on a Mac computer does not necessarily show when a user accessed a file, just that it was accessed. Other actions can also cause a file's last accessed timestamp to be updated,

such as copying or renaming a file, or extracting it from a compressed ZIP archive. [T]: On the issue of the relevant files being opened, I state the following. As stated in my report, I agree files listed in Police Statement of Facts have been opened. In my view, it is significant that the mother gave evidence that she opened and read a story entitled [Mary], a Chance Encounter in the early hours of the morning of 22 November 2012, having logged on using the father's password. The mother deposed that she opened a folder entitled Misc. and saw file names including The Stepdaughters, My Nieces, [Mary] and The First Time. The mother stated in her affidavit that she opened several of these files. Ms FF also deposed that on 22 November 2012 she opened files on a Mac computer. She stated in her affidavit that she observed approximately 60 files, some of which were entitled My Stepdaughter, Girl next door and My slut. She deposed that she opened a few of these files and observed a paragraph at the top headed [XXX], followed by a warning that the contents contained sexually explicit material. Nothing whatsoever in the evidence suggested that any person other than the father caused these files to be downloaded, whether knowingly or unknowingly. As was submitted by counsel for the mother, the titles of some of these files are offensive in themselves. Examples include her little sister, !!-12 kiddie suck, young and nasty, neighbour's daughter. The central questions, however, are whether the father knowingly downloaded these files and whether he opened any of this material. In my view, it is of evidentiary significance that both the mother and Ms FF opened several of these files in November 2012. Mr NN and Mr T assumed that time stamps extracted from the evidence are reliable. They indicated, however, that they have not conducted any specific testing to validate this assumption. Accordingly, it may be that the time stamps did not accurately reflect the time of accessing of these files. Mr T and Mr NN agreed that the time stamps do not necessarily indicate when a file was accessed and that other actions may produce an update. In my view, that piece of evidence is significant in light of the fact that both the mother and Ms FF accessed this material. Accordingly, it does not necessarily follow that only the father opened these files. I harbour suspicions that the father knowingly downloaded and accessed child pornography. Suspicions and the appearance of offensively titled material in a computer folder of his creation, however, are no substitute for evidence of actions and intent. I find, to the requisite standard, that the

father did not knowingly download and/or access child pornography. The Best Interests of the Children Section 60CC Considerations

The mother told Doctor J that the children love and trust the father and that they want to spend time with him. She indicated that they seemed to be in unison in parenting the children until the separation. In her oral evidence the mother indicated that she has read the reports of staff of H Supervisors in relation to the children's time with the father. She said that the reports are positive in every respect and do not indicate any concerns. I share that opinion, on the basis of my reading of these reports. Doctor J observed the children with the father and reported: The three children joined us now and it was plain that they were very pleased to see their father: there was a very affectionate reunion. All three sat on the couch close to [the father] and there was an easy interaction: they chatted easily and brought him up to date on various events that he had missed with them. There was a lot of good humour. It was an easy session and there were no issues. [The father's] behaviour was entirely appropriate. The father deposed that the mother was the children's primary carer but that he had a great deal of involvement in their lives. There was a dispute between the parties as to the extent of the father's involvement but, in her oral evidence, the mother readily made concessions in relation to his input. She said: I don't quibble that we shared in the care of the children from 2005 and he was actively involved in assisting them. The mother described the assistance which he gave to the child E with reading as a turning point for her and a valuable contribution by him. There was no suggestion whatsoever that the children have been subjected or exposed to family violence. Counsel for the ICL submitted that risk is a major issue and that the children should spend time with the father only in the presence of their paternal aunt, Ms O. Counsel for the mother contended that the risks associated with the father outweigh any benefit that might flow to the children from time with the father. Counsel for the ICL contended that the matters to which the father admits give rise to concern without more and pointed towards his conduct towards the mother's brother; his use of pornography and online relationships. Counsel for the ICL pointed out that Doctor J could not eliminate a risk that the child K may suffer sexual harm in the unsupervised care of the father. In her report Doctor J addressed the issue whether there is any risk of harm either physical, psychological or sexual imposed by the father or the mother to the

