

# LOCS Case Narratives

The Loss of Cross-Border Sanctuary (LOCS) data, v.1

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April 2024

## Description

This file contains case descriptions of the host-policy shifts recorded in the Loss of Cross-Border Sanctuary (LOCS) data. The rationale behind the data collection, including conceptual definitions, is described in the DPhil thesis *Sanctuary Politics*.<sup>1</sup> Each event is categorised according to coding decisions in LOCS, and those decisions are justified with word-for-word citations from secondary (and sometimes primary) sources.

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<sup>1</sup>Submitted to the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford.

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# 1 Definitions

Each section comprises a rebel-host dyad – that is, the interactions between a rebel group (as recorded by the UCDP) and the government of a neighbouring country. Some rebel groups are also listed under their target state, i.e. the government they wage war on, due to the capture or loss of domestic territory. In each section, host-policy shifts are listed sequentially, ordered from the earliest to the latest recorded policy-shift across time. The timelines include five types of events, each of which dated to the earliest point at which the event was first observed within a spell. Events are corroborated with quotes, the origins of which are listed sequentially in the right-hand margin.

*Sanctuary start* is defined as the earliest observation whereby a rebel group uses the neighbouring country to (a) host troops and (b) conduct cross-border combat operations. *Pledges* are defined as speech acts whereby representatives of the host government publicly announces that actions will be taken towards a rebel group which will harm or impede the group’s freedom of movement. The for of the pledge, e.g. speech or agreement, is defined below the event summary.

*Crackdown campaigns* are defined as continuous spells of operations whereby state security forces (military, police, or intelligence) restrict or harm members of the rebel group inside the host state’s territory. For each campaign, below the event summary, I define (i) the form of the first crackdown event; (ii) whether the campaign dislodged the sanctuary; (iii) whether it was intrusive, meaning the target state had boots on the ground; and (iv) whether it was joint, meaning the neighbouring states’ militaries coordinated actions through information sharing or command structures. Positive answers to these questions are justified with citations.

*Domestic territorial gains* are defined as the first acquisition of areas under rebel control inside the target state. *Domestic territorial losses* are defined as the loss of the last controlled area inside the target state. These two types of events are found under the rebel group’s dyad with its target state. The name of the territory in question is stated.

Note that LOCS only provides a complete sample of policy shifts for the 1989-2020 period. However, data was often collected for years before (and sometimes for years after) this period. In order to provide the user with the fullest possible overview, such records are included. However, the user should keep in mind that pre-1989 and post-2020 records are not necessarily complete.

## 2 Case Narratives: Host-policy shifts in LOCS

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### 2.1 ADF in DR Congo (Zaire)

Target: Uganda, Host: DR Congo (Zaire), UCDP Actor ID: 489

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#### Sanctuary start (Date: 1995, Jun )

**Event description:** (1) "[UMMF fighters,] including Jamil Mukulu fled to the DRC (then known as Zaire). With the consent and support of President Mobutu, the UMFF remnants re-formed at Bunia as the Allied Democratic Forces, and in June 1995 formed an alliance [as ADF] with the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU)."

Sources:  
Titeca and Fahey  
2016: 1192

#### Pledge (Date: 1997, Jul )

**Event description:** (1) "In an interview with the New Vision, Uganda's Ambassador to the DRC, Dr. Kamanda Bataringaya said that, three Memoranda of Understanding had been signed between the DRC and Uganda. These covered an agreement for joint operations between the UPDF and the FAC"; (2) "the UPDF was already allowed in Congolese territory under the terms of DRC-Uganda security agreements. (...) A 'Memorandum of Understanding' signed between the DRC and Uganda shortly after Kabila's rise to power [inaugurated in June 1997], providing for joint operations of the UPDF and the Forces Armées Congolaises"

Sources:  
Kasaija 2001: 77;  
Clark 2001: 273

**Pledge form:** Written pact

#### Crackdown campaign (Date: 1997, Dec )

**Event description:** (1) "In December 1997, the Ugandan army deployed two battalions on Congolese territory in cooperation with Congolese forces"; (2) "Following Mobutu's defeat in 1997, the new regime of President Laurent Désiré Kabila allowed Ugandan troops into eastern DRC to fight the ADF, in some cases the Ugandan troops collaborated with Congolese forces in attacking the ADF"; (3) "[Until] 2002, Rwanda effectively controlled the Kivus"

Sources:  
ICG 2012: 5;  
Titeca and Fahey  
2016: 1198; Rafti  
2007: 79

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "the Ugandan army deployed two battalions on Congolese territory in cooperation with Congolese forces"

#### Crackdown campaign (Date: 1998, Aug, 2)

**Event description:** (1) "the Ugandan army invaded the DRC in August 1998 and remained as an occupation force for nearly five years, but failed during this time to defeat the ADF"; (2) "One of the greatest myths that the international media have helped to propagate is that Rwanda and Uganda had entered the country on the side of rebels in a civil war in the Congo. This is a myth because there was no fighting in the Congo prior to the invasion of the country by Rwandan and Ugandan troops on 2 August 1998"

Sources:  
Titeca and  
Fahey 2016:  
1193; Nzongola-  
Ntalaja 1998: 15

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive: Yes**

**Joint: No**

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "the Ugandan army invaded the DRC in August 1998 and remained as an occupation force for nearly five years"

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2001, Apr, 6*)

**Event description:** (1) "6 April 2001 – The Ugandan army captures the ADF-NALU headquarters in the DRC"; (2) "It [the ADF] lost most of its operational capacity and could only take advantage of the remote terrain of the Rwenzori mountains to harass civilians."

*Sources:*  
ICG 2012: 17;  
Titeca and  
Vlassenroot  
2012: 160

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged: Yes**

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "It [the ADF] lost most of its operational capacity and could only take advantage of the remote terrain of the Rwenzori mountains to harass civilians." (Titeca and Vlassenroot 2012: 160)

**Leadership decapitation: No**

**Intrusive: Yes**

**Joint: No**

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "the Ugandan army launched a major search operation in the Rwenzori mountains"

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2005, Dec, 24*)

**Event description:** (1) "On 24 December 2005 a combined FARDC-UN force launched the largest operation ever conducted against the ADF until that point, Operation North Night Final, in the group's North Kivu territory [in DR Congo]"; (2) "In December 2005, the UN and the DRC armed forces (FARDC) launched operation North Night Final against ADF-NALU bases. The operation succeeded in destroying the group's main camps and killed about 90 combatants, but its leaders escaped and disappeared into the Rwenzori Mountains following a tip-off"; (3) "One of the major effects of this operation was the dispersion of ADF fighters and the loss of their supply lines"

*Sources:*  
Scorgie 2022:  
287; ICG 2012: 6;  
Titeca and  
Vlassenroot  
2012: 164

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged: Yes**

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "One of the major effects of this operation was the dispersion of ADF fighters and the loss of their supply lines" (Titeca and Vassel 2012: 164)

**Leadership decapitation: No**

**Intrusive: No**

**Joint: No**

#### **Pledge** (*Date: 2007, Sep, 8*)

**Event description:** (1) "In September 2007, Uganda and the DRC signed the Arusha pact, in which the two countries agreed to undertake joint efforts to combat [ADF and LRA]. (...) This pact had little result."; (2) The agreement states: "The Government of the DRC shall formulate an action plan to neutralize the negative forces, particularly the LRA and ADF, which shall become effective by January 2008"

*Sources:*  
Titeca and  
Vassenroot 2012:  
160-61; New  
Vision 2007

**Pledge form:** Written pact

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2010, Jun, 25*)

**Event description:** (1) "On 25 June, the FARDC launched Operation Rwenzori, which despite its presentation as a unilateral initiative, was in fact prepared collabora-

*Sources:*  
ICG 2012: 7;  
Scorgie 2022:  
289

tively by the FARDC and MONUSCO. The operation enabled Congolese troops to take several ADF camps as well as cut several of its supply lines.”; (2) “[T]he 2010 Operation Rwenzori came as such a surprise to so many actors. (...) Launched in late June 2010, Operation Rwenzori was militarily undertaken solely by FARDC [the DRC forces]”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “[T]he offensive initially was somewhat successful, dislodging the rebels from many of their entrenched bases, including the Nadui camp.” (Scorgie 2022: 289); (2) “[However,] They were able to quickly regain their eastern Congolese Rwenzori borderland space, and all the while maintain their western Ugandan networks and connections. If anything, they had to slightly shift their operating theatre to more remote territory.” (ibid.: 290)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2011, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) “Post-Operation Rwenzori the ADF re-established and expanded upon many of their previous camps (living in these until early 2014)”; (2) “[After Operation Rwenzori, the ADF] were able to quickly regain their eastern Congolese Rwenzori borderland space, and all the while maintain their western Ugandan networks and connections. If anything, they had to slightly shift their operating theatre to more remote territory.”

*Sources:*  
Scorgie 2022:  
294; Scorgie  
2022: 290

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Pledge** (Date: 2013, Nov, 28)

**Event description:** (1) “On 28 November 2013, shortly after the M23’s defeat, President Kabila ‘denounced harassments against the civilian population [by the ADF] and promised urgent measures before the end of the year’.”

*Sources:*  
Titeca and Fahey  
2016: 1199

**Pledge form:** Speech

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2014, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) “In January 2014, the FARDC launched operation Sukola I against the ADF – this too, like past such operations, weakened but failed to defeat the ADF”; (2) “MONUSCO and FARDC launched joint operations against the ADF in early 2014. The operations followed clear-cut counterinsurgency principles that treated non-state armed actors as the root of conflict. Yet, the ADF had survived decades in the borderlands of northern North Kivu by laying ties with local civilians and political authorities.”; (3) “Officially, the two men agreed “to work together” against “the negative forces which hold sway in the east of the DRC. ... However, we are aware of no indications that, on the ground, Uganda is assisting the FARDC in this operation,” claimed a MONUSCO official.”

*Sources:*  
Titeca and Fahey  
2016: 1199;  
Sweet 2021: 307;  
Stearns 2019

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “for a period of time [after Sukola I] they [the ADF] remained more scattered and decentralized than previously (...) [and only] by 2019 the group were securely under one centralized command-and-control” (Scorgie 2022: 312)

**Leadership decapitation: Yes**

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) "Mukulu was captured in Tanzania and sent to Uganda for trial" (Scorgie 2022: 311)

**Intrusive: No**

**Joint: No**

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2021, Nov, 26)

**Event description:** (1) "November [2021], following deadly bombings in Uganda's capital Kampala, Tshisekedi had allowed Ugandan units to cross into North Kivu in pursuit of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)"; (2) "After months of insistence, Museveni managed to get Tshisekedi to give the green light for a joint intervention against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which are active in North Kivu and Ituri."; (3) "On 26 November, Tshisekedi gave his Ugandan counterpart, Yoweri Museveni, permission to send his troops to Ituri and North Kivu. Several diplomatic sources have verified this information. (...) According to one of our sources, however, Tshisekedi has only given a verbal agreement and his Ugandan counterpart is now waiting for written confirmation."

*Sources:*  
Al-Jazeera 2022;  
The Africa  
Report 2022-04;  
The Africa  
Report 2021-12

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged: No**

**Leadership decapitation: No**

**Intrusive: Yes**

**Joint: Yes**

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Tshisekedi had allowed Ugandan units to cross into North Kivu in pursuit of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)"

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2022, Jul, 2)

**Event description:** (1) "Operation Shujaa (...) On 2nd July 2022, both Artillery and Combat helicopters bombarded ADF stronghold in sector three on the confluence of River Djelube, Lusolube and Semliki while infantry soldiers advanced to the objective and others on blocking effect (...) joint infantry forces were combing the area [with] fleeing ADF terrorist"

*Sources:*  
Thawite 2022

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged: Yes**

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) Operation Shujaa (...) On 2nd July 2022, both Artillery and Combat helicopters bombarded ADF stronghold (...) joint infantry forces were combing the area [with] fleeing ADF terrorist" (Thawite 2022)

**Leadership decapitation: No**

**Intrusive: Yes**

**Joint: Yes**

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Tshisekedi had allowed Ugandan units to cross into North Kivu in pursuit of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)"; (2) "joint infantry forces were combing the area [with] fleeing ADF terrorist"

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## **2.2 AFDL in Rwanda**

**Target: DR Congo (Zaire), Host: Rwanda, UCDP Actor ID: 422**

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#### **Sanctuary start** (Date: 1996, Oct, 18)

**Event description:** (1) "On Friday, October 18, 1996 (...) the Alliance des Forces

*Sources:*  
Roessler and  
Verhoeven 2017:  
177, 175



Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) as the vehicle to pursue regime change [was] (...) brought together by Paul Kagame. (...) [There was] maximum Rwandan support to a Congolese liberation movement that would oust Mobutu”

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## 2.3 AIAI in Somalia

**Target:** Ethiopia, **Host:** Somalia, **UCDP Actor ID:** 542

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### **Sanctuary start** (Date: 1982, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) “[At founding in 1982] These two Wahhabi organizations [AIAI’s predecessors] were operating secretly in the country [Somalia] during early years of their association”; (2) “The group (...) was Neo-Salafist and based in Puntland, in north-eastern Somalia. (...) The group later had a base in Laas Qoray in Somaliland ”

*Sources:*  
Sheikh 2019: 51;  
UCDP/actor/542

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 1996, Aug, 9)

**Event description:** (1) “Ethiopian regime was determined to eliminate the group of AIAI inside Somalia. On August 9, 1996, it launched an attack against AIAI’s bases across border of Somalia at Bulo Hawa, Luuq and other areas. Al-Itihad Al-Islamiyah’s intelligence group had already got information about the Ethiopia attack. AIAI had gone out of the cities and they went with their military bases without fighting and fled to the forest land of the region”; (2) “in 1996, the Ethiopian government attacked AIAI bases inside Somalia (...) In heavy fighting the groups main base at Luuq was destroyed. Further fighting was announced in Dolow, Somalia, in September, and again in December.”; (3) This eventually provoked military strikes from the Ethiopian army against AIAI camps around the town of Luuq in the Gedo region in 1996 and 1997.”; (4) “From 1996 to 1997, Ethiopian defence forces entered Somalia’s Gedo region as part of a military campaign against Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI)”; (5) “Ethiopia resolved to eliminate AIAI. So, on August 9, 1996, it launched the first of two raids on AIAI bases across the border in Somalia at Luuq and Buulo Haawa. The strike was limited and targeted but failed to find and destroy the AIAI leadership, which had gone into hiding.”

*Sources:*  
Sheikh 2019: 54;  
UCDP/actor/542;  
Hoehne and  
Gaas 2022: 415;  
Newbery 2021:  
257; Terdman  
2008: 50

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “[The Ethiopian army] launched an attack against AIAI’s bases across border of Somalia at Bulo Hawa, Luuq and other areas”; (2) “the Ethiopian government attacked AIAI bases inside Somalia”

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 1996, Dec )

**Event description:** (1) “In [December 1996-]January 1997, Ethiopian troops launched another raid on AIAI in that region. In this war, many of the Islamists were killed and wounded, the training camps were destroyed and the group crashed both militarily and administratively. From that time, Gedo region had fallen under the control of the clan militia supported by Ethiopia. The destruction of AIAI, nevertheless, did not lead to its total disappearance inside Somali society. The effective leaders of the group returned to their hometowns and started living in the community.”; (2) “This eventually provoked military strikes from the Ethiopian army against AIAI camps around the town of Luuq in the Gedo region in 1996 and 1997. AIAI ceased to exist as an organised movement

*Sources:*  
Sheikh 2019: 53;  
Hoehne and  
Gaas 2022: 415;  
Newbery 2021:  
257; Hummel  
2019;  
UCDP/actor/542;  
Hummel 2019

in the late 1990s”; (3) “From 1996 to 1997, Ethiopian defence forces entered Somalia’s Gedo region as part of a military campaign against Al-Ittihad Al-Islamiya (AIAI)”;

(4) “In late 1996, the Ethiopians lost patience, and conducted a series of raids across the border, dismantling al-Ittihad’s camps, and dispersing its membership. While most of its members returned to civilian life and others established a non-violent salafi political movement named Al-I’tisaam b’il Kitaab wa Sunna, a handful of die-hards remained committed to the cause of jihad.”;

(5) “Since the late 1990s there have been differing accounts as to the continued existence of AIAI in Somalia. While some reports claim that they are still a viable, though clandestine, force most experts argue that AIAI is no longer a force to count with”;

(6) “In [December 1996/]January 1997, Ethiopian forces returned. Many of the Islamists were killed or injured, the training camps were dismantled and AIAI’s short lived terrorist activities in Ethiopia came to an end. Officially, at least, AIAI, both in Ethiopia and in Somalia, ceased to exist, although during its heyday in the early 1990s, AIAI had a militia of more than 1,000 strong.”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “the training camps were destroyed and the group crashed both militarily and administratively. From that time, Gedo region had fallen under the control of the clan militia supported by Ethiopia” (Sheikh 2019: 53); (2) “dismantling al-Ittihad’s camps, and dispersing its membership” (Hummel 2019)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “[The Ethiopian army] launched an attack against AIAI’s bases across border of Somalia at Bulu Hawa, Luuq and other areas”; (2) “the Ethiopian government attacked AIAI bases inside Somalia”

## 2.4 ALiR in DR Congo (Zaire)

**Target:** Rwanda, **Host:** DR Congo (Zaire), **UCDP Actor ID:** 1128

**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1998, Jun )

**Event description:** (1) “By mid-1998, the RPA crushed the uprising [of ALiR, FDLR’s predecessor organisation, in Northern Rwanda], killing and capturing key ALiR commanders and combatants, and the ALiR was subsequently restructured into two separate branches in the Congo, with help from President Kabila who broke his earlier ties with the Rwandan government. ALiR I was based in Masisi (North Kivu) and Shabunda (South Kivu), and ALiR II was based in Kinshasa”

*Sources:*  
Rafti 2006: 9

## 2.5 Ambazonia insurgents in Nigeria

**Target:** Cameroon, **Host:** Nigeria, **UCDP Actor ID:** 7332

**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 2017, Nov )

**Event description:** (1) “With the escalation of violence, several Anglophone Cameroonians, especially in the border areas, fled to Nigeria for safety. The flight of Cameroon Anglophone refugees was facilitated by the reopening of the border on 16 November 2017 and the existence of cultural affinities across the border strengthened by marriage

*Sources:*  
Agbu and Okereke 2022: 299;  
Corey-Boulet 2018

and cross-border linkages of ethnicity among the Ejagam and the Boki ethnic groups.”; (2) “to the extent the crisis is expanding at all, it is in the opposite direction: into Nigeria, which borders Cameroon to the west”

### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2018, Jan, 5*)

**Event description:** (1) “A key Cameroonian separatist leader arrested in Abuja earlier this month has been deported by Nigerian authorities to Cameroon”; (2) “continued, it was the arrest of Sisiku Julius Ayuktabe alongside 12 other Southern Cameroons pro-Ambazonia leaders at Nera Hotel, Abuja, Nigeria, on 5 January 2018 and subsequent transfer of 10 of them to Cameroon on Friday 26 January 2018 that led to the full-scale armed struggle for the independent State of Ambazonia. Those arrested were Sisiku Julius AyukTabe (President of the interim government of Ambazonia), Dr Nfor Ngala Nfor (Chairman of Southern Cameroons National Council-SCNC), Dr Fidelis Nde Che, Dr Henry Kimeng, Prof Augustine Awasum and Dr Cornelius Kwanga.”; (3) “the Nigerian authority took custody of Sisiku Jukius Ayuktabe and 11 other pro-Ambazonia leaders at Nera Hotel, Abuja, in January 2018 and transferred 10 of these leaders, along with 37 other Anglophone Cameroonians arrested in Taraba State (North-east Nigeria) on 30 December 2017, to Cameroonian authorities for prosecution. (...) Furthermore, as part of efforts to prevent the influx of foreign fighters from Nigeria into its Anglophone regions, the Cameroonian military, working in concert with the Nigerian military, stopped hundreds of Nigerian mercenaries from crossing the borders to join the separatist groups in the conflict zone.”; (3) “[Cameroonian] cross-border violations in pursuit of pro-Ambazonia separatist fighters became more pronounced in the new year as Cameroon soldiers allegedly carried out cross-border raids at Danare-Daddi and Danare Bodam communities (...) The violation of shared border areas by Cameroonian troops assumed another dimension on 20 February 2018, when personnel of Cameroon’s military mounted an armoured tank with a plethora of well-armed personnel on the Cameroon end of the Ekok-Mfum bridge linking both countries (Negroid Haven, 2018). This action was vehemently challenged by the Head of Nigerian Immigration post at Mfum, Lawrence Asuquo, who described the situation as a war situation and an infringement on international protocols.”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “the Cameroonian military, working in concert with the Nigerian military, stopped hundreds of Nigerian mercenaries from crossing the borders to join the separatist groups in the conflict zone”; (2) “[Cameroonian] cross-border violations in pursuit of pro-Ambazonia separatist fighters became more pronounced in the new year as Cameroon soldiers allegedly carried out cross-border raids at Danare-Daddi and Danare Bodam communities”; (3) “Cameroon’s military mounted an armoured tank with a plethora of well-armed personnel on the Cameroon end of the Ekok-Mfum bridge linking both countries”

### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2021, Jun, 25*)

**Event description:** (1) “The Nigerian security operatives have allegedly arrested a senior commander of the Ambazonia separatist fighters, General Black Mamba around the Ikom border town. According to Biafra Nations League (BNL), scores of Ambazonians were also arrested alongside the leader, which has caused tension and panic at the Nigeria-Cameroon borders, Daily Post reports. The security agencies are said to be

*Sources:*

Reuters 2018;  
Agbu and  
Okereke 2022:  
299; Agbu and  
Okereke 2022:  
160; Agbu and  
Okereke 2022:  
163

*Sources:*

Sahara  
Reporters 2021

carrying out the arrest after the Ambazonians attacked Nigeria security men and took their guns.”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## 2.6 ARDUF in Eritrea

**Target:** Ethiopia, **Host:** Eritrea, **UCDP Actor ID:** 520

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1995, Mar )

**Event description:** (1) "Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF), most of which are based in Eritrea"; (2) "[The first time ARDUF conducted operations from Eritrea:] Missing Italian tourists were (...) kidnapped [and brought to Eritrea] by members of Ugugumo, an Afar militia in Ethiopia linked to ARDUF."

*Sources:*  
Tilahun 2015: 4;  
MAR 2004

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1995, Dec )

**Event description:** (1) "Tigrean forces are thought to have operated with Eritrean forces to invade the Afar regions of each state [and attack ARDUF] in December 1995."

*Sources:*  
MAR (2004)

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Tigrean forces are thought to have operated with Eritrean forces to invade the Afar regions of each state [and attack ARDUF] in December 1995."

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2012, May, 28)

**Event description:** (1) "[There was a] crossborder raid by Ethiopian forces in mid-March in pursuit of rebel groups purportedly operating under the banner of the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF). Ethiopia holds ARDUF responsible for killing five European tourists and kidnapping two others (who were later freed) near the border in January, and alleges that the Eritrean government funds and trains the rebel group."

*Sources:*  
EIU 2012

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

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## 2.7 ATTF in Bangladesh

**Target:** India, **Host:** Bangladesh, **UCDP Actor ID:** 306

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 2000, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "The bulk of the leadership is based in Bangladesh, outside the reach of Indian security forces, and contains many safe havens for the militants.";

*Sources:*  
UCDP/actor/306;  
SATP 2012

(2) "[For the first time ever, in] June 12: Chief Minister Manik Sarkar [of India] discloses that the State government has submitted to the Union government a comprehensive report containing details and precise location of 21 NLFT and eight All Tripura Tiger Front (ATTF) base camps in neighbouring Bangladesh."

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2002, Jun, 7)

**Event description:** (1) "Reports say, the ATTF has re-located its main base camp in Bangladesh from Satcherri to a new place—opposite Sidhai in West Tripura district—following a joint operation by Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) and Bangladesh Army personnel."

Sources:  
SATP 2012

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2006, Jan, 12)

**Event description:** (1) "Bangladeshi security forces reportedly close down an ATTF camp at Satcherri in the Habiganj district and arrest two militants, Jogesh Debbarma and Surendra Debbarma."; (2) "September 28: Tripura Chief Minister, Manik Sarkar, said at a press briefing, "Total number of NLFT and ATTF hideouts in Bangladesh has reduced from 56 to 26 recently""

Sources:  
SATP 2012;  
SATP 2012

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Expulsion

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Pledge** (Date: 2009, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) "[Upon inauguration in January] 2009, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina pledged not to allow her country's territory to be used by groups inimical to India's interests."; (2) "After the pro-India Awami League swept to power in [Bangladesh in] 2008, the ULFA rank and file knew their days in the country were numbered. The safer option was to relocate to the camps in Myanmar, but that would have meant crossing over to Arakan in Burma from Bangladesh, which entailed a month-long arduous journey through hundreds of kilometres of inhospitable terrain to Chin Province and then onward to Sagaing Division."; (3) "Dhaka and New Delhi took significant steps to formalise security cooperation when Sheikh Hasina visited New Delhi in January 2010. Three agreements on security cooperation were signed at the summit meeting with Manmohan Singh: Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters; Transfer of Sentenced Persons; and Combating International Terrorism, Organised Crime, and Illicit Drug Trafficking. The two countries have also initiated discussions on an extradition treaty"; (4) "February 8: Telegraph reports that the Unified Command Structures of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh have launched a joint operation to neutralize transit camps (...) The objective is to stop the militants from moving out of Bangladesh and from reaching Myanmar. The Sheikh Hasina regime has made her stand very clear vis-à-vis militant groups from India operating from Bangladeshi soil. Things will only get tough for the rebels in Bangladesh," he added."; (5) "after the AL came to power with a huge mandate, in 2009, the government took steps for course correction. As a result, India showed a positive outlook for the AL-led Bangladesh Government, which, in turn, established a strong bond between them."

Sources:  
Bhattacharjee  
2018: 305;  
Bhattacharyya  
2014: 106;  
Chakma 2012:  
13; SATP 2010:  
24; Rana 2018:  
566

**Pledge form:** Speech

**Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2009, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) "With this latest surrender, 17 militants of the banned ATTF have surrendered their arms and ammunition during the past one week after deserting their camps in neighbouring Bangladesh. "We have managed to escape from our camps in Sylhet District after Bangladesh launched anti-insurgency operations in different parts of that country. Some more guerrillas may sneak into Tripura any time from across the border," Debbarma confessed before the BSF personnel." ; (2) "[Yet still in April 2010] altogether 187 women cadres of the outfit are being trained in Tarabon, Kalu Adam, Pancherri and Bandarban areas in Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts over the past two months. But those camps would be shifted to the nearby Arakan areas of Myanmar in case the Bangladesh Government launched counter-insurgency operation."

Sources:  
SATP 2012;  
SATP 2012

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2012, Dec, 30)

**Event description:** (1) "December 30: SFs in Bangladesh have reportedly arrested ATTF 'chief' Ranjit Debbarma from Dhaka."; (2) "[Yet still in 2014] BSF believes that of 45 militant camps in Bangladesh 21 belong to groups such as ULFA NLFT and ATTF."

Sources:  
SATP 2012;  
SATP 2014

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## 2.8 Boko Haram in Cameroon

**Target:** Nigeria, **Host:** Cameroon, **UCDP Actor ID:** 1051

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**Sanctuary start** (Date: 2009, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "in 2009, traces of the sect [Boko Haram] at the border between Cameroon and Nigeria became obvious when members of Boko Haram fleeing Nigerian security forces were forced to settle or pass through Fotokol, Mora, Maroua, Kousseri, Bornori, Tolkomari, Kolofata and few other border communities (...) while also using the territory as a safe haven for carrying out their illicit ventures (...) The Far North of Cameroon became transit points for weapon acquisition by Boko Haram from Libya and Sudan."; (2) "The first signs of Boko Haram in Cameroon date back at least to 2009. (...) Boko Haram thus established the core of its logistics network in the Far North between 2010 and 2014"

Sources:  
Tar and Ahmed  
2022: 183-84;  
ICG 2016: 8-9

**Pledge** (Date: 2012, Feb, 28)

**Event description:** (1) "As part of measures at fostering defence and security co-operation at bilateral levels, the governments of Cameroon and Nigeria entered into the Agreement on the Establishment of the Cameroon-Nigeria Trans-border Security Committee. This agreement was signed in Abuja on 28 February 2012. Article 5 of this agreement spells out the areas of cooperation as follows: Exchange of information and

Sources:  
Agbu and  
Okereke 2022:  
154; Tar and  
Ahmed 2022:  
187

experiences on security. Investigation, survey, studies and research to prevent acts of trans-border security. Conduct of border control operations between the two countries"; (2) "Nigeria and Cameroon signed an agreement to set up the Trans-border Security Committee in 2012. The bilateral agreement had the sole objective of exploring and adopting measures to deny the insurgents easy access to penetrate either Cameroon or Nigeria through common borders."

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Pledge** (Date: 2014, May, 14)

**Event description:** (1) "On 14 May 2014, Cameroon officially declared war on Boko Haram"; (2) "the Paris summit of 17 May 2014, which was attended by former President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria and President Paul Biya, among other Heads of State. This summit focused on security issues in Nigeria, especially the escalation of Boko Haram aggression beyond Nigeria's national boundaries to contiguous countries of the Lake Chad Basin"; (3) "with the spread of the sect's activities across the Lake Chad Basin and the series of events that unfolded in the form of abductions, bombings, and attacks in Cameroon, the Cameroonian government officially declared war on Boko Haram on 14 May 2014 and promulgated Law No. 2014/028 of 23 December 2014 on the suppression of acts of terrorism"

**Pledge form:** Speech

*Sources:*  
Tar and Ahmed  
2022: 175; Agbu  
and Okereke  
2022: 155; Tar  
and Ahmed  
2022: 183

**Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2014, Jun )

**Event description:** (1) "A spectacular attack on the Waza construction camp of the Chinese company Sinohydro in May 2014 finally pushed Cameroon into declaring war on Boko Haram and deploying 700 soldiers from the BIR as reinforcements in the Far North."; (2) "[During the summer of 2014] spillover into Far North Region by combatants and fleeing Nigerians sparked a ground campaign from the Cameroonian military, supported from January 2015 by a multi-national joint task force from Lake Chad Basin countries"; (3) "Cameroon began to dismantle Boko Haram's arms caches"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
ICG 2016: 11;  
Rackley 2017;  
Chilaka and  
Onyebuchi 2019:  
53

**Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2015, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) "Chadian and Cameroonian forces secured their mutual border, before forcing fighters towards the Chadian border and dislodging them from Cameroonian territory. Once expelled, this approach ensured "that Boko Haram [did] not have access to the use of the borders for launching attacks", and this denied it safe havens and significantly degraded its capacity."; (2) "As the conflict intensified, Cameroon demanded hot pursuit rights from Nigeria in 2014 and, in cooperation with Chad, launched Operation Logone in January 2015. (...) The two armies carry out coordinated operations and regularly exchange intelligence."; (3) "Boko Haram extended armed attacks into northern Cameroon in 2014 but was substantially beaten back by joint Cameroonian, Chadian and Nigerian armed forces in early 2015"; (4) "In 2015, as the extremists began attacking Nigeria's neighbors with greater frequency, Cameroon ramped up cooperation under the Multinational Joint Task Force, a regional military effort to address the threat."; (5) "African leaders are stepping up their response to Boko Haram, with Chadian soldiers chasing the militants from a northern Nigerian town"; (6) "The MNJTF has dislodged Boko Haram from their strongholds, except for the Sambisa

*Sources:*  
Hankins 2020:  
40; ICG 2016: 27;  
Rackley 2017;  
Corey-Boulet  
2018; Sengupta  
and Nossiter  
2015; Mutah  
2021: 105;  
Happi 2020: 4

Forest, and freed many hostages kidnapped by the group”; (7) “the MNJTF has recorded successes on ground in dislodging Boko Haram [from Cameroon]”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “following international military collaboration among the four countries of the Lake Chad basin [beginning in summer 2014], Boko Haram lost almost all its territory in the course of five months.” (Hassan 2022: 78); (2) “Chadian and Cameroonian forces secured their mutual border, before forcing fighters towards the Chadian border and dislodging them from Cameroonian territory. Once expelled, this approach ensured “that Boko Haram [did] not have access to the use of the borders for launching attacks”, and this denied it safe havens and significantly degraded its capacity.” (Hankins 2020: 40)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “a ground campaign from the Cameroonian military, supported from January 2015 by a multi-national joint task force from Lake Chad Basin countries”; (2) “joint Cameroonian, Chadian and Nigerian armed forces in early 2015”; (3) “Cameroonian forces conducted joint operations along with the Nigerian Army on Nigeria’s territory”

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## 2.9 Boko Haram in Nigeria

**Target:** Nigeria, **Host:** Nigeria, **UCDP Actor ID:** 1051

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**Domestic territorial gain** (*Date:* 2013, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) “the notorious Sambisa Forest of Nigeria. The vast and extensive forest has served as Boko Haram’s base since 2013”; (2) “Its [Boko Haram’s] most significant territorial expansion campaigns took place between 2013”

*Sources:*  
Musah 2021: 3;  
Hassan 2022: 78

**Domestic territorial loss** (*Date:* 2021, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) “Boko Haram was active until 2021, when ISWAP killed its leader, absorbed its territory, and relegated its members to remote islands in Lake Chad.”

*Sources:*  
CFR 2023

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## 2.10 CNDD-FDD in DR Congo (Zaire)

**Target:** Burundi, **Host:** DR Congo (Zaire), **UCDP Actor ID:** 434

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1996, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) “In [late July] 1996 Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, came to power through a coup d’état that was supported by the Tutsi-dominated Burundian military. Due to ongoing violence, huge numbers of people were forced to flee to neighbouring countries, particularly Zaire and Tanzania. Hiding among these refugees were Hutu-dominated rebel groups such as the CNDD-FDD.”; (2) “CNDD-FDD used Congolese territory as bases for assault and retreat; to some extent they benefited from (at least passive) complicity, and at any rate territorial control of the collapsed state was nominal at most.”; (3) “In South Kivu, the ex-FAR shared its military expertise with the CNDD-FDD.”

*Sources:*  
Ansorg 2020:  
584-85;  
Reyntjens 1999:  
242; Rafti 2007:  
68

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1996, Oct, 12)

*Sources:*  
Prunier 1997:  
14-15; ICG 2002:  
7; Prunier 1997:  
15; Prunier 1997:  
6; Prunier 2009:  
416 fn. 134



**Event description:** (1) "[On 12 October 1996] the Banyamulenge and ADFL forces launched an attack on the refugee camps and the FDD support bases in Zaire (...) [And thus the] support structure which had provided the FDD with its fall-back positions in Zaire began to collapse; (2) "The first Congo war (1996-1997) was a severe blow to FDD organisational capacity. The joint military operations conducted by Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Eritrea in Eastern Congo destroyed FDD rear bases and disrupted supply routes."; (3) "most of the [CNDD-FDD] guerrillas fleeing Zaire reentered northern Burundi only in an effort to reach the eastern border with Tanzania, hoping to find a safe haven there."; (4) "the events which unfolded between early September and late November 1996 enabled the Rwandan leadership fully to realize (...) [the goal to] liquidate the FDD bases around Uvira [in DR Congo] and thus indirectly strengthen the [Burundian] Buyoya regime"; (5) "The FAB had had troops in South Kivu since October 1996 to counter FDD infiltrations."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "The joint military operations (...) destroyed FDD rear bases and disrupted supply routes [in Congo]." (ICG 2002: 7)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "joint military operations conducted by Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Eritrea in Eastern Congo"

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2002, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) "Since the beginning of 2002, the army has registered a number of significant victories that have boosted its morale and weakened the rebellion. Successes inside the Congo closed-off supply routes used by rebel units in southwestern Burundi. Capture of the Ubwari Peninsula by the combined forces of Rwanda, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), and the Burundi army dealt a severe blow to FDD capacities in South Kivu."; (2) "After the visit to Kinshasa of the Burundi transition Minister for Foreign Affairs, T  rence Sinunguruza in January 2002, it became clear that the DRC was eager to normalise relations with Burundi and resolve the issue of the FDD presence on its territory. FDD officers in Kigoma indicated, for instance, that in January 2002 their families were given an ultimatum to leave the country within three months."

Sources:  
ICG 2002: 3;  
ICG 2002: 11

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Expulsion

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) Capture of the Ubwari Peninsula by the combined forces of Rwanda, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), and the Burundi army"

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2002, Mar )

**Event description:** (1) "Successes inside the Congo closed-off supply routes used by rebel units in southwestern Burundi"; (2) "Following this incident [in March 2002], FDD fighters were reported to have dispersed in Zambia, Tanzania and other parts of Katanga."

Sources:  
ICG 2002: 3;  
ICG 2002: 11

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "Following this incident [in March 2002], FDD fighters

were reported to have dispersed in Zambia, Tanzania and other parts of Katanga.” (ICG 2002: 11)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) Capture of the Ubwari Peninsula by the combined forces of Rwanda, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), and the Burundi army”

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## 2.11 CPN-M in India

**Target:** Nepal, **Host:** India, **UCDP Actor ID:** 258

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1998, Sep )

**Event description:** (1) “September that year [1998], there were reports that Nepali and Indian Maoists had held a two-week-long secret meeting in the Indian city of Kolkata. [...] Later on] concrete evidence surfaced regarding links between the Maoists and like-minded groups in India”

*Sources:*  
Mishra 2004:  
635

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2001, Sep, 20)

**Event description:** (1) “Against this background late that month [September], the Indian foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, labeled the Maoists as terrorists and stated that India supported the Nepali government in its fight against them. (...) The Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Nirupama Rao, promised that India would not allow its territory to be used by those inimical to Nepalese interests.”; (2) “Following anti-terrorist trends [immediately after 9/11], the Indian and US governments listed the CPN (M) as a proscribed terrorist group, and the Indian government deployed its security forces along the Nepali border”

*Sources:*  
Mishra 2004:  
637; Ogura 2008:  
22

**Pledge form:** Speech

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2003, Aug, 20)

**Event description:** (1) “In August 2003, an important member of the CPN (M) Politburo, Gajurel, was arrested at Chennai Airport. Over the next few months, other Maoist leaders met the same fate, and by April 2004, 11 out of the 95 Central Committee members had been arrested in India”; (2) “Just before the breakdown [of talks, 21 August], reports came in that Indian authorities had arrested a high-profile Maoist politburo member, C. P. Gajurel, at Chennai International Airport”; (3) “So far, India has arrested and handed over around 60 Maoist leaders and activists to Nepal. However, that seems to have made no difference whatsoever to the functioning of the Maoist leadership on Indian soil.”