children and if so, the nature of that harm. She opined that there is nothing to suggest that the mother poses a risk of harm to the children. Doctor J offered these opinions as to whether the father poses a risk of harm to the children: The question of any risk of harm from the father depends on whether the court determines that it is likely he has been accessing child pornography on line. If the court were to make such a determination then this would have implications for his parenting capacity and there would also be a question of whether there is a risk of progression from online offending to hands-on offending, a question that is considered below. With the respect to the impact of pornography to the family, there are a number of issues that can be summarised as follows (from Manning 2006): Pornography consumption in general affects the individual consumer, encouraging distorted perceptions and beliefs about relationships and sexuality, devaluation of marriage and child rearing, increased aggression and the trivialisation of criminal behaviour; it increases risk of sexual deviancy, sexual perpetration, negative intimate relationships and accepting rape myths (eg assigning responsibility to the victim). Internet pornography may be incompatible with the characteristics of a stable, healthy marriage; there is decreased sexual satisfaction and intimacy and partners perceive it as an act of betrayal or infidelity. This undermining of marital and family relationships affects children and increases the risk of their exposure to sexually explicit content and/or behaviour; discovery of the activity often necessitates the need for discussions of sexual matters prior to the child being ready. (Manning 2006) Doctor J opined further: In terms of recidivism following a sexual offence of some kind, rates are reported to be low in general (13%), but there is a sub-group which has a high rate, which relates to other indices of sexual deviancy and, to a lesser extent, general criminological factors. (Hansen et al 1998; 2005). I note that very few of these factors would apply to [the father] so if he were regarded as an offender, he would have to be considered as being in the low risk group with regard to recidivism. In her oral evidence Doctor J said inter alia: I can't be certain that [E] is at no sexual risk from him. Whether there is a psychological risk to [E] if she has contact depends on the critical element of child pornography. If it is accepted that he does not have an interest in child pornography, it is less clear that there is a psychological risk. If it is child pornography, that is a high level risk. If it is general pornography, that is well within the

bounds of normal behaviour but not if it is an intense occupation that impacts on parenting capacity but is not necessarily a sexual risk. With such a parent, alternate weekends and a night in the off week, only one overnight and less than half the holidays because they are likely to be accessing pornography while the children are around. If what [the mother's brother] says is accepted, it has progressed to a hands-on offence and that moves into a different category of risk. There is a risk to any child once there is a hands-on offence. That is a bigger risk than viewing pornography. The mother and the ICL both expressed concern at the possibility that the father may have been grooming K prior to the separation. It should be noted, however, that the mother said in her oral evidence: I do not say that he has behaved toward [K] in any way that could be considered grooming. The mother described in her affidavit behavioural changes in K in the months prior to November 2012. She said that he repeatedly stated that he loved her and became anxious around bedtime. She deposed that this behaviour ceased within weeks of the separation but, in December 2013/January 2014, K became teary and clingy. The mother informed Doctor J of these changes in K's behaviour. She said that K asked her during the criminal proceedings if Dad is found not guilty will he come home?. The mother informed him that the marriage was finished so that the father would not come home regardless of the outcome of the trial. She stated that K settled again after this conversation. Doctor J reported that K doesn't recall any bad experience that he has had in the family. Neither Mum nor Dad has ever done anything that has made him feel uncomfortable or unhappy. She observed: (note: [K] was not asked explicitly about sexual contact but was given a lot of opportunity to raise any issues of discomfort within his family. It seemed clear that he had nothing to report and he remained relaxed and open). In her oral evidence Doctor J said: [K's] statement is not necessarily indicative that he has not been groomed. It is incompatible with overt inappropriate sexual behaviour by the father. If [K] had started to feel a little uncomfortable, he may feel happy at the removal of the father. In her report Doctor J opined as follows: I note the mother's account that [K] seemed to be more secure since his father left. On the face of it this might suggest that [K] had reasons to be uncomfortable living with his father. I note also concerns regarding his sexualised behaviour; this is difficult to assess since some such behaviour in young children is common, however in this case

there are a number of related issues that might raise more concern: [the mother] describes a lack of closeness between father and son; there was a period of marked insecurity and fear just prior to [Mr FFs] disclosure and this seemed to stop when [the father] did not return to live with the family; recently, when the criminal case was being heard and [K] was aware of this, the same anxious behaviour emerged which settled once his mother assured him that acquittal did not mean that his father would return home. None of those behavioural changes in and of itself is sufficient to raise the possibility that [K] has experienced abuse; there is no specific syndrome of abuse, sexually abused children may display no symptoms or any of a variety of nonspecific symptoms and signs (e.g. sleep disturbances, enuresis or phobias) that may equally indicate physical or emotional abuse or other stressors unrelated to sexual abuse, such as family difficulties. Doctor J then referred in her report to the two instances of sexual behaviour on the part of K, being the incident with another little boy and the events involving his cousin M. Her overall conclusion in relation to K was as follows: Thus, there may be some cause for concern, but none of these behaviours is diagnostic in itself; it is the overall profile of disturbances that must be considered. It is also important to note that nothing emerged during my assessment of [K] that would raise any concerns of this nature. I am not satisfied that the father was grooming and/or had sexually abused K prior to the separation. As Doctor J observed nothing emerged during my assessment of [K] that would raise any concerns of this nature. Clearly, Doctor J was alert to this issue and undertook what she considered to be appropriate investigative steps. The mother raised concerns as to [The father's] focus on [the child E]. She deposed: (b) I recalled some unease about [the father's] focus on [the child E]. [The father] had a close relationship with [E] often to the exclusion of the other two children. For example: [the father] focused his time more on her than the other children. He spent 30-60 minutes in her room at night tucking her in to bed. He permitted her to watch television shows which I thought were not appropriate for a 12-13 year old because of the sexual content, including Underbelly and Police Rescue. When I spoke to him about my concerns he would say: it's fine. I recall on the holiday with my family to the Whitsundays, [the father] spent his time almost exclusively with [E]. I recall seeing them holding hands and skipping along White Haven Beach. That behaviour made me

feel uneasy. When I suggested to him that he encourage [E] to spend time with other family members on the holiday, he laughed at me and was dismissive of my concerns. (c) The main problem was that [the fathers] time was not shared with the others and for example [the father] (i) Made a video of [Es] softball pitch and sent it to the States to a friend who was an expert (ii) Made a video of [Es] trip to my Dads 70th birthday (and spent the whole of the birthday weekend finessing the video) (iii) Spoke with [E] about her friends, school, sport and extracurricular activities at length and for significantly longer periods than he spent with [K] and [F] I was happy that [E] was involved but [the father] did not spend that time with the others and it was a source of tension between us and I said words to the effect of: you have two other children ... The mother conceded that the father spent time with E in her bedroom when he assisted her with reading. With respect to the mother, it is probably the case that she now looks back on the behaviour of the father through a prism of suspicion and expresses these concerns in relation to E. The father told Mr R that he has never viewed child pornography and that he wanted to normalise Mr FFs experience of sex education. Mr R reported that the father admitted to a physical attraction to girls in the age range of fifteen years but that he had never, nor would he contemplate, sexual activity with young girls. Mr R disagreed with Doctor J that the father demonstrated a lack of empathy for the mother's brother. He took the view that the father expressed concern that [the mother's brother] might have been sexually abused by someone and mis-identified him as the perpetrator. He also opined that the father dismissed the allegation by [the mother's brother] because he does not believe he committed a sexual offence on [the brother]. Mr R opined: I have observed [the father] experience significant distress over the period of treatment. At times his personality may be interpreted as reserved. However, that is not to say that he lacks empathy. His distress about the break-up of his marriage, about not being able to see his children and his ongoing concerns for the welfare of his children provided evidence that he does experience a great deal of emotion. It was Mr R's assessment that the father does not meet the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5th Edition criteria for any kind of paraphilic disorder including paedophilic disorder. He opined further: [The father] has no personality traits shared by individuals shared by schizoid, avoidant or dependant personality. From my observations and in my