*Sources:*  
Ogura 2008: 20;  
Mishra 2004:  
640; Mishra  
2004: 642

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) “11 out of the 95 Central Committee members had been arrested in India” (Ogura 2008: 20)

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2004, Jun )

**Event description:** (1) “On 4-5 June 2004. (...) [India’s FM] pledged support to

*Sources:*  
Upreti 2006: 44;  
Ogura 2008: 20

Nepal to strengthen its security capabilities to fight the Maoist insurgency. On the eve of his visit Indian police had arrested 11 Maoist leaders 12 (including 6 central leaders) in Patna, India"; (2) "Because of these incidents, the CPN (M) decided to relocate their party headquarters from India (where Chairman Prachanda and his staff had taken refuge) to Nepal"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "Because of these incidents, the CPN (M) decided to relocate their party headquarters from India (where Chairman Prachanda and his staff had taken refuge) to Nepal" (Ogura 2008: 20) (2) Indian Home Ministry report for 2005-2006 observed that "Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) are reported to have come to various parts of the country, especially bordering States such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, [not for cross-border combat but] mainly for medical treatment." (mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/AnnualReport0506.pdf)

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) "11 out of the 95 Central Committee members had been arrested in India" (Ogura 2008 : 20)

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## 2.12 CPN-M in Nepal

**Target:** Nepal, **Host:** Nepal, **UCDP Actor ID:** 258

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**Domestic territorial gain** (*Date:* 1996, Feb, 13)

**Event description:** (1) "When the CPN (M) began the People's War on February 13, 1996 (...) [they immediately established] guerrilla zones (...) [and a] base area"

**Name of territory:** Several Mid-West areas.

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*Sources:*  
Ogura 2008:  
13-14

## 2.13 CSNPD in Cameroon

**Target:** Chad, **Host:** Cameroon, **UCDP Actor ID:** 448

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1992, Jan, 1)

**Event description:** (1) "Until his reconciliation with Deby in August 1994, Moïse Nodji Kett led the Comité de sursaut national pour la paix et la démocratie (CSNPD) in southern Chad, using the Central African Republic as a base."; (2) "Ketté operated in the extreme southeastern Chad, using bases across the border in the Central African Republic and Cameroon"; (3) "The CSNPD, which formed in 1992, allegedly wanted to prevent the Déby government from exploiting oil in the Doba Basin"

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*Sources:*  
Miles 1995: 59;  
Behrends et al.  
2011: 149; Lujala  
and Rustad 2012

## 2.14 CSNPD in Central African Republic

**Target:** Chad, **Host:** Central African Republic, **UCDP Actor ID:** 448

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1992, Jan, 1)

**Event description:** (1) "Until his reconciliation with Deby in August 1994, Moïse Nodji Kett led the Comité de sursaut national pour la paix et la démocratie (CSNPD) in southern Chad, using the Central African Republic as a base."; (2) "Ketté operated

*Sources:*  
Miles 1995: 59;  
Behrends et al.  
2011: 149; Lujala  
and Rustad 2012

in the extreme southeastern Chad, using bases across the border in the Central African Republic and Cameroon"; (3) "The CSNPD, which formed in 1992, allegedly wanted to prevent the Déby government from exploiting oil in the Doba Basin"

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## 2.15 EIJM-AS in Sudan

**Target:** Eritrea, **Host:** Sudan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 495

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### **Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1989, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "Omer al-Bashir had seized power in Sudan with the help of the National Islamic Front (NIF) led by Mr. Hassan Al-Turabi. The latter supported the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM) that led campaigns against the EPLF and Eritrean military forces"; (2) "EIJM – AS remained based in Sudan and most of its operations were concentrated in the west of Eritrea."; (3) "The EIJM started to launch a guerrilla campaign against the EPLF from Sudan along the western border with Eritrea in 1989."

*Sources:*  
OHCHR 2015:  
44;  
UCDP/actor/495;  
OHCHR 2015:  
44

### **Pledge** (*Date:* 1994, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) "in August 1994 Eritrea and Sudan signed a joint statement aimed at ensuring non-interference in each other's affairs."

**Pledge form:** Written pact

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*Sources:*  
OHCHR 2015:  
44

## 2.16 ELN in Colombia

**Target:** Colombia, **Host:** Colombia, **UCDP Actor ID:** 744

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### **Domestic territorial gain** (*Date:* 2017, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "A military offensive in 1973, known as "Operation Anorí," wiped out much of the group's soldiers and weakened its command structure. This forced the guerrillas to withdraw to the border with Venezuela and rearm [a situation which remained since] (...) [Yet] After the FARC demobilized in early 2017, the ELN began a process of expansion (...) filling the territorial vacuums left by the FARC"

**Name of territory:** Former FARC-controlled areas

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*Sources:*  
InSight Crime  
2017

## 2.17 ELN in Venezuela

**Target:** Colombia, **Host:** Venezuela, **UCDP Actor ID:** 744

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### **Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1980, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "The presence of Colombian insurgent groups at the border with Venezuela dates back at least to 1980, as testified by the occasional skirmishes between ELN and Venezuelan security forces."; (2) "Between the 1970s and 1980s, the ELN began to use Venezuela as a refuge from the operations of the Colombian authorities, which turned the border state of Apure into the favorite rear guard of the guerrillas."

*Sources:*  
Martínez 2017:  
140; InSight  
Crime 2017

### **Pledge** (*Date:* 1995, Mar, 15)

**Event description:** (1) "[In response to] ELN attack in Cararabo (...) Venezuelan President Rafael Caldera yesterday declared the border with Colombia an area of military operations and ordered the immediate creation of new tactical units of the Armed Forces

*Sources:*  
El Tiempo 1995

at strategic points in the four Venezuelan states adjoining our country. Simultaneously, he ordered the expansion of the jurisdiction of the military courts there, which will be in charge of judging actions such as the one committed on February 26 by the ELN column that attacked the Cararabo river base and killed eight marines."

**Pledge form:** Speech

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1995, Apr* )

**Event description:** (1) "Venezuelan governments were hostile to the rebels, particularly following the 1995 massacre of eight Venezuelan marines by the ELN in Apure."; (2) "Venezuelan Army and National Guard troops have been operating in Teatros de Operaciones (theaters of operation) since the mid-1990s, with theaters 1 and 2 based in Guasdalito, Apure and La Fría, Táchira, respectively. (...) [However,] Despite the presence of Venezuelan forces in the area, they are limited in their ability to establish control."

*Sources:*  
Ortegón 2017;  
Boraz 2007: 249

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) Cunningham and Sawyer (2019) code new leader ascending due to death of former leader.

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

## **2.18 ETA in France**

**Target:** Spain, **Host:** France, **UCDP Actor ID:** 313

#### **Sanctuary start** (*Date: 1961, Jul* )

**Event description:** (1) "ETA's first leadership took refuge from the repression by crossing the border into exile [in July 1961. (...) The] group's 'French sanctuary' [...] had taken shape"

*Sources:*  
Woodworth  
2001: 36

#### **Pledge** (*Date: 1984, Jan, 12*)

**Event description:** (1) "In January 1984, France launched its policy of expulsion to third countries. On 10 January, 12 Spanish Basque activists were arrested in the early hours of the morning between Hendaye and Bayonne and immediately put on a military plane bound for Paris. The raid targeted members of ETA-pm VIII, including one of its leaders, José Maria Larretxea-Goni (victim of an attempted kidnapping by the four Spanish police officers in October 1983)<sup>3</sup> but also important members of ETA-m."

*Sources:*  
Alvarez 2018:  
122

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1984, Jun, 22*)

**Event description:** (1) "A product of the new French doctrine since the beginning of the year was the arrest of two Spanish Basques on 22 June 1984 and their conviction the next morning in court. (...) This is not a major coup, but it suggests that the public prosecutor's office is finally following the policy proposed by the Interior since 1981, which consists of harassing the ETAs in their rear base, taking every opportunity to establish an offence in order to obtain convictions, which are admittedly minor, but which hinder the organisation's movements and can then justify house arrest and expulsion."

*Sources:*  
Alvarez 2018:  
133-34

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint: No**

**Crackdown campaign** (Date: 1986, Jul, 19)

**Event description:** (1) "In order to carry out this surrender, the French Constitutional Council gave the green light, on July 11, 1986, to a decree-law of November 2, 1945, which allowed the immediate expulsion from the territory of foreigners who constituted "a threat to public order" by administrative means, without the need for a court order (Article 26). This procedure of absolute urgency, much faster than extraditions, was in place for 16 months, and represented a qualitative leap in France's cooperative disposition. In application of this law, on July 19, the presumed ETA member José López Varona, alias "Ixema", was arrested by the French police and handed over to the Spanish police at the Hendaye border. The justification given by the Paris authorities was that Varona's activities were a source of "public order problems" and that he did not possess the necessary documentation to reside in France."; (2) "Foreigners would be placed at the border, where Spanish security forces were free to arrest them. As most Basque militants did not have legal papers and were not French citizens, the government's decision spread panic. Several French newspapers interpreted this policy as the end of the ETA sanctuary in France. Basques were expelled this way during the Chirac premiership"; (3) "In short, the French decide to make direct police-to-police deliveries" (Alvarez 1996: 194); (4) "five or six of its [ETA's] main leaders have been arrested"

*Sources:*  
Blanco 1996:  
346; de la Calle  
and Sanchez-  
Cuenca 2022:  
118; Alvarez  
2018: 192;  
Alvarez 2018:  
232

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged: Yes**

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "Para llevar a cabo esta entrega, el Consejo Constitucional francés dio luz verde, el 11 de julio de 1986, a un decreto-ley del 2 de noviembre de 1945 que permitía proceder por vía administrativa, sin necesidad de requerimiento judicial, a la expulsión inmediata del territorio de aquellos extranjeros que constituyesen "una amenaza para el orden público", (artículo 26). Este procedimiento de urgencia absoluta, mucho más rápido que las extradiciones, estuvo en práctica durante 16 meses, y supuso un salto cualitativo en la disposición cooperadora de Francia. En aplicación de esta ley, el 19 de Julio fue detenido por la Policía francesa y entregado a la española en la frontera de Hendaya el presunto etarra José López Varona, alias "Ixema", La justificación dada por las autoridades de París fue que las actividades de Varona eran fuente de "problemas de orden público" y que no poseía la documentación necesaria para residir en Francia." (Blanco 1996: 346). (2) "Foreigners would be placed at the border, where Spanish security forces were free to arrest them. As most Basque militants did not have legal papers and were not French citizens, the government's decision spread panic. Several French newspapers interpreted this policy as the end of the ETA sanctuary in France. Basques were expelled this way during the Chirac premiership" (de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2022: 118).

**Leadership decapitation: Yes**

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) "Joaquín Iceta Picabea, Juan Carlos García Gastelu and Ignacio Lopez Vergara Astola, who had been living in France for two years, were arrested in their turn (Alvarez 2018: 214).

**Intrusive: No**

**Joint: No**

**Crackdown campaign** (Date: 1991, Jul, 30)

**Event description:** (1) "The interior ministers [of France and Spain] announced the creation of a joint police station in Le Perthus (the French side of La Junquera), responsible for overseeing the operation of the Bin Conholes crossing between the two countries. Since its inauguration on 30 July 1991, three French and three Spanish police officers

*Sources:*  
Blanco 1996: 368  
[692]; Blanco  
1996: 367 [591];  
Blanco 1996: 371  
[595]; Alvarez  
2018: 272-273

have been working together under the direction of two inspectors of each nationality. According to Marchand, 'working together on a daily basis will facilitate the exchange of information' in the fight against terrorism"; (2) "[There was] a police operation, which began in Spain, spread beyond the border as a result of coordination between the French and Spanish police forces"; (3) "However, the measure of 'hot pursuit' is not yet in force for Spain and France. (...) [Still,] in the second half of August, important incidents took place between the police and ETA which led to the dismantling of the 'Donosti commando' by the Civil Guard [the Spanish police] and that of the 'Vizcaya group' by the Basque Autonomous Police. In the latter raid, the Basque police officer Alfonso Mentxaka and the ETA activist Juan María Ormazabal, 'Turko', were killed."; (4) "[Already the year before,] we can see a general intensification of links between the French and Spanish police (...) cooperation between French and Spanish police officers made it possible to dismantle distribution networks (...) [with] links formed at local level by the PAF [French border security] with the Spanish security forces on the Basque question [along] the border (...) [Indeed,] An important bilateral meeting was held on May 4 1990 (...) The meeting concluded an agreement on the establishment of a central judicial liaison, and on the local local liaison officers in Bayonne and Vitoria, and more frequent operational meetings in France. (...) At operational level (...) [France and Spain agreed on] setting up a joint crisis headquarters for major operations (...) however, they [the French] did not wish to go any further (...) The right to hot pursuit was ruled out (...) The French [still] refused the presence of Spanish police officers on their territory"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "in the second half of August, important incidents took place between the police and ETA which led to the dismantling of the 'Donosti commando' by the Civil Guard [the Spanish police] and that of the 'Vizcaya group' by the Basque Autonomous Police." (Blanco 1996: 371 [595])

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "[There was] the creation of a joint police station (...) working together on a daily basis (...) [with] the exchange of information"; (2) "links formed at local level by the PAF [French border security] with the Spanish security forces on the Basque question [along] the border"; (3) "The French [still] refused the presence of Spanish police officers on their territory"

## 2.19 FARC in Colombia

**Target:** Colombia, **Host:** Colombia, **UCDP Actor ID:** 743

**Domestic territorial gain** (*Date:* 1964, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "[Territorial control was established by] communist guerrillas who preceded the FARC-EP"

**Name of territory:** Various

*Sources:*  
Gutiérrez 2022

## 2.20 FARC in Ecuador

**Target:** Colombia, **Host:** Ecuador, **UCDP Actor ID:** 743

### **Sanctuary start** (*Date: 1980, Spring*)

**Event description:** (1) "the FARC, which entered the department [of Ecuador] in the 1980s, persisted until its demobilization in 2017."

*Sources:*  
Idler 2019: 89

### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2008, Mar* )

**Event description:** (1) "The operation to kill Reyes began in the early hours of Saturday morning when the Colombian army received confirmation from a spy that the guerrilla commander was in a hamlet called Santa Rosa just across the border in Ecuador. Planes were sent to bombard the camp, followed by troops in helicopters who recovered the bodies of Reyes and another 16 rebels. Also among the dead was Guillermo Enrique Torres, alias Julian Conrado, a Farc commander known for his music, who had released several compilations of revolutionary ballads that he wrote and sang. Colombian President Alvaro Uribe spoke to his Ecuadorean counterpart Rafael Correa informing him of the action."

*Sources:*  
McDermott 2008

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

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## **2.21 FARC in Venezuela**

**Target:** Colombia, **Host:** Venezuela, **UCDP Actor ID:** 743

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### **Sanctuary start** (*Date: 1964, Spring*)

**Event description:** (1) "Venezuela was a site of operations for the FARC throughout the Colombian conflict"

*Sources:*  
InSight Crime  
2023

### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2004, Jun* )

**Event description:** (1) "Since the middle of 2004, there appears to have been a potential shift in Venezuelan toleration of activities by illegal Colombian groups. Seventeen FARC combatants captured after a June 2004 firefight along the border were deported to Colombia; Venezuela arrested a high-ranking FARC official in February 2005, extraditing him to Colombia in April; and the Venezuelan National Guard killed two and injured nine in a firefight with the FARC in March 2005."; (2) "Venezuela did increase border security and temporarily shut the legal border crossings in January 2005 following an incident in which a senior FARC official, Ricardo Granda, was abducted in Caracas by bounty hunters and transported to Colombia."

*Sources:*  
Boraz 2007: 261;  
Boraz 2007: 258

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## **2.22 FARF in Cameroon**

**Target:** Chad, **Host:** Cameroon, **UCDP Actor ID:** 451

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### **Sanctuary start** (*Date: 1994, Aug* )

*Sources:*  
Behrends et al.  
2011: 149-50;  
Behrends et al.  
2011: 50



**Event description:** (1) "in August 1994, the government and the CSNPD signed yet another peace agreement. (...) Some of those in the CSNPD regarded Ketté's final peace accord with Deby as a sell-out. These rebels formed FARF, under the leadership of Laokin Bardé in 1994."; (2) "FARF use[d] Central African [and] Cameroonian territory as rear-bases."

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1997, May*)

**Event description:** (1) "Déby's diplomats negotiated with Central African Republic and Cameroonian counterparts to deny FARF use of Central African or Cameroonian territory as rear-bases. This diplomacy succeeded and Bardé, realising the loss of his safe havens, signed a peace treaty with his opponent."; (2) "By mid-1997 the government signed peace deals with FARF and the MDD leadership and succeeded in cutting off the groups from their rear bases in the Central African Republic and Cameroon."; (3) "[Before signing the 1997 peace agreement, FARF's] leader, Laokein Barde (...) like Kette, he was eventually cut off from his rear bases in CAR and Cameroon and was forced into the peace agreement."

*Sources:*  
Behrends et al. 2011: 150; US Department of State 2017 (see also IBP 2013: 31); MAR 2004

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1997, Nov, 24*)

**Event description:** (1) "Three FARF leaders were arrested on November 24th in the Cameroon capital and placed in custody in a police station"; (2) "According to Africa Research Bulletin, quoting AFP, some 300 former combatants with the FARF arrived in the capital, N'Djamena, on 12 June 1998"

*Sources:*  
Africa Research Bulletin 1998: 12937; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2001 (see also Africa Research Bulletin (1998) "Former FARF Rebels for Selection")

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "The government (...) succeeded in cutting off the groups from their rear bases in the Central African Republic and Cameroon." (US Department of State 2017); (2) "300 former combatants with the FARF arrived in the capital, N'Djamena" (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2001; see also Africa Research Bulletin 1998)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

## **2.23 FARF in Central African Republic**

**Target:** Chad, **Host:** Central African Republic, **UCDP Actor ID:** 451

#### **Sanctuary start** (*Date: 1994, Aug*)

**Event description:** (1) "in August 1994, the government and the CSNPD signed yet another peace agreement. (...) Some of those in the CSNPD regarded Ketté's final peace accord with Deby as a sell-out. These rebels formed FARF, under the leadership of Laokin Bardé in 1994."; (2) "FARF use[d] Central African [and] Cameroonian territory as rear-bases."

*Sources:*  
Reyna 2011: 149-50; Reyna 2011: 50

#### **Pledge** (*Date: 1997, Mar, 6*)

*Sources:*  
Berman and Sams 2000: 224; Behrends et al. 2011: 150

**Event description:** (1) "[A peacekeeping mandate] was signed by President Bongo on 6 March 1997 for an initial period of three months. The mandate provided that "the objective of MISAB is to help restore peace and security [in the CAR] by monitoring the implementation of the agreements signed on 25 January 1997 in Bangui." Beyond that, the text simply stated that "MISAB shall conduct operations to disarm the ex-rebels, the militia and all other unlawfully armed individuals."; (2) "Déby's diplomats negotiated with Central African Republic and Cameroonian counterparts to deny FARF use of Central African or Cameroonian territory as rear-bases."

**Pledge form:** Written pact

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1997, May, 17*)

**Event description:** (1) "Déby's diplomats negotiated with Central African Republic and Cameroonian counterparts to deny FARF use of Central African or Cameroonian territory as rear-bases. This diplomacy succeeded and Bardé, realising the loss of his safe havens, signed a peace treaty with his opponent."; (2) "By mid-1997 the government signed peace deals with FARF and the MDD leadership and succeeded in cutting off the groups from their rear bases in the Central African Republic and Cameroon."; (3) "[Before signing the 1997 peace agreement, FARF's] leader, Laokein Barde (...) like Kette, he was eventually cut off from his rear bases in CAR and Cameroon and was forced into the peace agreement."; (4) "Frisson Laokein Barde returned to N'djamena on May 17th [1997]"; (5) "The uprising [in CAR] was suppressed with the help of François Bozizé, and with the backing of Chadian troops"; (6) "Laokein Bardé [i.e. the FARF leader] (...) withdrew before his assassination, in [April/]May 1998, in the Bakoro massif in CAR"; (7) "the Forces armées de la République fédérale (FARF) (...) was active until the death of its leader in April 1998 in the Moundou area and in the Bakoro massif of the Central African Republic"; (8) "[According to Chadian news,] Barde was shot (...) in an ambush of the regular Chadian army"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "The government (...) succeeded in cutting off the groups from their rear bases in the Central African Republic and Cameroon." (US Department of State 2017); (2) "Laokein Bardé [i.e. the FARF leader] (...) withdrew [from the CAR] before his assassination" (Marchal 2009: 36); (3) "Frisson Laokein Barde returned to N'djamena on May 17th [1997]" (Africa Research Bulletin 1997: 12699)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "[The operations were] with the backing of Chadian troops"; (2) "Barde was shot (...) in an ambush of the regular Chadian army"

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1998, Jun, 12*)

**Event description:** (1) "According to Africa Research Bulletin, quoting AFP, some 300 former combatants with the FARF arrived in the capital, N'Djamena, on 12 June 1998"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "300 former combatants with the FARF arrived in the capital, N'Djamena" (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2001; see also Africa Research Bulletin 1998)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

#### *Sources:*

Reyna 2011: 150;  
US Department of State 2017  
(see also IBP 2013: 31); MAR 2004; Africa Research Bulletin 1997: 12699; Alusala 2007: 13; Marchal 2009: 36; ICG 2006: 4; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2001

#### *Sources:*

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2001  
(see also Africa Research Bulletin (1998) "Former FARF Rebels for Selection")

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "[The operations were] with the backing of Chadian troops"; (2) "Barde was shot (...) in an ambush of the regular Chadian army"

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## 2.24 FDLR in Burundi

**Target:** Rwanda, **Host:** Burundi, **UCDP Actor ID:** 528

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 2019, Dec )

**Event description:** (1) "Burundi hosts FDLR splinter elements from South Kivu, which it has deployed to its border with Rwanda. In December 2018, assailants coming from Burundi launched an attack in the Nyungwe forest in south-western Rwanda"

*Sources:*  
ICG  
2020-Averting: 3

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2021, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) "Burundi appears to have reversed its policy of sheltering the FDLR, attacking the group's forest hideout in February 2021."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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*Sources:*  
ICG  
2022-Regional

## 2.25 FDLR in DR Congo (Zaire)

**Target:** Rwanda, **Host:** DR Congo (Zaire), **UCDP Actor ID:** 528

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 2000, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) "When Paul Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took Kigali in 1994, these elements crossed the border to what was then Zaire, regrouped and recruited from among exiled Rwandans and others who identify themselves as Hutu in the country"; (2) "By mid-1998, the RPA crushed the uprising [of ALiR, FDLR's predecessor organisation, in Northern Rwanda], killing and capturing key ALiR commanders and combatants, and the ALiR was subsequently restructured into two separate branches in the Congo, with help from President Kabila who broke his earlier ties with the Rwandan government. ALiR I was based in Masisi (North Kivu) and Shabunda (South Kivu), and ALiR II was based in Kinshasa (...) In 2000, ALiR I and ALiR II came together under the politico-military structure of the FDLR"; (3) "As relations between Laurent Desiré Kabila and Paul Kagame began to deteriorate, the rebel group came to the aid of Kabila to fight the common enemy"

*Sources:*  
Marriage 2016:  
88; Rafti 2006: 9;  
Rafti 2004: 16

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2002, Jul, 30)

**Event description:** (1) "On 30th July 2002, an agreement was signed between Rwanda and the DRC under the 'third-party' supervision of the United Nations and the government of South Africa. The Pretoria Accords called for the withdrawal and repatriation of all Rwandan troops from the DRC, including those in Kamina, within ninety days and the collaboration of the DRC government to track down and disarm the ex-FAR and Interahamwe within the territory under its control."

*Sources:*  
Rafti 2004: 18

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2002, Sep )

**Event description:** (1) "Kabila banned the FDLR rebels on 24th September and gave a deadline of 72 hours to its leaders to depart, calling them personae non grata." (2) "Yielding to international pressure, President Joseph Kabila, who the previous year had succeeded his assassinated father, formally outlawed the FDLR in 2002. Some senior officers were arrested in Kinshasa, while 1,900 FDLR troops were restricted to an army base in Kamina."; (3) "By 2002 relations between the Western FDLR units and the Congolese government had cooled, notably following Laurent Kabila's assassination and subsequent replacement by his son. Joseph Kabila declared the group illegal in September 2002, from which time it is widely acknowledged that large-scale military assistance from the Congolese government to the FDLR ceased"; (4) "Until late 2002, the FDLR also received weapons and cash payments from Laurent Désiré Kabila and Joseph Kabila (...) In September 2002, Rwanda and the DRC signed the Pretoria Accords, which called for the withdrawal of all Rwandan troops from the DRC and Rwanda ostensibly pulled out its troops. Pressured to disarm and repatriate Hutu rebels operating in Congolese territory, Kabila banned FDLR leadership from the DRC and cut off all support hitherto given to the rebels."; (5) "The Congolese army attacked those troops [restricted to an army base in Kamina after Kabila's policy shift earlier that year] in late 2002 after they refused voluntary demobilisation, forcefully repatriating 359 combatants and dispersing the rest into the forest. Under this pressure, the remnants of the western branch of the FDLR moved eastwards to link up with their comrades in the Kivus in 2003"; (6) "[In] October [2002] (...) they [the FDLR leadership] had been forcibly repatriated to Kigali"; (7) "the Congolese military proved unable to enforce this plan, and instead were reduced to attacking the camp; the majority of Rwandan combatants scattered into the bush, with only 157 entering the demobilisation process. The rest made their way across the DRC, regrouping with the Rwandan rebel elements that had remained in the East throughout the war"; (8) "After banning the FDLR leadership in September 2002, Kabila arrested and transferred Colonel Renzaho to the ICTR. Colonel Mpiranya and Colonel Ntiwiragabo subsequently fled the DRC for fear of being delivered to international justice, leaving a power void in the movement."; (9) "Ugandan troops only entered Congo in force later in the month of August [1998], and Ugandan authorities did not admit to their presence until September"; (10) "[Only on] 24 Apr 2003 (...) Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni gave the order on Thursday for his forces to withdraw from the troubled [Ituri] district, [officially withdrawing in May 2003] (...) [Yet at the time] around 6,000 to 7,000 Ugandan troops in Ituri, and it would be impossible to evacuate them all in one day."

*Sources:*  
Rafti 2004: 18;  
ICG 2005: 2;  
Shepherd 2016:  
74; Rafti 2006:  
13; ICG 2005: 2;  
Prunier 2009:  
445, fn. 109;  
Shepherd 2016:  
74; Rafti 2007:  
73; Clarke 2001:  
280; The New  
Humanitarian  
2003

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "[The operations] forcefully repatriating 359 combatants and dispersing the rest into the forest" (ICG 2005: 2)

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) "Kabila arrested and transferred Colonel Renzaho to the ICTR. Colonel Mpiranya and Colonel Ntiwiragabo subsequently fled the DRC for fear of being delivered to international justice, leaving a power void in the movement." (Rafti 2007: 73)

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Ugandan troops (...) entered Congo in force later in the month of August [1998]"; (2) "[Still as of] 24 Apr 2003 (...) around 6,000 to 7,000 Ugandan troops in Ituri, and it would be

impossible to evacuate them all in one day.”; (3) “the Ugandan army invaded the DRC in August 1998 and remained as an occupation force for nearly five years”

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2004, Apr*)

**Event description:** (1) “While the new national Congolese army began military operations against the FDLR in South Kivu in April 2004, it did not sustain them and finally halted them when a mutiny broke out in Bukavu in May”

*Sources:*  
ICG 2005: 4

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2004, Nov, 25*)

**Event description:** (1) “On November 25 a direct phone call to MONUC announced Rwanda’s decision to cross the border (it already had, but not officially) and attack the FDLR. (...) Kagame wrote to the African Union saying that his troops ‘would need to stay only two weeks in the Congo’ to root out the FDLR”; (2) “In November it [the Congolese army] launched a new operation with minimal MONUC support but its objectives were never clear (...) At the end of 2004 in South Kivu, isolated skirmishes between army and FDLR alternated with friendly discussion and even joint roadblocks and tax collection points”; (3) “In late 2004, Samba Kaputo, Kabila’s national security adviser, presented the international community in Kinshasa with a new plan for dealing with the FDLR, which included a vague deadline of early 2005 for it to leave the country (...) Rwandan incursion into North Kivu in November and December 2004 actually occurred (...) [as] army trucks crossed the border in late November and headed for Rutshuru”; (4) “Yielding to international pressure, Kabila set upon the FDLR. In November and December 2004, the FARDC clashed with the FDLR in the Walungu area of South Kivu”

*Sources:*  
Prunier 2009: 299; ICG 2005: 3; ICG 2005: 6; Rafti 2005: 103

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “MONUC announced Rwanda’s decision to cross the border (it already had, but not officially) and attack the FDLR”; (2) Rwandan incursion into North Kivu in November and December 2004 actually occurred (...) [as] army trucks crossed the border in late November and headed for Rutshuru”; (3) “[the Congolese army] launched a new operation with minimal MONUC support”

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2005, Jan*)

**Event description:** (1) “In January 2005, the African Union resolved to create a force to disarm and repatriate the FDLR. The FARDC subsequently began a series of offensives against the FDLR to force Hutu rebel disarmament, with MONUC backing. (...) Despite joint FARDC-MONUC operations, the Rwandan rebels proved very resilient against attack. Well-acquainted with the Congolese terrain and adeptly trained in guerrilla tactics, FDLR troops swiftly withdrew and avoided confrontation with the Congolese army. (...) They destroyed FDLR camps and supplies, but the combatants became more aggressive as they lost their resources”; (2) “the newly-integrated Congolese army began a series of offensives against the FDLR in the northern territories of South Kivu to force Hutu rebel disarmament, with support from the MONUC South Kivu Brigade.”

*Sources:*  
Rafti 2007: 80; Rafti 2006: 23

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "FDLR troops swiftly withdrew and avoided confrontation with the Congolese army. (...) [The counterinsurgents] destroyed FDLR camps and supplies" (Rafti 2007: 80)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "MONUC announced Rwanda's decision to cross the border (it already had, but not officially) and attack the FDLR"; (2) Rwandan incursion into North Kivu in November and December 2004 actually occurred (...) [as] army trucks crossed the border in late November and headed for Rutshuru"; (3) "[the Congolese army] launched a new operation with minimal MONUC support"

### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2005, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) "The FDLR re-infiltrated certain bases after the withdrawal of the FARDC and MONUC and rotated throughout South Kivu, changing FDLR concentrations in the province (...) In August 2005, FDLR troops headed north towards Bunyakiri (a transit zone between North Kivu and South Kivu), south to the Ruzizi Plain and reinforcements arrived from the main FDLR Headquarters in Kibue, North Kivu, passing from Kambogoti to Bunyakiri. A strong FDLR concentration was established in Kalonge, between Bunyakiri and Shabunda."; (2) "[By late 2005 notwithstanding the MONUC and Rwandan assaults in the DRC,] the FDLR was a well-organized, nearly conventional army (...) the government had failed to uproot it, did not really want to use it as an excuse for offensive operations in the eastern Congo anymore, but could not tolerate it on its borders for fear that one day it might develop into a real threat if something went wrong inside Rwanda itself."; (3) "[As of 2006] The FARDC regularly close their eyes to rebels penetrating the borders."; (4) "The Congolese transitional government itself supported the Hutu rebels and it has never prevented the flow of arms to them. The incapacity and unwillingness of the Congolese government to dismantle the FDLR have, in fact, been key factors in the rebels' protracted presence in eastern Congo."; (5) "Despite ostensibly banning FDLR leadership from the DRC, FDLR leaders travelled openly in the DRC and Joseph Kabila attempted to gain international recognition for the FDLR"

*Sources:*

Rafti 2006: 23;  
Prunier 2009:  
309; Rafti 2006:  
12; Rafti 2007:  
81; Rafti 2006:  
24

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

### **Pledge** (*Date:* 2008, Dec, 4)

**Event description:** (1) "Dec 4 (Reuters) - Congo and Rwanda have agreed a military plan to try to disband a Rwandan Hutu militia whose presence in eastern Congo is seen as a root cause of enduring conflict there, the Congolese Foreign Minister said on Thursday [4 Dec 2008]"; (2) "The neutralisation of Nkunda was part of a deal between President [Joseph] Kabila [of the DRC] and President [Paul] Kagame [of Rwanda]," Guillaume Lacaille, International Crisis Group DRC analyst, told IRIN. (...) 'To rebound from this last humiliation, Kabila actually made a deal with Rwanda to oust the FDLR and in exchange he got Nkunda's head,' Lacaille said."; (3) "With the disbanding of the CNDP later in the year [2008], the FDLR's currency with the Congolese state de-

*Sources:*

Reuters 2008;  
IRIN 2009;  
Marriage 2019:  
91; Vogel and  
Stearns 2018:  
697

creased and the Kinshasa government agreed to the joint demobilisation operation with the Rwandan army"; (4) "In 2008, President Kabila struck a deal with the Rwandan government, leading to the arrest of CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda and the integration of CNDP troops into the FARDC. As part of this deal, Rwanda deployed troops to the Kivus to hunt down the Rwandan Forces démocratiques pour la libération du Rwanda (FDLR) in joint operations with the FARDC."

**Pledge form:** Written pact

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2009, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) "in January 2009 (...) the Rwandan and the Congo governments began cooperating on neutralising the FDLR forces"; (2) "Operations [against the FDLR] have intensified since the joint operation between the Rwandan army and the FARDC in early 2009, followed by a series of UN-supported operations by the FARDC designed to fracture FDLR command and control (...) These have been successful in forcing the FDLR away from the border region between Rwanda and the DRC, and had in 2009 and early 2010 pushed the FDLR out of some of the most profitable resource-rich regions that they had been exploiting, in some cases for many years. They have, however, not significantly degraded FDLR command and control."; (3) "[There was] a rapprochement of sorts between the Congolese and Rwandan states. In early 2009 the two governments launched a joint initiative to demobilise the FDLR, and this was followed by a further mission led by the Congolese army."; (4) "The initiation of a series of military interventions in 2009 proved to be a turning point, beginning with Umoja Wetu, an operation conducted jointly by the Rwanda Defence Forces and the FARDC. (...) Additional FARDC-led and UN-supported interventions followed and, by 2012, had led to the defection of almost 4,000 FDLR elements. The attacks also disrupted the group's ability to control territory"; (5) "Following a secret agreement between former DRC President Joseph Kabila and Kagame, Rwanda deployed about 4,000 troops under the Umoja Wetu operation with the Congolese armed forces to fight the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) and the FDLR in January and February 2009."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "in January 2009 (...) the Rwandan and the Congo governments began cooperating on neutralising the FDLR forces"; (2) "Rwanda deployed about 4,000 troops under the Umoja Wetu operation with the Congolese armed forces to fight the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) and the FDLR in January and February 2009"

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2009, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) "Operations [against the FDLR] have intensified since the joint operation between the Rwandan army and the FARDC in early 2009, followed by a series of UN-supported operations by the FARDC designed to fracture FDLR command and control (...) These have been successful in forcing the FDLR away from the border region between Rwanda and the DRC, and had in 2009 and early 2010 pushed the FDLR out of some of the most profitable resource-rich regions that they had been exploiting, in some cases for many years. They have, however, not significantly degraded FDLR command and control."; (2) "The initiation of a series of military interventions in 2009 proved to be a turning point, beginning with Umoja Wetu, an operation conducted jointly by the Rwanda Defence Forces and the FARDC. (...) Additional FARDC-led and

*Sources:*

Venugopalan 2016: 7; Shepherd 2016: 74; Marriage 2016: 89, 95; Florquin and Seymour 2016: 1-2; ICG 2022: 3

*Sources:*

Shepherd 2016: 74; Florquin and Seymour 2016: 1-2; Duursma and Gamez 2021: 243; Stys 2014: 10

UN-supported interventions followed and, by 2012, had led to the defection of almost 4,000 FDLR elements. The attacks also disrupted the group's ability to control territory"; (3) "In the framework of the so-called "four plus four" mechanism in which four Rwandan officials met several times with their counterparts from the DRC, the Rwandan and Congolese armies planned a joint military operation, dubbed "Umoja Wetu" (English: Our Unity), to defeat the FDLR. This allowed Rwanda to send troops to the DRC to attack the FDLR (...) The joint operation started in late January 2009 and ended with Rwanda withdrawing at the end of February 2009. (...) The Congolese national army, with support from MONUC, continued to fight the FDLR after Rwanda's withdrawal."; (4) "[During] Kimia II, (...) March-December 2009 (...) The FDLR were dislodged from their military and political headquarters in Masisi, strongholds in Lubero, as well as trading, taxation and mining areas. The leadership of both RUD and FDLR were forced into sparsely populated, remote areas of Masisi, Walikale and Lubero."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "The attacks also disrupted the group's ability to control territory" (Florquin and Seymour 2016: 1-2); (2) "the group evacuated most of its positions in South Kivu and regrouped its soldiers in the inaccessible Itombwe forest, straddling Mwenga and Uvira territories." (Stys 2012: 4)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "in January 2009 (...) the Rwandan and the Congo governments began cooperating on neutralising the FDLR forces"; (2) "Rwanda deployed about 4,000 troops under the Umoja Wetu operation with the Congolese armed forces to fight the Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP) and the FDLR in January and February 2009"

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2015, Jan, 27)

**Event description:** (1) "The FARDC unilaterally launched its 'Sukola II' operation on 27 January 2015 and carried out offensives in the provinces of North and South Kivu. (...) the FDLR's response was to retreat and abandon strongholds without fighting"; (2) "The Congolese army (FARDC) has launched military operations against the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) (...) The FARDC's operation, dubbed Sukola II (Lingala for "cleaning"), began in earnest on February 24th when troops launched strikes against FDLR positions in the South Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). A few days later FARDC launched attacks in North Kivu too, where the bulk of FDLR's estimated 1,200-1,500 remaining combatants are located."; (3) "the Sukola II offensive of the national army, the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC), against the Rwandan Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) rebels in late 2015."; (4) "In 2015, [FARDC] launched a new operation targeting mainly the FDLR, one in a long series that has weakened the group since 2009."; (5) "During his tenure, former president Kabila made sure that his security services cooperated and shared intelligence with Kigali."; (5) "Following a row over the human rights record of the two FARDC generals selected to lead the operation, military collaboration between MONUSCO and the FARDC was suspended, however (UNSC, 2015, para. 26). The FARDC unilaterally launched its 'Sukola II' operation on 27 January 2015 and carried out offensives in the provinces of North and South Kivu."

*Sources:*  
Florquin and Seymour 2016: 2-3; EIU 2015; Vogel and Stearns 2017: 2; Florquin and Seymour 2016: 1; ICG 2020-Averting; Florquin and Seymour 2016: 2

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No



**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2015, Nov )

**Event description:** (1) "In November 2015, the FARDC began a new wave of attacks in North Kivu, which forced the FDLR to retreat to areas where it faced opposition from other local armed groups. Some observers viewed the last round of attacks as significant, possibly the largest in the region since those targeting M23 in 2013. The FDLR retreated together with dependents and Congolese civilians, abandoning the FDLR headquarters in Katobo (...) Sukola II had forced FDLR elements to abandon long-held positions and had further disrupted the group"; (2) "during their Sukola II operations against the FDLR in late 2015 and early 2016, the FARDC collaborated with local proxies, in particular the NDC-R and the Mai-Mai Mazembe, against the Rwandan rebels."