opinion, he is likely to have retreated into online sexual behaviour as a direct psychological response to the intimacy problems he experienced with his wife. Mr R was asked for his opinion as to whether the father poses any risk to the children. He reported: I am of the opinion that [the father] is not a risk to his children or any other children. Biological fathers rarely sexually offend against their children and when they do it is because they are highly paraphilic, which in my opinion [the father] is not (paraphilic). Mr R was asked whether any of the opinions which he expressed in his report would be different, in the event that the court were to determine that either or both of the allegations of use of child pornography or sexual abuse of the mother's brother were established on the evidence adduced in these proceedings. He said: If the court was to determine either (or both) of those allegations to be true in whole or in part, my opinion would differ in the treatment which [the father] would require. My opinion of his risk to the children would not change. I have concerns as to the father's apparent capacity to compartmentalise his life and engage in a long-term deception of the mother. Clearly, he lied to her when he stated that he had no interest in pornography. I consider it likely that the father understated his interest in pornography and the time which he devoted to such material. For example, he wrote a story (exhibit 9) of a pornographic nature which is of twenty closely-spaced pages in length. He said in his oral evidence that it took him several hours to write this story, a proposition about which I entertain serious doubts. The father's own admission in relation to pornography was I got too interested in it. All three children expressed a clear view to Doctor J that they want to see the father. In the video on a USB stick (exhibit 15) the children can be observed telling the father that they miss him. As noted, the contact reports of staff at H organisation portray the children as happy in the company of their father and enjoying their interaction with him. No issue was raised in relation to the quality of the relationship between the children and the mother, who is the unchallenged primary residence parent. Doctor J assessed that the children are strongly attached to [the father] and the bonds between the father and the children are warm and affectionate. The child E told Doctor J that the children spend considerable time with members of the maternal family and that she feels close to [Ms FF] in particular. She indicated that her closest relationship within the paternal family is with [Ms O]. The child F indicated to Doctor J that the children see the maternal family regularly and that she is

possibly closest to her grandfather. She said that her closest relationship within the paternal family is with Uncle The child K indicated to Doctor J that he is close to his maternal family, particularly his grandmother. He said that he likes Dad's family too, perhaps [Ms O] especially. In my view, the children are fortunate in that they share loving and constructive relationships with both their maternal and paternal extended families. I consider that they will benefit from ongoing, strong connections with both sides of their family. Having observed the paternal grandmother and Ms O in the witness box, I formed the view readily that the paternal family has much to offer the children. Of course, the same observation applies to the maternal extended family. Doctor J was of the view that there could well be limitations on the father's capacity to meet the psychological needs of the children. She reported: The mother is well able to provide for all the needs of the children, including emotional and intellectual. The father's capacity would have to be assessed in the light of whether or not the court determines that the matters in item B are likely to be true (the allegations of child pornography and sexual abuse of [the mother's brother]). Should the court determine that there is a basis to those concerns, it would have considerable bearing on the father's capacity to meet the children's emotional and intellectual needs. Should the court determine that there is no basis to those concerns then there is no reason why [the father] could not meet the children's intellectual needs, but there would still be concerns about limitations in his capacity to meet their psychological needs as follows: there is a manifest lack of empathy, for example, in the way [the father] dismissed the allegations made by [the mother's brother]; empathy is a critical attribute of good parenting so in that regard he is not well equipped as a primary carer. Further, if it were the case, as suggested by the mother that [the father] used to spend his evenings in online activities, then this may suggest a lack of emotional availability that might extend to the children as well as it apparently did to his wife. There would also be an issue of a degree of deception that was involved in these secret activities. Thus, if the court were to determine there is no risk of sexual harm then [the father's] parental capacity would be assessed as not optimal in respect of emotional needs but as adequate. Nevertheless, the children are strongly attached to him and the bonds between father and children are warm and affectionate. I share these concerns of Doctor J. In my view there is no issue as to the extent to which each of the

parties have taken the opportunity to participate in making decisions about major long term issues in relation to the children and spending time and communicating with them. Similarly, I see no issues as to the extent to which each of the parties has fulfilled their obligations to provide financial support for the children. Doctor J considered that the children have coped very well with the cessation of contact so far, which shows that they are resilient and can cope with upheavals in their lives. She opined that it is likely that they will continue to adjust to their circumstances, whatever is the determination of the court. The Presumption of Equal Shared Parental Responsibility I am required to apply a presumption that it is in the best interests of the children that the parties have equal shared parental responsibility. There was no suggestion of family violence and I have made no finding that the father abused any of the children. I have made findings that the father sexually abused the mother's brother. He, however, was not at the time... a member of the parents family as prescribed by section 61DA(2)(a) so as to render inapplicable this presumption. I am satisfied that the presumption is rebutted by evidence that it is not in the children's best interests for the parties to have equal shared parental responsibility. After her discovery of the father's comprehensive and long-standing betrayal of her, the mother now is understandably profoundly suspicious of his motivations and behaviour. I accept her evidence that she would find it extremely difficult to consult with the father concerning issues relating to the children. The mother said: I would keep [the father] up to date but I would not consult. I don't trust [the father's] judgment any more. I don't have a reference point for his true motivations. I don't think he has insight. The children have a practical need for decisions to be made in relation to their long-term care, welfare and development. At this point, it seems to me that their parents are unable to consult with each other and reach consensus. That the court is required to determine whether K attends X School illustrates that inability.

Conclusion As To Parenting Issues

As there will be no order for equal shared parental responsibility I am not required to consider whether it is in the children's best interests, and reasonably practicable, that they spend equal or substantial and significant time with their mother and father. I am at liberty to determine directly which parenting orders are in the best interests of the children. I have found that the father subjected the mother's brother to sexual abuse. As noted above, Doctor J considered that the

behaviour described by the mother's brother constitutes a hands-on offence, which is a bigger risk than viewing pornography. I regard the father's conduct in relation to the mother's brother as a vivid illustration of his lack of respect for personal boundaries, as identified by Doctor J. Doctor J could not exclude a risk that the children may be subjected to behaviour which constitutes sexual harm in the unsupervised care of the father. I agree with that conclusion but I am conscious that they are aged fifteen, thirteen and eleven years. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that they have a capacity for self-protection. I share the concerns expressed by Doctor J as to the father's capacity to provide for the children's psychological needs, to which I have referred above in these reasons. I agree with Doctor J that the father showed a lack of empathy in relation to the allegations made by the mother's brother. He was prepared to attribute these allegations to a head injury; a sinister motivation in collusion with the mother or an inaccurate identification of the perpetrator of sexual abuse as himself. In my view, his lack of acceptance of responsibility was reflected in his comment I will apologise if I have to.... I cannot agree with the view of Mr R that the father displayed empathy. With respect to Mr R, he was entirely dependent on the father's self-reporting and appeared to be embarking on the path of advocacy for him. Doctor J also drew attention to the father's degree of deception, involved in his secret activities in relation to his capacity to provide for the children's psychological needs. It is clear that the father engaged in a comprehensive deception of the mother and his family, to a point where he led a compartmentalised life. Doctor J referred also to the time which the father devoted to his secret activities and the impact upon his emotional availability. As noted, I tend to the view that he understated the extent of his use of pornography. I have only his word that he no longer uses pornography, as expressed both to the court and to Mr R. I am conscious of the recommendations which Doctor J made ultimately in her oral evidence. She said: I would think that time with family members would be acceptable, especially with the three children together. That would be pleasant for the children in the long-term. Yes, I would take this view if there is a concern about the father viewing child pornography. The ICL supported this recommendation and submitted a Minute of Proposed Orders which would see the children spend day periods with the father in the presence of the paternal aunt Ms O until the beginning of 2017. Thereafter, they would spend

unsupervised time with the father on each alternate Sunday. These orders would commence only after the mother, the ICL and Ms N have agreed on what information should be provided to the children concerning the court orders and reasons for judgment. I found Ms O to be an impressive witness and I have no hesitation in accepting her in the role proposed by the ICL. In her affidavit, she offered her consent to acting as a supervisor of the children's time with the father. I agree with the observation of counsel for the ICL that no-one knew about the father's double life, so it is not unreasonable for [Ms O] to say that he is a person of honour and integrity. Notably, Ms O remained in court and heard a considerable amount of the evidence after her turn in the witness box. I will make orders substantially as proposed by the ICL. I can see no reason to exclude members of the paternal family in addition to Ms O from occasions when the children spend time with the father. I can see no reason to prevent the children from interacting with the father by telephone, Skype, email and text message. I will not accede to the application of the mother for injunctive orders to restrain the father from approaching or contacting the children by any means. I will make orders which permit the father to attend events at the children's schools to which parents are invited from time to time but excluding sports fixtures. My intention is to allow the father a continuing knowledge of the children's educational progress for example, by attendance at parent/teacher interviews, but not to provide additional opportunities for him to spend time with them.