*Sources:*  
Florquin and  
Seymour 2016:  
3; Stearns 2022:  
234

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "The FDLR retreated together with dependents and Congolese civilians, abandoning the FDLR headquarters in Katobo" (Florquin and Seymour 2016: 3)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## **2.26 FLEC-FAC in Angola**

**Target:** Angola, **Host:** Angola, **UCDP Actor ID:** 541

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### **Domestic territorial gain** (*Date:* 1993, Mar )

**Event description:** (1) "[FLEC escalated violence in] the beginning of 1993. By mid-1993, FLEC-FAC was thought to be in control of much of the rural interior of Cabinda, but not of Cabinda town, home to one-half of the enclave's population. FLEC-FAC achieved this with a force reported to be no larger than 600 to 1,000 armed men."; (2) "Mar 1993 - FLEC rebels were thought to be in control of much of Cabinda's jungle interior, but the Angolan government still controlled Cabinda City, where one-half of Cabinda's population lives, and the oil wealth"

*Sources:*  
Porto 2003: 77;  
MAR (2004)

**Name of territory:** Cabinda bushes

### **Domestic territorial loss** (*Date:* 2002, Dec )

**Event description:** (1) "By the end of the year, it was reported that the main bases of both FLEC-FAC and FLEC-R had been destroyed"; (2) "At the end of December 2002, the FAA had claimed it had captured the bastions of another separatist faction, the FLEC-R"; (3) "The FAA gradually advanced to the heart of the rebel-held territory, and by the end of October 2002 it had destroyed Kungo-Shonzo, the FLEC-FAC's (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Armed Forces of Cabinda) main base in the municipality of Buco-Zau"

*Sources:*  
UCDP 2022;  
Porto 2003: 1;  
Porto 2003: 1

**Name of territory:** Cabinda bushes

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## 2.27 FLEC-FAC in Congo

Target: Angola, Host: Congo, UCDP Actor ID: 541

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### Sanctuary start (Date: 1967, Jan, 10)

**Event description:** (1) "10 January 1967: FLEC, following the example of the MPLA, created a government in exile based in the border town of Tshela, Zaire. In the early years of the autonomy movement, Zaire allowed the rebels to use its territory and generally gave them its support."

Sources:  
World  
Investment  
News 2002

### Pledge (Date: 1975, Dec )

**Event description:** (1) "For some months [after the Alvor agreement] Ngouabi was more concerned that a fallout with Congo-Kinshasa could spell the end of his regime. Aware of the risk of a confrontation, Ngouabi accordingly decided to ban all FLEC activities on Congolese soil"

Sources:  
Martin 2019: 215

**Pledge form:** Political bill

### Crackdown campaign (Date: 1977, Apr )

**Event description:** (1) "Following the assassination of Ngouabi [then president of Brazzaville] in March 1977, the Military Committee of the party now headed Congo-Brazzaville; the committee's two main leaders, Joachim Yhombi Opango and Denis Sassou-Nguesso, (...) launched a policy of rapprochement with the communist bloc. On the orders of Sassou, a raid was organized and more than 400 Cabindans were made prisoners and incarcerated at the Pointe-Noire air base under the supervision of Cuban soldiers."

Sources:  
Martin 2019: 216

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

### Crackdown campaign (Date: 1997, Oct )

**Event description:** (1) "The Republic of Congo carried out raids on [FLEC] camps"; (2) "the [Angolan] intervention had been short, sharp and decisive and had succeeded in achieving clear and limited objectives. UNITA was now effectively removed from Congo and the FLEC campaign, denied external bases and supply routes, could be expected to subside once more."; (3) "FAA troops launched an invasion on Congo-Brazzaville in October 1997. At the same time, an unnamed American defense contractor shipped nearly 500 former U.S. Special Forces operatives to Cabinda. By extending Angola's influence over Congo-Brazzaville, a country that habitually harbored FLEC and UNITA forces, the invasion served both Angola's and Chevron's interests."; (4) "the end of the civil war and the repossession of power by Sassou-Nguesso forced the FDC to dismantle its bases in Congo-Brazzaville"

Sources:  
Minahan 2002:  
352; McQueen  
2017: 102; Reed  
2009: 191;  
Martin 2019: 221

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "The installation of new governments in the neighboring states ended much of the Cabindan separatists' outside support, while their bases in those countries were closed and the fighters dispersed" (Minahan 2002: 352)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "FAA troops launched an invasion on Congo-Brazzaville"

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2013, Oct )

**Event description:** (1) "Angolan troops entered Congo unlawfully in pursuit of separatist rebels from the Front de libération de l'enclave du Cabinda (FLEC), and also took a number of Congolese troops and civilians hostage (...) The recent incursion is the first such confrontation between the two countries since Angola helped to topple the former president, Pascal Lissouba, to support the return to power of Denis Sassou Nguessou in 1997."; (2) "Angolan forces have entered neighbouring Congo-Brazzaville and taken a number of Congolese troops hostage"

Sources:  
EIU 2013;  
France 24: 2013

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

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## **2.28 FLEC-R in Angola**

**Target:** Angola, **Host:** Angola, **UCDP Actor ID:** 540

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#### **Domestic territorial gain** (Date: 1993, Mar )

**Event description:** (1) "Mar 1993 - FLEC rebels were thought to be in control of much of Cabinda's jungle interior, but the Angolan government still controlled Cabinda City, where one-half of Cabinda's population lives, and the oil wealth"

Sources:  
MAR (2004)

**Name of territory:** Cabinda bushes

#### **Domestic territorial loss** (Date: 2002, Dec )

**Event description:** (1) "By the end of the year, it was reported that the main bases of both FLEC-FAC and FLEC-R had been destroyed"; (2) "At the end of December 2002, the FAA had claimed it had captured the bastions of another separatist faction, the FLEC-R"; (3) "The FAA gradually advanced to the heart of the rebel-held territory, and by the end of October 2002 it had destroyed Kungo-Shonzo, the FLEC-FAC's (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda-Armed Forces of Cabinda) main base in the municipality of Buco-Zau"

Sources:  
UCDP 2022;  
Porto 2003: 1;  
Porto 2003: 1

**Name of territory:** Cabinda bushes

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## **2.29 FLEC-R in DR Congo (Zaire)**

**Target:** Angola, **Host:** DR Congo (Zaire), **UCDP Actor ID:** 540

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#### **Sanctuary start** (Date: 1967, Jan, 10)

**Event description:** (1) "10 January 1967: FLEC, following the example of the MPLA, created a government in exile based in the border town of Tshela, Zaire. In the early years of the autonomy movement, Zaire allowed the rebels to use its territory and generally gave them its support."

Sources:  
World  
Investment  
News 2002

#### **Pledge** (Date: 1976, May, 20)

**Event description:** (1) "On May 20, 1976, Mobutu signed an agreement to cease

Sources:  
Martin 2019: 215

hostilities with Angola and guarantee continued access to its ports on the Atlantic. However, tensions between Congo-Kinshasa and Angola would continue to escalate given the continued presence of (...) FLEC separatists on Congolese soil"

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Pledge** (*Date:* 1978, Aug, 19)

**Event description:** (1) "In July 1978 (...) Neto and Mobutu signed a second non-aggression pact (...) In a simple quid pro quo, Neto pledged to disarm and repatriate the Katangese if Mobutu pulled back FNLA, FLEC and UNITA bases from the border."; (3) "the joint communique issued mentioned no date for the reopening of the rail line.<sup>19</sup> President Mobutu needed the rail operational so that Zairian copper could be easily exported; Neto needed Mobutu to calm the border area between the two countries. Reportedly, Neto arrested Nathaniel Mbumba, the Katangan rebel leader, as a goodwill gesture toward Mobutu."; (4) "Following the second invasion of Zaire's Shaba province in the spring of 1978 by the former Katangese Gendarmes based in Angola, Zaire's President Sese Seko Mobutu decided that it would be wise to try to get along with his southern neighbor, hoping to prevent a Shaba III. Angolan President Agostinho Neto proposed a rapprochement with his Zairian counterpart, offering to curb the activities of the Katangese and begin their repatriation if Mobutu would do the same"

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*

George 2005: 136; Powell 2016: 27; James 2020: 196; Bender 1983: 125

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1978, Sep )

**Event description:** (1) "This time the deal stuck and the Katangese were disarmed and repatriated (with the assistance from Cuban troops) while FNLA, FLEC and UNITA bases along the Angolan-Zairian border were shut down"; (2) "The two leaders made the accord public on August 19 as Neto made a two-day visit to Kinshasa."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Expulsion

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "FLEC and UNITA bases along the Angolan-Zairian border were shut down" (George 2005: 136)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*

George 2005: 136; Powell 2016

**Pledge** (*Date:* 1985, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) "Zaire and Angola agreed not to allow rebels to use the other's territory as bases"; (2) "in February 1985 [Mobutu] and President dos Santos agreed to establish a joint commission to ensure that neither country's territory would be used as a base for "subversive groups." (...) [However,] the MPLA doubts Mobutu is living up to the letter of the deal"

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*

MAR (2004); Gunn 1986: 3

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1997, May )

**Event description:** (1) "Following the takeover of Kinshasa by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for Liberation (AFDL) in [May] 1997, several FLEC leaders, among them José Tibúrcio Zinga Luemba of FLEC-R (...) were arrested by Laurent-Désiré Kabila's security forces"; (2) "The installation of new governments in the neighboring states ended much of the Cabindan separatists' outside support, while their bases in those countries were closed and the fighters dispersed"; (3) "[Now being] confronted with the combined pressure of a better-equipped Angolan military force and closer co-operation between Luanda and the rebels' former allies (...) [meant that] the separatist cause

*Sources:*

Martin 2019: 221; Minahan 2002: 352; Porto 2003: 10; McQueen 2017: 109; allAfrica 2022; Porto 2003: 10

had undoubtedly been greatly weakened after the downfall of Mobutu"; (4) "With the 'Cabinda corridor' secure after the expulsion of the rebels from Matadi and their base at Kitona in the first days of the intervention, Angola's aims had essentially been achieved."; (5) "1997, eight FLEC-R executives - including Colonel José Tibúrcio Zinga Luemba - were arrested in Kinshasa on the orders of the authorities of the 'Democratic Republic of Congo' (DRC)."; (6) "[A] military contingent of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) (...) had been deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo [in June 1997]"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "[FLEC's] bases in those countries were closed and the fighters dispersed" (Minahan 2002: 352)

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) "several FLEC leaders, among them José Tibúrcio Zinga Luemba of FLEC-R (...) were arrested by Laurent-Désiré Kabila's security forces" (Martin 2019: 221)

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "[A] military contingent of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) (...) had been deployed in the Democratic Republic of Congo [in June 1997]"

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## 2.30 FPR in Uganda

**Target:** Rwanda, **Host:** Uganda, **UCDP Actor ID:** 527

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1987, Dec )

**Event description:** (1) "FPR was established [in December 1987] in Uganda by Tutsi refugees who had fled their country to escape the abuse and repression of the Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda. (...) FPR began its attack on Rwanda in 1990, attacking from Ugandan territory"; (2) "[Personal bonds to Museveni allowed] FPR to garner material support from Uganda in the early stages of the conflict. Initially FPR simply kept hold of the weapons their soldiers had been issued in the Ugandan army, but the group later covertly received arms and ammunition from the same source."

*Sources:*  
UCDP/actor/527;  
UCDP/actor/527

## 2.31 Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan in Afghanistan

**Target:** Afghanistan, **Host:** Afghanistan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 299

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**Domestic territorial loss** (*Date:* 1996, Sep, 27)

**Event description:** (1) "After the fall of Kabul in September 1996, (...) Hekmatyar's once powerful bases in the eastern and southern provinces were completely overrun by the Taliban, their arms and ammunitions confiscated, thus forcing the rank and file to either join the Taliban or desert altogether."

**Name of territory:** Southeast of Kabul

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*Sources:*  
Jamali 2005: 3

## 2.32 Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan in Pakistan

**Target:** Afghanistan, **Host:** Pakistan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 299

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### **Sanctuary start** (Date: 1976, Jun, 13)

**Event description:** (1) "They formally named the new movement Hizb-e Islami (...) in Nishtarabad [in Pakistan] on 13 June 1976"

Sources:  
Sands 2019: 94

### **Sanctuary start** (Date: 2002, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) "Returning to the Afghan-Pakistan border region [in February 2002], he [Hekmatyar] aligned himself with the Taliban and took up arms against American and allied NATO forces"; (2) Hekmatyar settled "somewhere close to the Pakistani border (...) in his decades-old power base"; (3) "Hezb's prime stronghold [has since been] the Shamshatu refugee camp in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, that has been managed by Hezb (...) with the Pakistani government's consent"; (4) "As well as supporting the Afghan Taliban proper, Pakistan also became the base for operations by Hekmatyar's Hezb"

Sources:  
Chalk 2013: 299;  
Tahir 2008: 3;  
Osman 2016: 6;  
Misra and  
Clarke 2011: 129

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2002, Nov, 29)

**Event description:** (1) "US agents and Pakistani security forces detained him [Hekmatyar's son-in-law, Ghairat Bahir] in Islamabad in 2002, along with his driver, Gul Rahman, and he was secretly rendered to Afghanistan and tortured by the CIA in the 'Salt Pit', north of Kabul."; (2) "Ghairat Baheer, an Afghan national, was captured along with Gul Rahman in Islamabad, Pakistan on October 29, 2002, by U.S. agents and Pakistani security forces and subsequently transferred to Afghanistan."; (3) "During 2002, the United States took an increasingly direct, if low-profile, role in both law enforcement and military operations being conducted on Pakistani territory. These operations have led to favorable results in tracking and apprehending dangerous Islamic militants, but the activities of U.S. personnel in the country have led to increasing signs of anti-American backlash"; (4) "The number of U.S. counterterrorism agents in Pakistan has been reported at between 'several dozen' and 'the low hundreds.' (...) senior Pakistani officials have indicated that F.B.I. agents participated in numerous raids, where they 'carry guns' and 'help us break down doors.'"; (5) "[Already] On May 8, 2002, senior U.S. government officials from several executive branch agencies hosted the first meeting of the U.S.-Pakistan Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism and Law Enforcement (...) Islamabad has [since] taken action against at least 185 of the 247 U.S.-designated entities operating on Pakistani territory"

Sources:  
Osman 2016: 9;  
Open Society  
Foundation  
2013: 33;  
Kronstadt 2003:  
i; Kronstadt  
2003: 7;  
Kronstadt 2003:  
8-9

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "U.S. agents [now the Afghani government] and Pakistani security forces [operated jointly in Pakistan]"; (2) "F.B.I. agents participated in numerous raids, where they 'carry guns' and 'help us break down doors.'"

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2008, Aug, 12)

**Event description:** (1) "A missile strike against an alleged militant gathering point, suspected to have been launched by the United States, killed at least nine people (...) in northwestern Pakistan. (...) The camp was linked to the militant group of the Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar"; (2) "President George W. Bush (...) approved orders in July that for the first time allow American Special Operations forces to carry out ground assaults inside Pakistan without the prior approval of the Pakistani government"; (3) "An offensive near the Afghan border had killed more than 1,000 suspected insurgents

Sources:  
NYT 2008;  
Schmitt 2008;  
NYT 2008

and predicted that the region would be 'stabilized' within two months"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "American Special Operations forces to carry out ground assaults inside Pakistan without the prior approval of the Pakistani government"

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### 2.33 Hizb-i Wahdat in Iran

**Target:** Afghanistan, **Host:** Iran, **UCDP Actor ID:** 300

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1998, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) "the Government of Iran pressured these competing groups to unite in order to form a more formidable Shia counterweight (...) Accordingly, Hizb-i Wahdat was established on 18 July 1989 (...) its troops scattered and leader fled to Iran after the Hizb-i Wahdat headquarters was captured by the government in [August] 1998 (...) The Government of Iran was a significant benefactor to Hizb-i Wahdat and provided funding and arms."

*Sources:*  
UCDP/actor/300

### 2.34 IMU in Afghanistan

**Target:** Uzbekistan, **Host:** Afghanistan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 359

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1999, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) "IMU headquarters in Kabul and Kandahar (...) [were observed] on August 26, 1999"

*Sources:*  
Naumkin 2003:  
43-44

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2001, Nov )

**Event description:** (1) "An IMU contingent was heavily involved in fighting around Mazar-i-Sharif and Konduz in November of 2001, and it appears that substantial numbers of IMU followers were killed during fighting in the latter city (...) [The IMU's] military leader, Juma Namangani, died from wounds received during U.S. bombing in the Mazar-i-Sharif region of Afghanistan"

*Sources:*  
Ruzaliev 2004:  
30

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "The IMU's bases and men (...) became a target during the 2001 U.S.-led antiterrorist campaign in Afghanistan." (Ruzaliev 2004: 29)

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) " [The IMU's] military leader, Juma Namangani, died from wounds received during U.S. bombing in the Mazar-i-Sharif region of Afghanistan" (Ruzaliev 2004: 30)

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## 2.35 IMU in Kyrgyzstan

Target: Uzbekistan, Host: Kyrgyzstan, UCDP Actor ID: 359

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### Crackdown campaign (Date: 1999, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) "[In late August] Kyrgyz troops launched a military operation"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
Naumkin 2003:  
42 (see also  
Ruzaliev 2004:  
28)

### Crackdown campaign (Date: 1999, Oct, 5)

**Event description:** (1) "The departure of the militants (...) took place in early October [1999]"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "[The] military operation that forced the militants back into Tajikistan" (Naumkin 2003: 42)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
Naumkin 2003:  
42 (see also  
Ruzaliev 2004:  
28)

### Sanctuary start (Date: 1999, Summer)

**Event description:** (1) "in the summer of 1999 (...) a network of IMU members and sympathizers was concentrated in one of Kyrgyzstan's southern regions, Batken, (...) It is there, in the south of Kyrgyzstan, that two enclaves are located"

*Sources:*  
Naumkin 2003:  
40

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## 2.36 IMU in Tajikistan

Target: Uzbekistan, Host: Tajikistan, UCDP Actor ID: 359

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### Sanctuary start (Date: 1997, Autumn)

**Event description:** (1) "Following the end of the civil war in Tajikistan in [June] 1997, IMU's military leader Juma Namangani (...) settled in a Tajik[istan]"; (2) "The IMU emerged after a number of Islamists fled Uzbekistan into neighboring Tajikistan as a result of Karimov's domestic crackdown."

*Sources:*  
Ruzaliev 2004:  
23; Miller 2006:  
66

### Crackdown campaign (Date: 1999, Nov )

**Event description:** (1) "[There was a] deportantion of the IMU's fighters [from Tajikistan] to Afghanistan in November 1999"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
Naumkin 2003:  
45

### Crackdown campaign (Date: 2002, Jul )

**Event description:** (1) "The Tavildara Valley in Tajikistan, once Namangani's im-

*Sources:*  
Parker 2003: 48



pregnable stronghold is firmly in the control of the Tajik government forces working with CIA operatives hunting down IMU stragglers”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “[On June 25, 2002,] Tajikistan’s Security Ministry, supported by the CIA had conducted a search for IMU forces in the mountains of Tajikistan but had failed to find any evidence of an IMU presence” (Naimkin 2003: 61)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## 2.37 IMU in Uzbekistan

**Target:** Uzbekistan, **Host:** Uzbekistan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 359

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**Domestic territorial gain** (*Date:* 2000, Jul )

**Event description:** (1) “In July 2000, the IMU launched their second campaign ... [and] built fortified areas in the mountains along a major road into the Ferghana Valley”

**Name of territory:** Parts of Ferghana Valley

*Sources:*  
Parker 2003: 31

**Domestic territorial loss** (*Date:* 2000, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) “Uzbek special forces, fresh from Russian and US training, finally forced the IMU from their positions after a month of hard fighting”

**Name of territory:** Parts of Ferghana Valley

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*Sources:*  
Parker 2003: 31

## 2.38 Jam’iyyat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan in Pakistan

**Target:** Afghanistan, **Host:** Pakistan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 292

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1975, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) “The Peshawar-based parties (...) include four Islamist groups – Hizb-i Islami (...) Jamiat-i Islami”; (2) “In 1975 (...) Burhanuddin Rabbani [the leader of JI] emigrated to Pakistan. (...) As later became known, they conducted military preparations under the leadership of instructors from the elite special services of Pakistan.”

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*Sources:*  
Weinbaum 1991:  
74; Rumer 2005:  
159

## 2.39 JEM in Chad

**Target:** Sudan, **Host:** Chad, **UCDP Actor ID:** 468

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 2003, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) “The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was established early in 2003 by a group of educated, politically experienced Darfurians”; (2) “[When] insurgencies started in Sudan (...) Déby was unable and – even though only on a hidden agenda – unwilling to stop (...) the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), from using Chad as a rear base. (...) Déby consistently refused to directly support to Sudanese rebels.”

*Sources:*  
Small Arms  
Survey 2011: 1;  
Meerpohl 2013:  
4

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2003, Mar )

*Sources:*  
Meerpohl 2013:  
4; Berg 2008: 77;  
Marchal 2008:  
432; Prunier  
2011: 98;  
Gnanguénon

**Event description:** (1) "In March and April 2003, Déby wanted to help Bashir fighting the SLA and the JEM and sent Chadian troops to Darfur via the border town of Tiné."; (2) "[Déby] took military action against them"; (3) "Throughout the first two years of the conflict in Darfur, Khartoum provided Déby with funds to divide and weaken the Darfur insurgency, notably the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)"; (4) "At the beginning of the insurrection the GoS had benefited from almost total support from Idris Deby who even sent troops and a couple of helicopters to help chase the rebels"; (5) "In 2003, Chadian soldiers (...) entered Sudan for the first time, alongside the Sudanese army, to fight against the Darfur rebels."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2004, Mar )

**Event description:** (1) "In March 2004, the Chadian government offered new pledges of fidelity to the Sudanese government. This led to the creation of a dissident group within the JEM, namely the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD)"

**Pledge form:** Speech

*Sources:*  
Tubiana 2008: 27

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2006, Jul, 26)

**Event description:** (1) "High-level talks held in Libya resulted in an announcement of mended relations (...) and a pledge from both governments to end support to the respective opposition groups operating from both countries."; (2) "Last week the two states' presidents agreed at a mini-summit in Tripoli to ban insurgents from setting up bases in each country"; (3) " On 26 July 2006, an agreement was signed in which both governments agreed not to give refuge any more to the other's rebels. (...) Though short-lived, the agreement was the first bilateral attempt to yield any real effect on the ground"

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*  
HRW 2006;  
Reuter; Tubiana  
2008: 29

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2006, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) "[After the deal and before September 2006] it seems that Déby did play the game to some extent and asked the Darfur rebels to leave Chad. Some of them went abroad or to rebel areas in Darfur; others remained in Chad, acting more discreetly."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Expulsion

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "Some of them went abroad or to rebel areas in Darfur; others remained in Chad, acting more discreetly." (Tubiana 2008: 29)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
Tubiana 2008: 29

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2007, May )

**Event description:** (1) "The two countries [Sudan and Chad] set up a joint military committee to monitor the border and in May the two presidents signed a reconciliation accord in Saudi Arabia"

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*  
Shinn 2015: 282

### **Pledge** (*Date: 2009, Jun* )

**Event description:** (1) "It was actually in June 2009 that Déby's people told the [JEM and SLM/A] guerrillas that they needed to get out of there [Chad], and many of them did"; (2) "In August 2009, first talks between Chad and Sudan were held in Tripoli with Gaddafi's support"

**Pledge form:** Direct communication

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
Marchal 2022;  
Meerpohl 2013:  
6

### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2010, Jan* )

**Event description:** (1) "In August 2009, first talks between Chad and Sudan were held in Tripoli with Gaddafi's support and an agreement was signed in January 2010. When the rapprochement reached the ground, pressure mounted on the JEM and border crossings became more difficult"; (2) "JEM's leader was not anymore authorized to stay in Chad "; (3) "N'Djamena turned its back on the rebel group last year after a rapprochement with Khartoum."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "The deployment since early 2010 of a joint Sudan–Chad Border Force"; (2) "An agreement [between Chad and Sudan] was signed in January 2010. When the rapprochement reached the ground, pressure mounted on the JEM and border crossings became more difficult"

*Sources:*  
Meerpohl 2013:  
6; Marchal 2016:  
7-8; Reuters  
2011

### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2010, Feb* )

**Event description:** (1) "Expelled from Chad in February 2010 (...) JEM lost its main strongholds in North Darfur (...) [Yet] Despite the Sudan–Chad rapprochement, JEM re-entered North Darfur via Chad. Chadian elements of the Chad–Sudan border protection force turned a blind eye. This was possible thanks to the assistance of sympathizers within the Chadian inner circle."; (2) "When the rapprochement reached the ground, pressure mounted on the JEM and border crossings became more difficult. Afterwards, Déby stiffened his policy and banished the JEM from Chadian territory."; (3) "In February 2010 (...) Déby (...) ordered JEM to leave Chadian territory"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "JEM lost its main strongholds in North Darfur" (Small Arms Survey 2013: 1-2); (2) "border crossings became more difficult" (Meerpohl 2013: 6)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "The deployment since early 2010 of a joint Sudan–Chad Border Force"; (2) "An agreement [between Chad and Sudan] was signed in January 2010. When the rapprochement reached the ground, pressure mounted on the JEM and border crossings became more difficult"

*Sources:*  
Small Arms  
Survey 2013: 1;  
Meerpohl 2013:  
6; Tamm and  
Duursma 2022:  
17

### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2010, May* )

**Event description:** (1) "In May 2010, Khalil Ibrahim [the JEM leader] was refused permission to transit through Chad to Darfur and was expelled, without papers, to the Libyan capital, Tripoli"; (2) "Khalil Ibrahim [the leader of JEM] (...) fled to Chad in

*Sources:*  
Small Arms  
Survey 2013: 1;  
Hamed 2014:  
222; Meerpohl  
2013: 6;  
Gramizzi and  
Tubiana 2012:  
10; Gramizzi  
and Tubiana  
2012: 10

May 2010, but Chad also prevented him from crossing their territory and using it as a base of operations against Sudan"; (3) "With the closure of state-sponsored supply lines to rebel groups from Chad (...) in mid-2010"; (4) "In May 2010, JEM members and their leader Khalil Ibrahim were seized at N'Djaména airport and then expelled to Libya"; (5) "But, despite the deployment since early 2010 of a joint Sudan–Chad Border Force, large-scale rebel movements between the desert areas of north-eastern Chad and northern Darfur continue to be possible. One example is JEM's successful operation to extract its leader Khalil Ibrahim from Libya around 28 August 2011 via the Libya–Chad–Niger and Libya–Chad–Sudan tri-borders. Small-scale exchanges of military equipment between Chadian and Sudanese armed groups likewise illustrate the limits of rapprochement and disarmament with respect to denying material support to rebel forces."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "JEM members and their leader Khalil Ibrahim were seized at N'Djaména airport and then expelled to Libya" (Veerpohl 2013: 6)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "The deployment since early 2010 of a joint Sudan–Chad Border Force"; (2) "An agreement [between Chad and Sudan] was signed in January 2010. When the rapprochement reached the ground, pressure mounted on the JEM and border crossings became more difficult"

## 2.40 JEM in Libya

**Target:** Sudan, **Host:** Libya, **UCDP Actor ID:** 468

**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 2005, May )

**Event description:** (1) "After Minnawi's signing of the Convention of Abuja in [5 May] 2006, Gaddafi switched alliances and became a supporter of the Islamic-oriented JEM (...) [Since,] Gaddafi had provided a safe haven for insurgents and combat training centres for them, in addition to financial aid and logistical and intelligence support. Tripoli also provided them with a large area which enabled the armed movements to access secure treatment of persons wounded in battles against the government's army."; "The Libyan intervention was clear in the Darfur conflict (...) providing the Darfur rebel movements with training bases inside the Libyan territories."

*Sources:*  
Hamed 2014:  
192; Ahmed  
2011: 41-42

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2011, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) "With the closure of state-sponsored supply lines to rebel groups from (...) Libya in (...) mid-2011. (...) After Gaddafi's fall [on 20 August 2011], the JEM had to look for other resources, which it hopes to receive from South Sudan and Uganda"; (2) "Regime change in Libya (...) and the rapid establishment of political and military cooperation between Khartoum and the new Libyan National Transitional Council, has ended government-sponsored transfers of arms and other material support from Libya to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)"; (3) "Testimonies and reports gathered during 2011 and 2012 confirm that the major Darfur rebel movements are no longer able to rely on previous external sources or supply routes"; (4) "JEM fighters (...) ranged across both Darfur and Kordofan and then crossed the savanna to newly independent South Sudan, which provided it with a safe haven (...) More

*Sources:*  
Small Arms  
Survey 2013: 3;  
Gramizzi and  
Tubiana 2012: 9;  
Gramizzi and  
Tubiana 2012:  
50; De Waal  
2013: 75;  
Karamalla-  
Gaiballa 2022: 6

than one hundred ‘technical’ vehicles and several thousand JEM fighters did reach their destination in South Sudan”; (5) “After [Gaddafi’s] death, the head of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Khalil Ibrahim, fled Libya on December 22, 2011. However, the Sudanese government killed him with the help of Libyan rebels [i.e. the NTC, now in government].”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “Testimonies and reports gathered during 2011 and 2012 confirm that the major Darfur rebel movements are no longer able to rely on previous external sources or supply routes” (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2012: 50)

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) “The Sudanese government killed [JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim] with the help of Libyan rebels [i.e. the NTC, now in government].” (Karamalla-Gaiballa 2022: 6)

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “the Sudanese government killed him [Khalil Ibrahim, JEM’s leader] with the help of Libyan rebels [i.e. the NTC, the government as of 20 August 2011].”

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## 2.41 JEM in South Sudan

**Target:** Sudan, **Host:** South Sudan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 468

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 2011, Dec )

**Event description:** (1) “JEM fighters [expelled from Libya] (...) ranged across both Darfur and Kordofan and then crossed the savanna to newly independent South Sudan, which provided it with a safe haven (...) More than one hundred ‘technical’ vehicles and several thousand JEM fighters did reach their destination in South Sudan [by Dec 2011]”; (2) “[Upon South Sudan’s independence,] JEM maintained a visible presence in Bentiu, the base of South Sudan’s operations, and JEM vehicles streamed in and out of the SPLA’s temporary forward operating base in Hejlij.”; (3) “[By independence,] Smaller JEM divisions have already been located in South Sudan”; (4) “In the years following, President Kiir continued to co-opt armed groups”

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*Sources:*  
De Waal 2013: 75; Small Arms Survey 2013: 2; Gramizzi and Tubiana 2012: 10; ICG 2014: 6

## 2.42 JEM in Sudan

**Target:** Sudan, **Host:** Sudan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 468

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**Domestic territorial gain** (*Date:* 2003, Apr )

**Event description:** (1) “In April, SLA and JEM forces captured and briefly held the airport of el-Fasher, capital of North Darfur state, destroying government aircraft on the ground and making off with weapons, vehicles, stores, and a captured air force general. Later in 2003, the SLA attacked and briefly seized the North Darfur towns of Mellit and Kutum [and] controlled large swathes of North Darfur and Jebel Marra”

**Name of territory:** Main Dar Zaghawa towns

*Sources:*  
Tanner and Tubiana 2007: 23

**Domestic territorial loss** (*Date:* 2004, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) “In December 2003 and January 2004 the government recap-

*Sources:*  
Tanner and Tubiana 2007: 24

tured Tina, Kornoy, and Um Buru, the main ‘towns’ in Dar Zaghawa (...) [However, their Zaghawa] fighters had escaped the GoS [Gov’t of Sudan] onslaughts of late 2003 and early 2004 by seeking and receiving sanctuary in eastern Jebel Marra [mountains in Sudan]”

**Name of territory:**Main Dar Zaghawa towns

#### **Domestic territorial gain** (Date: 2005, Sep )

**Event description:** (1) “In [September] 2005, the JEM successfully established a presence in eastern Sudan with the help of Eritrea. Before the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA), the JEM may have had as many as 2,000 fighters in the east”; (2) “the entire Jebel Moon—an area in western Darfur—controlled and divided for years between various insurgent groups in Darfur, shifted en masse toward the JEM when the latter increased its military support in December 2007.”

**Name of territory:**Areas in Eastern and Northern Sudan

*Sources:*  
Tanner and  
Tubiana 2007:  
25; Marchal  
2008: 432

#### **Domestic territorial loss** (Date: 2010, May )

**Event description:** (1) “Due to the group’s expulsion from Chad and a large counterinsurgency campaign by Khartoum, JEM lost its main strongholds in the northern areas of Darfur, including Jebel Mun, and retreated south”; (2) “Sudan’s army on Saturday said it had captured a strategic base held by JEM, Darfur’s most militarily powerful rebel group. The army stated it killed 108 insurgents in the battle at the rebel stronghold at Jebel Moon in West Darfur near the border with Chad.”

**Name of territory:**Areas in Eastern and Northern Sudan

*Sources:*  
Military  
Periscope 2022;  
Dabanga 2010

## **2.43 Kashmir Insurgents in Pakistan**

**Target:** India, **Host:** Pakistan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 325

#### **Sanctuary start** (Date: 1989, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) “Pakistan did not cause Kashmir’s secessionist moment, but certainly took advantage of it, as it became “deeply involved in the uprising and provided training, arms, and sanctuary,” along with fighters themselves. (...) When insurgency began, training [in Pakistan] tended to be elementary (...) at the outset, Pakistan supported groups demanding independence, such as JKLF, as well as those demanding accession to Pakistan, such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM),”; (2) “Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group that was founded with the help of Pakistani intelligence officers in the late 1980s to fight a proxy war against India in Kashmir.”; (3) “In the 1980s, a secessionist movement took shape, with young Kashmiris crossing into Pakistan for arms training”

*Sources:*  
Butt 2017:  
115-116; Perlez  
and Masood  
2008; Yasir 2019

#### **Pledge** (Date: 2002, Jan, 12)

**Event description:** (1) “general [and PM Musharraf] spoke under threat of war from India, knowing that many of his fellow officers in the army high command, not to mention ordinary Pakistanis, would be watching for any sign that he was capitulating to the nation’s traditional enemy. He announced new measures to crack down on Islamic militants who have fomented terrorism in Pakistan and abroad, knowing that the groups he was taking aim at are entrenched, heavily armed and sworn to kill, if necessary, anybody obstructing their Islamic holy war. (...) He promised to end the use of Pakistan as a base for terrorism in Kashmir”; (2) “Lashkar-e-Taiba was banned by the then Pakistan president, Pervez Musharraf, in [January] 2002.”; (3) “General Musharraf pledged to cut off the infiltration routes of the insurgents and crack down on militant groups inside

*Sources:*  
Burns 2002;  
Perlez and  
Masood 2008;  
Filkins 2002

Pakistan.”

**Pledge form:** Speech

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2002, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) “In the wake of the speech, about 3,300 extremists were arrested and detained”; (2) “the [Kashmiri] groups’ offices have been raided and the members arrested at the time of the ban [in early 2002, at least] (...) 3300 members of such groups who were arrested in 2002”; (3) “Before the 2002 ban on Lashkar-e-Taiba, it had its headquarters in the town of Muridke near Lahore, and this facility was transferred to Jamaat-al-Dawa following the ban”; (3) “[Yet,] they have been released quickly”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
Kronstadt 2003:  
3; Khan 2005: 32;  
Khan 2005: 25

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2003, Nov, 15)

**Event description:** (1) “In response to renewed international pressure, the Government of Pakistan banned six militant organizations in November 2003 (...) These groups included Islami Tehrik-e-Pakistan (Islamic Movement of Pakistan, formerly known as Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan); Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (Islamic Union of Pakistan, formerly known as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan); Tehrike-Khudam-ul-Islam (Movement of the Servants of Islam, formerly known as Jaishe-Mohammad); Jamiat-ul-Ansar (Gathering of the Companions, formerly known as Harkat-ul-Mujahedin and Harkat-ul-Ansar); Hizb-ul-Tahreer; and Jamaat-ul-Furqa”; (2) “Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf Saturday [15 November 2003] banned three religious outfits as the government sought to curb attempts by outlawed militant groups to resume their activities under new guises, officials said. Musharraf issued the orders at a meeting attended by Prime Minister Zafarullah Jamali, provincial leaders and officials. The government imposed banned [as received] the Islami Tehreek Pakistan (ITP), Millat-e-Islami Pakistan (MIP) and Khudamul Islam and put Jamaatul Dawa on a watch list under the Anti Terrorist Act, a government spokesman told AFP. (...) [In his statement, he said:] “Sort them out. These foreigners staying illegally have no place here,” Musharraf told the participants. “We will not allow Pakistan to become a sanctuary for any kind of terrorist activity. Any one wanting to do so can do so in their own countries.”

**Pledge form:** Speech

*Sources:*  
Khan 2005: 34;  
Jawad 2003

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2003, Dec )

**Event description:** (1) “A decision has been taken to seize the properties belonging to the leaders of banned organizations and then to auction them. (...) a decision has been taken to launch a grand operation against the banned organizations that are involved in sectarian activities after changing their names.”; (2) “the Government of Pakistan (...) in November 2003, sealed their offices [of the outlawed organisations] and froze their accounts. These groups included Islami Tehrik-e-Pakistan (Islamic Movement of Pakistan, formerly known as Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan); Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (Islamic Union of Pakistan, formerly known as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan); Tehrike-Khudam-ul-Islam (Movement of the Servants of Islam, formerly known as Jaishe-Mohammad); Jamiat-ul-Ansar (Gathering of the Companions, formerly known as Harkat-ul-Mujahedin and Harkat-ul-Ansar); Hizb-ul-Tahreer; and Jamaat-ul-Furqa”; (3) “Pakistan’s efforts to control militant infiltrations across the Line of Control must be judged as quite successful—even if the government’s decision was not initially popular in military circles. (...)”

*Sources:*  
Pakistan 2003;  
Khan 2005: 34;  
Khan 2005: 35;  
AFP 2003

Pakistan seems to have changed its policy and that it has made a difference.”; (4) “An interior ministry official who is coordinating raids on the banned groups’ facilities said 137 offices had been shut down. “Up till now 137 offices of the banned groups have been sealed in various parts of the country,” the official told AFP on condition of anonymity. President Pervez Musharraf on Saturday outlawed three groups for ignoring bans he imposed on them in January last year. They had since reemerged under new names but with the same leaders. The groups outlawed under the 1997 Anti Terrorist Act are: Islami Tehreek, the reformed Shiite militant group Tehreek-i-Jafria; Khudamul Islam, the new name for Jaish-e-Mohammad organisation of anti-India rebels fighting in disputed Kashmir; and Millat-e-Islami, which was the violent Sunni outfit Sipah-e-Sahaba.”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2007, Feb, 21)

**Event description:** (1) “The foreign ministers of India and Pakistan pledged in talks here Wednesday to work together to fight terrorism after a bomb attack on a train traveling between the two countries killed 68 passengers of both nationalities.”

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*  
Gentleman 2007

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2008, Nov, 8)

**Event description:** (1) “Pakistani authorities have raided a camp run by the Pakistani-based militant group suspected of conducting the Mumbai attacks, a Pakistani official said. The raid at the camp in Pakistani-held Kashmir on Sunday resulted in the arrest of the operational leader of the organization, Zakiur ur-Rehman Lakhvi, the supreme operational commander of Lashkar-e-Taiba (...) The operation at the camp (...) will be the first concrete steps by Pakistan in response to the assault on Mumbai last month. (...) It appears to be the first time that Pakistan has captured a senior operational figure in Lashkar-e-Taiba”; (2) “After mounting pressure from the United States and India, Pakistani authorities raided a camp run by the militant group suspected of carrying out the Mumbai attacks”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
Perlez and  
Masood 2008a;  
Perlez and  
Masoon 2008b

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2013, Sep, 28)

**Event description:** (1) “The leaders of Pakistan and India held their first official meeting in New York on Sunday, leaving with renewed promises of mutual restraint in Kashmir (...) Indian officials have for years demanded that Pakistan take action against Lashkar-e-Taiba and its founder, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, who lives openly in Lahore. Mr. Menon, the Indian security adviser, said in New York that Mr. Sharif had promised to take action against those responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Mr. Menon said the tone of the talks was friendly, but added: “As for how useful and productive the meeting was, I think the only proof will be in the months to come.”; (2) “Pakistani authorities widened their efforts to curb militant groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba, the one suspected of conducting the Mumbai attacks, raiding some of their properties and arresting about 20 members, security officials said Tuesday. (...) the leader of another militant

*Sources:*  
Walsh 2013;  
Perlez 2008



group, Jaish-e-Muhammad, had been placed under house arrest. Bush administration officials publicly praised the steps"

**Pledge form:** Written pact

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## 2.44 KDPI in Iraq

**Target:** Iran, **Host:** Iraq, **UCDP Actor ID:** 164

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1983, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "Since 1983 (...) its [the KDPI's] headquarters are just across the Iraqi border"

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*Sources:*  
van Bruinessen  
1986

## 2.45 KIO in India

**Target:** Myanmar, **Host:** India, **UCDP Actor ID:** 201

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1988, Dec )

**Event description:** (1) "In December 1988, RAW's Chief-of-Station in Bangkok, B B Nandy, met with KIO's charismatic chairman Maran Brang Seng and facilitated his first visit to New Delhi (...) Not just with small arms and money, New Delhi also offered political and diplomatic training to KIO cadres in 1990-91"; (2) "In 1988, India strongly backed the Burmese pro-democracy movement and Yangon fell out with Delhi. The Burmese Communist Party broke up as a result of an ethnic revolt by the Wa tribesmen and China stopped backing anti-Myanmar rebels to develop close relations with the military junta. That is when the Myanmar army stopped cooperating with the Indians and the Research and Analysis Wing cultivated the Kachin Independence Organization"; (2) "Several reports indicate that India provided financial and material support to the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the Karen National Union (KNU) that had joined the opposition to the military regime."; (3) "After the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) became the main source of training and weapons for all northeastern rebel groups, India's external intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), cultivated the KIA for six long years, supplying them weapons and even allowing them to carry a limited trade in jade and precious stones using Indian territory."

*Sources:*  
Paliwal 2020;  
Telegraph India  
2018; Routray  
2011: 303;  
Bhaumik 2005

**Pledge** (*Date:* 1994, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) "India reached out to Myanmar once again and sought its cooperation to improve security along their shared border. Consequently, in January 1994, both the countries signed an agreement for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the border as well as a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on cooperation between civilian and border authorities and a border trade agreement (...) [coordinating] border-guarding personnel"; (2) "The India-Myanmar Border Trade Agreement was signed on 21 January 1994"; (3) "In the mid-1990s, the two states agreed on the intention of increasing cooperation and preventing insurgency and crime, and the Indian Army Chief visited Myanmar."; (4) "A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on 21 January 1994 to increase cooperation between civilian border authorities of the two countries and to prevent "illegal and insurgent activities" (...) [Still,] it was only with the advent of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in 1998 that a real transformation started gaining pace. (...) "During this phase (which continues to date), there have been military to military dialogues

*Sources:*  
Das 2018: 589;  
ERIA 2020: 23;  
Basit 2018: 77;  
Routray 2011:  
305

and political rapprochement. The stakes have also included management of security situation in the North-east”;

**Pledge form:** Speech

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1998, Feb, 12)

**Event description:** (1) “Operation Leech marked the end of India’s limited cultivation of the Burmese rebel groups and pro-democracy coalitions that had climaxed in the covert quid pro quo between Indian intelligence and the Kachin rebels.”; (2) “Thirty-four men who are being tried in secret by India, accused of being arms smugglers, are Burmese anti-junta rebels who were once backed by the Indian army, say human rights activists who are demanding their freedom. The Indian army says the men (...) were captured by Indian security forces in [12]February 1998”

*Sources:*  
Bhaumik 2005;  
Ramesh 2007

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2008, Apr, 11)

**Event description:** (1) “April 11: Arunachal Pradesh Home Minister Tako Dabi said that there were definite intelligence inputs about ethnic guerrillas of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) from adjoining Myanmar infiltrating into the State’s Changlang District in recent weeks. “We have already launched a military operation to drive out the KIA rebels” [he said]”

*Sources:*  
SATP 2009: 48

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2019, Feb, 17)

**Event description:** (1) “India, Myanmar target insurgents in joint operations (...) India’s role in the operation was to ensure the rebels did not cross into its territory and escape, and to this end, at least 10,000 Indian troops (Assam Rifles units) were deployed along the Indo-Myanmar border between February 17 and March 2, according to senior army officials. (...) “We operated in coordination with the Myanmar Army and our main aim was to prevent elements of the Kachin Army from moving into India,” said a second senior officer in the military establishment”; (2) “In 2019, a second joint operation called “Operation Sunrise” was conducted. It targeted both Burmese ethnic armed groups based in India, and Indian rebel groups based in Burma. (...) The second phase took place at the border between Sagaing Region in Burma, and Manipur state in India.”

*Sources:*  
Hindustan  
Times 2019;  
India Today  
2019

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “India, Myanmar target insurgents in joint operations (...) India’s role in the operation was to ensure the rebels did not cross into its territory and escape, and to this end, at least 10,000 Indian troops (Assam Rifles units) were deployed (...) ‘We operated in coordination with the Myanmar Army’”

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## 2.46 KNU in Thailand

Target: Myanmar, Host: Thailand, UCDP Actor ID: 180

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### Sanctuary start (Date: 1953, Oct )

**Event description:** (1) "Thailand supported the Karens in particular as a means of pressure against the Burmese. Pibul Songkram began to use the Mons and the Karens in this way after a mistaken Burmese bombing attack on a Thai border village in October 1953."; (2) "Tensions between the two neighbors have risen because of Thailand's toleration of various insurgent groups along their shared border (...) [and the Karens] enjoyed close ties with senior Thai intelligence and army officers.<sup>108</sup> The Thai military sent special agents to serve with Karen and Mon units as both observers and advisers. "

Sources:  
Buszynski 1998:  
292; Beehner  
2016: 250-51

### Crackdown campaign (Date: 1989, May )

**Event description:** (1) in 1989 (...) the early part of that year, hundreds of Burmese troops, without any qualms whatsoever, crossed into Thailand in their attempt to attack KNU strongholds from the rear."; (2) Thailand's tolerance of Myanmar's military incursions against these ethnic groups was the logical consequence. In May 1989 the Myanmar military launched an incursion against the Karens through Thai territory at Ban Wan Kan during which a Thai border village was razed. (...) Thailand then began to cooperate with Myanmar to manage the ethnic groups in the name of border security."; (3) "[There was an] establishment of a joint Thai-Myanmar border committee in May 1989 at deputy foreign minister level"; (4) "on a regular basis (...) Thailand began to cooperate with SLORC against the Karen, the Karenni and other rebellious ethnic groups along the common border"; (5) "In May 1989, the Burmese military carried out an armed attack against the Kawmura camp only a few miles from the border (...) buoyed by improved ties with its Thai military counterparts"; (6) "In May 1989, the Burmese military carried out an armed attack against the Kawmura camp (...) [after which] the tatmadaw decided to launch a major anti-Karen offensive in 1991"

Sources:  
Lertcharoenchok  
1997; Buszynski  
1998: 292, 291;  
Buszynski 1998:  
292; Buszynski  
1998: 300;  
Beehner 2018:  
21; Beehner  
2016: 257-58

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Hundreds of Burmese troops, without any qualms whatsoever, crossed into Thailand in their attempt to attack KNU strongholds from the rear."; (2) "On a regular basis (...) Thailand began to cooperate with SLORC against the Karen, the Karenni and other rebellious ethnic groups along the common border"

### Crackdown campaign (Date: 1997, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) "The Thai military's willingness to cooperate with SLORC was revealed once again in February 1997 when the Burmese launched another offensive against the Karen along the border. (...) the Thai army enforced the repatriation of some 3,000 Karen women and children and began to screen all Karen males above the age of 15.<sup>46</sup> In an incident on 28 January 1997 the SLORC-controlled Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) raided Thai territory. Army Commander Chettha was prepared to dismiss the event, declaring that it was an internal conflict for Myanmar"; (2) "Local Thai troops at Suan Phung revealed last Thursday that they had already sent across the

Sources:  
Buszynski 1998:  
302;  
Lertcharoenchok  
1997

border two batches of Burmese, the first of which had some 1,000 people and the other of about 800. Nobody knows for certain whether the first group of 1,000 are Karen refugees or illegal Burmese immigrants arrested around Bangkok. The Burmese attack to capture the KNU's 4th Brigade area, located opposite to Kanchanaburi, and the synchronised, but hastily-organised, Thai deportation of the refugees"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## 2.47 KR in Thailand

**Target:** Cambodia (Kampuchea), **Host:** Thailand, **UCDP Actor ID:** 270

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1979, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) "since Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978 and overthrew the Communist Khmer Rouge Government [in Jan 1979] (...) nearly 250,000 of the guerrillas' followers have fled into Thailand, usually well ahead of a Vietnamese assault. This classic guerrilla fade-away tactic, familiar in Vietnam's own history, has kept casualties low and deprived Hanoi's troops of bounty. Reporters who watched recent evacuations saw rebels in clean uniforms entering Thailand with livestock and weapons."; (2) "[The rebels] rove along the Thai-Kampuchean border ready to cross into Thailand when pressed by the Vietnamese and Heng Samrin forces, and may turn up as refugees in camps along the Thai border or seek temporary sanctuary (...) Thai authorities have been lenient towards the resistance forces, probably because they are fighting for national independence, and the Thai army has sometimes exchanged artillery fire with the Vietnamese- Heng Samrin forces"; (3) [Still by 1988] The Khmer Rouge move in and out of Cambodia from bases in Thailand, where they are tolerated because they serve as a buffer to Bangkok's traditional enemies, the Vietnamese."

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*Sources:*  
Crossette 1985;  
Theeravit 1982:  
570; Crossette  
1988

## 2.48 LRA in Central African Republic

**Target:** Uganda, **Host:** Central African Republic, **UCDP Actor ID:** 488

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 2007, Winter)

**Event description:** (1) "[A]t the end of 2007, a group was sent off westward along the border between DRC and Sudan to the Central African Republic."

**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 2009, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) "2009 February - Ugandan LRA rebels cross into CAR"; (2) "From June 2009, Kony and sections of the LRA crossed the [Congolese] border with CAR and remained there until the present"; (3) "The LRA is even present [in the CAR] now with a small group in Vakaga province and is actively engaged in diamond exploitation there in order to finance its other activities."; (4) "CAR appears to have been used by LRA commanders as an ideal location for transiting through the region and procuring abductees and supplies, due to its (...) lack of an effective military"; (5) "The re-entry of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) – originally a Ugandan insurgency – into the CAR in May 2009 and its almost free range in the south east"

*Sources:*  
Allen and  
Vlassenroot et al.  
2010: 276 (see  
also Schomerus  
2007: 37)  
*Sources:*  
BBC 2018; Titeca  
2020: 7; Berg  
2008: 34; Arieff  
2014: 10; ICG  
2010: 1

**Pledge** (*Date: 2009, Jun, 12*)

**Event description:** (1) "[Media reported that] The Chiefs of Staff of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and the Central African Republic met Thursday [12 June 2009] in Kisangani to address the unresolved issue of the presence of Ugandan rebels from the Lord's Resistance Army (...) in Province Orientale, Congo, local media say, raising the possibility that the meeting could represent the preparatory phase of a new military campaign against the rebels"; (2) "The chiefs of general staff of the armed forces of the DRC, Uganda and the Central African Republic, CAR, are meeting this Thursday in Kisangani in Orientale Province. Purpose of this tripartite meeting: to look into the security situation"; (3) "In 2009, it [the CAR authorities] called on countries in the region to work together to end the insecurity and abuses perpetrated by the LRA"; (4) "In August 2009 [at an assembly in Tripoli], the AU Assembly discussed prospects for an AU-led effort to eliminate the LRA, as well as encouraged member states to "renew their efforts, including military action."

**Pledge form:** Speech

*Sources:*  
MISNA 2009;  
Radio Okapi  
2009; World  
Peace  
Foundation: 3;  
Ngossia 2020:  
109

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2009, Jul*)

**Event description:** (1) "By July 2009, the UPDF had entered CAR and settled in Obo"; (2) "[In July 2009, the] forces of the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) [were] currently at Obo, in HautMbomou sub-prefecture [in CAR]"; (3) "The [LRA-infested southeast] region has received increased international aid and attention since Ugandan troops deployed to the area to pursue LRA leaders in mid-2009"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "The UPDF had entered CAR and settled in Obo"; (2) "Ugandan troops deployed to the area to pursue LRA leaders"

*Sources:*  
Cakaj 2010: 8;  
UN OCHA 2009;  
Arieff 2014: 10

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2009, Sep, 9*)

**Event description:** (1) "On September 9, 2009 the UPDF bombed Kony's camp in Goughere where he was allegedly injured."; (2) "2009 September - Ugandan army confirms that it is pursuing LRA rebels in CAR"; (3) "Despite the presence of some 150 FACA and as many as 700 Ugandan troops in the area, the LRA continues to terrorise the local population"; (4) "[The LRA now] attempt to outrun the Ugandan army, which has been allowed to intervene on CAR soil to engage the LRA"; (5) "With the CAR's approval, Uganda has deployed troops to take part in a major operation against the LRA."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "The deployment of several thousand UPDF soldiers in eastern CAR has resulted in a decrease in the number of LRA attacks on major towns in the south-east" (Ngossia 2020: 108

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "The UPDF had entered CAR and settled in Obo"; (2) "Ugandan troops deployed to the area to

*Sources:*  
Cakaj 2010; BBC  
2018; ICG 2010:  
15; Bauters 2012:  
21; BBC 2009

pursue LRA leaders”

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2013, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) “The operations restarted in August 2013, after the AU garnered support from the Djotodia government”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “The operations restarted in August 2013” (Arieff 2014: 11)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “The UPDF had entered CAR and settled in Obo”; (2) “Ugandan troops deployed to the area to pursue LRA leaders”

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Sources:  
Arieff 2014: 11

## **2.49 LRA in DR Congo (Zaire)**

**Target:** Uganda, **Host:** DR Congo (Zaire), **UCDP Actor ID:** 488

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#### **Sanctuary start** (Date: 2005, Sep )

**Event description:** (1) “At the beginning of September, the [LRA’s] first crossing [into the Garamba National Park, DRC] took place”; (2) “The killing of eight MONUC peacekeepers by the LRA on 23 January 2006 in the Garamba National Park occurred almost in a timely manner to back up Museveni’s claims [that the LRA had camps in DR Congo]”; (3) “the Congolese army encountered difficulties in pushing back the LRA, and were forced by higher-level authorities to – at least initially – tolerate the LRA’s presence. A Washingtonbased Ugandan intermediary, Jongomoi Okidi-Olal, played a key-role in this situation. For example, Congolese army representatives and other authorities were directed to him by the LRA, and he in turn directed them to Kinshasa officials – confirming the LRA’s authorization to stay in the DRC.”

Sources:  
Allen and Vlassenroot et al. 2010: 274; Allen and Vlassenroot et al. 2010: 196; Titeca 2020: 25 (see also Schomerus 2007: 25)

#### **Pledge** (Date: 2007, Sep, 8)

**Event description:** (1) “In September 2007, Uganda and the DRC signed the Arusha pact [alias Ngurdoto Agreement], in which the two countries agreed to undertake joint efforts to combat [ADF and LRA]. (...) This pact had little result.”; (2) The agreement states: “The Government of the DRC shall formulate an action plan to neutralize the negative forces, particularly the LRA and ADF, which shall become effective by January 2008”; (3) “UGANDA and the Democratic Republic of Congo on Saturday signed a landmark agreement which will see the Lord’s Resistance Army rebels flushed out of Garamba within 90 days.”

**Pledge form:** Written pact

Sources:  
Titeca and Vassenroot 2012: 160-61; New Vision 2007

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2008, Jul )

**Event description:** (1) “For more than two years, as the LRA established and built up their base in the expansive Garamba forest, (...) accompanied by a de facto arrangement between the DRC government and the LRA to leave each other alone. But in July/August 2008, the DRC army (the FARDC) began deploying along two sides of the forest.”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

Sources:  
Allen and Vlassenroot et al. 2010: 221

**Dislodged:** No  
**Leadership decapitation:** No  
**Intrusive:** No  
**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2008, Dec, 14)

**Event description:** (1) "In December 2008, the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) entered the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and launched an attack on the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which was hiding in Garamba National Park in northern DRC, just across the border from Sudan. This military strike, called Operation Lightning Thunder, aimed at dislodging and ending the military activity of the armed group."; (2) "on 14 December 2008 (...) Collaborating with the armies of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and southern Sudan, and assisted by the USA, the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) launched Operation Lightning Thunder. This was an attack on the LRA in Garamba National Park of the DRC, just across the border from Sudan. Here Kony was known to have a base, a few days' walk from Ri-Kwangba, where he had occasionally turned up to meet with various peace negotiators since 2006."; (3) "Operation Lightning Thunder destroyed the LRA base camp and scattered the LRA over the DRC, Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR)."

*Sources:*  
Vlassenroot et al.  
2012: 2; Allen  
and Vlassenroot  
et al. 2010: 1;  
Schomerus and  
Tumutegereize  
2009

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "Operation Lightning Thunder destroyed the LRA base camp and scattered the LRA over the DRC, Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR)." (Schomerus and Tumutegereize 2009); (2) "the LRA was able to withdraw to safer areas and to split into smaller groups to avoid detection." (Allen and Vlassenroot et al. 2010: 19); (3) "Two years later, however, the LRA remains at large" (Vlassenroot et al. 2012: 2)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "the Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) entered the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and launched an attack on the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)"; (2) "UPDF launched Operation Lightning Thunder. This was an attack on the LRA in Garamba National Park of the DRC"

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2009, Jun )

**Event description:** (1) "From June 2009, Kony and sections of the LRA crossed the [Congolese] border with CAR and remained there until the present"; (2) "The joint Ugandan-Congolese operation, "Lightning Thunder"(...) scattered and pushed them north into Sudan and the CAR"

*Sources:*  
Titeca 2020: 7;  
ICG 2010: 15

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "From June 2009 [after five months of Lightning Thuder crackdowns], Kony and sections of the LRA crossed the border with CAR and remained there until the present (...) Sections of the LRA remain active in the DRC. However, (...) only a 100 to 150 combatants are left" (Titeca 2020: 7)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "the Ugan-

dan People's Defence Force (UPDF) entered the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and launched an attack on the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)"; (2) "UPDF launched Operation Lightning Thunder. This was an attack on the LRA in Garamba National Park of the DRC"

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## 2.50 LRA in Sudan

**Target:** Uganda, **Host:** Sudan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 488

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### **Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1992, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "[In] early 1992 (...) the Sudanese government had acquired control of several of several stretches of the Sudan-Ugandan border and Kony was invited to Juba by the Sudanese Military Security"; (2) "The LRA's Sudan base at Aru-Kubi, home to 34000 fighters, was nicknamed "New Gulu" (...) or "Kony Village", and was the LRA's headquarters from 1994 to 1997. (...) [Then,] the LRA leadership became settled in SAF-held Juba from 1997 until the early 2000s"; (3) "After 1990, the LRA gained a further boost when it began receiving direct aid from the Sudanese government"

*Sources:*  
Prunier 2009: 82;  
Schomerus 2012:  
126; Dunn 2004:  
366

### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1997, Apr )

**Event description:** (1) "[There was a] joint UPDF-SPLA operation carried out inside southern Sudan in early April 1997, killing 153 and taking 210 prisoners, followed a few days later by another battle wherein (...) sixty-eight LRA fighters were killed"

*Sources:*  
Prunier 2009:  
423, fn. 91

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

### **Pledge** (*Date:* 1999, Dec, 8)

**Event description:** (1) "President al Bashir of Sudan and President Museveni of Uganda signed the Nairobi Agreement (NA) in December of 1999, restoring diplomatic relations between the two nations"; (2) "the agreement established that neither party would support the other's rebels"

*Sources:*  
Papa et al. 2010:  
350; Schomerus  
2007: 26

**Pledge form:** Written pact

### **Pledge** (*Date:* 2002, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) "In an attempt to root out the LRA once and for all, Sudan signed a protocol with Uganda in March 2002 that allowed Ugandan troops to be deployed in southern Sudan to carry out search-and-destroy operations against LRA bases"; (2) "This [permit] was done with the explicit support of the government of Sudan, which, fearing American retaliation after September 11, was anxious to be seen taking anti-terrorist measures."; (3) "On 5 March, Sudan and Uganda signed the first protocol which permitted limited operations against the LRA in Sudan"

*Sources:*  
Dunn 2004: 141;  
Rodriguez 2004:  
82; Pambazuka  
News

**Pledge form:** Written pact

### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2002, Mar )

**Event description:** (1) "in early March, UPDF troops began pouring into southern Sudan as part of an offensive codenamed 'Operation Iron Fist'. (...) [Uganda claimed] by the end of March that they had "captured" all four main rebel camps (along with Kony's Kaunda suit)"; (2) "Uganda, in turn, announced Operation Iron Fist, its own version

*Sources:*  
Atkinson 2009:  
7; Lacey 2002



of the American-led effort to fight terrorism in Afghanistan. Since March, government troops have chased rebels into their Sudanese hide-outs, killing several hundred in fierce fighting. ”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “UPDF troops began pouring into southern Sudan as part of an offensive codenamed ‘Operation Iron Fist’”

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2005, Nov* )

**Event description:** (1) “The LRA rebels led by the elusive Joseph Kony have been holed up in the densely-forested Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of Congo since 2005 when they fled an onslaught by the UPDF in the north and south Sudan.”; (2) “[Material] supplies [from Sudanese elements] stopped in November 2005, when the LRA crossed into Garamba National Park in DRC. Khartoum apparently tried to re-establish contact in March 2006, but the general consensus is that the relationship was by then over—the LRA today is adamant that they no longer have any connection with the GoS [Government of Sudan].”; (3) “The CPA [the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on South Sudan] meant Khartoum had less reason or opportunity to provide support for the LRA, while the newly established Government of Southern Sudan became less willing to continue hosting the UPDF”; (4) “This is the general context in which the LRA moved to the DRC: having lost its support from Khartoum and no longer welcome in South(ern) Sudan, continued military pressure, and an opening for peace talks.”

*Sources:*  
New Vision  
2009; Schomerus  
2007: 25; Dolan  
2010: 9; Titeca  
2020: 12

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “Khartoum apparently tried to re-establish contact in March 2006, but the general consensus is that the relationship was by then over—the LRA today is adamant that they no longer have any connection with the GoS [Government of Sudan].” (Schomerus 2007: 25); (2) “Reports of LRA activity on Sudanese soil, specifically in Eastern Equatoria, in 2006–07 are contradictory. In late 2006, some locals were adamant that the LRA had stopped attacking and was no longer supplied by Khartoum. Others remain just as convinced that the LRA was still attacking and ambushing” (Schomerus 2007: 36)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “[LRA] fled an onslaught by the UPDF in the north and south Sudan.”

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2007, Jan* )

**Event description:** (1) “In January 2007, using the cover of the ceasefire, the remaining senior LRA commanders finally managed to make the journey. As a result, the LRA succeeded in their efforts to regroup their forces”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Other

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “In January 2007, using the cover of the ceasefire, the remaining senior LRA commanders finally managed to make the journey. As a result,

*Sources:*  
Allen and  
Vlassenroot et al.  
2010: 275-276

the LRA succeeded in their efforts to regroup their forces" (Allen and Vlassenroot et al. 2010: 275-276); (2) "[In October 2008, when leaving DRC camps and considering to re-enter Sudan, it became clear that] the UPDF and SPLA are waiting for them on the other side of the border (...) [Instead,] they were pushed back in a 'friendly way'. (...) [Thus,] the LRA did not cross back ; but instead walked north-west on the Sudanese side of the border and slipped back into the DRC" (Titeca 2020: 17)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "[LRA] fled an onslaught by the UPDF in the north and south Sudan."

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## 2.51 LURD in Guinea

**Target:** Liberia , **Host:** Guinea, **UCDP Actor ID:** 509

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 2000, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) "LURD was created in February 2000 in Freetown, Sierra Leone, by Liberians fleeing from persecution by Taylor to Guinea (...) Guinean President Lansana Conté decided to facilitate LURD's consolidation as a viable military threat against the Liberian government; President Conté intended for LURD to serve as a "buffer" between Guinea and Liberia. (...) LURD received considerable support from Guinea in the form of access to territory, weapons, materiel, and logistic support (...) [They were] based in Conakry, Guinea"; (2) "The LURD militia was born in Sierra Leone but has always been operationally based in Guinea."

*Sources:*  
UCDP/actor/509;  
ICG 2005: 21

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2002, Oct )

**Event description:** (1) "The Guinean government publicly forced LURD to leave Macenta, located in the southeastern border region, and return to Liberia in October 2002."

*Sources:*  
Hazen 2013: 114

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Expulsion

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "Guinea (...) forced LURD to leave Macenta, located in the southeastern border region, and return to Liberia" (Hazen 2013: 114)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## 2.52 MDD in Nigeria

**Target:** Chad, **Host:** Nigeria, **UCDP Actor ID:** 446

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1991, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) "In 1990, with the fall of the Hissène Habré dictatorship [in December 1990], the former president's supporters also regrouped in the area under the Movement for the Defence of Democracy (MDD). The Lake has since served as a safe haven for [the] rebels"; (2) "The [MDD] launched its first attacks in the Lake Chad region from across the Chad-Nigeria border"; (3) "Jan 3, 1992 – Forces allied with the opposition groups Forces Armées Occidentales (FAO), the Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le

*Sources:*  
Omenma 2020: 93;  
UCDP/actor/446;  
MAR 2004; Tar 2021: 273

Developement (MDD), and the Movement for Development and Democracy (MDD), launched an invasion of Chad from Nigeria"; (2) "Habre's Movement for the Defence of Democracy (MDD), established a base here [Nigerian part of in Lake Chad] and recruited some Nigerians and other from neighbouring countries into their armed groups."

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 1992, Apr, 10)

**Event description:** (1) "Goukouni Guet led MDD until he was arrested in Nigeria in early 1992, and subsequently extradited to Chad."; (2) "[April 10:] the arrest and extradition of more than 40 people, including the MDD leader, Goukouni Guet, in Nigeria"

Sources:  
UCDP/actor/446;  
MAR 2004

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) "the arrest and extradition of more than 40 people, including the MDD leader, Goukouni Guet, in Nigeria" (MAR 2004)

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## **2.53 MEK in Iraq**

**Target:** Iran, **Host:** Iraq, **UCDP Actor ID:** 308

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#### **Sanctuary start** (Date: 1986, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "The group was formed in the 1960s with the goal of overthrowing the Shah of Iran. The group was driven out of Iran after an unsuccessful attempt to rise up against the Khomeini regime in September 1981. The group sided with the Saddam Hussein regime and established themselves in Iraq in 1986."; (2) "Former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein let the group - also known as the Mujahedeen Khalq, or MEK - operate camps in Iraq from which it staged attacks on Iran."; (3) "Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the MEK obtained all of its military assistance and the majority of its financial support from Saddam Hussein's regime, with the remainder of the MEK's financial assistance obtained from ex-patriot Iranian communities. Iraq supplied the MEK with weapons, bases and protection, and the MEK pursued Saddam Hussein's Iranian enemies"

Sources:  
UCDP/actor/308;  
NYT 2007;  
Carella 2005: 2

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2003, Apr)

**Event description:** (1) "The United States military disarmed the group after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, assuming responsibility for security at Camp Ashraf."; (2) "In early April of 2003, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States began bombing the MEK bases in Iraq. The United States and the MEK signed a ceasefire on April 15, 2003"

Sources:  
Kingsley 2020  
(see also Shane  
2012); Cafarella  
2005: 14

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2009, Jul, 28)

**Event description:** (1) "Juan Cole reports on a raid by the Iraqi military on "Camp Ashraf, the stronghold of the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK) terrorist cult in eastern Iraq, on Tuesday, killing at least four MEK members, wounding 21, and arresting 28." (...) This

Sources:  
Etheridge 2009;  
NYT 2009

little incident at Camp Ashraf is like a magnitude 4.5 earthquake in California, something that locals would hardly notice but which indicates that a big fault in the earth is on the move. (...) the action by the Iraqi government may indicate a shift in Iraqi policy away from Washington and toward friendlier relations with Tehran.”; (3) “Americans troops had guarded the camp since 2003, but recently handed over responsibility to Iraqi forces. Baghdad promised that the exiles would be protected. There is no authoritative version of events, but it does not look as if that promise is being kept (...) The camp’s residents are members of the People’s Mujahedeen of Iran (MEK), which is committed to overthrowing Tehran’s government. Saddam Hussein welcomed them to Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war and they have lived at the camp ever since.”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2012, Jul, 6)

**Event description:** (1) “The Iraqi government has set July 20 as a deadline to close Camp Ashraf, which was given to the M.E.K. by Saddam Hussein. Iraqi officials now are deeply hostile to the group, and at least twice Iraqi security forces have clashed with M.E.K. members at Ashraf, resulting in several dozen deaths. (...) [Besides,] The Obama administration on Friday stepped up pressure on a dissident Iranian group to complete a move from its longtime base in Iraq”

**Pledge form:** Speech

*Sources:*  
Shane 2012-07

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2013, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) “After intensive lobbying by a bipartisan group of lawmakers, the American government also removed them from a list of terrorist organizations in [September] 2012. A year later, they were finally welcomed by Albania.”; (2) “About 100 of the group’s members are expected to stay at Camp Ashraf for now, with permission of the Iraqi authorities to oversee the group’s property there”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “About 100 of the group’s members are expected to stay at Camp Ashraf for now, with permission of the Iraqi authorities to oversee the group’s property there” (Shane 2012-09)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
Kingsley 2020;  
Shane 2012-09

## 2.54 MFDC in Gambia

**Target:** Senegal, **Host:** Gambia, **UCDP Actor ID:** 529

**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 2006, Apr, 13)

**Event description:** (1) “28 April 2006 (...) Salif Sadio wrote to Abbé Diamacoune. In it, he (...) [told of his arrival] in the border area with Gambia”; (2) “On 13 April 2006, the Guinea-Bissau chief of staff announced the fall of Sadio’s last remaining camp at Barraca Mandioca, although Sadio himself escaped capture, crossing Casamance to set up camp next to the Gambian border”; (3) “This break with the Guinea-Bissau leaders

*Sources:*  
Foucher 2023:  
100; Foucher  
2019: 282;  
Alioune 2016:  
138; Foucher  
2003: 109;  
Emmanuel and  
Lenn 2019: 63;  
Marut 2011: 368;  
Marut 2011: 369;  
Tandia 2013:  
224; Foucher  
2023: 99; Evans  
2004: 7; Alioune

places the Banjul regime at the centre of the conflict with the displacement of the fighting to the north and the rapprochement between the southern front fighters and the regime of President Jammeh"; (4) "[Despite a tradition for cooperation between Gambia and Senegal,] As soon as he came to power [in 2000], Wade angered Banjul by calling for an end to Gambian mediation. Relations between the two countries then oscillated very quickly between tension and cooperation, cordial official visits and inflammatory statements."; (5) "during the 22 years rule of the Gambia former president, Yahyah Jammeh which ended with his defeat in the 2016 presidential election, relations between the two states were highly volatile (...) Gambia dissidents based in Senegal have been allowed to be more vocal and criticize Jammeh's regime in The Gambia under President Sall's administration contributed to the volatility"; (6) "Recently [written in 2011], deliveries of Iranian arms via the Gambia enabled a radical group to carry out spectacular actions against the Senegalese army for a brief period."; (7) "Salif Sadio has moved from one border to the other"; (8) "President Jammeh of Gambia has always denied implication of his government in the Casamance war and still does so. Neither has he reckoned the presence of MFDC combatants in the border areas, where the leader of the armed wing Attika ("warrior" in Jola), Salif Sadio, has his strongholds of Darsilami and Kajaalong bordering the Gambian village called Jifanta. Yet he is assisting Salif Sadio and his men, who move within the Gambia without being disturbed."; (9) "21-22 June 2005 [In the first documented case of hit-and-run attack on Senegalese targets by MFDC rebels within Gambia,] In Touba Mouride, around ten hooded armed men in a 4x4 vehicle registered in Gambia fired on a Bounkiling gendarmerie patrol returning from a patrol in the village of Saré Alkaly. One constable, Boubacar Seydi, was killed and another, Chief Constable Mamadou Maiga, seriously injured. The assailants, whose number was not specified, then left in the direction of the border with neighbouring Gambia."; (10) "[Yet] In The Gambia there are no maquis rear bases"; (11) "The Casamance rebels circulate freely in Gambia with the complicity of President Yaya Jammeh."; (12) "From around 2007 and up to last year, Sadio's men had camps in Katama, Karrunor, Jilanfari, Katinoro, and Jundang [along the border to Gambia]."

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2017, Jan, 19)

**Event description:** (1) "the Organization set 19 January 2017 as the date the troops would move into the Gambia if Jammeh continued to refuse to step down (...) The operation was codenamed Operation Restore Democracy. (...) Despite the lack of endorsement of military action by the UNSC, Senegalese armed forces entered the Gambia on the same day (...) In the early hours of the offensive, clashes took place near the border village of Kanilai, the home town of Yahya Jammeh, between Senegalese and pro-Jammeh MFDC forces, and Senegal reportedly took control of the village. Senegal halted its offensive (...) 26 January, 2017, [as] President Adama Barrow returned to the Gambia, while about 2,500 ECOWAS troops remained in the country to stabilize it."; (2) "Senegalese soldiers reportedly arrested separatist fighters on Gambian soil and a pro-Jammeh Gambian general at the border"; (3) "The downfall of Jammeh after the elections in The Gambia in 2016 and his replacement by new authorities very close to Senegal—all events in which Senegalese authorities played no small part—leaves Sadio in a more precarious situation than ever."; (4) "On 19 January, there was apparently some sporadic fighting on Gambian territory which involved Senegalese troops and rebel units from Casamance"; (4) "[Whereas other ECOWAS states were the key engineers and drivers of the intervention,] Senegal was thus the only ECOWAS member state that could have been accused of having a hidden agenda in its use of the ECOWAS mandate to promote democracy in The Gambia. It would, however, be erroneous to interpret ECOWAS's actions throughout the crisis as an attempt by Senegal to solve a political

*Sources:*  
Abiodun et al.  
2019: 51-52; Ba  
and Foucher  
2022: 154;  
Foucher 2019:  
283; Hartmann  
2017: 90;  
Hartmann 2017:  
94

conflict with a neighbouring state.”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

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## 2.55 MFDC in Guinea-Bissau

**Target:** Senegal, **Host:** Guinea-Bissau, **UCDP Actor ID:** 529

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1982, Summer)

**Event description:** (1) “[Since 1982] Senegal constantly suspected Guinea-Bissau of supporting the separatist rebellion”; (2) “MFDC units made increasing use of the border zone as a rear base from the late 1980s, the conflict began to acquire a Bissauan dimension, and to feed into existing tensions in Bissauan society and politics. Most notably, elements in the Bissauan armed forces began collaborating – out of both sympathy and material motives – with the MFDC, running guns and drugs (cannabis) across the border. (...) ominous rumours began to spread of training camps over the border in the Cacheu-Cachungu region of Guinea-Bissau, capitalizing on sympathy among Bissauan Jola and Balant, some of whom remembered help from their Casamançais kinfolk in the forest war against the Portuguese.”; (3) “discovery in 1986 of a complot, qualified as a balante, which made it possible to make the [MFDC-Bissau] menage.”; (4) “Since the advent of the Casamance conflict [in 1982], the MFDC (...) has used the border between the two countries as a fallback zone. As a result, at the beginning of the armed conflict, the MFDC had the advantage of the terrain by using the border with Guinea-Bissau as a fallback base.”; (5) “The repression that followed the demonstrations of the early 1980s [i.e. 1982] forced some of the separatist militants to take refuge in the bush, towards the border with neighbouring Guinea-Bissau. It was there that they tried to structure a guerrilla movement.”

*Sources:*  
Diop et al. 1994:  
189-212; Manley  
1998; Marut  
1996: 83-84;  
Aliouni 2016:  
136; Foucher  
2007

**Pledge** (*Date:* 1993, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) “Gone are the territorial disputes: in exchange for the renunciation of its territorial claims, an agreement associates Bissau with the exploitation of the zone’s fishery and mineral resources. Concluded in 1993, (...) Gone are the historical disputes, with Bissau dispelling any ambiguity about its intentions by committing itself to a political and military collaboration with Senegal.”; (2) “January 1993 Senegalese army sweeps the border area with Guinea-Bissau”; (3) “[On 19 March] Abbé is arrested in Bissao by the Bissao-Guinean authorities (...) Abbé is forcibly brought back to Ziguinchor from Guinea Bissau by the Bissau-Guinean government (...) [the day after,] Abbé is forcibly brought back to Ziguinchor from Guinea Bissau by the Bissau-Guinean government”; (4) “12 December 1992 The Senegalese army bombed Sao Domingos, where rebel bases were believed to be located - two Guinean civilians killed and three injured - this operation followed the death of two Senegalese soldiers in an ambush.”; (5) “Since the mid-1990s, the settlement of the territorial dispute between Bissau and Dakar, which largely explains the support that the MFDC found within the Bissau-Guinean state apparatus, has deprived the Casamance rebels of a vital rear base.”