Alteration of Property Interests

Approach to these proceedings In *Stanford v Stanford* [2012] HCA 52 the majority of the High Court of Australia held as follows: 35. It will be recalled that s 79(2) provides that [t]he court shall not make an order under this section unless it is satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order. Section 79(4) prescribes matters that must be taken into account in considering what order (if any) should be made under this section. The requirements of the two sub-sections are not to be conflated. In every case in which a property settlement order under s 79 is sought, it is necessary to satisfy the court that, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to make the order. Their Honours further observed as follows: 42. In many cases where an application is made for a property settlement order, the just and equitable requirement is readily satisfied by observing that, as the result of a choice made by one or both of the parties, the husband and wife are no longer living

in a marital relationship. It will be just and equitable to make a property settlement order in such a case because there is not and will not thereafter be the common use of property by the husband and wife. No less importantly, the express and implicit assumptions that underpinned the existing property arrangements have been brought to an end by the voluntary severance of the mutuality of the marital relationship. That is, any express or implicit assumption that the parties may have made to the effect that existing arrangements of marital property interests were sufficient or appropriate during the continuance of their marital relationship is brought to an end with the ending of the marital relationship. And the assumption that any adjustment to those interests could be effected consensually as needed or desired is also brought to an end. Hence it will be just and equitable that the court make a property settlement order. What order, if any, should then be made is determined by apply s 79(4). Both parties seek orders which would alter their interests in property. Most significantly, they each wish to terminate their joint ownership of the matrimonial home at Z Street, Suburb U. I construe their respective applications as mutual concessions that it is just and equitable for the court to make orders for alteration of property interests. I am comfortably satisfied that it is just and equitable that there be orders for alteration of property interests. The parties separated almost two years ago and now lead separate lives, with no prospect of a reconciliation. They no longer intermingle their finances and have no intention to do so in the future. In these circumstances, it seems to me to be just and equitable to allow the parties to terminate their financial interrelationship on a final basis. The Assets, Superannuation, Liabilities and Financial Resources The parties agreed on the nature and value of their assets and superannuation and the identity and extent of their liabilities. It was common ground that neither party holds a financial resource. The parties agreed that the balance sheet is as follows:

ASSETS		Ownership	Description	Husband	Wife
	J		Z Street, Suburb U		
\$ 1,050,000	\$ 1,050,000	W	Honda motor vehicle	20,000	20,000
	W		Mazda motor vehicle	2,000	2,000
	J		Household Contents	27,000	27,000
	W		Shares	2,500	2,500
	H		Sailing Boat	2,000	2,000
	W		Business known as Faulconer Blan Firm	20,000	20,000
	Total			\$ 1,123,500	\$ 1,123,500

LIABILITIES

Ownership		Description	Husband	Wife
J	NAB - mortgages	\$ 652,640	\$ 652,640	J
NAB	Line of Credit Account	46,000	46,000	J
NAB	-Everyday Account	1,300	1,300	H
MasterCard		12,000	12,000	H
Visa				

card 1,600 1,600 Total \$ 713,540 \$ 713,540 SUPERANNUATION Member Name of Fund Type of Interest Husband Wife W MLC Accumulation \$ 19,350 \$ 19,350 14 W Legal Super Accumulation 6,600 6,600 15 W AGEST Accumulation 35,000 35,000 16 H MLC Accumulation 282,400 282,400 Total \$343,350 \$343,350 SUMMARY Husband Wife 17 Gross assets \$ 1,123,500 \$ 1,123,500 18 Liabilities (713,540) (713,540) 19 Net assets 409,960 409,960 20 Superannuation 343,350 343,350 21 Net assets + superannuation \$ 753,310 \$ 753,310

The designations (H), (W) and (J) indicate ownership of an asset or asuperannuation fund and the holding of a liability by the husband,the wife andthe parties jointly. Contributions Itwas common ground that the contributions of the parties were equal as at thedate of trial. Independently of these mutual concessions,I am satisfied thatequality is the appropriate finding as to contribution. In summary, neitherparty introduced assets of any significanceinto the relationship; they adoptedcomplementary roles during their twenty five year marriage and raised theirthree children together.