*Sources:*  
Marut 1996:  
84-85; Foucher  
2023: 13;  
Foucher 2023:  
14; Foucher  
2023: 12; Marut  
2011: 368

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1995, Feb, 10)

*Sources:*  
Marut 2001: 4;  
Marut 2001: 20;  
MAR 2004;  
Rulac 2021;  
Massey 2017:  
230-31; Marut  
1996: 81; Manley

**Event description:** (1) "[Amidst] the rapprochement between Nino Vieira and Senegal's President Abdou Diouf started in 1995 (...) it rode on the back of the rebellion in Casamance with an attempted joint manoeuvre by the two armies to organize a combing operation along the border area and granting the Senegalese army the right to pursue people on Guinea-Bissau territory."; (2) "the combing operations along the border with Guinea-Bissau executed by the Senegalese army since 1995"; (3) "Feb 22, 1995: Senegal fired rockets on the Guinea Bissau town of Ignore, one week after a similar strike on another border town, Punta Rosa. The Senegalese claimed they were trying to ferret out any rebels hiding across the border."; (4) "on 10 February 1995, Senegalese aircrafts bombed MFDC targets in Guinea-Bissau"; (5) "In the ensuing diplomatic round, realpolitik triumphed. A politico-military accord was framed with Senegal. Bissau moved closer to Paris with Vieira signalling Guinea-Bissau's entry into the Franc Zone. Following the disappearance of four French tourists in Casamance in 1995, joint exercises, with French logistical support, were conducted. Whilst Guinea-Bissau was legally neutral, the Senegalese saw the exercises as a basis for a full scale offensive against the rebels. (...) An agreed zone of 'hot pursuit' was created giving Senegalese troops access to a strip of Bissauan territory, seven kilometres wide, along the border."; (5) "Nino Vieira has in fact just made a spectacular rapprochement with Abdou Difu's Senegal. And this rapprochement is largely at the expense of the Casamance rebellion, with the Senegalese army having more and more free rein in northern Guinea-Bissau"; (6) "Bombings by the Senegalese air force on Bissauan territory in 1995 provoked widespread political and military protest, while the Government strove to improve relations. (...) Well-known MFDC bases at Efof and Youtou, near the border with Guinea-Bissau, were destroyed, forcing the MFDC to reconsider its tactics as the war began to take on a scorched-earth quality"; (7) "First, joint actions by the two armies in 1995: the mysterious disappearance in April of four French tourists in Casamance served as a signal to launch an offensive by the Senegalese army, which quickly showed its real objective, the eradication of the Casamance rebellion, which was planted in the forest areas along the Guinea-Bissau border. Preceded by joint Franco-Senegalese military operations in eastern Senegal, this offensive benefited from French technical assistance (aerial scouting), and from a border blockade by the Bissau army"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "The two armies to organize[d] a combing operation along the border area and granting the Senegalese army the right to pursue people on Guinea-Bissau territory."; (2) "An agreed zone of 'hot pursuit' was created giving Senegalese troops access to a strip of Bissauan territory, seven kilometres wide, along the border."; (3) "[There were] joint actions by the two armies"; (4) "[There was] a border blockade by the Bissau army"; (5) "The Senegalese army having more and more free rein in northern Guinea-Bissau"

### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1998, Jun, 9*)

**Event description:** (1) "The official aim of the Senegalese intervention [into G-B 9 June 1998], known as "Operation Gabou", was to defend a democratically elected leader (...) [yet] it was clear to all observers that the intervention was directly linked to the conflict in Casamance and that the Senegalese army had other aims: firstly, they wished to avoid a government in Bissau which was associated with the Casamance rebellion, and secondly, they wanted to outflank the rebel fighters of the Democratic

*Sources:*

Marut 2001: 3;  
Marut 2001: 5;  
MAR 2004;  
Zartman 2016:  
13; Massey 2017:  
232-33; Massey  
2017: 247;  
Foucher 2023:  
30

Forces of Casamance Movement (Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance - MFDC). (...) the Senegalese soldiers were confronted with unexpected resistance by the insurgents.”; (2) “The last Senegalese soldiers left Bissau in March [1999]”; (3) “Simultaneous shelling of rebel bases detected along the Guinea-Bissau border”; (4) “Under Yala and the second Vieira regime, the Guinea-Bissau government adopted a decidedly more pro-Senegal stance.”; (5) “After three days of fighting [post 6 June 1998] a dual intervention took place from neighbouring Senegal and Guinea. (...) Senegal and Guinea dispatched 1,300 and 500 troops respectively as part of an intervention that the Senegalese dubbed Opération Gabou. (...) few Senegalese politicians objected to the underlying goal of the intervention - to create conditions for a direct assault on MFDC rear bases in Guinea-Bissau.”; (6) “the schism in the Guinea-Bissau armed forces furnished an opportunity to tackle the MFDC from behind their rear bases”; (7) “[Yet, the rebels maintain operations: in] Nov. 1998 (...) members of the clerical committee travel to the Bissa-Guinean border (...) to meet the maquis”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “The schism in the Guinea-Bissau armed forces furnished an opportunity to tackle the MFDC from behind their rear bases”; (2) “The Senegalese intervention [into G-B 9 June 1998], known as ‘Operation Gabou’ (...) wanted to outflank the rebel fighters of the Democratic Forces of Casamance Movement”

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2000, Oct, 19)

**Event description:** (1) “[On 19] October [2000], President Yala [newly instated in G-B] issued a warning to Casamançais separatists that they would not be allowed to use Guinea-Bissau territory for their guerrilla activities against Senegal”; (2) “By October 2000, President Yalá warned Casamance rebels to abstain from using Guinea-Bissau’s territory for their guerrilla activities against Senegal”

**Pledge form:** Speech

*Sources:*  
Marut 2001: 8;  
Embaló 2012:  
267

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2000, Dec)

**Event description:** (1) “[G-B leader] Mané’s death freed [G-B leader] Yala to align himself more firmly with the Senegalese government vis-à-vis the Casamance and he turned his forces against Sadio’s Front Sud hardliners on Bissau-Guinean territory. In December 2000 a contingent of the Bissau-Guinean army under Colonel Tagmé Na Way, in cooperation with Sagna moderates, launched an offensive against the [MFDC]”; (2) “Guinea-Bissau’s importance as a source [of material support has] diminished since 2000”; (3) “During the incidents the authorities arrested numerous military officers and political leaders in Guinea-Bissau, as well as Casamançais fighters, and the President reiterated his determination that Guinea-Bissau would not be used as a rear base for the Casamance rebellion.”; (4) “From late 2000 (...) until 2006, the Guinea-Bissau army operated directly against Salif Sadio[’s MFDC]”; (5) “The rapprochement between the two countries is favoured by the change of policy due to the advent of alternation in the early 2000s in Senegal and Guinea-Bissau. The new Guinea-Bissau administration, aware of the destabilising force of the Casamance rebels, moved closer to Dakar and made the fight against the MFDC a national cause. In order to achieve this, the new Bissau-Guinean leaders expelled the former rebels from the national territory.”; (6) “The real break came in November 2000 with the death of General Mané, still supported by

*Sources:*  
Evans 2004: 5;  
Marut 2001: 9;  
Foucher 2013: 5;  
Alioune 2016:  
137; Foucher  
2003: 106;  
Foucher 2013:  
8-9; Foucher  
2013: 10;  
Foucher 2013:  
11



Salif Sadio, during another attempted putsch. From then on, President Yala declared himself hostile to the presence of the MFDC in his country. He embarked on a policy of eradicating Sadio's bases, allying himself with Sadio's competitor in the MFDC, Léopold Sagna, who had not followed Mané in his second attempt. Between the end of 2000 and mid-2001, the MFDC's presence in the country was threatened by the death of General Mané. Between the end of 2000 and mid-2001, fighting increased"; (7) "Dakar directly supported Guinea-Bissau (...) providing military supplies and material (...) Guinea-Bissau troops co-operated with the [anti-Sadio] MFDC separatists, operating in Senegalese territory with the tacit (or perhaps secret) agreement of Dakar"; (8) "[These were] a joint assault by the Guinea-Bissau army and the Kassolol faction [of the MFDC]"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Dakar directly supported Guinea-Bissau (...) providing military supplies and material"; (2) "Guinea-Bissau troops co-operated with the [anti-Sadio] MFDC separatists, operating in Senegalese territory with the tacit (or perhaps secret) agreement of Dakar"; (3) "Attacks by Bissau-Guinean forces, with Senegalese material support"; (4) "[Close] relations between the armies of Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, which are characterised by fairly regular contacts between the Zone and Sector Commanders."

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2002, May*)

**Event description:** (1) "In 2002, Guinea-Bissau forces put further pressure on Sadio and his supporters, arresting those of them living in Bissau or expelling them to Senegal, and occupying and destroying refugee villages (...) the southern front no longer constituted a hotspot in the Casamance conflict"; (2) "[By 2004] Sadio's separatists [were located] to the east of the border zone of Fouladou [on the Senegalese side of the border], where Sadio had retreated."; (3) "in Senegal, Kolda village in the Casamance region has been reportedly attacked by Guinea-Bissau troops on 19 May [2002]."; (4) "Sadio hanged on on the Casamance side of the Bissau-Senegal border a little bit longer [after the 2002 crackdown]. He was still there in 2005, when I was able to go and interview him! But in 2006, there was a final clean-up, and he was forced to leave and fall back on the Gambian border bases in the Djibidione."; (5) "eighteen alleged MFDC members are to be sent back to Senegal by UNOGBIS (the UN office in GB) The men were arrested last May in the outskirts of Bissau "for involvement in subversive activities". These 18 "Casamance" men are currently being held in the capital's central prison"; (6) "29 May 2002 - Alexandre Djiba expelled from Bissau."; (7) "[By July,] The military announced on 7 July that it had ceased operations, according to the sources, who added that the situation in Casamance had been calm in the past week"; (8) "6 May 2002 - The latest flare-up spread into the border villages [between Casamance and Gambia] of Dasilami, Dimbaya and Kartong as the Senegalese army pursued fleeing MFDC regulars out of Casamance into Gambian territory."; (9) "Since Yala came to power, the military in Guinea-Bissau has been actively engaged in closing down the rearguard bases of the MFDC. The rebels were known to have a strong presence in Guinea-Bissau north of the Cacheu Kiver, and including the area around Sio Vicente, which is about 25 km south of the border. Several violent clashes between Guinea-Bissau's army and the hardline faction of MFDC under Salif Sadio took place in this region. At the beginning of 2001 the Guinea-Bissau army succeeded in dislodging the MFDC from its bases in Varela and Susana, less than 15 km south of the border to Senegal. The new provincial military commander, Coronel

*Sources:*  
Foucher 2013: 9;  
Foucher 2013:  
10; Radio France  
Internationale  
2002; Vincent  
Foucher in  
correspondence  
(20.07.2023);  
Foucher 2023:  
69; Foucher  
2023: 69;  
Foucher 2023:  
70; Foucher  
2023: 67;  
Ostheimer 2001:  
55

Tagnie Na Wai, became known for his forceful and even violent repatriation of the many Casamance refugees who had fled over the border into Senegalese territory. According to the latest reports, the Guinea-Bissau military has forced Salif Sadio's rebels back into Casamance territory, and in July 2001 started to withdraw approximately 1500 of the troops deployed along the border. Nevertheless, the ongoing conflict within Senegal will remain one of the biggest challenges to regional stability faced by the executive as well as parliament in Bissau. The MFDC may infiltrate Guinea-Bissau territory again, making use of their ethnic affiliations."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "Sadio's separatists [were now located] to the east of the border zone of Fouladou [on the Senegalese side of the border], where Sadio had retreated." (Foucher 2013: 10)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Attacks by Bissau-Guinean forces, with Senegalese material support" (Evans 2021: 9); (2) "Dakar directly supported Guinea-Bissau (...) providing military supplies and material" (Foucher 2023: 8); (3) "General Babacar Gaye reaffirmed the vitality of relations between the armies of Guinea-Bissau and Senegal, which are characterised by fairly regular contacts between the Zone and Sector Commanders. As far as the Gambia is concerned, relations are not at the same level as those with the Guinea-Bissau Army." (Foucher 2023: 60); (4) "[While the G-B military pounded Sadio's position from south, in the north (Casamance) there was the] Start of a 'security' operation led by Colonel Abdoulaye Diallo, commander of military zone number 6 in Kolda. [There was] an operation carried out on 10 September [2002] near the border with Guinea-Bissau" (Foucher 2023: 71)

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2006, Apr, 13)

**Event description:** (1) "From late 2000 (...) until 2006, the Guinea-Bissau army operated directly against Salif Sadio's MFDC"; (2) "On 13 April 2006, the Guinea-Bissau chief of staff announced the fall of Sadio's last remaining camp at Barraca Mandioca, although Sadio himself escaped capture, crossing Casamance to set up camp next to the Gambian border"; (3) "it was the Guinea-Bissau army, not 'foreign' forces, that eventually dislodged the most extreme elements of the rebel Movement of Democratic Forces in the Casamance (MFDC) from their bases along the border with Senegal."; (4) "'Operation Clean-up', still in partnership with Kassolol against Sadio. Just as in previous offensives Casamance refugees – some of them with ties to the separatist fighters – who had set up camp close to Sadio's bases were chased back to Senegal and their houses burned"; (5) "in 2006, there was a final clean-up, and he was forced to leave and fall back on the Gambian border bases in the Djibidione."; (6) "14 March 2006 Start of the Guinea-Bissau offensive against Salif's camps (in April, the name Operation Limpeza was introduced) (...) 20 April 2006 The Bissau-Guinean army bombards Sadio's positions near Nhambalang, in the north of the country, with heavy weapons. (...) 22-23 April 2006 Salif Sadio's elements evacuating their bases in Baséré, Niambalang, Diacoumoune and Babonda."

*Sources:*  
Foucher 2013: 7;  
Foucher 2013:  
12; Foucher  
2013: 5; Foucher  
2013: 11;  
Vincent Foucher  
in  
correspondence  
(20.07.2023);  
Foucher 2023:  
100

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "[It] dislodged the (...) (MFDC) from their bases along the border with Senegal." (Foucher 2013: 5); (2) "the fall of Sadio's last remaining camp at Barraca Mandioca, although Sadio himself escaped capture, crossing Casamance"

(Foucher 2013: 12)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2011, Jun, 29)

**Event description:** (1) "At the end of June 2011 the chiefs of staff of the two countries signed an agreement in Bissau, following which Guinea-Bissau pledged to 'arrest all the rebels who had taken refuge on its territory'."

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*  
Foucher 2013:  
15

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2011, Jul )

**Event description:** (1) "following [the agreement signed in late June] Guinea-Bissau became involved in 'arresting all the rebels who had taken refuge on its territory'. In turn, the Senegalese army undertook to train Guinea-Bissau soldiers and to contribute to the upgrading of the naval barracks in Bissau."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
Foucher 2013:  
15

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2021, Feb, 10)

**Event description:** (1) "Senegal's army said Tuesday it has captured three rebel bases in the southern Casamance region with support from neighbouring Guinea-Bissau"; (2) "The rebels were driven out in particular from their base in Badjom, "the center of gravity and strength of the MFDC" about twenty kilometers from Ziguinchor, the main city of Casamance, said Colonel Kandé. "There was a great cooperation (of) the Guinea-Bissau Defense and Security Forces (FDS), operational and military cooperation," said Colonel Kandé. Guinea-Bissau has long been accused of serving as a rear base for the rebels, even providing them with weapons. An ally of Senegalese President Macky Sall, Umaro Sissoco Embaló, became president of Guinea-Bissau in 2020."; (3) "The regime changes in Gambia in 2017 and Guinea-Bissau in 2021, which brought Adama Barrow and Umaro Sissoco Embaló to power respectively, redefined the balance of power and offered an important advantage to the state of Senegal in its operations against the Casamance rebels. The close relationship of Macky Sall, president of the Senegalese republic, to both leaders has translated into greater ability for Senegalese troops to pursue rebels into traditional havens in Guinea-Bissau and Gambia."; (4) "The operations against the MFDC bases were carried out with assistance from Guinea-Bissau's defense and security forces (...) The Bissau-Guinean army moved forces up to the border to prevent the conflict from spilling over (...) MFDC elements accused Guinea-Bissau's President Embaló of allowing Senegalese military units to use a corridor through his country to attack the MFDC from the rear, as well as allowing small BissauGuinean units to join in the assault, an action legitimized by the recent defense agreements with Macky Sall's government"; (5) "Guinea Bissau, with the strength of recent defense agreements with Senegalese President Macky Sall, allowed the Senegalese army to carve out a corridor from its territory. Moreover, it fought in small units alongside its Senegalese ally in the clashes with the independence forces which have been taking place for several days."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

*Sources:*  
AFP 2021;  
Rédaction  
Africanews  
2021; GI TOC  
2022; McGregor  
2021: 5;  
Kondiararama  
2021

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Senegal's army (...) captured three rebel bases in the southern Casamance region with support from neighbouring Guinea-Bissau (...) There was a great cooperation (of) the Guinea-Bissau Defense and Security Forces (FDS), operational and military cooperation"; (2) "[Now there was a] greater ability for Senegalese troops to pursue rebels into traditional havens in Guinea-Bissau"; (3) "The operations against the MFDC bases were carried out with assistance from Guinea-Bissau's defense and security forces (...) Guinea-Bissau's President Embaló [was alleged] of allowing Senegalese military units to use a corridor through his country to attack the MFDC from the rear, as well as allowing small Bissau-Guinean units to join in the assault"; (4) "Guinea Bissau, with the strength of recent defense agreements with Senegalese President Macky Sall, allowed the Senegalese army to carve out a corridor from its territory. Moreover, it fought in small units alongside its Senegalese ally in the clashes with the independence forces which have been taking place for several days."

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## 2.56 MLC in Uganda

**Target:** DR Congo (Zaire), **Host:** Uganda, **UCDP Actor ID:** 423

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1999, Jun )

**Event description:** (1) "Uganda collaborated in the establishment of Jean-Pierre Bemba's Mouvement de Liberation du Congo (Movement for the Liberation of the Congo or MLC) in mid-1999."; (2) "[Bemba was a] close ally of Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni"

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*Sources:*  
Sadiki 2012: 190;  
ICG 2018: 6

## 2.57 NDFB in Bangladesh

**Target:** India, **Host:** Bangladesh, **UCDP Actor ID:** 363

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1990, Dec )

**Event description:** (1) "[Following Operation Bajrang in November 1990,] Several NDFB camps sprang up along the Bangladeshi side of the Indo-Bangladesh border, where the hardcore cadres of the movement were based"

*Sources:*  
Mazumdar 2005:  
567-68

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1996, Jun )

**Event description:** (1) "As the pro-India Awami League (AL) came to power in Dhaka in 1996 [the] crackdown on the rebels was intensified"; (2) "The process of taking shelter in Bhutan increased as the pro-India Awami League (AL) came to power in Dhaka in 1996"

*Sources:*  
Mahanta 2013:  
222; Mahanta  
2013: 223

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2000, Jul, 24)

**Event description:** (1) "The pressure on militants [was] building up in Bangladesh.

*Sources:*  
Kotwal 2001-12:  
2228 (see also  
The Indian  
Express, 2007)

In the last week of July 2000, the Bangladesh Army and Bangladesh Rifles launched a joint operation against the militants and busted many camps in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of the country. After the raid, a number of militants staying in the camps were forced to run for cover towards India following the operation."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "militants staying in the camps were forced to run for cover towards India following the operation." (Kotwal 2001-12: 2228)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2004, Jul, 17*)

**Event description:** (1) "Once again, news that otherwise has serious ramifications for Indo-Bangladesh trans-border terror politics, (...) there were multiple attacks by unidentified gunmen in Dhaka's Segun Bagicha, Dhanmondi and Shyamali localities, in which an indefinite number, reportedly up to 24, separatist militants from Northeast India were killed and several others wounded."; (2) "June 12: The ten militants, who are killed in the encounter in the Rangamati district of Bangladesh reportedly include an unspecified number of NDFB cadres"

*Sources:*  
Outlook India  
2004; SATP 2012:  
68

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2007, Mar, 1*)

**Event description:** (1) "March 1: Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) personnel arrest six NDFB militants along with a Bangladeshi national at Burunga of Nalitabari sub-district of Sherpur. The arrested militants are identified as Mohishwar, Shombhu, Warao, Hor Kumar, Jiban Kumar, and Thandoi."

*Sources:*  
SATP 2012: 66

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Pledge** (*Date: 2007, Nov*)

**Event description:** (1) "The military-backed caretaker government was in power from January 2007 to December 2008. The bilateral relations improved over this period, the highlight being the rejuvenation of military cooperation and the exchange of visits of the army chiefs in 2008 that took place after a gap of nearly a decade."; (2) "[Regarding] terrorism and separatist violence in India: this is now the foremost issue in Dhaka's foreign affairs. (...) In the fall, Dhaka and New Delhi reached both bilateral and multilateral agreements to strengthen their counterterrorism cooperation."; (3) "[By the end of October 2007] The idea of creating a database for improved coordination to deal with terrorism, drug trafficking, cybercrimes and financial fraud was raised at the conference that ended Thursday. On the first day of the three-day conference, interior ministers of SAARC countries met police chiefs who agreed to share information to stop trans-border crimes."; (4) "[There were] efforts by the military-backed Caretaker Government (CTG) during 2007 and 2008 to subdue the militants"; (5) "[Regarding] ULFA hideouts

*Sources:*  
Bhattacharjee  
2020: 11;  
Hagerty 2008:  
181; Jeena 2007;  
Sikri 2009: 156;  
Anwer 2020: 82;  
Chakravarty  
2021: 550;  
Alamgir 2010:  
153

in Northeast India, (...) For the first time in the history of Indo-Bangladesh ties, the caretaker government in 2007 heard the Indian complaints in this regard. However, it did not do much in dismantling these camps.”; (6) “Since 2007, during the Army-backed caretaker government in Bangladesh bilateral ties acquired an upward trajectory and gathered greater momentum when Prime Minister (PM) Sheikh Hasina returned to power in 2009.”; (7) “Coming on the heels of the discredited BNPJamaat administration, the 2007-08 caretaker government adopted a tough antiterrorism stance”

**Pledge form:** Written pact

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2008, Jul, 11)

**Event description:** (1) “Ahead of Info-Bangladesh Foreign Secretary talks here next week and after repeated demands by New Dehli, Bangladesh Saturday handed over four Indian insurgents based on its soil to police in India’s Northeast (...) [They] belong to the rebel group (...) NDFB [and] ULFA”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

Sources:  
KUNA 2008

#### **Pledge** (Date: 2009, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) “[Upon inauguration in January] 2009, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina pledged not to allow her country’s territory to be used by groups inimical to India’s interests.”

**Pledge form:** Speech

Sources:  
Bhattacharjee  
2018: 305 (see  
also Gogoi 2016:  
568)

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2009, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) “Within months of her [Sheik Hasina] coming to power, the ULFA and NDFB leaders were handed over.”; (2) “[As of August,] the exact number of camps of the [NDFB] outfit in Bangladesh is yet to be ascertained, it is believed that the outfit is running at least 10 bases and some of the bases are in the Khagrachari area from where the five militants were reportedly arrested.”; (3) “August 18: Assam Tribune reports that five militants belonging to the NDFB were arrested from the Khagrachari area in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) District (...) The report in Daily Star said that the arrested persons have been charged with illegal entry into that country.”; (4) “In consonance with her words, Bangladesh acted against the groups which were operating in the country. Many leaders of the north-eastern insurgent groups - (...) [including] National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) – were arrested with Bangladesh’s help”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) “Many leaders of the north-eastern insurgent groups - (...) [including] National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) – were arrested with Bangladesh’s help” (Bhattacharjee 2018: 305)

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

Sources:  
Hazarika 2022;  
SATP 2012: 182;  
SATP 2012: 182;  
Bhattacharjee  
2018: 305

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2010, Apr, 30)

**Event description:** (1) “NDFB chief Ranjan Daimary who chose to stay put in Bangladesh and did not become a part of the ceasefire agreement, was arrested and handed over to India by the Bangladesh authorities on 30 April 2010.”; (2) “May 1: Bangladesh

Sources:  
Miller and  
D’souza 2012:  
204; SATP 2012:  
36; SATP 2012:  
35; SATP 2012:  
37

handed over Ranjan Daimary, the 'president' of the NDFB to India"; (3) "[Early May 2010:] Sources revealed that under pressure in Bangladesh, anti-talk faction of the NDFB recently established a camp in Myanmar and is located near a camp of KYKL."; (4) "Ohnjalu of the NDFB 'publicity cell' to the media on May 2 stated that "the arrest of NDFB chief is unfortunate but the fight against India to liberate the Bodo people will continue." The statement also threatened that the Assam government would "get a better answer in the days to come if it does not hold talks with the NDFB."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "[In April 2010] the intelligence agency of Bangladesh and India still believes that the political leadership of Bangladesh still does not have full control over all the Government agencies (...) Sources said that the 'chairman' of the anti-talk faction of the NDFB, Ranjan Daimary, and a number of his followers are still in Bangladesh, while several key leaders of the ULFA, including Antu Chowdang and Drishti Rajkhowa are, also staying in Bangladesh." (SATP 2012: 36); (2) "February 12 [2011]: Interrogation of the four arrested NDBF militants revealed that militants continue to use the porous Meghalaya stretch of the India-Bangladesh border." (SATP 2012: 18)

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) "NDFB chief Ranjan Daimary who chose to stay put in Bangaldesh and did not become a part of the ceasefire agreement, was arrested and handed over to India by the Bangaldesh authorities on 30 April 2010." (Miller and D'souza 2012: 204)

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

## 2.58 NDFB in Bhutan

**Target:** India, **Host:** Bhutan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 363

**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1991, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "NDFB (...) preferred to take shelter in Bhutan after the first organised military offensive in Assam named as 'operation Bajrang' took place on 27–28 November 1990."; (2) "The royal government did not pay much attention to these groups as long as they were not threatening the Bhutanese people. From the safety of their bases in Bhutan, the ULFA and NDFB waged their hit-and-run attacks in Assam."

*Sources:*  
Mahanta 2013:  
222; Mazumdar  
2005: 569

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2000, Jul )

**Event description:** (1) "At last the Bhutan National Assembly passed a resolution at its 78th session in July 2000 favouring military action against the Northeast insurgent groups-ULFA and NDFB, to evict them from Bhutanese soil"; (2) "[The 2003 mandate] was not, however, for the first time that the NA had given such a mandate. Earlier, the 78th NA that met between June 25 and July 26, 2000 had also passed a resolution of this intent (...) The then Bhutanese Home Minister, Lyonpo Thinley Gyamsto, also introduced a four-point course of action, including cutting off ration supply to the terrorists, punitive action against the individuals and groups found guilty of helping the terrorists (...) and military action against the terrorists, if all other efforts fail" "

*Sources:*  
Kotwal 2001-12:  
2227; Kumar  
2004: 393

**Pledge form:** Political bill

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2003, May, 17)

**Event description:** (1) "Bhutanese King Jigme Singhye Wangchuk calls upon

*Sources:*  
SATP 2010: 100;  
Global Security  
2023

the people to volunteer for formation of a 'militia force' to counter Indian insurgent groups-ULFA, NDFB and the KLO on its soil."; (2) "On May 17, 2003, Bhutanese King Jigme Singhye Wangchuk called upon the people to volunteer for formation of a militia force to counter Indian militant groups ULFA, NDBF and the KLO on its soil. Media report says that the 81st National Assembly of Bhutan adopted a resolution for the last attempt to persuade ULFA, NBFD, and the KLO to close down their camps within this year peacefully failing which terrorist would face military action."

**Pledge form:** Speech

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2003, Dec, 19)

**Event description:** (1) "With stunning ease, the RBA overran the [camps] (...) the RBA captured the main NDFB camp at Tikri (also in Samdrup Jongkhar) (...) By December 19, just five days into the operation, all 30 camps had been overrun and captured."; (2) "Bhutan's royal government was still apprehensive about allowing a foreign army to enter its territory and thus was not keen on inviting the Indian Army to conduct operations. (...) it was thought best to allow the Bhutanese themselves to act (...) [yet] Throughout the operation, the Indian Army was in touch with the RBA through Major General S. S. Dhillon, commandant of the Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) in Bhutan, who coordinated with the chief operations officer (COO) of the RBA, Lieutenant General G. G. Lam Dorji, who was based in the Bhutanese capital Thimphu and reported directly to King Wangchuk. Thus, any request for assistance by the RBA in terms of logistics, medical evacuation, surveillance, and communications was promptly communicated to both Indian army corps."; (3) "[In] Bhutan in 2003, the Indian Army never formally violated the Himalayan Kingdom's sovereignty. Rather, the assault was carried out in close coordination with the Royal Bhutan Army and its police, with the Indian Army deployed along the Indian side of the border to trap the rebels in a pincer-style attack."; (4) "On December 15, 2003, the 6,000-person-strong RBA launched simultaneous attacks on the ULFA, NDFB, and KLO camps in the southern districts of Bhutan as part of Operation All Clear."; (5) "The Indian Army provided logistical support (...) to the RBA during Operation All Clear. The Indian Army's 4 Corps, based at Tezpur, Assam, sealed the 266-kilometer-long Indo-Bhutan border to prevent militants from escaping into India"

*Sources:*  
Mazumdar 2005:  
575, 574 (Gogoi  
2016: 551);  
Mazumdar 2005:  
574-76; Beehner  
2016: 273;  
Mazumdar 2005:  
575; Mazumdar  
2005: 575

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "With stunning ease, the RBA overran the [camps] (...) the RBA captured the main NDFB camp at Tikri (also in Samdrup Jongkhar) (...) By December 19, just five days into the operation, all 30 camps had been overrun and captured." (Hussain 2006: 575, 574)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Throughout the operation, the Indian Army was in touch with the RBA through Major General S. S. Dhillon, commandant of the Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) in Bhutan, who coordinated with the chief operations officer (COO) of the RBA, Lieutenant General G. G. Lam Dorji, who was based in the Bhutanese capital Thimphu and reported directly to King Wangchuk. Thus, any request for assistance by the RBA in terms of logistics, medical evacuation, surveillance, and communications was promptly communicated to both Indian army corps."; (2) "[In] Bhutan in 2003, the Indian Army never formally violated the Himalayan Kingdom's sovereignty. Rather, the assault was carried out in close coordination with the Royal Bhutan Army and its police, with the Indian Army



deployed along the Indian side of the border to trap the rebels in a pincer-style attack.”; (3) “The Indian Army provided logistical support (...) to the RBA during Operation All Clear. The Indian Army’s 4 Corps, based at Tezpur, Assam, sealed the 266-kilometer-long Indo-Bhutan border to prevent militants from escaping into India”

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## 2.59 NDFB in Myanmar

**Target:** India, **Host:** Myanmar, **UCDP Actor ID:** 363

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### **Sanctuary start** (Date: 2010, May, 3)

**Event description:** (1) “Under pressure in Bangladesh, anti-talk faction of the NDFB recently established a camp in Myanmar and is located near a camp of KYKL”; (2) “[By the summer of 2010] The outfit is still maintaining its bases in the Khagrachari area of Bangladesh, while the newly set up bases of the outfit in Myanmar are being maintained with the help of Manipur-based KYKL.”

*Sources:*

SATP 2014: 71;  
SATP 2013: 35

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2011, Nov )

**Event description:** (1) “[In September 2011] NDFB, besides PLA, UNLF, and PREPAK, among others, maintain and operate bases in [Myanmar]. The Myanmar Army had [that month] mounted an operation against the militant outfits and destroyed some camps”; (2) [However, by November 2011] The Central Government has formally confirmed that several militant outfits of Northeast, including ULFA, NDFB, both factions of NSCN have camps in Sagaing Region, and States of Chin and Kachin in Myanmar.”

*Sources:*

SATP 2013: 11;  
SATP 2014: 23

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

### **Pledge** (Date: 2013, Jun, 20)

**Event description:** (1) “India and Myanmar have agreed to cooperate to prevent cross border movement of armed groups, share information on seizure of arms and check arms smuggling/drug trafficking (...) the agreement was reached during the 20th Sectoral Level (Joint Working Group) Meeting between Myanmar and India held in Bagan, Myanmar, from June 19-20. (...) Myanmar side was requested not to allow operations by insurgent groups along the Indo-Myanmar border. ”; (2) “However, till date, the Myanmar Army has not launched full-scale operations against the militant groups.”

*Sources:*

SATP 2015: 20;  
SATP 2015: 7

**Pledge form:** Written pact

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2019, Feb, 2)

**Event description:** (1) “One ULFA (I) rebel was killed and another one apprehended by Myanmar Army during the operations launched by them against Northeast insurgent groups at Taga in Myanmar’s Sagaing division. Myanmar army launched offensive to flush out Northeast rebel groups—ULFA-I, NSCN-K, NDFB-S and KLO—who have bases in the Burmese territory.”

*Sources:*

Chakraborty  
2019

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2019, Apr, 30)

**Event description:** (1) "Mililitants from Northeast are facing heat following the operation launched in Myanmar. Several militants belonging to anti-talk faction of ULFA are coming back and surrendering in Assam."; (2) "the Myanmar Army destroyed several training camps in 2019 under an exercise codenamed, "Operation Sunrise"."; (3) "During 2019–2020, the Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) launched three coordinated military operations with the Indian Army codenamed Operation Sunrise against several insurgent groups of the Northeast.66 Military action by the Tatmadaw destroyed several rebel camps in Myanmar, forcing many of them to cross back into India and surrender. In fact, these operations contributed, to some extent, in ending Bodo militancy in Assam."; (4) "Around a dozen insurgent operating bases and camps have been "smashed" along the India-Myanmar border, with the armies of the two countries working in close coordination to eliminate threats in the region"

*Sources:*  
Singh 2019;  
Dutta 2022; Das  
2022: 482; The  
Times of India  
2019

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "militants (...) of ULFA are coming back and surrendering in Assam."

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) launched three coordinated military operations with the Indian Army codenamed Operation Sunrise"; (2) "India and Myanmar have conducted two synergised operations against insurgents"

### **Pledge** (Date: 2021, Dec )

**Event description:** (1) "In December 2021, India's foreign secretary, Harsh Vardhan Shringla, visited Myanmar securing assurance for continued action against insurgent groups targeting the Northeast region. "

*Sources:*  
Dutta 2022

**Pledge form:** Written pact

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## **2.60 NLFT in Bangladesh**

**Target:** India, **Host:** Bangladesh, **UCDP Actor ID:** 307

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### **Sanctuary start** (Date: 2000, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "[For the first time ever, in] June 12: Chief Minister Manik Sarkar [of India] discloses that the State government has submitted to the Union government a comprehensive report containing details and precise location of 21 NLFT and eight All Tripura Tiger Front (ATTF) base camps in neighbouring Bangladesh."

*Sources:*  
SATP 2012

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2006, Sep )

**Event description:** (1) "[Following crackdowns,] Tripura Chief Minister, Manik Sarkar, said at a press briefing, "Total number of NLFT and ATTF hideouts in Bangladesh has reduced from 56 to 26 recently"

*Sources:*  
SATP 2012

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation: No**

**Intrusive: No**

**Joint: No**

**Pledge** (*Date: 2009, Jan*)

**Event description:** (1) "[Upon inauguration in January] 2009, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina pledged not to allow her country's territory to be used by groups inimical to India's interests."; (2) "After the pro-India Awami League swept to power in [Bangladesh in] 2008, the ULFA rank and file knew their days in the country were numbered. The safer option was to relocate to the camps in Myanmar, but that would have meant crossing over to Arakan in Burma from Bangladesh, which entailed a month-long arduous journey through hundreds of kilometres of inhospitable terrain to Chin Province and then onward to Sagaing Division."; (3) "Dhaka and New Delhi took significant steps to formalise security cooperation when Sheikh Hasina visited New Delhi in January 2010. Three agreements on security cooperation were signed at the summit meeting with Manmohan Singh: Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters; Transfer of Sentenced Persons; and Combating International Terrorism, Organised Crime, and Illicit Drug Trafficking. The two countries have also initiated discussions on an extradition treaty"; (4) "February 8: Telegraph reports that the Unified Command Structures of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh have launched a joint operation to neutralize transit camps (...) The objective is to stop the militants from moving out of Bangladesh and from reaching Myanmar. The Sheikh Hasina regime has made her stand very clear vis-à-vis militant groups from India operating from Bangladeshi soil. Things will only get tough for the rebels in Bangladesh," he added."; (5) "after the AL came to power with a huge mandate, in 2009, the government took steps for course correction. As a result, India showed a positive outlook for the AL-led Bangladesh Government, which, in turn, established a strong bond between them."

**Pledge form:** Speech

*Sources:*  
Bhattacharjee  
2018: 305;  
Bhattacharyya  
2014: 106;  
Chakma 2012:  
13; SATP 2010:  
24; Rana 2018:  
566

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2009, Sep, 14*)

**Event description:** (1) "NLFT militants were facing serious crisis because of large-scale desertion and about 23 camps run by the NLFT in Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh had been closed down. With assumption of power by the Sheikh Hasina-led Government in Bangladesh, the Army had launched a drive against the Northeast militants and demolished several camps and issued quit notices."; (2) "[Yet, months later,] it had recruited 40 tribal youths and sent them to the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh for training in guerrilla warfare"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged: No**

**Leadership decapitation: No**

**Intrusive: No**

**Joint: No**

*Sources:*  
SATP 2012;  
SATP 2012

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2015, Dec, 1*)

**Event description:** (1) "Number of insurgent hideouts has been reduced in Bangladesh although some groups are still functioning there (...) Some developments have taken place in Bangladesh since the BSF is having good relation with its Bangladesh counterpart. "It's now very difficult for the ultras to operate from the neighbouring country." [confirmed Indian authorities]"; (2) "[In January 2016, Indian officials said] "We can now say the banned militants of Tripura now do not have any support base or infrastructure""; (3) "[By October 2016, it was reported that] Over the past six months, 33 NLFT

*Sources:*  
SATP 2015;  
SATP 2016;  
SATP 2016

rebels with a huge quantity of arms and ammunition have surrendered to the Tripura Police after escaping from their hideouts in Bangladesh.”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “It’s now very difficult for the ultras to operate from the neighbouring country.” [confirmed Indian authorities]” (SATP 2015); (2) “[In January 2016, Indian officials said] “We can now say the banned militants of Tripura now do not have any support base or infrastructure” (SATP 2016)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2017, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) “The BSF has informed the BGB that seven militant outfits from the Northeast have set up as many as 20 camps in Bangladesh. Sources in the BSF said the NLFT has 10 camps”

Sources:  
SATP 2017

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## **2.61 NSCN-IM in Myanmar**

**Target:** India, **Host:** Myanmar, **UCDP Actor ID:** 223

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### **Sanctuary start** (Date: 1988, Apr, 30)

**Event description:** (1) “The majority of these armed groups [including the NSCN-IM’s predecessor] established their camps in Myanmar in the mid-1970s.”; (2) “on April 30, 1988, the NSCN split into two factions, namely the NSCN-K led by S S Khaplang, and the NSCN-IM, led by Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah”; (3) “Under a military agreement between the two countries in 1987, they planned to improve coordination and to conduct joint operations against the many insurgent groups that are based in Myanmar, including those that fight against India.”; (4) “[Yet] In 1988, India strongly backed the Burmese pro-democracy movement and Yangon fell out with Delhi. The Burmese Communist Party broke up as a result of an ethnic revolt by the Wa tribesmen and China stopped backing anti-Myanmar rebels to develop close relations with the military junta. That is when the Myanmar army stopped cooperating with the Indians and the Research and Analysis Wing cultivated the Kachin Independence Organization”

Sources:  
Routray 2011:  
314; SATP 2016;  
Hazarika 1995;  
Telegraph India  
2015

### **Pledge** (Date: 1994, Jan, 21)

**Event description:** (1) “The India–Myanmar Border Trade Agreement was signed on 21 January 1994”; (2) “In the mid-1990s, the two states agreed on the intention of increasing cooperation and preventing insurgency and crime, and the Indian Army Chief visited Myanmar.”; (3) “A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on 21 January 1994 to increase cooperation between civilian border authorities of the two countries and to prevent “illegal and insurgent activities” (...) [Still,] it was only with the advent of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in 1998 that a real transformation started gaining pace. (...) “During this phase (which continues to date), there have been military to military dialogues

Sources:  
ERIA 2020: 23;  
Basit 2018: 77;  
Routray 2011:  
305

and political rapprochement. The stakes have also included management of security situation in the North-east”;

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1995, Apr, 25)

**Event description:** (1) “For the first time since the 1980’s, Indian and Burmese troops have been cooperating in a military operation against Indian insurgents, trapping the rebels in a pincers movement near the border, intelligence officials and diplomats say. (...) The joint operation against three groups of insurgents [including the NSCN-IM] began in [late April]”; (2) “In a major joint Indo-Myanmar anti-insurgency drive in April 1995, the Indian and Myanmar Armies launched a pincer attack on a group of some 200 Indian insurgents, codenamed ‘Operation Golden Bird,’ along the border with Mizoram. Up to 60 ULFA and other Northeast Indian insurgents were killed and several others arrested during the 44-day offensive.”; (3) “the Common Border Trade Agreement of 1994 and a gradual improvement of the bilateral relationship. In 1995, India and Myanmar even conducted a joint military operation against ethnic guerrilla groups along the Mizoram border”; (4) “[During] ‘Operation Golden Bird’, when the Burmese Army functioned on its side of the border and we functioned on ours. There was a column of the NSCN (IM) escorting representatives of the ULFA carrying head loads of arms from the Chittagong Hill Tracts. They were intercepted on the Manipur-Burma border. There was a running fight. The column was hit hard and suffered casualties. We seized a large number of arms. The Burmese Army operated in the Chin Hills. It was a successful operation.”; (5) “They [India and Myanmar] launched a number of counter-militancy operations in following years aimed at curbing India-hostile militant organizations, where Burmese forces for instance contributed by blocking the militants’ escape routes”; (6) “But suddenly, Myanmar pulled out of the joint operation, allowing the trapped rebel column to escape. Analysts link this with India’s 1993 decision to award Aung San Suu Kyi with the Jawaharlal Nehru Peace Prize.”; (7) “This joint counterinsurgency operation considerably weakened these rebel groups, but Rangoon withdrew before this operation could produce even more successes after India granted the Nehru Prize for International Understanding to Aung San Suu Kyi”; (8) “During Operation Golden Bird, a 1995 border skirmish involving rebels from the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the operation was carried out by joint Indian-Burmese forces, but the Indian army never technically entered Myanmar.”; (8) “In this joint India-Myanmar military operation, India’s 57th Mountain Division managed to block a huge rebel column encompassed more than 200 rebels from NSCN, ULFA, and Manipuri separatists who were moving through the MizoramMyanmar border. The rebel columns had previously picked up weapon consignments from Cox Bazar in Bangladesh and headed towards Manipur. However, Myanmar’s military pulled off half way of the joint operation to show their protest against the decision made by the government of India to award the Nehru Peace Prize to Myanmar’s pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The pulling out of Myanmar’s military in the joint operation had resulted in the trapped rebel columns to escape. The “Golden Bird” joint military operation between India and Myanmar failed.”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “For the first time since the 1980’s, Indian and Burmese troops have been cooperating in a military

*Sources:*  
Hazarika 1995;  
Hussain 2006:  
36-37;  
Gottschlich  
2017: 174 (see  
also Mirsa 2000:  
79); Mizzima  
2006; Basit 2018:  
77; Routray  
2011: 315;  
Egreteau 2008:  
941; Beehner  
2016: 273; Ayob  
2023: 726

operation against Indian insurgents, trapping the rebels in a pincers movement near the border, intelligence officials and diplomats say.”; (2) “In a major joint Indo-Myanmar anti-insurgency drive in April 1995, the Indian and Myanmar Armies launched a pincer attack on a group”

#### **Pledge** (*Date: 1999, Jul*)

**Event description:** (1) “In July 1999, the Indian and Myanmar home ministries held a meeting in New Delhi to identify means to strengthen cooperation on issues like cross-border terrorism and setting up better communication links.”; (2) “the officials of India and Myanmar [did] hold meetings [in July] 1999. Both the countries agreed on the following issues (i) to check movement of separatist across border (ii) to strength communication network along the internal borderline, (iii) to set up measures to check narcotics smugglings and to launch joint operation against the separatist on the both sides of border”

*Sources:*  
Routray 2011:  
306; Singh and  
Sandu 2014: 389

**Pledge form:** Speech

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2000, Feb, 6*)

**Event description:** (1) “On February 6, 2000, near about one thousand Burmese troops attack on NSCN Headquarter in Burma. This operation [ran] over a week and they got success.”; (2) “This military co-operation has been generally continuing between the two nations despite some ups and downs in recent years.”; (3) “They [India and Myanmar] launched a number of counter-militancy operations in following years aimed at curbing India-hostile militant organizations, where Burmese forces for instance contributed by blocking the militants’ escape routes”

*Sources:*  
Singh and  
Sandhu 2014:  
389; Basit 2018:  
77; Kundu 2015:  
73

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2004, Jan, 5*)

**Event description:** (1) “Separatist rebels fighting for an independent homeland in Nagaland on the India-Burma border say they have beaten back a Burmese military assault. (...) The Indian army said it had little knowledge of the Burmese operation but a senior military intelligence official said additional Indian forces had been deployed on the border to prevent rebels crossing. (...) Analysts say the Burmese army may not be able to overrun and hold the Naga rebel bases because of the difficult terrain and the extended supply lines which the Naga guerrillas can ambush at will.”; (2) “Burma has so far neither agreed to joint operations suggested by India nor obliged her by undertaking a comprehensive Bhutan-style operation along her western borders. But its army has attacked some of the NSCN (Khaplang) bases and warned other rebel groups to leave or face attacks.”

*Sources:*  
BBC 2004;  
Bhaumik 2005

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2005, Dec, 8*)

**Event description:** (1) “A faction of Naga separatist rebels in north-east India say five of their bases in Burma’s Sagaing division have come under attack. A rebel

*Sources:*  
BBC 2005;  
Bhaumik 2005

spokesman told the BBC a whole brigade of Burmese troops are closing in on these bases, forcing the rebels to fight a rearguard action. (...) Burmese troops are firing mortars and light artillery on the bases. (...) three NSCN fighters were captured by the Burmese troops and few injured. (...) But its bases in Burma have been attacked at regular intervals by Burmese troops in the past two years.”; (2) “Burma has so far neither agreed to joint operations suggested by India nor obliged her by undertaking a comprehensive Bhutan-style operation along her western borders. But its army has attacked some of the NSCN (Khaplang) bases and warned other rebel groups to leave or face attacks.”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2009, Nov, 5)

**Event description:** (1) “Burmese troops have surrounded a base of Naga separatists in the country’s northwest and begun bombing it, Indian military officials said. They said Indian troops have fanned out in the hills opposite this base in Sagaing to arrest any rebels who may try to flee into Indian territory. (...) Indian troops confirmed heavy shelling of the Naga rebel base since late on Thursday but were not sure whether the Burmese had launched an infantry assault. Burma’s military junta has been under Indian diplomatic pressure to launch assaults against northeast Indian rebel bases in its territory for some time now. But the junta has cited counter-insurgency commitments elsewhere in the country for not starting an offensive against these bases located mostly in Sagaing division in the hilly northwest of the country.”

Sources:  
BBC 2009

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Pledge** (Date: 2010, Jul, 26)

**Event description:** (1) “In 2010, India and Myanmar signed an agreement allowing Indian forces to pursue insurgents across the border.”; (2) “A strategic pact signed between India and Myanmar has been hailed in the country’s northeast as a major step forward in combating terror and boosting trade and commerce between the two neighbouring nations. “The agreement between the two countries to offer mutual legal assistance in criminal matters would surely help in tackling insurgency in the northeast with a number of militant groups active in the region having bases inside Myanmar,” Biren Singh, senior Manipur minister and state government spokesperson, told IANS. The pact was signed in New Delhi Tuesday during Myanmar military ruler Than Shwe’s visit.”; (3) “India has signed a mutual legal assistance agreement through which Indian insurgents held in Myanmar can be deported for trial under Indian laws. India had been pushing for the pact with Myanmar for two-and-a-half decades. It was signed during the 25-29 July visit of Than Shwe, the leader of Myanmar’s military government.”

Sources:  
Vishwanathan  
2015: 2; Hussain  
2010; Roche  
2010

**Pledge form:** Written pact

#### **Pledge** (Date: 2014, May, 10)

**Event description:** (1) “India and Myanmar have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Border Cooperation. The MOU was signed by Mr Gautam Mukhopadhyaya, Ambassador of India to Myanmar, and Major General Kyaw Nyunt,

Sources:  
Ministry of  
External Affairs  
2014;  
Vishwanathan  
2015: 2; SATP  
2014

Deputy Defence Minister of Myanmar, in Nay Pyi Taw on May 8, 2014. The MoU provides a framework for security cooperation and exchange of information between Indian and Myanmar security agencies. A key provision is that of conduct of coordinated patrols on their respective sides of the international border and the maritime boundary by the Armed Forces of the two countries. Both sides have agreed to exchange information in the fight against insurgency"; (2) "[The 2010 Agreement] was followed by a memorandum of understanding signed in May 2014 that provided for coordinated patrolling and intelligence sharing."; (3) "[Still, five months later,] An MHA [Indian] Source stated that "We will raise the issue of NSCN-IM sending even more people to Myanmar" during meeting with Myanmar officials on October 12."

**Pledge form:** Written pact

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2015, Jun, 4)

**Event description:** (1) "While the initial Indian Army statement cloaked the operation in ambiguity and reported that it was carried out along the border, Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore told media that the 'surgical strikes had been carried out a few kilometres inside Myanmar'. Zaw Htay, the director of the office of Myanmar President Thein Sein, also acknowledged the fact that the operation was carried out inside Myanmar [with Myanmar's accept]."; (2) "There was surely a military assault on a rebel base, on the border with Myanmar or somewhat inside it. (...) [Yet] the rebel camp attacked on the border is just one of the many transit camps that dot the India-Myanmar frontier and serve as a "hop-in" point for bigger rebel squads coming into Indian territory from deeper-and bigger-rebel bases, it would have some effect in combating insurgency in the northeastern states. (...) The "transit camps" allow bigger rebel squads to rest after a long march from deep inside Myanmar and observe movement of Indian security forces (...) before they enter Indian territory for operations. (...) A member of Modi's cabinet, Prakash Javadekar, told reporters the operation was carried out with Burmese assistance"; (3) "On June 9, 2015, the Indian army reportedly carried out a pre-dawn "surgical strike" against two rebel bases of Naga and Manipuri separatists in western Myanmar."

*Sources:*  
Vishwanathan  
2015: 1;  
Bhaumik 2015:  
16; Beehner  
2018: 400, 272

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "the Indian army reportedly carried out a pre-dawn "surgical strike" against two rebel bases of Naga and Manipuri separatists in western Myanmar."

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2018, Jul, 25)

**Event description:** (1) "According to Security officials, Myanmar Army launched an operation against several camps of National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) camps in Myanmar on July 25, reports Nagaland Post. Isak Sumi of NSCN-K in a Facebook post claimed that 'The on-going standoff between the Myanmar Army and Naga Army has temporarily been resolved without untoward incident but Naga Army had to make a tactical withdrawal. The overall situation is still tense but the Naga Army are re-entrenched again and safe'."

*Sources:*  
SATP 2018

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No



Joint: No

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## 2.62 Palipehutu-FNL in DR Congo (Zaire)

Target: Burundi, Host: DR Congo (Zaire), UCDP Actor ID: 432

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### Sanctuary start (Date: 1998, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "Despite the CNDD-FDD rebellion forces briefly passing through, from 1998 onwards large parts of the province became strongholds of PALIPEHUTU-FNL"; (2) "The FNL uses the DRC both as a logistical rear base and as a place where its combatants can rest and recuperate from the harsh circumstances they endure in Burundi."; (3) "Palipehutu-FNL operated mainly within Burundi"; (4) "Having crossed through the DRC, some of the arms end up in the hands of the Palipehutu-FNL which picks them up in the border areas of the DRC and Burundi (Ruzizi plain or Rukoko forest)."

Sources:  
Van Acker 2016:  
18; Romkema  
2007: 59; UCDP  
no. 597; Pézard  
and Florquin  
2007

### Crackdown campaign (Date: 2006, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "Since MONUC deployed a unit next to a fixed FNL camp in early 2006, the FNL has dispersed its combatants among the local population."; (2) "The continued existence of the FNL in the DRC has provided a strong rationale for the Burundian army to conduct counter-insurgency measures in the DRC."; (3) "The deployment in the first trimester of 2006 of a MONUC contingent next to the FNL camp led to this camp being abandoned. Since then, FNL combatants apparently live among the civilian population in the Ruzizi Plains bordering Burundi [with] the FNL dispersed and mixed within the population"; (4) "Burundi forces which frequently crossed the borders claiming to pursue the rebels."; (5) "The PALIPEHUTU-FNL is not very active now on DRC territory."

Sources:  
Romkema 2007:  
8; ACCORD  
2012; Romkema  
2007: 59; Ameir  
2008: 72; ICG  
2007: 16

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "the FNL has dispersed its combatants among the local population."; (2) "The PALIPEHUTU-FNL is not very active now on DRC territory."

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "The Burundian army (...) conduct counter-insurgency measures in the DRC."; (2) "Burundi forces which frequently crossed the borders claiming to pursue the rebels."

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## 2.63 Patani insurgents in Malaysia

Target: Thailand, Host: Malaysia, UCDP Actor ID: 365

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### Sanctuary start (Date: 1961, Winter)

**Event description:** (1) "The Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani (BNPP), organized in 1959, is the oldest Muslim resistance group [in southern Thailand]"; (2) "BNPP's political leadership remained in Kelantan [Malaysia] (...) which made it easier to operate on both sides of the border (...) [The BNPP] "enjoyed considerable support from Malaysia's Parti Islam in Kelantan", but not from the government in Kuala Lumpur; (3) "Malaysia has (...) a long history of providing refuge for southern Malay Muslims. This has been

Sources:  
Che Man 1985:  
108; ICG 2005: 7;  
Funston 2010:  
249

an explicit policy since at least 1961”

**Pledge** (*Date: 1977, Jan, 1*)

**Event description:** (1) “The change of Thai Prime Minister in the aftermath of the 6 October 1976 military coup was a positive development for Thai-Malaysian cooperation”; (2) “The October 1976 coup in Thailand which brought the staunchly anti-communist regime of Prime Minister Thanin Kraivichien to power gave a new lease of life to border security cooperation. It led to the signing of a new agreement to replace the 1970 accord (...) ‘Agreement Between the Government of Malaysia and the Government of Thailand on Border Cooperation,’ (...) January 1977 (...) Both sides were granted the right of ‘hot pursuit’ subject to prior approval by the other side for the distance and duration of the border crossing”

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*  
Ong 2020: 1360;  
Acharya 1990:  
11

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1977, Jan, 14*)

**Event description:** (1) “Operation Daoyai Musnah (Big Star) involving some 3,500 Thai-Malaysian troops began on 14 January in an area fifteen miles northwest of Padang Besar”; (2) “beginning in January 1977 (...) these operations had continued until 1981, involving a total of 22 infantry battalions. Each operation contained 80

*Sources:*  
Ong 2020: 1360;  
Chulanont 2010:  
141

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1984, Feb*)

**Event description:** (1) “Taksin 8402, 8601, 8602, 8603, and 8704 were unilateral operations. Thai and Malaysian troops launched military attacks against the CPM and Muslim separatists in their territories. Thai troops pressured the CPM to leave their strongholds on Thai side and confronted Malaysian troops on the other side of the border. Malaysian troops also did the same with separatists.”; (2) “Taksin 8402 was reported to have resulted in the capture of 12 separatist camps and one CPM stronghold. Generally, government officials have claimed success in these operations and believe that the influence and mobility of the armed separatist movement have been drastically reduced”

*Sources:*  
Chulanont 2010:  
149; Algappa  
1986: 228

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Pledge** (*Date: 1994, Jan, 16*)

**Event description:** (1) “The Malaysian government has warned Thai Muslim separatists living in Malaysia to halt terrorist activities against Thailand or face expulsion.”

**Pledge form:** Direct communication

*Sources:*  
MAR, 2004

**Pledge** (*Date: 1997, Dec*)

**Event description:** (1) “[In December 1997] the Deputy Foreign Minister, M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, went to Malaysia and met Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi to discuss ways to crush the separatist movements. The Malaysian foreign minister said Malaysia was ready to give full cooperation and reiterated its policy to refuse admission to any terrorist group”; (2) “After economic crisis hit Southeast Asia in [July] 1997, Malaysia had actually stepped up its cooperation to resolve security along the common border.”; (3) “Kuala Lumpur duly responded with several high-profile arrests of PULO and New PULO members, marking a major shift in the government’s hands-off stance to what it had traditionally referred to as a purely domestic Thai problem. The change in policy (...) came with the specific approval of Mahathir bin

*Sources:*  
Noiwong 2001:  
220; Noiwong  
2001: 67; Chalk  
2008: 8

Mohamad”

**Pledge form:** Media broadcast

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 1998, Jan, 23)

**Event description:** (1) “In January 1998, Malaysia and Thailand launched a joint operation codenamed ‘Pitak Tai’ to crack down on insurgent outfits”; (2) “[January 1998 saw] improved border-security cooperation, which (...) resulted in the capture of a number of key individuals, including, notably, Rohman Bazo and Haji Thanam”; (3) “In January 1998, the three leading figures of the new PULO (the Patani United Liberation Organization) and the military leader of the mainstream PULO were arrested in Malaysia and were handed over by Malaysian forces. Following this close cooperation between Thailand and Malaysia, leading separatist figures, feeling insecure in Malaysia that was once their safe haven, left Malaysia for Saudi Arabia and Sweden.”; (4) “Within a month following this close cooperation from Malaysia, ten leading separatist figures, who then felt insecure in Malaysia, which was once their safe haven, left the country.”; (5) “The repatriation of PULO people was the most controversial episode during Prime Minister Mahathir’s administration.”

*Sources:*  
Bankok Post  
2016; Chalk  
2008: 7;  
Noiwong 2001:  
67; Noiwong  
2001: 220;  
Chulanont 2010:  
167

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “Following this close cooperation between Thailand and Malaysia, leading separatist figures, feeling insecure in Malaysia that was once their safe haven, left Malaysia for Saudi Arabia and Sweden.” (Noiwong 2001: 7)

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) “The three leading figures of the new PULO (the Patani United Liberation Organization) and the military leader of the mainstream PULO were arrested in Malaysia” (Noiwong 2001: 7)

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “Malaysia and Thailand launched a joint operation”

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## **2.64 Patani insurgents in Thailand**

**Target:** Thailand, **Host:** Thailand, **UCDP Actor ID:** 365

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#### **Domestic territorial gain** (Date: 2004, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) “Since 2004 even officials from the TAO [i.e. the administrative organisation] were scared to travel there (...) [At least as early as] January 2004, (...) districts such as Sungai Padi and Joh-Ai-Rong in Narathiwat, or Banang Sata in Yala, were generally avoided by most outsiders, including state officials, wherever possible”

**Name of territory:** Districts in Narathiwat and Yala

*Sources:*  
McCargo 2008:  
158, 162

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## **2.65 PKK in Iran**

**Target:** Turkey, **Host:** Iran, **UCDP Actor ID:** 323

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#### **Sanctuary start** (Date: 1983, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) “The Iranian side of the Shehidan Mountains adjacent to Turkey’s Hakkari province was claimed”; (2) “Relying on its cooperation protocol with

*Sources:*  
Sinkaya 2018:  
848-849; Sinkaya  
2018: 848;  
Sinkaya 2018:  
848; Bolukbasi  
1991: 20; Radu  
2001: 53

the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party), which had been signed in Damascus in 1983, the PKK established several camps in the north of Iraq. Because the KDP was then an ally of Iran, Turkey viewed the KDP-PKK agreement as equal to tacit Iranian support for the PKK. Moreover, the PKK increased its presence in the Western Azerbaijan province of Iran, using the mountainous geography of the Turkish-Iranian border through the mid-1980s.”; (3) “Ankara’s request of a hot-pursuit agreement to follow PKK militants inside Iranian territories was rejected by Tehran.”; (4) “throughout the [Iran-Iraq war, 1980-1988] war, both Tehran and Damascus provided military, financial, and logistical support to the Kurds.”; (5) “Iran, because of its ambiguous position vis-a’-vis Kurdish separatism in Turkey and Iraq (but never at home), likewise allowed the PKK to use Iranian territory to open new fronts along Turkey’s eastern frontier.”

**Pledge** (*Date: 1984, Nov* )

**Event description:** (1) “the two countries [Iran and Turkey] signed a security agreement in November 1984 in Ankara. This agreement required the parties to prevent the activities of any group engaging in destructive action against the security of the other.”

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*  
Sinkaya 2018:  
848

**Pledge** (*Date: 1992, Sep* )

**Event description:** (1) “In order to overcome their disagreements over their security concerns, they signed a new security protocol in September 1992. The protocol, which repeated previous provisions, required both parties to prevent any activities that threatened the others’ security, and to prevent illegal border crossings. It also envisaged the establishment of security committees at the level of experts and high-level officials.”

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*  
Sinkaya 2018:  
848

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1994, Mar Spring*)

**Event description:** (1) “In the spring of 1994, Tehran turned over fourteen PKK guerrillas to the Turks and maintained diplomatic relations despite the Turkish bombing of the PKK’s Zaleh camp near the Iranian border killing twenty Iranians.”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
Gunter 1998: 4

**Pledge** (*Date: 1999, Aug, 11*)

**Event description:** (1) “On 11 August the Turks and Iranians signed another border security co-operation agreement (...) From the 11 August 1999 Security and Co-operation Understanding against ‘terrorist groups’ and the subsequent 17 August earthquake to the end of 1999 there were no major flare-ups between the two countries”

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*  
Olson 2000: 880

**Pledge** (*Date: 2002, Jun* )

**Event description:** (1) “Turkish-Iranian economic, political, and security ties improved significantly after the AKP’s assumption of power in November 2002 and especially after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003”; (2) “The two countries did however make some diplomatic progress in 2002 when each recognized the other’s principal insurgent group (the PKK in Turkey and the MKO in Iran) as ‘terrorists.’ Also, the U.S. State Department’s 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism noted a reduction of Iranian support for all the Turkish terrorist groups.”; (3) “Alienation of Iran in Turkey’s foreign

*Sources:*  
Larrabee and  
Nader 2013: 2;  
Cline 2004: 329;  
Luleci-Sula 2020:  
734; Sinkaya  
2012: 139

policy slowed down starting from the 2000s”; (4) “the turning point in Turkish-Iranian relations was former Turkish President A. Necdet Sezer’s official visit to Iran in June 2002. During that groundbreaking visit, the two sides agreed to sideline ideological differences, cooperate on security issues, and embark on advancing economic and cultural interactions.”

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2004, Jul, 24)

**Event description:** (1) “After almost two decades of mutual mistrust and competition revolving around the Kurdish issue, Iran and Turkey found their interests converged on the eve of the March 2003 American intervention in Iraq. (...) Revived Kurdish (PKK/PJAK) militancy in Turkey and Iran made the PKK a common enemy of both countries. American reluctance to fight the PKK and PJAK led to further cooperation between Ankara and Tehran. In July 2004, Iran declared the PKK and its affiliates to be a terrorist organization.”; (2) “Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Tehran in 2004 during which the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding regarding security cooperation.”; (3) “During Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Tehran in July 2004, Turkey and Iran signed a security cooperation agreement that labeled the PKK a terrorist organization. Since 2004, Iran has also been confronted with a Kurdish insurgency known as the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), which is based in the Kandil Mountains in Northern Iraq and has close ties with the PKK.”; (4) “On July 24, 2004, during Erdoğan’s first official visit to Teheran, Turkey and Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on security cooperation, with the PKK/PJAK as the target.”

**Pledge form:** Speech

*Sources:*

Sinkaya 2018:  
852; Demiryol  
2013: 114;  
McCurdy 2008:  
96; Jenkins 2012

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2005, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) “the MOU [signed in July 2004] on security led to concrete action. (...) there were lower level meetings between the two countries’ militaries; particularly on the ground in the area close to the intersection of Turkey’s borders with Iraq and Iran, where Turkish and Iranian local commanders started holding meetings to deconflict their activities (...) the two sides began to share intelligence on the movements of PKK/PJAK militants (...) There were also instances where local commanders coordinated their offensive activities, launching simultaneous attacks in mountainous areas close to their shared border to prevent Kurdish militants in one country from fleeing to the other. In addition, Iran started extraditing alleged PKK militants to Turkey.”; (2) “The PJAK operations on Iranian soil reportedly boosted intelligence cooperation between Turkey and Iran, which started to share intelligence on the PKK”; (3) “The PKK and PJAK were declared common problems of Turkey and Iran. Turkey and Iran have thus worked together to defeat the two groups”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “Local commanders coordinated their offensive activities, launching simultaneous attacks in mountainous areas close to their shared border to prevent Kurdish militants in one country from fleeing to the other” (Jenkins 2012: 33)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “Turkish and Iranian local commanders started holding meetings to deconflict their activities (...) the two sides began to share intelligence on the movements of PKK/PJAK militants (...) There were also instances where local commanders coordinated their offensive

*Sources:*

Jenkins 2012: 33;  
Kaválek and  
Mareš 2018: 106;  
Noi 2012: 25

activities, launching simultaneous attacks in mountainous areas close to their shared border to prevent Kurdish militants in one country from fleeing to the other. In addition, Iran started extraditing alleged PKK militants to Turkey.”; (2) “The PJAK operations on Iranian soil reportedly boosted intelligence cooperation between Turkey and Iran, which started to share intelligence on the PKK”; (3) “The PKK and PJAK were declared common problems of Turkey and Iran. Turkey and Iran have thus worked together to defeat the two groups”; (4) “Direct or indirect cooperation between Ankara and Tehran against the PKK continued till late 2011.”

## 2.66 PKK in Iraq

**Target:** Turkey, **Host:** Iraq, **UCDP Actor ID:** 323

### **Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1982, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) “The PKK was established on November 27, 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan and a handful of his associates in Lice, Diyarbakir”; (2) “The PKK began moving into Iraqi Kurdistan in 1982.”

*Sources:*  
Bolukbasi 1991:  
16; Orhan 2014:  
36

### **Pledge** (*Date:* 1983, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) “the ‘Frontier Security and Cooperation Agreement’ (February 1983) between Turkey and Iraq, which provided for operations against armed groups on each other’s territory”; (2) “Following this move [of the PKK to Iraq], Ankara established a treaty of border security and cooperation with Baghdad in 1983. This treaty allowed each state to follow Kurdish rebels up to a limit of 10 km inside the borders of the other state.”; (3) “In 1983, the Turkish and Iraq governments signed a “Frontier Security and Cooperation Agreement” which allowed Turkey to enter 10 km to the Iraqi Territory with military operations”; (4) “During the 1980s, as the Iraqi government engaged in its terrible eight-year struggle against Iran, it could not fully enforce its yat in the north of the country, Kurdistan. Accordingly, it agreed to allow the Turkish military to make requent incursions into northern Iraq when in hot pursuit of PKK units harbored there.”

*Sources:*  
Charountaki  
2012: 189;  
Orhan 2014: 36;  
Gumustekin  
2012: 38; Gunter  
1998: 4-5

### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1983, May, 27)

**Event description:** (1) “The first operation of the Turkish army against the PKK in Iraqi territory was organized within the framework of this treaty. After the killing of three Turkish soldiers in the Hakkari region, the Turkish army carried out an operation with 7000 soldiers in 1983. The PDK camps were also targeted by Turkish operations, while Saddam Hussein’s forces simultaneously launched attacks against the camps.”; (2) “On May 27, 1983 the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced that with Iraqi consent, a “limited operation” had been carried out and that Turkish forces had entered northern Iraq in pursuit of “bandists,” left wing guerrillas and Kurdish separatists, including those of the PKK (...) The Turkish forces consisting of two-elite brigades (ca. 7,000 troops) penetrated the Iraqi territory between Zakho and Amadiyya by three miles, although some reports claimed that Turkey’s thrust went as far as twenty miles. Since Baghdad knew about the operation, it also launched a similar attack simultaneously against the KDP camps from the south.”; (3) “During the remaining months of 1983 and in 1984, the PKK strengtheihed by the KDP’s logistical support, was engaged in crossborder raids from northern Iraq (Haftanin and Lejno Zaho camps) into southeastern Turkey. The PKK also made use of Syria’s long border with Turkey”

*Sources:*  
Orhan 2014: 36;  
Bolukbasi 1991:  
24; Bolukbasi  
1991: 25

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive: Yes**

**Joint: Yes**

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "The first operation of the Turkish army against the PKK in Iraqi territory was organized within the framework of this treaty. (...) The PDK camps were also targeted by Turkish operations, while Saddam Hussein's forces simultaneously launched attacks against the camps."

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1991, Apr*)

**Event description:** (1) "The Turkish military operation (fifth operation) occurred in April 1991.; (2) "Turkish operations resumed in 1991 following attacks by the PKK, especially against military posts (jandarma karakolları) in transborder regions."; (3) "The General Staff of Ankara's armed forces adopted a new offensive strategy in 1991, declaring "low intensity conflict" against the PKK and its desire for greater "field control" of the border areas."

*Sources:*  
Gumustekin  
2012: 42; Orhan  
2014: 37;  
Beehner 2018:  
404

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged: No**

**Leadership decapitation: No**

**Intrusive: Yes**

**Joint: No**

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Operation of the Turkish army against the PKK in Iraqi territory"

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1997, May, 14*)

**Event description:** (1) "Further large-scale Turkish military interventions into northern Iraq took place in May 1997 and again in October 1997 when Turkish forces escalated their support for the KDP by bombing PUK and PKK positions and actually approached the cities of Irbil and Kirkuk. In the largest intervention to date, a reported 50,000 Turkish troops entered northern Iraq on May 14, 1997. The incursion had several purposes: to destroy PKK units, strengthen Barzani's KDP (hoping he would prevent future PKK raids), and balance Iran's relationship with the PUK."; (2) "The large Turkish military intervention against the PKK in 1997"; (3) "In 1997, Turkey undertook two big operations entitled "Hammer" and "Dawn" in the same region."; (4) "Turkish military interventions continued in Iraq until the time that the PKK announced the unilateral ceasefire in 2000"

*Sources:*  
Gunter 1998: 7;  
Gumustekin  
2012: 46; Orhan  
2014: 37; Orhan  
2014: 38

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged: No**

**Leadership decapitation: No**

**Intrusive: Yes**

**Joint: No**

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Large-scale Turkish military interventions into northern Iraq"

#### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2008, Jan*)

**Event description:** (1) "Turkish fighter jets have bombed areas in northern Iraq for the second day in a row damaging farmland. An Iraqi Kurdish official said there were no casualties in Sunday afternoon's air raid, which targeted a mountainous area north of Irbil and lasted for more than three hours."; (2) "After the relationship between the US and Turkey improved, both parties agreed to act together against the PKK. (...) Turkey carried out its 25th operation in Northern Iraq [on 21 February], deploying 3 thousand Turkish commandos along with other military backing. However, the U.S. reaction led Turkish forces to withdraw from Northern Iraq"; (2) "In February, a land operation entitled "Sun" was led in the region of Zap in Iraq"

*Sources:*  
Al-Jazeera 2008;  
Gumustekin  
2012: 51; Orhan  
2014: 39

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Turkey carried out its 25th operation in Northern Iraq, deploying 3 thousand Turkish commandos along with other military backing."

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2011, Oct )

**Event description:** (1) "In October 2011, Turkey performed its 26th operation. 10 thousand soldiers and air forces operated in five different places in Northern Iraq"; (2) "In November 2011, the U.S. installed Predator drones from Iraqi to Turkey in order to support anti-PKK actions."

Sources:  
Gumustekin  
2012: 51;  
Gumustekin  
2012: 51

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Operation of the Turkish army against the PKK in Iraqi territory"; (2) "the U.S. [now Iraq government] installed Predator drones from Iraqi to Turkey in order to support anti-PKK actions."

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## **2.67 PKK in Syria**

**Target:** Turkey, **Host:** Syria, **UCDP Actor ID:** 323

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#### **Sanctuary start** (Date: 1980, Sep )

**Event description:** (1) "PKK (...) engaged in a "tactical retreat" into Syria in 1980, when Öcalan fled Turkey just ahead of a military coup that culminated in a violent crackdown on Marxists. He and his followers were given relatively free rein in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, where they thrived."; (2) "After the [12 September] 1980 coup, one wing of the PKK escaped and gathered in Syria under the protection of the Syrian government. Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the organization took refuge status in Syria, after 1980 and began to reside in Damascus. The training camps and the bases of the terrorist organization were also built in Syria or somewhere else on Lebanese territory under Syrian control"; (3) "As a first step, Öcalan established relations with Palestinian Marxist organizations. These organizations granted the PKK a space in the Bekaa valley in Northern Lebanon. Therefore, some PKK militants and cadres were sent to the Bekaa on Öcalan's directives. The border crossing enabled the militants to decrease the effects of political repression following the military coup d'Etat."; (4) "Öcalan and other high ranking PKK members fled the country in the wake of the coup, and most of them, including Öcalan, were granted political asylum in Syria. (...) From September 1980, Damascus decided to provide logistical, military and financial support to the PKK to the extent that by 1984 the PKK had lost most of its organizational freedom, having found it necessary to clear most of its operations first with the Syrian muhabarat."

Sources:  
Radu 2001: 52;  
Yayla 2001: 21;  
Orhan 2014: 31;  
Bolukbasi 1991:  
17

#### **Pledge** (Date: 1986, Mar )

**Event description:** (1) "Despite Damascus and Ankara signing a security protocol

Sources:  
Bolukbasi 1991:  
25



in March 1986, which promised to end assistance to the PKK, Damascus continued to overtly support the organization. The PKK camps in northern Syria, Jirnik, Darbasiya, Resulayn, and Amudah, served the PKK in its infiltration drives into Turkey."

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Pledge** (*Date:* 1998, Oct, 20)

**Event description:** (1) "this was the first time that Turkey seriously pressured Syria. Toward the end of the summer, Turkish officials even started to hint that, if necessary, military force might be used to dislodge the PKK leader"; (2) "In order to ease the tension, Egyptian and Jordanian authorities played a mediating role. Under the resulting Adana Protocol [signed 20 October 1998], Syria expelled Öcalan, recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization and agreed not to support it."

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*  
Marcus 2007:  
269; Öztig 2019:  
119

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1998, Nov )

**Event description:** (1) "Turkey's de facto alliance with Israel automatically raised the stakes for Syria's continuing support for the organization. As a result, when in the summer of 1998 Ankara threatened military action because of Syrian aid to Öcalan, President Hafez al-Assad had to back down. In October of that year he expelled Öcalan and closed most PKK camps in Lebanon and Syria, including those along the Turkish border"; (2) "Under pressure from Turkey and the USA, Syria abandoned its support for the PKK and the chief of the organization, Abdullah Öcalan, had to leave Syria in 1998."; (3) "Syria expelled Öcalan, recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization and agreed not to support it."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "In October of that year he expelled Öcalan and closed most PKK camps in Lebanon and Syria, including those along the Turkish border" (Radu 2001: 56)

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) "In October of that year he expelled Öcalan and closed most PKK camps in Lebanon and Syria, including those along the Turkish border" (Radu 2001: 56 Öcalan is subsequently imprisoned.)

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
Radu 2001: 56;  
Orhan 2014: 33;  
Öztig 2019: 119

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2016, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) "In August 2016, therefore, Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria. Ankara stipulated that the operation be conducted in order to protect the border, target ISIS, and prevent the PKK and the PYD/YPG from establishing an autonomous entity in northern Syria. (...) Even after Operation Euphrates Shield ended, Turkey continued its military strikes, targeting the YPG in Syria and the PKK in northern Iraq in April 2017."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria."

*Sources:*  
Öztig 2019: 122

## 2.68 PLA in Myanmar

Target: India, Host: Myanmar, UCDP Actor ID: 314

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### Sanctuary start (Date: 1985, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "By the mid-1980s, rebel groups from (...) Manipur were also allowed by the Nagas to set up camps in these [Myanmarese] regions."; (2) "PLA has bases in Myanmar. The camps are located from Upper MNHs in Sagaing region on Arunachal-Myanmar border till Rakhine state."