Section 75(2) Factors Thehusband and wife are aged 50 and 49 years respectively and are each in goodhealth. The husband is employed as a project managerand earns approximately\$158,000 gross per annum. The wife conducts her own professional practice anddeposed that she draws a grossannual sum of about \$104,000. In her oralevidence she said that she expects that her gross fees in the 2014 tax year willamountto \$280,000 to \$300,000. Thehusband pays child support of \$1,020 per week for the three children. There wasno suggestion that he has been in arrears orin any way unreliable with paymentof child support. Theparenting orders which I will make will result in the children spending most oftheir time in the care of the wife. Of course,I cannot predict what role thehusband will play in the care of the children as they grow older and make theirrown decisions andchoices. Iam comfortably satisfied that there should be an adjustment in favour of thewife on account of section 75(2) factors. The net assets and superannuation arevalued at \$753,310. I assess that an adjustment of 10 per cent of that amountinfavour of the wife is appropriate in all of the circumstances of theseproceedings. Accordingly,I find that the net assets and superannuation should be divided in the ratio of60 per cent to the wife and 40 per centto the husband. Those percentagesequate to \$451,986 and \$301,324 to the wife and the husband respectively. Asnoted, the parties agreed that the wife should have an

opportunity to retain the U property, upon payment of a cash sum to the husband. It was also agreed that the wife will transfer to the husband her interest in the Mazda motor vehicle. The Minute of Orders submitted on behalf of the husband sought a splitting order in respect of his superannuation benefit. No submission was put as to why I should make an order which would see the wife unable to access part of her entitlement for many years, in circumstances where she has an immediate need to accommodate the children of the parties. I appreciate that the husband likewise will be unable to access his superannuation benefit for many years. On the other hand, Ms O gave evidence that the husband has accommodation available in her home for an unlimited period. The husband earns a reasonable level of income and might be expected to re-establish himself financially within a relatively short time-frame. For these reasons, I will not make a splitting order in respect of the husband's superannuation fund. The wife will thus take or retain the following assets and superannuation: 1. Z Street, Suburb U \$1,050,000 2. Honda motor vehicle \$20,000 3. Household Contents \$27,000 4. Shares \$2,500 5. Business Faulconer-Blan Firm \$20,000 6. MLC Superannuation \$19,350 7. Legal Super \$6,600 8. AGEST Superannuation \$35,000 \$1,180,450 She will assume sole responsibility for the following liabilities: 1. Nab Mortgage \$652,640 2. NAB Line of Credit \$46,000 3. NAB Everyday Account \$1,300 \$699,940 The wife will thus hold net assets and superannuation to the value of \$480,510, which exceeds her entitlement of \$451,986 by \$28,524. The husband will take or retain the following assets and superannuation: 1. Sailing Boat \$2,000 2. Mazda motor vehicle \$2,000 3. MLC Superannuation \$282,400 \$286,400 He will retain sole responsibility for the following liabilities: 3. MasterCard \$12,000 4. Visa card \$1,600 \$13,600 The husband will thus hold net assets and superannuation to the value of \$272,800, which falls short of his entitlement of \$301,324 by \$28,524. The wife thus will be in a position to retain the U property upon payment to the husband of a sum of \$28,524. In the event that the wife fails to make such payment to the husband the parties will effect a sale of the U property and a division of the net proceeds as to 91 per cent to the wife and the balance to the husband. This percentage of 91 per cent is calculated as follows: Net equity in U property \$350,060 Net value of assets and superannuation held by the wife \$130,450 Difference between the wife's entitlement of \$451,986 and \$130,450 \$321,536

\$321,536 is equal to approximately 91 per cent of the net equity in the Uproperty Net value of assets and superannuation held by the husband \$272,800 Difference between the husbands entitlement of \$301,324 and \$272,800 \$28,524 \$28,524 is equal to approximately 9 per cent of the net equity in the Uproperty. The child Ks education There is no doubt that the parties made a joint decision that K should commence attendance at X School from Year 5 in 2014. They both signed an Acceptance of Offer of Enrolment Contract on 10 August 2012 (exhibit 14). They paid a non-refundable fee of \$4,000. As I understood the evidence of the mother, she changed her mind about Ks attendance at X School because of concerns about the ability of herself and the father now to meet the fees and incidental costs. In final submissions, however, counsel for the mother suggested that there be orders to the effect that each of the parties bear one half of these costs in the event that K attends X School. I will order that the child K attends X School, at the shared expense of the parties, for three reasons. Firstly, the parties entered into a contract and paid a deposit pursuant to their agreement upon this school for K. Secondly, the parties daughters E and F attend a private school. Thirdly, the mother acknowledged that X School is a good school. I certify that the preceding one hundred and seven eight (178) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Stevenson delivered on October 2014 Associate: Date: 17 October 2014 AustLII: Copyright

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