Sources:  
Bhattacharyya  
2018: 254; SATP  
2015

### Pledge (Date: 1987, Dec)

**Event description:** (1) "Under a military agreement between the two countries in [December] 1987, they planned to improve coordination and to conduct joint operations against the many insurgent groups that are based in Myanmar, including those that fight against India."; (2) "[Yet] In 1988, India strongly backed the Burmese pro-democracy movement and Yangon fell out with Delhi. The Burmese Communist Party broke up as a result of an ethnic revolt by the Wa tribesmen and China stopped backing anti-Myanmar rebels to develop close relations with the military junta. That is when the Myanmar army stopped cooperating with the Indians"

Sources:  
Hazarika 1995;  
Telegraph India  
2015

**Pledge form:** Written pact

### Pledge (Date: 1994, Jan, 21)

**Event description:** (1) "The India-Myanmar Border Trade Agreement was signed on 21 January 1994"; (2) "In the mid-1990s, the two states agreed on the intention of increasing cooperation and preventing insurgency and crime, and the Indian Army Chief visited Myanmar."; (3) "A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on 21 January 1994 to increase cooperation between civilian border authorities of the two countries and to prevent "illegal and insurgent activities" (...) [Still,] it was only with the advent of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in 1998 that a real transformation started gaining pace. (...) "During this phase (which continues to date), there have been military to military dialogues and political rapprochement. The stakes have also included management of security situation in the North-east"

Sources:  
ERIA 2020: 23;  
Basit 2018: 77;  
Routray 2011:  
305

**Pledge form:** Written pact

### Pledge (Date: 1999, Jul)

**Event description:** (1) "In July 1999, the Indian and Myanmarese home ministries held a meeting in New Delhi to identify means to strengthen cooperation on issues like cross-border terrorism and setting up better communication links."; (2) "the officials of India and Myanmar [did] hold meetings [in July] 1999. Both the countries agreed on the following issues (i) to check movement of separatist across border (ii) to strength communication network along the internal borderline, (iii) to set up measures to check narcotics smugglings and to launch joint operation against the separatist on the both sides of border"

Sources:  
Routray 2011:  
306; Singh and  
Sandu 2014: 389

**Pledge form:** Speech

### Crackdown campaign (Date: 2000, Nov)

**Event description:** (1) "Indian Home Minister L.K Advani, after meeting with visiting Burmese Home Minister Col. Tin Hlaing, said on 17 November 2000 that the Burmese army is helping India fight against Naga insurgency (...) In addition, Burmese generals have assured the Indian government they would continue similar operations against

Sources:  
Aung and Myint  
2019: 99-100;  
Basit 2018: 77;  
Kundu 2015: 73

the remaining camps of Indian insurgents inside Burmese territory. Obviously, this is a result of the growing friendship between the two governments.”; (2) “They [India and Myanmar] launched a number of counter-militancy operations (...) aimed at curbing India-hostile militant organizations, where Burmese forces for instance contributed by blocking the militants’ escape routes”; (3) “the Myanmar Army launched several other anti-insurgency operations along the border in the 2000s”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) [India and Myanmar] launched a number of counter-militancy operations (...) aimed at curbing India-hostile militant organizations, where Burmese forces for instance contributed by blocking the militants’ escape routes”

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2010, Jul, 26)

**Event description:** (1) “In 2010, India and Myanmar signed an agreement allowing Indian forces to pursue insurgents across the border.”; (2) “A strategic pact signed between India and Myanmar has been hailed in the country’s northeast as a major step forward in combating terror and boosting trade and commerce between the two neighbouring nations. “The agreement between the two countries to offer mutual legal assistance in criminal matters would surely help in tackling insurgency in the northeast with a number of militant groups active in the region having bases inside Myanmar,” Biren Singh, senior Manipur minister and state government spokesperson, told IANS. The pact was signed in New Delhi Tuesday during Myanmar military ruler Than Shwe’s visit.”; (3) “India has signed a mutual legal assistance agreement through which Indian insurgents held in Myanmar can be deported for trial under Indian laws. India had been pushing for the pact with Myanmar for two-and-a-half decades. It was signed during the 25-29 July visit of Than Shwe, the leader of Myanmar’s military government.”

*Sources:*  
Vishwanathan  
2015: 2; Hussain  
2010; Roche  
2010

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2011, Sep, 11)

**Event description:** (1) “September 11: In a boost for Indian security concerns, the Myanmar army launched a second offensive in Sagaing province against various Indian militant groups, including [the PLA and ULFA], who have their bases there.”

*Sources:*  
SATP 2012

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2012, May, 24)

**Event description:** (1) “Myanmar Government has ordered Manipur-based militant outfits to shut their camps and training facilities and leave its soil by 10th of June. Home Ministry official sources said in New Delhi that the Myanmar Army’s order was issued on 24 May. There are 12 to 15 camps of Manipur based insurgent groups like PLA and PREPAK across the Indo-Myanmar border where more than 2,000 armed cadres are taking shelter. The militants often come to Manipur to carry out subversive activities and leave the State to escape action by security agencies.”

*Sources:*  
SATP 2012

**Pledge form:** Direct communication

**Pledge** (Date: 2014, May, 10)

**Event description:** (1) "India and Myanmar have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Border Cooperation. The MOU was signed by Mr Gautam Mukhopadhyaya, Ambassador of India to Myanmar, and Major General Kyaw Nyunt, Deputy Defence Minister of Myanmar, in Nay Pyi Taw on May 8, 2014. The MoU provides a framework for security cooperation and exchange of information between Indian and Myanmar security agencies. A key provision is that of conduct of coordinated patrols on their respective sides of the international border and the maritime boundary by the Armed Forces of the two countries Both sides have agreed to exchange information in the fight against insurgency"; (2) "[The 2010 Agreement] was followed by a memorandum of understanding signed in May 2014 that provided for coordinated patrolling and intelligence sharing."; (3) "[Still, five months later,] An MHA [Indian] Source stated that "We will raise the issue of NSCN-IM sending even more people to Myanmar" during meeting with Myanmar officials on October 12."

**Pledge form:** Written pact

Sources:  
Ministry of  
External Affairs  
2014;  
Vishwanathan  
2015: 2; SATP  
2014

**Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2015, Jun, 12)

**Event description:** (1) "It has been estimated that PLA and MNRF sustained 68 casualties during the cross Border raid [in May] in Myanmar by Indian Army."; (2) "While the initial Indian Army statement cloaked the operation in ambiguity and reported that it was carried out along the border, Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore told media that the 'surgical strikes had been carried out a few kilometres inside Myanmar'. Zaw Htay, the director of the office of Myanmar President Thein Sein, also acknowledged the fact that the operation was carried out inside Myanmar [with Myanmar's accept]."; (3) "There was surely a military assault on a rebel base, on the border with Myanmar or somewhat inside it. (...) [Yet] the rebel camp attacked on the border is just one of the many transit camps that dot the India-Myanmar frontier and serve as a "hop-in" point for bigger rebel squads coming into Indian territory from deeper-and bigger-rebel bases, it would have some effect in combating insurgency in the northeastern states. (...) The "transit camps" allow bigger rebel squads to rest after a long march from deep inside Myanmar and observe movement of Indian security forces (...) before they enter Indian territory for operations. (...) A member of Modi's cabinet, Prakash Javadekar, told reporters the operation was carried out with Burmese assistance"

Sources:  
SATP 2015;  
Vishwanathan  
2015: 1;  
Bhaumik 2015:  
16 (see also  
Beehner 2018:  
400)

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Cross Border raid in Myanmar by Indian Army."

**Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2022, Jan, 1)

**Event description:** (1) "On January 13, one trooper of Indian 21 Para commandos and two People's Liberation Army (PLA) militants were killed in an exchange of fire at Sinum village, about 10 km inside Myanmar near the international border, reports The Hindu. This was the first major offensive by the Indian army after the killing of five Assam Rifles personnel including a Colonel and his wife and son in an ambush on November 13"

Sources:  
SATP 2022

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "10 km inside Myanmar near the international border (...) [there] was the first major offensive by the Indian army"

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## 2.69 PLO in Jordan

**Target:** Israel, **Host:** Jordan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 204

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1965, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "[In 1965] Palestinian commandos belonging to the most militant faction of the PLO, Fatah, unleashed a series of hit-and-run raids [from Jordan] against targets inside Israel, raids that by late 1965 Hussein was powerless to stop"

*Sources:*  
Little 1995: 534

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1970, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) "In February 1970 heavy clashes occurred between the Jordanian police and Palestinian guerrillas."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
Michalák 2012: 113

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1970, Sep, 1)

**Event description:** (1) "Bedouin troops loyal to Hussein raided fedayeen hideouts in early September [1970] (...) the Palestinians blew up the airliner on 11 September, 'the tough little king', as Kissinger called him, proclaimed martial law and 'resolved on an all-out confrontation with the fedaye'; (2) "On September 17, 1970, the Bedouins got a green light from the king. With the assistance of tanks and air support, the Jordanian army attacked the Palestinian camps."; (3) "in September 1970, the government of Jordan began its suppression of Palestinian nationalist activities there. With this, Lebanon soon became the headquarters and primary operational base of the PLO."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "The fighting was so brutal that many guerrilla fighters preferred to cross the Jordan River and get caught by the Israeli forces rather than face the Jordanian soldiers. (...) The al-Fatah movement lost its (...) political and military bases (...) After the "Jordanian disaster", the Palestinian organizations were to search for new bases for their operations" (Michalák 2012: 115, 117-18)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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*Sources:*  
Little 1995: 540-41;  
Michalák 2012: 115; Brynen 1987: 3

## 2.70 PLO in Lebanon

Target: Israel, Host: Lebanon, UCDP Actor ID: 204

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**Sanctuary start** (Date: 1970, Oct, 1970)

**Event description:** (1) "[After] September 1970, (...) Lebanon soon became the headquarters and primary operational base of the PLO."

Sources:

**Crackdown campaign** (Date: 1982, Jun )

**Event description:** (1) "When Israel invaded in June 1982 (...) [it] led to the PLO's departure from Beirut."; (2) "A year after Israel's invasion of Lebanon forced the bulk of PLO forces into uncertain exile in the four corners of the Arab world, its battered remnants are waiting this weekend in the hills around Tripoli for a confrontation with Damascus which could consign them and their cause to political oblivion."; (3) "In 1982, the Palestinian sanctuary in Lebanon ended following Israel's second invasion of the country. After its expulsion from Beirut, the PLO split again"

Sources:  
Brynen 1987:  
430; Black 1983;  
Saverio  
Leopardi 2021

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "When Israel invaded in June 1982 (...) [it] led to the PLO's departure from Beirut." (Brynen 1987: 430)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Israel's invasion of Lebanon"

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## 2.71 PLO in Syria

Target: Israel, Host: Syria, UCDP Actor ID: 204

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**Sanctuary start** (Date: 1969, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "The PLO, of course, secured [sanctuary and] support [in] Syria [between] 1969-January 1976"; (2) "The PLO was, particularly before 1976, heavily reliant on Syrian bases and supply routes"

Sources:  
Brynen 1987:  
422; Brynen  
1987: 460

**Crackdown campaign** (Date: 1976, Oct )

**Event description:** (1) "[There were] head-on confrontations with the Syrian forces in Lebanon in 1976 and again in 1983. (...) a Syrian military offensive on the Palestinian strongholds in Lebanon in October 1976."

Sources:  
Sela 2014:  
283-84

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Crackdown campaign** (Date: 1983, May )

**Event description:** (1) "[There were] head-on confrontations with the Syrian forces in Lebanon in 1976 and again in 1983."; (2) "[There was a] failed attempt in May 1983 by a group of Syrian-backed rebels to dismiss Arafat by force following which all Syrian-based factions were banished from the PLO."

Sources:  
Sela 2014: 283;  
Sela 2014: 286

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "[After Syrian attempts] to dismiss Arafat by force following which all Syrian-based factions were banished from the PLO." (Sela 2014: 283)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## 2.72 RCD in Rwanda

**Target:** DR Congo (Zaire), **Host:** Rwanda, **UCDP Actor ID:** 424

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1998, Aug, 2)

**Event description:** (1) "Rwanda and Uganda initiated the war that erupted on 2 August 1998, prior to the founding of the [...] RCD, the rebel movement."; (2) "RCD was formed on 12 August 1998 by various political elements opposing the President Kabila. Key opposition leaders were called to a meeting in Goma where the movement was formed with direct support from Rwanda and Uganda."

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*Sources:*

Sadiki 2012: 32;  
UCDP/actor/424

## 2.73 RCD in Uganda

**Target:** DR Congo (Zaire), **Host:** Uganda, **UCDP Actor ID:** 424

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1998, Aug, 2)

**Event description:** (1) "Rwanda and Uganda initiated the war that erupted on 2 August 1998, prior to the founding of the [...] RCD, the rebel movement."; (2) "RCD was formed on 12 August 1998 by various political elements opposing the President Kabila. Key opposition leaders were called to a meeting in Goma where the movement was formed with direct support from Rwanda and Uganda."

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*Sources:*

Sadiki 2012: 32;  
UCDP/actor/424

## 2.74 Renamo in Malawi

**Target:** Mozambique, **Host:** Malawi, **UCDP Actor ID:** 498

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1982, May )

**Event description:** (1) "[In July 1981, it was reported that] Malawi had established camps for Renamo at Salima, Mangoche and Mount View, [however,] the force operating from Malawi at this time, the Partido Revolucionário Moçambicano (PRM), was still an independent organisation. (...) In May (...) a Provisional Accord of Unification was agreed between [Renamo leader] Cristina and PRM leader Gimo Phiri"

*Sources:*

Robinson 2006:  
139

**Pledge** (*Date:* 1984, Sep )

**Event description:** (1) "Mozambican leaders tried repeatedly to reach a detente with Malawi to block or limit support for Renamo's operations (...) [and the two countries reached] security pacts, in September 1984 and December 1986"

*Sources:*

Minter 1994: 137

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Pledge** (*Date:* 1986, Sep, 11)

*Sources:*

El-Khawas 1990:  
3

**Event description:** (1) "[On 11] September 1986, a regional summit was held in Blantyre, Malawi's capital, during which Machel, along with Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe and Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, urged Malawi's Hastings Kamuzu Banda to hand the RENAMO rebels over to Mozambican authorities. Banda refused; instead, he promised to expel the rebels from his country"

**Pledge form:** Other

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 1986, Nov )

**Event description:** (1) "Banda apparently responded by simply telling the MNR to leave the country (...) with a reported 10,000 guerrillas crossing into Mozambique."; (2) "By November 1986 the threats and diplomatic overtures Mozambique and its allies had made towards Malawi seem to have convinced Malawian authorities to expel Renamo's forces from their territory, forcing up to 5,000 Renamo fighters into central Mozambique"; (3) "Malawi had served as a transit point and safe haven for Renamo guerrillas (...) [however, in late 1986 events made] Banda rethink this approach and, following the establishment of a joint Malawian-Mozambican Security Committee (...) he sent a Malawian military force to guard this vital transport network for his country"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Expulsion

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
Gunn 1986: 6;  
Robinson 2006:  
252; Alden 2001:  
17

## **2.75 Renamo in Mozambique**

**Target:** Mozambique, **Host:** Mozambique, **UCDP Actor ID:** 498

### **Domestic territorial loss** (Date: 1979, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) "From January 1980 [the government] launched a new three-pronged attack on the Renamo base there, known as Casa Banana. Renamo quickly abandoned Casa Banana"

**Name of territory:** Parts of Gorongosa Mountains

*Sources:*  
Robinson 2006:  
121

### **Domestic territorial gain** (Date: 1979, Apr )

**Event description:** (1) "[Renamo] began a move to the new Sitatonga base, in which they would be fully settled by April 1980"

**Name of territory:** Sitatonga

*Sources:*  
Robinson 2006:  
121

### **Domestic territorial gain** (Date: 1979, Sep, 5)

**Event description:** (1) "Matsangaissa led a 300-man battalion from Odzi to the Gorongosa Mountains to set up a permanent base (...) arriving on 5 September"

**Name of territory:** Parts of Gorongosa Mountains

*Sources:*  
Robinson 2006:  
114

### **Domestic territorial loss** (Date: 1980, Jun, 30)

**Event description:** (1) "A final offensive on 30 June was successful in occupying enemy [Renamo] positions in the south (...) [In result,] they had been driven from their bases on Mozambican soil"

**Name of territory:** Sitatonga

*Sources:*  
Robinson 2006:  
124

### **Domestic territorial gain** (Date: 1980, Jul, 18)

*Sources:*  
Robinson 2006:  
125



**Event description:** (1) "[By 18 July] the scattered rebels, now led by Afonso Dhlakama, began to regroup in a base 26 kilometres from the Zimbabwe border at Chicarre, also referred to as Garágua.<sup>1</sup> In this sparsely populated area of southern Manica Renamo's now bedraggled army could operate with impunity."

**Name of territory:**Chicarre/Garágua

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## 2.76 Renamo in South Africa

**Target:** Mozambique, **Host:** South Africa, **UCDP Actor ID:** 498

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1979, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) "On 14 August 1979, Mozambican representative Sergio Vieira warned South Africa that he knew "groups were being trained in [a farm near Komatipoort] in South Africa and being sent through Rhodesia for action against Mozambique"

*Sources:*  
Robinson 2006:  
113

**Pledge** (*Date:* 1983, Dec, 20)

**Event description:** (1) "In mid-December 1983 the secret negotiations between Mozambique and South Africa [about mutual expulsion of ANC and Renamo; the Nkomati Accord] became publicly known. On 20 December Mozambican representatives Sergio Vieira and Jacinto Veloso again met South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha"

*Sources:*  
Robinson 2006:  
171

**Pledge form:** Media broadcast

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1984, Apr )

**Event description:** (1) "[As for implementation of the deal, on the question of military logistics, militants] who were involved both before and after 1984 said that secrecy intensified after the Nkomati agreement. Afterwards [supplies were shipped into Renamo-held areas inside Mozambique, and] (...) the Dakota aircraft came only at night, to sites kept secret from most soldiers."; (2) "South African supplies were arriving regularly by helicopter at a Renamo base in Maputo province as late as February 1991."; (3) "[By the year 1990] Since it lacks rear bases and therefore depends u provisioning, it must be able to obtain compliance over large are Mozambique."

*Sources:*  
Minter 1994:  
186; Minter 1994:  
188; Hall 1990:  
39

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "secrecy intensified after the Nkomati agreement. Afterwards [supplies were shipped into Renamo-held areas inside Mozambique, as Renamo had no firm presence in South Africa]" (Minter 1994: 186)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## 2.77 Renamo in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)

**Target:** Mozambique, **Host:** Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), **UCDP Actor ID:** 498

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1977, Mar )

**Event description:** "Renamo's first base was established at an old tobacco farm outside Odzi [in Rhodesia], near Umtali, in March 1977"

*Sources:*  
Robinson 2006:  
102

**Pledge** (*Date: 1980, Feb, 14*)

**Event description:** (1) "ZANU [which had pledged to expel RENAMO] easily won a majority in the nation's elections [on 14 February] and would form a government in Zimbabwe from mid-April 1980"; (2) "It was clear from that point on that the MNR could not remain in Rhodesia."

**Pledge form:** Other

*Sources:*  
Robinson 2006:  
121; Young 1990:  
495

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1980, Apr*)

**Event description:** (1) "In April 1980 (...) the ascent to power of radical forces in Zimbabwe led to the full transfer of Renamo to South African soil"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Other

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "the ascent to power of radical forces in Zimbabwe led to the full transfer of Renamo to South African soil" (Robinson 2006: 121)

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) Cunningham and Sawyer (2019) codes leadership change (to Afonso Dhlakama) after death of previous leader.

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*Sources:*  
Robinson 2006:  
121

## 2.78 RFDG in Liberia

**Target:** Guinea, **Host:** Liberia, **UCDP Actor ID:** 463

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date: 2000, Sep*)

**Event description:** (1) "[The RFDG] received important backing from both the Government of Sierra Leone and Liberia"; (2) "The majority of the violence involving the RFDG was cross-border attacks that took place in the mineral rich areas of the country along the Guinean southern borders with Sierra Leone and Liberia"; (3) "Guinean Armed Forces fought to contain fierce cross-border attacks by alleged Guinean, Sierra Leonean and Liberian rebels fighting under the Movement of the Democratic Forces of Guinea (RFDG) from Liberian territory between 2000 and 2001. These attacks were believed to have been motivated by revenge for Guinea's military support to fighters of Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) of Sierra Leone (mainly Kamajor militia) who were based in Guinea refugee camps."; (4) "A previously unknown rebel group calling itself the ' Rally o cratic Forces of Guinea' (RFDG) eventually claimed responsibility attacks (...) [of] September 2000"

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*Sources:*  
UCDP/actor/463;  
UCDP/actor/463;  
Addo 2004: 8;  
Arieff 2009: 343

## 2.79 RFDG in Sierra Leone

**Target:** Guinea, **Host:** Sierra Leone, **UCDP Actor ID:** 463

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date: 2000, Sep*)

**Event description:** (1) "The majority of the violence involving the RFDG was cross-border attacks that took place in the mineral rich areas of the country along the Guinean southern borders with Sierra Leone and Liberia"; (2) "These [cross-border] attacks were believed to have been motivated by revenge [from Sierra Leone's government] for Guinea's military support to fighters of (...) the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) of Sierra Leone (mainly Kamajor militia) who were based in Guinea refugee camps."; (3) "A previously unknown rebel group calling itself the ' Rally o cratic Forces of Guinea' (RFDG) eventually claimed responsibility attacks (...) [of] September 2000"

*Sources:*  
UCDP/actor/463;  
Addo 2004: 8;  
Arieff 2009: 343

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## 2.80 RUF in Liberia

Target: Sierra Leone, Host: Liberia , UCDP Actor ID: 532

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### Sanctuary start (Date: 1991, Mar, 23)

**Event description:** (1) "The Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel movement based in the north and east of Sierra Leone which has launched a number of incursions into Guinea. In 1991 the RUF unleashed an insurgency which has ravaged the country. The group is known for its extreme cruelty, including hacking off the limbs of civilians."; (2) "Revolutionary Front (RUF), a rebel movement based in Sierra Leone which uses Liberia as a staging area"; (3) "The conflict over government in Sierra Leone began as RUF (Revolutionary United Front) launched a rebellion from neighbouring Liberia in 1991. (...) on 23 March 1991, invading from neighboring Liberia (...) From the very outset of the rebellion, Sankoh's RUF movement received support from the NPFL (National Patriotic Front of Liberia) leader Charles Taylor in Liberia."; (4) " [In October 2009] United Nations Security Council gave Liberia two months to provide evidence that it had stopped providing aid and support to rebels of the Revolutionary United Front, whose forces have led a war in Sierra Leone that is entering its 10th year. Last week, U.N. officials said they had no evidence that Liberia had stopped supporting the rebels."

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Sources:  
AFP 2001; Samb  
2001;  
UCDP/actor/532;  
VOA 2009

## 2.81 SCIRI in Iran

Target: Iraq, Host: Iran , UCDP Actor ID: 231

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### Sanctuary start (Date: 1982, Nov, 17)

**Event description:** (1) " SCIRI was created by Iraqi exiles in Iran on 17 November 1982 (...) Much of the early activity by SCIRI was made up of attacks launched from the Iranian side of the border (...) Since its formation 1982, SCIRI has received substantial support from Iran"; (2) "Both SCIRI and the Badr Brigades operated from Iran until 2003, when the toppling of Saddam Hussein allowed it to return to the country"

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Sources:  
UCDP/statebased/521;  
Erstad 2018: 26

## 2.82 SLM/A in Chad

Target: Sudan, Host: Chad, UCDP Actor ID: 469

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### Sanctuary start (Date: 2003, Feb, 28)

**Event description:** (1) "SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army), previously known as the Darfur Liberation Front, issued a Political Declaration on 14 March 2003, stating that it had taken up arms against the Khartoum"; (2) At that time, Déby was unable [or] unwilling to stop the two armed opposition movements in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), from using Chad as a rear base"

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Sources:  
UCDP 2022;  
Meerpool 2013:  
4

### Crackdown campaign (Date: 2003, Mar )

**Event description:** (1) "In March and April 2003, Déby wanted to help Bashir fighting the SLA and the JEM and sent Chadian troops to Darfur via the border town of Tiné. (...) [Yet,] the Chadian soldiers – mainly Zaghawa themselves – showed little motivation to fight against other Zaghawa and, instead, gave the rebel movements advance warning

Sources:  
Meerpohl 2013:  
4; Berg 2008: 77;  
Tamm and  
Duursma 2022:  
13; Marchal  
2008: 432;  
Prunier 2011: 98;  
Gnanguénon  
2021: 17

of the planned attack by the Chadian army"; (2) "[Déby] took military action against them [JEM and SLM/A]"; (3) "Earlier in 2002, Darfurian opposition figures had asked Déby to support an armed rebellion, but he had refused the request and then instead sent 500 Chadian soldiers to Darfur in 2003 to help Sudan's government forces quell the rebellion"; (4) "Throughout the first two years of the conflict in Darfur, Khartoum provided Déby with funds to divide and weaken the Darfur insurgency"; (5) "At the beginning of the insurrection the GoS had benefited from almost total support from Idris Deby who even sent troops and a couple of helicopters to help chase the rebels"; (6) "In 2003, Chadian soldiers (...) entered Sudan for the first time, alongside the Sudanese army, to fight against the Darfur rebels."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2006, Jul, 26)

**Event description:** (1) "High-level talks held in Libya resulted in an announcement of mended relations (...) and a pledge from both governments to end support to the respective opposition groups operating from both countries."; (2) "Last week the two states' presidents agreed at a mini-summit in Tripoli to ban insurgents from setting up bases in each country"; (3) "On 26 July 2006, an agreement was signed in which both governments agreed not to give refuge any more to the other's rebels."

*Sources:*  
HRW 2006;  
Reuter; Tubiana  
2008: 29

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2006, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) "[After the deal and before September 2006] it seems that Déby did play the game to some extent and asked the Darfur rebels to leave Chad. Some of them went abroad or to rebel areas in Darfur; others remained in Chad, acting more discreetly."

*Sources:*  
Tubiana 2008: 29

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Expulsion

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "Some of them went abroad or to rebel areas in Darfur; others remained in Chad, acting more discreetly." (Tubiana 2008: 29)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2007, May )

**Event description:** (1) "The two countries [Sudan and Chad] set up a joint military committee to monitor the border and in May the two presidents signed a reconciliation accord in Saudi Arabia"

*Sources:*  
Shinn 2015: 282

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2009, Jun )

**Event description:** (1) "It was actually in June 2009 that Déby's people told the [JEM and SLM/A] guerrillas that they needed to get out of there [Chad], and many of them did"; (2) "In August 2009, first talks between Chad and Sudan were held in Tripoli with Gaddafi's support"

*Sources:*  
Marchal 2022;  
Meerpohl 2013:  
6

**Pledge form:** Direct communication

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2010, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) "When the rapprochement reached the ground, (...) border crossings became more difficult. (...) [Ending in] the closure of [the SML/A and JEM's] state-sponsored supply lines to rebel groups from Chad (...) in mid-2010"

Sources:  
Meerpohl 2013:  
6

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "[Ending in] the closure of [the SML/A and JEM's] state-sponsored supply lines" (Meerpohl 2013: 6)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "The deployment since early 2010 of a joint Sudan–Chad Border Force"; (2) "An agreement [between Chad and Sudan] was signed in January 2010. When the rapprochement reached the ground, pressure mounted on the JEM and border crossings became more difficult"

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## **2.83 SLM/A in Sudan**

**Target:** Sudan, **Host:** Sudan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 469

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### **Domestic territorial gain** (Date: 2003, Apr )

**Event description:** (1) "In April, SLA and JEM forces captured and briefly held the airport of el-Fasher, capital of North Darfur state, destroying government aircraft on the ground and making off with weapons, vehicles, stores, and a captured air force general. Later in 2003, the SLA attacked and briefly seized the North Darfur towns of Mellit and Kutum [and] controlled large swathes of North Darfur and Jebel Marra"

Sources:  
Tanner and  
Tubiana 2007: 23

**Name of territory:**Main Dar Zaghawa towns

### **Domestic territorial loss** (Date: 2004, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) "In December 2003 and January 2004 the government recaptured Tina, Kornoy, and Um Buru, the main 'towns' in Dar Zaghawa (...) The SLA dispersed to survive"

Sources:  
Tanner and  
Tubiana 2007: 24

**Name of territory:**Main Dar Zaghawa towns

### **Domestic territorial gain** (Date: 2004, Feb )

**Event description:** (1) "[Shortly after the January offensive, SLM] fighters had escaped the GoS [Gov't of Sudan] onslaughts of late 2003 and early 2004 by seeking and receiving sanctuary in eastern Jebel Marra [mountains in Sudan.] (...) the SLA (...) denies government forces access to areas by attacking officials, cutting off roads, and controlling trade flows."

Sources:  
Tanner and  
Tubiana 2007:  
24, 26

**Name of territory:**Eastern Jebel Marra

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## **2.84 SPLM/A in Eritrea**

**Target:** Sudan, **Host:** Eritrea, **UCDP Actor ID:** 466

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### **Sanctuary start** (Date: 1995, Jun )

**Event description:** (1) "Asmara began supporting the SPLM/A and northern opposition movements in the mid-1990s in retaliation for Khartoum's support to armed

Sources:  
Seymour 2010:  
57; Adar 2000b;  
Venkataraman  
2005: 67; Biles  
1996: 12;  
Venkataraman  
2005: 66; Hentz  
2013: 222; Shinn  
2015: 280;  
Connell 2007:

Islamist opposition in Eritrea"; (2) "Eritrea not only closed the Sudanese embassy in its capital, Asmara, but also handed over the facilities to the NDA in June 1995. (...) The SPLA has since 1996 based its New Sudan Brigade in western Eritrea."; (3) "It is the considered view of many that Eritrea started supporting the Sudanese opposition militarily since January 1996 soon after the breakdown of diplomatic relations."; (4) "the Sudan Alliance Forces [SPLA's northern front] are allowed to operate freely in western Eritrea (...) Sudanese rebels are training in Eritrea (...) Brig Khalid insists that there are other Sudanese military training camps in the border region of western Eritrea and that his units have already infiltrated Sudan to engage in small-scale guerrilla activity"; (5) "On 17 June 1995 (...) a conference of Sudanese political forces [was] inaugurated [in Eritrea] (...) guested by the Popular Liberation Movement of John Garang in the South"; (6) "[T]ilting the balance firmly towards the SPLA [in] January 1994, Eritrea broke off relations with Sudan, accusing Khartoum of sponsoring an Islamist rebel group inside Eritrea. (...) [Eritrea] needed no further encouragement to enhance the military performance of the SPLA"; (7) "Eritrea broke relations with Sudan at the end of 1994, became a strong supporter of the SPLM/A, and permitted the opposition National Democratic Alliance [allied with the SPLM/A] to locate its headquarters in the former Sudan embassy in Asmara"; (8) "SPLA training for the Bejas started in 1995, and the first joint operation took place in October 1996"; (9) "Starting in 1996, the SPLA also based a military force in western Eritrea, known as the New Sudan Brigade."

**Pledge** (*Date: 1999, May*)

**Event description:** (1) "[When] Eritrea's relations with Ethiopia worsened to the extent of war (...) national interest considerations prompted the Eritrean government to make a move towards Sudan and normalize relations with it; for Asmara could not afford to devote hostility on both sides of its borders. (...) The whole normalization process took place in May 1999 at a tripartite meeting in Doha, Qatar, which was attended by the Heads of State of Eritrea, Sudan and Qatar where President Isaias and his Sudanese counter part General Omar al-Bashir agreed to normalize their bilateral relations"; (2) "Then the outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998 transformed the geopolitics of the Greater Horn. During the course of the futile but deadly war that followed, Asmara and Addis were quick to seek their own rapprochement with Khartoum, drastically easing the threats to the NIF."; (3) "The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998 ended the U.S. sponsored 'front line states' policy"

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*  
Venkataraman  
2005: 70;  
Seymour 2010:  
55; Shinn 2003

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1999, Winter*)

**Event description:** (1) "Eritrea trained and supported the forces of the NDA [SPLA-aligned northeastern front] (...) in western Eritrea around Haikota, Tessenei and Sawa and received logistical support, training and arms from Asmara until the late 1990s, when Asmara engineered a rapprochement with Khartoum and moved the NDA's camps across the border to a base at Belasid [in late 1999]. Once there, they received regular supplies of food, fuel, ammunition and more from across border, as well as political instruction and military training in or near their new base. (...) NDA camps had been relocated across the border from the Haikota/Sawa area to Belasid (...) [and] included armed forces from SPLM/A"

*Sources:*  
Connell 2007  
(see also Arnold  
and LeRiche  
2013: 103;  
Seymour 2010:  
56)

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Expulsion

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## 2.85 SPLM/A in Ethiopia

Target: Sudan, Host: Ethiopia, UCDP Actor ID: 466

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### Sanctuary start (Date: 1983, Jul )

**Event description:** (1) "Since 1983, when hostilities resumed, the Ethiopian government had been a major sponsor of John Garang's Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)."; (2) "[At birth, the rebel group] trekked all the way to the Ethiopian borders where the first SPLM/A camps were established"; (3) "[T]he formation of the SPLM/SPLA [was] in July 1983"; (4) "The Derg played an important role in the establishment of the SPLM/A which it logistically and militarily supported (...) The Derg provided the SPLA with substantial military and logistical support in its struggle against the Khartoum regime which hosted the opposition movements from Ethiopia. It also provided the SPLM/A with supply routes, training facilities, a radio station, and sites for the establishment of refugee camps in the Gambella region ran by the UNHCR (...) Ethiopian officers and Air Borne commandos also provided intensive military training for thousands of SPLA guerrilla fighters at different SPLA military camps in western Ethiopia"; (5) "Ethiopian support was crucial to their gains, as the Ethiopian government used the SPLA to retaliate for Sudan's support to Eritrean, Tigrayan, Omoro, and Anuak insurgents in Ethiopia."; (6) "SPLA's conduct of the guerrilla war against Khartoum (...) relied on camps in Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda to launch its operations and subsequently regroup."; (7) "During the 1980s, SPLA received crucial aid from the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, which provided both rear bases and arms."; (8) "Part of Ethiopia's support for the SPLA was in allowing it to set up bases in Gambella. Here, the Sudanese rebels recruited and trained tens of thousands of young men from refugee camps."

*Sources:*  
Hentz 2013: 221;  
Nyaba 1997: 21;  
D'Agoût 2013:  
63; Bayissa 2011:  
20, 29; Seymour  
2010: 53; Frahm  
2015: 260;  
Gleditsch et al.  
2013: 236;  
Davison 2014

### Pledge (Date: 1991, May, 28)

**Event description:** (1) "The collapse of the Derg [on May 28 1991, when the EPRDF took power] was immediately followed by the withdrawal of the SPLM/A and south Sudanese refugees from Ethiopia"; (2) May – President Mengistu is forced out of Addis Ababa, putting SPLA base areas in Ethiopia in jeopardy"; (3) "The 1991 fall of Colonel Mengistu's regime (...) [meant that] the SPLA, which had been close to the former communist regime, suddenly lost its main source of support."; (4) "[The] overthrow of the SPLA's main backer, Ethiopia's ruler, Mengistu Haile Mariam [led to the SPLM/A] losing its supplies and radio station"; (5) "The successor Tigray-dominated government, when it operated as a rebel movement, often took refuge in Sudan during its struggle to overthrow Mengistu. After taking power in 1991, it established cordial relations with Khartoum"

*Sources:*  
Bayissa 2011: 40;  
Lobban 2001:  
120; Prunier  
2009: 81;  
Lobban 2001:  
120; Shinn 2015:  
280

**Pledge form:** Other

### Crackdown campaign (Date: 1991, Jun )

**Event description:** (1) "[By June] Ethiopian rebel groups seize power in Addis Ababa, and SPLA loses its strongest regional ally. Radio SPLA/SPLM had broadcast its programs from Addis, which was also a safe haven for SPLM leadership. (...) southern Sudanese refugees are driven out of Ethiopian refugee camps."; (2) "The EPRDF government subsequently expelled the SPLA guerrillas from their Ethiopian bases"; (3) "Ethiopia's new government had been hosted in Khartoum as rebels during the civil war. On taking power in Addis Ababa they stopped assistance to the SPLA and expelled its leadership to Nairobi."; (4) "When Mengistu's government collapsed in 1991, the SPLA,

*Sources:*  
Makinda 1993:  
129; Hentz 2013:  
221; The  
Economist 1998:  
67; Human  
Rights Watch  
1998: VI

viewed as an enemy by the new Ethiopian government, was suddenly stripped not only of this rearguard support but also of access from Ethiopia to the territory it controlled within Sudan. The SPLA (...) promptly fled from Ethiopia back into Sudan."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Expulsion

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "The SPLM (...) was suddenly stripped not only of this rearguard support but also of access from Ethiopia to the territory it controlled within Sudan. The SPLA (...) promptly fled from Ethiopia back into Sudan." (Human Rights Watch 1998: VI)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 1998, Nov, 2)

**Event description:** (1) "Sudan has welcomed a move by the Ethiopian government to close down the rebel SPLA office in Gambela, near the Sudanese border. According to the daily 'al-Rai al-Aam', presidential adviser Adam al-Tahir said the measure demonstrated Ethiopia's 'seriousness to normalise relations with Sudan'. The move follows the resumption of Ethiopian Airlines flights to Khartoum. The DPA news agency said the SPLA's expulsion from Gambela was first reported by a United Arab Emirates newspaper and timed to coincide with the closure of OLF offices in Sudan."; (2) "The 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrean war changed the Realpolitik dimensions of the Sudanese civil war. For example, Ethiopia has not only sought rapprochement with Sudan (...), but has also closed the SPLA's base in Gambela on its western border with Sudan."; (3) "It is because of the Ethio-Eritrean war that a rapprochement has been re-established between Ethiopia and Sudan. (...) Ethiopia has not only closed the SPLA's base in Gambela in western Ethiopia but has also agreed with Hussein Mohamed Aideed of Somalia to prevent the OLF operations against Ethiopia from their bases in Somalia."; (4) "On May 12, 1998, Eritrea unexpectedly occupied a small piece of territory previously administered by Ethiopia near their border (...) Ethiopia slowly and quietly explored improved ties with Sudan. Near the end of 1998, Sudanese media began to suggest that Sudanese-Ethiopian ties were on the mend."; (5) "Then the outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998 transformed the geopolitics of the Greater Horn. During the course of the futile but deadly war that followed, Asmara and Addis were quick to seek their own rapprochement with Khartoum, drastically easing the threats to the NIF."; (6) "[In May 1998] Ethiopia concluded that its erstwhile close friend Eritrea had become a greater enemy than Sudan. Drawing on the axiom that the 'enemy of my enemy is my friend,' Ethiopia decided to normalize relations with Sudan by the end of 1998 (...) [and] Ethiopia began to cut back its support for the SPLA."

*Sources:*  
UN OCHA 1998;  
Adar 2000a;  
Adar 2000b: 6;  
Shinn 2002: 3;  
Seymour 2010:  
55; Shinn 2003

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Expulsion

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "[Ethiopia] closed the SPLA's base in Gambela on its western border with Sudan." (Adar 2000a)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No



## 2.86 SPLM/A in Libya

Target: Sudan, Host: Libya, UCDP Actor ID: 466

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### Sanctuary start (Date: 1983, Jul )

**Event description:** (1) "[1983 saw the] establishment of the local SPLM/A office in Libya, which channelled military aid from Libya's leader Muammar al-Gaddafi to the movement"; (2) "Relations between Libya and Sudan deteriorated sharply when Sudan supported Egypt after the Camp David accords of September 1978. Tripoli reacted by providing aid to the southern-based Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA)"; (3) "The Gaddafi regime [supported] the SPLM in southern Sudan for years during the rule of Numeiri [i.e. pre-1985]"; (4) "Policy differences prompted Libya to support any organisation that opposed Numeiri's government in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Accordingly, Gaddafi supported the SPLA as a way of destabilising the Numeiri regime"

Sources:  
Ylönen 2009: 6;  
Huliaras 2001: 9;  
Hamed 2014:  
190; Makinda  
1993: 131

### Pledge (Date: 1985, May, 18)

**Event description:** (1) "When Nimeiri fell in 1985, Qadhafi immediately abandoned military support for the SPLA and switched his full support to Nimeiri's former Muslim opponents in the North [of Sudan, i.e. the government]"; (2) "Qaddafi perceived the opportunity to increase his influence in Khartoum by a sudden visit on 18 May [1985] to offer what the Sudanese most required – (...) an end to assistance to the SPLA. (...) On 23 July diplomatic relations were restored amid a spirit of friendship and cooperation"; (3) "Following Numeiri's ousting in [6 April] 1985, Libya's role in Sudan changed. Gaddafi recognised Swareddahab's government immediately and soon the two states restored full diplomatic relations."; (4) "Sudan immediately expelled the Libyan opposition and closed down its military training camps. In return, Libyans stopped supporting the SPLM of Garang in southern Sudan."; (5) "[However, Libyan Defence Minister] Mohammed said Libya has "no intention of forming any strategic alliance with Sudan or of interfering in Sudan's domestic and foreign policies."

Sources:  
Huliaras 2001: 9;  
Collins 2005: 66;  
Makinda 1993:  
131; Deeb 1991:  
174; Dickey 1985

**Pledge form:** Written pact

### Crackdown campaign (Date: 1986, Mar, 14)

**Event description:** (1) "Muamar Qaddafi has been maneuvering farther south to strengthen his militart and political influence in Sudan (...) The Sudanese government (...) earlier this month formally requested that Libya (...) help it fight rebels in the south of the country. (...) As part of that agreement, two Libyan bombers reportedly have been used in air attacks against the rebel-held towns of Rumbek and Yirol in south Sudan [on 14 March 1986]. (...) Growing Libyan involvement during the past month in Sudanese military and political affairs comes after a yearlong campaign by Qaddafi to increase his influence [in Sudan]"; (2) "A year later Libya was providing planes and military equipment to bomb the southern Sudanese rebels' strongholds."; (3) "Backed by arms supplies from (...) Libya, whose leader Qaddafi had changed sides, the al-Mahdi governments [of Sudan] expected to deal the final blow to the SPLA."

Sources:  
Harden 1986:  
A17; Deeb 1991:  
173; van Baarsen  
2000: 23

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "[Gaddafi] switched his full support [to Sudan]" (Huliaras 2001: 9), "Back[ing them with] arms supplies" (van Baarsen 2000: 23)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## 2.87 SPLM/A in Sudan

Target: Sudan, Host: Sudan, UCDP Actor ID: 466

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### Domestic territorial gain (Date: 1987, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) "In January 1987, the SPLA introduced a limited shift to conventional operations that resulted in the capture of a string of Khartoum's garrisons in Upper Nile, eastern Equatoria, and southern Blue Nile."; (2) By 1987 (...) the SPLA changed tactics from ambushes and began seiging towns and garrisons for days and weeks at a time in order to gain control of those locations (Johnson 1998, 59). It was not until this time that the SPLA first gained control of northern locations"; (3) "By 1989, the SPLA had managed to bring large parts of Southern Sudan under its control"; (4) "By mid 1989, the SPLA had consolidated its control over a large swathe of Southern Sudan. The cumulative effect of these operations was that the government forces were in a dire shape with limited capacity to defend the few garrisons that were still under its control." **Name of territory:** Upper Nile, eastern Equatoria, and southern Blue Nile

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Sources:  
D'Agoût 2013:  
64; Rose 2012:  
30; The  
Economist 1998;  
D'Agoût 2013:  
64-65

## 2.88 SPLM/A in Uganda

Target: Sudan, Host: Uganda, UCDP Actor ID: 466

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### Sanctuary start (Date: 1993, Winter)

**Event description:** (1) "When Museveni came to power [in 1986] the Sudanese regime was immediately persuaded that Uganda would become a rear base for the Sudanese rebel movement, although there were no signs that such a plan existed. (...) As for Ugandan support for the SPLA, it was nonexistent until 1993, and there were times when a simple appointment with the Kampala SPLA representative (who did not even have an office) could cause the poor man to be questioned and briefly detained by the Ugandan police for 'unauthorised political activities'. Museveni was extremely careful not to antagonize Khartoum, and if he finally resorted to helping the SPLA it was only because his policy of noninterference failed in the end to produce any results."; (2) "The SPLA did not need Uganda [in the 1980s] because at the time it could rely on solid support from communist Ethiopia."; (3) "[Only] after 1993 Uganda started to give the SPLA support"; (4) "Museveni [was] reluctan[t] to provide any form of help for Colonel Garang's movement up to late 1993"; (5) "SPLA's conduct of the guerrilla war against Khartoum (...) relied on camps in (...) Uganda to launch its operations and subsequently regroup."; (6) "Uganda (...) provided a haven and military support for the movement and Ugandan troops have even participated actively in SPLM/A offensive"; (7) "During the 1990s, SPLA managed to enlist the support of the new regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as of the government of Uganda."; (8) Garang's confidence [in 1994] (...) was derived from agreement by Uganda's President Museveni and Isayas Afewerki, the leader in Eritrea, to supply greater support to the SPLA/M, in part compensating for the loss of Ethiopian backers."; (9) "As a quid pro quo [for Sudan's sanctuary to the LRA], Uganda also gives the SPLA logistical and military support with Kampala functioning as a conduit for SPLA arms deliveries."; (10) "Uganda's commitment to the SPLA reached a peak in the mid-1990s when, together with Ethiopia and Eritrea, it became part of the U.S. 'front line states' strategy to put pressure on the government in Khartoum."

Sources:  
Prunier 2009: 80;  
Prunier 2009:  
387, fn. 20;  
Prunier 2009: 75;  
Prunier 2004:  
382; Frahm 2015:  
260; Sandu 2014:  
74; Gleditsch et  
al. 2013: 236;  
Arnold and  
LeRiche 2013:  
90; Adar 1998:  
47; Shinn 2003

### Pledge (Date: 1999, Dec, 8)

**Event description:** (1) "President al Bashir of Sudan and President Museveni of

Sources:  
Papa et al. 2010:  
350; Schomerus  
2007: 26

Uganda signed the Nairobi Agreement (NA) in December of 1999, restoring diplomatic relations between the two nations"; (2) "The agreement established that neither party would support the other's rebels"

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2002, Mar, 5)

**Event description:** (1) "Early in 2002, Uganda's president, Yoweri Museveni, visited Khartoum and agreed to reestablish full diplomatic relations"; (2) "Sudan signed a protocol with Uganda in March 2002 that allowed Ugandan troops to be deployed in southern Sudan to carry out search-and-destroy operations against LRA bases"; (3) "Uganda also agreed not to shelter or render military or logistic assistance to the Colonel John Garang-led rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)"; (4) "On 5 March, Sudan and Uganda signed the first protocol which permitted limited operations"; (5) "An agreement between the Sudanese and Ugandan governments in 2002 led to the loss of Ugandan support for the SPLM, which severely hurt the rebel group's position relative to the government"; (6) "Museveni [President of Uganda] said in November [2002] that Uganda had stopped providing military assistance to the SPLA although it could still transit Uganda. (...) The two countries also decided to deploy a joint monitoring team on their common border to deal with allegations that both sides were resuming support for rebel groups operating in the area."; (7) "Although the icy relations between Bashir and Museveni thawed somewhat in the period 2000-2002, Museveni's continued support for the SPLM/A and the general distrust between the two leaders hindered real reconciliation."

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*  
Shinn 2015: 284;  
Dunn 2004: 141;  
PANA Press  
2002;  
Pambazuka  
News; Gleditsch  
et al. 2013: 235;  
Shinn 2003;  
Shinn 2003

## 2.89 Taliban in Afghanistan

**Target:** Afghanistan, **Host:** Afghanistan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 303

**Domestic territorial gain** (*Date:* 1994, Oct, 12)

**Event description:** (1) "In a well-organized assault in [12 Oct] 1994, the Taliban took control of Spin Boldak, a run-down town that functioned as a border-crossing point for smugglers and that contained an enormous weapons and ammunition depot under the control of Hekmatyar's Hizb-e Islami"

**Name of territory:** Spin Boldak

*Sources:*  
Crews and Tarzi  
2008: 63

**Domestic territorial loss** (*Date:* 2001, Dec )

**Event description:** (1) "Mullah Omar surrendered Kandahar on 5 December, but he himself escaped into the desert on a motorbike. By then most of the Taliban had left Kandahar for the safety of their villages or neighbouring Baluchistan province in Pakistan."

**Name of territory:** Kandahar

*Sources:*  
Rashid 2010: 220

**Domestic territorial gain** (*Date:* 2006, Nov )

**Event description:** (1) "[The Tabela] were able to gain virtual control over much of Kandahar and Helmand provinces by late 2006."

**Name of territory:** Kandahar and Helmand

*Sources:*  
Williams 2008:  
54

## 2.90 Taleban in Pakistan

Target: Afghanistan, Host: Pakistan, UCDP Actor ID: 303

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### Sanctuary start (Date: 1995, Summer)

**Event description:** (1) "By the spring of 1995 (...) money, weapons, pickup trucks, and supplies shipped across the Pakistan border. (...) Benazir Bhutto (...) was secretly authorizing the Taliban's covert aid"; (2) "By the summer of 1995, the Pashtun network in the army and the ISI determined to back the Taliban, especially as President Burhanuddin Rabbani sought support from Pakistan's rivals – Russia, Iran and India."

Sources:  
Coll 2004: 294,  
297; Rashid  
2010: 188

### Sanctuary start (Date: 2001, Sep, 19)

**Event description:** (1) "On September 19, Musharraf addressed the nation and explained the rationale for siding with the US (...) [and to target] the Taliban, and international terrorism. [He explained that,] From Pakistan they wanted intelligence-information exchange, use of airspace, and logistic support. (...) He admitted that the opinion was divided, but the vast majority supported him (...) He informed the domestic audience that his critical concerns were sovereignty, economy, strategic assets."

Sources:  
Yamin 2015: 123

**Pledge form:** Speech

### Crackdown campaign (Date: 2002, Mar, 27)

**Event description:** (1) "The suspected [al Qaeda] commander was one of 25 Arabs and 5 Taliban fighters captured when a team of American and Pakistani agents raided several houses in Pakistan on Thursday. The operation was carried out in Faisalabad and Lahore. (...) The operation seems to be the first time that American law enforcement and intelligence operatives have conducted a raid in a foreign country as part of the Bush administration's campaign against terrorism."; (2) "It is almost a daily occurrence now, after months of seeming inaction: Pakistani agents raid a house and arrest suspected members of the Taliban or Al Qaeda. At least 75 people have been detained in a half dozen raids that began on March 27"; (3) "Special Operations forces – Army Delta Force and Navy Seal units – were allowed to accompany Pakistani forces on raids in the tribal areas in 2002 and early 2003"

Sources:  
Gordon 2002;  
Myadans 2002;  
Mazzetti and  
Rohde 2008

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "A team of American and Pakistani agents raided several houses in Pakistan on Thursday. The operation was carried out in Faisalabad and Lahore."

### Pledge (Date: 2004, Jan, 10)

**Event description:** (1) "Prime Minister Zafarullah Khan Jamali of Pakistan arrived here on Monday pledging to bring a new spirit of cooperation to the countries' relations in everything from trade to terrorism. It was the highest-level visit from Pakistan since the fall of the Taliban government two years ago. Pakistan was a close ally of the Taliban government (...). But the two leaders' talk before journalists at the presidential palace here on Monday morning was of neighborliness and cooperation in the joint fight against terrorism."

Sources:  
Gall 2004

**Pledge form:** Speech

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2004, Mar )

**Event description:** (1) "Hundreds of Islamic militants and Pakistani government paramilitary troops engaged in heavy fighting for more than six hours on Tuesday at a fort in the Pakistani tribal areas, just miles from the Afghan border, Pakistani officials said. (...) In the past several weeks, Pakistani and American forces have stepped up operations in the border region in a spring offensive intended to rout Taliban fighters from their hiding places"; (2) "In March, Pakistani forces launched Operation Kalosha II (...). The operation involved a 13-day cordon-and-search effort across a 36-km<sup>2</sup> area west of Wana. (...) The operation was launched with 700 personnel, but by March 19, roughly 7,000 army and Frontier Corps troops were battling the militants at several locations"; (3) "Washington pressured Pakistan to launch an offensive against the foreign fighters in FATA. Operation Al Mizan comprised several smaller operations, such as Operation Kalosha II, which took place in South Waziristan. Pakistan deployed between 70,000 and 80,000 forces in FATA. The army conducted a major 13-day cordon-and-search operation across a 36-km area west of Wana"

*Sources:*  
Rohde 2004;  
Jones and Fair  
2010: 47-49;  
Khan 2011: 132

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2006, Aug, 10)

**Event description:** (1) "Pakistani forces arrested 29 suspected Taliban militants Tuesday in a raid on a private hospital after they came from neighboring Afghanistan, officials said. The arrests came as NATO said it was likely to sign an agreement with Afghanistan to formalize its presence in the country but warned that it would need more resources and international cooperation to do so."

*Sources:*  
The New York  
Times 2006

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2007, Jul, 23)

**Event description:** (1) "One of the most wanted Taliban militants in Pakistan killed himself when troops raided a hideout in Baluchistan province, government officials said today."

*Sources:*  
Masood 2007

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2016, May, 20)

**Event description:** (1) "An American drone strike against the leader of the Afghan militants signaled a major break with precedent as the United States circumvented Pakistan in an effort to disrupt the strengthening insurgency (...) the attack was significant, as it is believed to be the first American drone strike in Baluchistan, the de facto headquarters of the Afghan Taliban, after years of such attacks in other Pakistani and Afghan areas."; (2) "The attack was a sign of American exasperation with Pakistan's duplicitous

*Sources:*  
Mashal 2016;  
NYT 2016; Gall  
and Khapalwak  
2017

game of working with Washington to combat terrorism while sheltering the Taliban (...) Pakistan complained Monday that the strike had violated its sovereignty.”; (3) “More than a year after the event, Afghans on both sides of the war and a growing number of Western security analysts say that Pakistan most likely engineered Mullah Mansour’s death to remove a Taliban leader it no longer trusted.”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) “The Afghan intelligence agency said Sunday that the Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Muhammad Mansour, had been killed in the strike” (Mashal 2016)

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

## 2.91 ULFA in Bangladesh

**Target:** India, **Host:** Bangladesh, **UCDP Actor ID:** 326

**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1985, Winter)

**Event description:** (1) “In 1985 the ULFA opened operations in Bangladesh by setting up safe houses at Damai village in Moulvi Bazar district bordering the north-eastern Indian state of Meghalaya”

*Sources:*  
Hussain 2007:  
108

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1996, Jun )

**Event description:** (1) “As the pro-India Awami League (AL) came to power in Dhaka in 1996 [the] crackdown on the rebels was intensified”; (2) “The process of taking shelter in Bhutan increased as the pro-India Awami League (AL) came to power in Dhaka in 1996”

*Sources:*  
Mahanta 2013:  
222; Mahanta  
2013: 223

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2000, Jul, 24)

**Event description:** (1) “The pressure on militants [was] building up in Bangladesh. In the last week of July 2000, the Bangladesh Army and Bangladesh Rifles launched a joint operation against the militants and busted many camps in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of the country. After the raid, a number of militants staying in the camps were forced to run for cover towards India following the operation.”; (2) “The insurgent groups were earlier thriving in Bangladesh and Bhutan, but the diplomatic pressure of the Indian government in 2001 onwards forced these rebels to shift their operational headquarters to Myanmar.”

*Sources:*  
Kotwal 2001-12:  
2228; Anand  
2018 (see also  
The Indian  
Express, 2007)

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2004, Jan, 2)

*Sources:*  
Outlook India  
2004; Hussain  
2006

**Event description:** (1) "January 2, 2004, Bangladeshi security forces reportedly arrested as many as 34 rebels belonging to the ULFA from different parts of Dhaka. Some Bangladeshi newspapers, including Jugantar, quoted police officials as saying the militants were arrested after raids at different places including Mohammedpur, Green Road and Gulshan, all upmarket localities in Dhaka."; (2) "On January 2 [2004], (...) Ranjit Debbarma's residence in Dhaka was attacked by rocket propelled grenades (RPG) [by Bangladeshi forces]. (...) The 'chiefs' of the ATTF and ULFA were reportedly staying in this highly secure building. After the rocket attack on the building's 2nd floor, where the ATTF 'chief' was allegedly staying, the local police swung into action and detained almost everyone in the building. (...) It is claimed that many of those arrested were ULFA cadres, and (...) local media reports in Dhaka (...) mentioned the arrest of 34 ULFA cadres. (...) The Home Ministry at a high-level meeting with paramilitary BDR and intelligence agencies yesterday (January 4, 2004) asked them to step up border security and watch on Dhaka to stem infiltration of Indian terrorists."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2007, Nov )

**Event description:** (1) "The military-backed caretaker government was in power from January 2007 to December 2008. The bilateral relations improved over this period, the highlight being the rejuvenation of military cooperation and the exchange of visits of the army chiefs in 2008 that took place after a gap of nearly a decade."; (2) "[Regarding] terrorism and separatist violence in India: this is now the foremost issue in Dhaka's foreign affairs. (...) In the fall, Dhaka and New Delhi reached both bilateral and multilateral agreements to strengthen their counterterrorism cooperation."; (3) "[By the end of October 2007] The idea of creating a database for improved coordination to deal with terrorism, drug trafficking, cybercrimes and financial fraud was raised at the conference that ended Thursday. On the first day of the three-day conference, interior ministers of SAARC countries met police chiefs who agreed to share information to stop trans-border crimes."; (4) "[There were] efforts by the military-backed Caretaker Government (CTG) during 2007 and 2008 to subdue the militants"; (5) "[Regarding] ULFA hideouts in North-east India, (...) For the first time in the history of Indo-Bangladesh ties, the caretaker government in 2007 heard the Indian complaints in this regard. However, it did not do much in dismantling these camps."; (6) "Since 2007, during the Army-backed caretaker government in Bangladesh bilateral ties acquired an upward trajectory and gathered greater momentum when Prime Minister (PM) Sheikh Hasina returned to power in 2009."; (7) "Coming on the heels of the discredited BNP/Jamaat administration, the 2007-08 caretaker government adopted a tough antiterrorism stance"; (8) "the Bangladesh Rifles reportedly destroyed two Indian militants camps inside Bangladesh's territory in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region in late 2007"

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2008, Jul, 11)

**Event description:** (1) "Ahead of Info-Bangladesh Foreign Secretary talks here next week and after repeated demands by New Dehli, Bangladesh Saturday handed over four Indian insurgents based on its soil to police in India's Northeast (...) [They] belong to the rebel group (...) NDFB [and] ULFA"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

*Sources:*  
Bhattacharjee  
2020: 11;  
Hagerty 2008:  
181; Jeena 2007;  
Sikri 2009: 156;  
Anwer 2020: 82;  
Chakravarty  
2021: 550;  
Alamgir 2010:  
153; Chakma  
2012: 11

*Sources:*  
KUNA 2008

**Dislodged:** No  
**Leadership decapitation:** No  
**Intrusive:** No  
**Joint:** No

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2009, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) "[Upon inauguration in January] 2009, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina pledged not to allow her country's territory to be used by groups inimical to India's interests."; (2) "After the pro-India Awami League swept to power in [Bangladesh in] 2008, the ULFA rank and file knew their days in the country were numbered. The safer option was to relocate to the camps in Myanmar, but that would have meant crossing over to Arakan in Burma from Bangladesh, which entailed a month-long arduous journey through hundreds of kilometres of inhospitable terrain to Chin Province and then onward to Sagaing Division."; (3) "Dhaka and New Delhi took significant steps to formalise security cooperation when Sheikh Hasina visited New Delhi in January 2010. Three agreements on security cooperation were signed at the summit meeting with Manmohan Singh: Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters; Transfer of Sentenced Persons; and Combating International Terrorism, Organised Crime, and Illicit Drug Trafficking. The two countries have also initiated discussions on an extradition treaty"; (4) "February 8: Telegraph reports that the Unified Command Structures of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh have launched a joint operation to neutralize transit camps (...) The objective is to stop the militants from moving out of Bangladesh and from reaching Myanmar. The Sheikh Hasina regime has made her stand very clear vis-à-vis militant groups from India operating from Bangladeshi soil. Things will only get tough for the rebels in Bangladesh," he added."; (5) "after the AL came to power with a huge mandate, in 2009, the government took steps for course correction. As a result, India showed a positive outlook for the AL-led Bangladesh Government, which, in turn, established a strong bond between them."

*Sources:*  
Bhattacharjee  
2018: 305;  
Bhattacharyya  
2014: 106;  
Chakma 2012:  
13; SATP 2010:  
24; Rana 2018:  
566

**Pledge form:** Speech

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2009, Oct, 20)

**Event description:** (1) October 20: The Bangladesh Government on October 19 launched a massive hunt for arresting some cadres of two Indian militant outfits — United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO)"; (2) "The Government of Bangladesh has directed the Security Forces to keep vigilance to prevent any kind of subversive activities by the ULFA in the country. State Minister for Home Shamsul Haque Tuku told. Referring to the recent crackdown on militants, the minister said no militants would be able to escape the dragnet"

*Sources:*  
SATP 2010: 12;  
SATP 2010: 12

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** No  
**Leadership decapitation:** No  
**Intrusive:** No  
**Joint:** No

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2009, Dec, 2)

**Event description:** (1) "The replacement of Khaleda Zia government by a more India-friendly Sheikh Hasina government in Bangladesh in early 2009 also brought about changes on the ground. (...) The Sheikh Hasina government was determined not to allow the soil of Bangladesh to be used by insurgent forces, particularly from India, for their operations. (...) in November and December 2009, all top leaders of the ULFA (...) were arrested by the Bangladesh authorities and handed over to Indian authority. With

*Sources:*  
Gogoi 2016: 569;  
SATP 2010: 7;  
SATP 2010: 5



these arrests and the developments that followed, ULFA got vertically divided into two houses"; (2) "[December 2] The 'chairman' of the ULFA Arabinda Rajkhowa and 'deputy commander-in-chief' Raju Baruah were arrested in Dhaka. Both the ULFA leaders are likely to be handed over to India, highly placed official sources said (...). The detained ULFA 'leader' Mithinga Daimary (...) termed Bangladesh's recent offensive towards the ULFA militants as a 'betrayal.'"; (3) "December 4: The 'chairman' of the ULFA, Arabinda Rajkhowa alias Rajiv Rajkonwar and 'Deputy Commander-in-Chief' of the outfit, Raju Baruah, were handed over to the BSF near Dawki sector of the India-Bangladesh border"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "Prithvi Raj expresses concern over the move by North-east militants to shift base from Bangladesh to Myanmar in the wake of the ongoing operations against them by Dhaka. Admitting that there was an exodus of ULFA militants to Myanmar to escape the ongoing operations by the Bangladeshi Security Forces, Prithvi Raj said, "It is quite natural that the militants look for new pastures to continue their future activities." (SATP 2010: 3); (2) "Security sources [in early 2010] said that at least 30 to 40 members of the outfit are still in Bangladesh." (SATP 2014: 79); (3) "all top leaders of the ULFA (...) were arrested by the Bangladesh authorities and handed over to Indian authority. With these arrests and the developments that followed, ULFA got vertically divided into two houses." (Gogoi 2016: 569)

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) "The 'chairman' of the ULFA Arabinda Rajkhowa and 'deputy commander-in-chief' Raju Baruah were arrested in Dhaka" (SATP 2010: 7)

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2013, Dec, 26)

**Event description:** (1) "According to highly placed sources, despite repeated denial by Bangladesh authority, (...) northeast India's militant formations still exist in the Bangladeshi soil. Out of the total militant hideouts, (...) the NSCN [Nagaland] and ULFA [Assam] have four and three hideouts respectively."; (2) "[In February 2015] BSF IG Meghalaya Frontier, Sudesh Kumar stated that a section of middle rank cadres of ULFA was in Bangladesh"; (3) "[Indian police later interrogated an ULFA fighter who admitted he had] had joined the banned outfit in 2013 and underwent arms training in Bangladesh in 2014."

Sources:

SATP 2015: 33;  
SATP 2017;  
SATP 2018

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2018, Jul, 14)

**Event description:** (1) "In a major development reported after decades of cross-border insurgency along India's eastern frontier, the BSF [Indian Border Security Force] has said that camps and hideouts of Indian Insurgent Groups (IGs) across the country's frontier on the Bangladeshi soil have been reduced to "almost zero". (...) "Whenever we have information about exodus or insurgents of the northeastern states in Bangladesh, we share the information and immediate raids are undertaken by the BGB [the Bangladeshi forces]. (...) As a result, the number of training places and hideouts of these insurgents have been reduced to almost zero," the BSF DG said"

Sources:

The Economic  
Times 2018

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "ULFA move[d] its cadres and weapons from Bangladesh to Assam" (Saikia 2018)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "we share the information and immediate raids are undertaken by the BGB [the Bangladeshi forces]."

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## 2.92 ULFA in Bhutan

**Target:** India, **Host:** Bhutan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 326

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1991, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "ULFA (...) preferred to take shelter in Bhutan after the first organised military offensive in Assam named as 'operation Bajrang' took place on 27–28 November 1990."; (2) "The royal government did not pay much attention to these groups as long as they were not threatening the Bhutanese people. From the safety of their bases in Bhutan, the ULFA and NDFB waged their hit-and-run attacks in Assam."; (3) "By the end of 1990 and early 1991, the ULFA had set up well-entrenched bases inside Southern Bhutan"

*Sources:*  
Mahanta 2013:  
222; Mazumdar  
2005: 569;  
Hussain 2006:  
10

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2000, Jul )

**Event description:** (1) "At last the Bhutan National Assembly passed a resolution at its 78th session in July 2000 favouring military action against the Northeast insurgent groups-ULFA and NDFB, to evict them from Bhutanese soil"; (2) "[The 2003 mandate] was not, however, for the first time that the NA had given such a mandate. Earlier, the 78th NA that met between June 25 and July 26, 2000 had also passed a resolution of this intent (...) The then Bhutanese Home Minister, Lyonpo Thinley Gyamsto, also introduced a four-point course of action, including cutting off ration supply to the terrorists, punitive action against the individuals and groups found guilty of helping the terrorists (...) and military action against the terrorists, if all other efforts fail"

*Sources:*  
Kotwal 2001-12:  
2227; Kumar  
2004: 393

**Pledge form:** Political bill

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2000, Sep, 18)

**Event description:** (1) "September 18: A news report stated that in a special joint operation conducted over a period of two weeks, eighteen ULFA terrorists were killed in Bhutan"; (2) "[Yet] the Indian Army never formally violated the Himalayan Kingdom's sovereignty"

*Sources:*  
SATP 2010: 110;  
Beehner 2016:  
273

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "A special joint operation conducted over a period of two weeks"

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2003, May, 17)

**Event description:** (1) "On May 17, 2003, Bhutanese King Jigme Singhye Wangchuk

*Sources:*  
Global Security  
2023

called upon the people to volunteer for formation of a militia force to counter Indian militant groups ULFA, NDBF and the KLO on its soil. Media report says that the 81st National Assembly of Bhutan adopted a resolution for the last attempt to persuade ULFA, NDBF, and the KLO to close down their camps within this year peacefully failing which terrorist would face military action."

**Pledge form:** Speech

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2003, Dec, 15)

**Event description:** (1) "On December 15, 2003, the 6,000-person-strong RBA launched simultaneous attacks on the ULFA, NDBF, and KLO camps in the southern districts of Bhutan as part of Operation All Clear."; (2) "December 15: Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) launches military operations against the ULFA, NDBF and KLO terrorists holed up in 30 camps in southern Bhutan"; (3) "[In] Bhutan in 2003, the Indian Army never formally violated the Himalayan Kingdom's sovereignty. Rather, the assault was carried out in close coordination with the Royal Bhutan Army and its police, with the Indian Army deployed along the Indian side of the border to trap the rebels in a pincer-style attack."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "With stunning ease, the RBA overran the [camps]" (ibid.: 574) "By December 19, just five days into the operation, all 30 camps had been overrun and captured." (Hussain 2006: 575)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Throughout the operation, the Indian Army was in touch with the RBA through Major General S. S. Dhillon, commandant of the Indian Military Training Team (IMTRAT) in Bhutan, who coordinated with the chief operations officer (COO) of the RBA, Lieutenant General G. G. Lam Dorji, who was based in the Bhutanese capital Thimphu and reported directly to King Wangchuk. Thus, any request for assistance by the RBA in terms of logistics, medical evacuation, surveillance, and communications was promptly communicated to both Indian army corps."; (2) "[In] Bhutan in 2003, the Indian Army never formally violated the Himalayan Kingdom's sovereignty. Rather, the assault was carried out in close coordination with the Royal Bhutan Army and its police, with the Indian Army deployed along the Indian side of the border to trap the rebels in a pincer-style attack."; (3) "The Indian Army provided logistical support (...) to the RBA during Operation All Clear. The Indian Army's 4 Corps, based at Tezpur, Assam, sealed the 266-kilometer-long Indo-Bhutan border to prevent militants from escaping into India"

Sources:  
Mazumdar 2005:  
575; Gogoi 2016;  
Beehner 2016:  
273

#### **Pledge** (Date: 2011, Feb, 25)

**Event description:** (1) "February 25: Bhutan Prime Minister Lyonchhen Jigmi Thinley said that law-breakers from Assam, especially militant groups including the ULFA, will not be allowed to take refuge in his country. He categorically said that the ULFA had stopped setting up base in Bhutan and the leaders and activists of the outfit had left the neighbouring country. "There is no ULFA camp in Bhutan. People of Assam who are not law-abiding will not be allowed to take refuge in Bhutan," Thinley told reporters at Borjhar airport."

**Pledge form:** Speech

Sources:  
SATP 2013: 46

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2013, Feb, 13)

**Event description:** (1) "The Bhutan government has launched military operations

Sources:  
Business  
Standard India  
2013; SATP 2015:  
16

against the United Liberation Front of Assam (Ulfa) and Bodo militant camps located in the country. It has informed the Indian government before doing so. This information was given to Parliament by Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha yesterday. (...) The move has come after a long process of politico-diplomatic pressure on the Bhutan government, following repeated complaints by the Assam government, including former Governor Gen SK Sinha, that militants from Assam had sanctuary in Bhutan. The Bhutan government had deflected the issue in the past by denying that there were any camps. However, the current move comes after the spate of Bihari killings in Assam by these groups and stepping up of pressure by India to flush militants out.”; (2) “[In June 2013] The DGP also said that the ULFA-I has lost its sanctuaries in Bangladesh and Bhutan, which weakened the outfit to a large extent”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “[In June 2013] The DGP also said that the ULFA-I has lost its sanctuaries in (...) Bhutan, which weakened the outfit to a large extent” (SATP 2015: 16)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

## 2.93 ULFA in India

**Target:** India, **Host:** India, **UCDP Actor ID:** 326

**Domestic territorial gain** (*Date:* 1986, Winter)

**Event description:** (1) “List of ULFA Training Camps Period from 1986–90”

**Name of territory:** Assam: Tinsukia, Dibrugarh, Sibsagar, Jorhat, Golaghat, Nagaon, Kamrup, Nalbari, Goalpara, Barpeta, Darrang, Sonitpur, Lakhimpur, Dhemaji.

*Sources:*  
Mahana 2013:  
105

**Domestic territorial loss** (*Date:* 1990, Winter)

**Event description:** (1) “ULFA loses its domestic sanctuaries following Operation Bajrang”

**Name of territory:** Assam: Tinsukia, Dibrugarh, Sibsagar, Jorhat, Golaghat, Nagaon, Kamrup, Nalbari, Goalpara, Barpeta, Darrang, Sonitpur, Lakhimpur, Dhemaji.

*Sources:*  
Gogoi 2016: 550

## 2.94 ULFA in Myanmar

**Target:** India, **Host:** Myanmar, **UCDP Actor ID:** 326

**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1983, May, 12)

**Event description:** (1) “the first batch of ULFA was sent to NSCN camp on 12 May 1983”

*Sources:*  
Mahanta 2013:  
73

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1990, Jul )

**Event description:** (1) “In 1990, the KIO was allowed to open a Representative Office of Kachin Affairs (ROKA) in New Delhi to streamline the logistics of interaction with and support from the Government of India. Not just with small arms and money, New Delhi also offered political and diplomatic training to KIO cadres in 1990-91. Throughout this period, India was planning military operations against ULFA and NSCN-IM. For

*Sources:*  
Paliwal 2020

that purpose, the one thing it sought in return from the KIO was denial of sanctuary and support to the India-centric Naga and Assamese rebels. The effect was immediate. Between July and October 1990, most ULFA and NSCN-IM cadre had to vacate Kachin-dominated territory.”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Expulsion

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 1995, Apr )

**Event description:** (1) “In a major joint Indo-Myanmar anti-insurgency drive in April 1995, the Indian and Myanmar Armies launched a pincer attack on a group of some 200 Indian insurgents, codenamed ‘Operation Golden Bird,’ along the border with Mizoram. Up to 60 ULFA and other Northeast Indian insurgents were killed and several others arrested during the 44-day offensive.”; (2) “the Common Border Trade Agreement of 1994 and a gradual improvement of the bilateral relationship. In 1995, India and Myanmar even conducted a joint military operation against ethnic guerrilla groups along the Mizoram border”; (3) “[During] ‘Operation Golden Bird’, when the Burmese Army functioned on its side of the border and we functioned on ours. There was a column of the NSCN (IM) escorting representatives of the ULFA carrying head loads of arms from the Chittagong Hill Tracts. They were intercepted on the Manipur-Burma border. There was a running fight. The column was hit hard and suffered casualties. We seized a large number of arms. The Burmese Army operated in the Chin Hills. It was a successful operation.”; (4) “During Operation Golden Bird, a 1995 border skirmish involving rebels from the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the operation was carried out by joint Indian-Burmese forces, but the Indian army never technically entered Myanmar.”; (5) “In this joint India-Myanmar military operation, India’s 57th Mountain Division managed to block a huge rebel column encompassed more than 200 rebels from NSCN, ULFA, and Manipuri separatists who were moving through the Mizoram-Myanmar border. The rebel columns had previously picked up weapon consignments from Cox Bazar in Bangladesh and headed towards Manipur. However, Myanmar’s military pulled off half way of the joint operation to show their protest against the decision made by the government of India to award the Nehru Peace Prize to Myanmar’s pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The pulling out of Myanmar’s military in the joint operation had resulted in the trapped rebel columns to escape. The “Golden Bird” joint military operation between India and Myanmar failed.”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “For the first time since the 1980’s, Indian and Burmese troops have been cooperating in a military operation against Indian insurgents, trapping the rebels in a pincers movement near the border, intelligence officials and diplomats say.”; (2) “In a major joint Indo-Myanmar anti-insurgency drive in April 1995, the Indian and Myanmar Armies launched a pincer attack on a group”

*Sources:*  
Hussain 2006:  
36-37;  
Gottschlich  
2017: 174 (see  
also Mirsa 2000:  
79); Mizzima  
2006; Beehner  
2016: 273; Ayob  
2023: 726

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2004, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) “[Following the Bhutanese operation of December 2003,

*Sources:*  
Hussain 2006:  
18

Yangon has reportedly turned on the heat on Indian insurgents in the country”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2007, Jan, 26)

**Event description:** (1) “[By early February 2007] at least 100 militants belonging to the NSCN-K and ULFA were reportedly killed during a massive counter-insurgency operation by the Myanmar Government in its territory bordering the North Eastern States of India. ULFA had over 300 cadres in the camps when the operation began on January 26”

Sources:  
SATP 2010: 62

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “ULFA had over 300 cadres in the camps when the operation [killing more than 100] began on January 26” (SATP 2010: 62)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

#### **Pledge** (Date: 2010, Jan, 21)

**Event description:** (1) “January 21 [2010]: Ruling junta of Myanmar assured that it plans to launch co-ordinated operations with India to flush out Northeast militants from its territories and has promised to help track down elusive ULFA ‘commander-in-chief’ Paresh Baruah.”; (2) “[On 1 February] The ULFA started moving some of their camps in Myanmar deep into the dense forest areas, apprehending a crackdown.”; (3) “[On April 10] Myanmar’s Ambassador to India U. Kyi Thein at Shillong in Meghalaya said that action against Indian insurgents in its territory will be initiated only after receiving military assistance from India. “We have informed India of our requirements to help us in fighting against the insurgents,” the Ambassador said. “India has agreed to provide us our military requirements, but I cannot share with you our requirements,” Thein said. He said, “We also shared the same problem (insurgency) like India. This problem will be sorted once India meet our requirements.”

Sources:  
SATP 2014: 84;  
SATP 2014: 83;  
SATP 2014: 76

**Pledge form:** Speech

#### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2011, Sep, 7)

**Event description:** (1) “September 7 [2011]: Myanmar Army personnel attacked the camp of ULFA-ATF. In an e-mailed statement chief of the central publicity unit of ULFA-ATF, Arundoy Dohotia, said: “The Myanmar army attacked our camp today. Nobody was injured, however, in the attack. We had prior information about this attack and hence were prepared for it. More such attacks are expected in the near future also. (...) September 8: SFs [Indian Special Forces] have confirmed the claim made by ULFA-ATF that the Myanmar’s Army has launched an offensive against Indian militants holed up in the neighboring country”; (2) “September 9: Paresh Baruah (55), Chairman of ULFA-ATF, was injured when Myanmar’s Army shot at him during a counter-insurgency operation on Indian insurgents in Myanmar along the Myanmar-China Border”

Sources:  
SATP 2014: 31;  
SATP 2014: 33

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Pledge** (Date: 2013, Jun, 20)

**Event description:** (1) "India and Myanmar have agreed to cooperate to prevent cross border movement of armed groups, share information on seizure of arms and check arms smuggling/drug trafficking (...) the agreement was reached during the 20th Sectoral Level (Joint Working Group) Meeting between Myanmar and India held in Bagan, Myanmar, from June 19-20. (...) Myanmar side was requested not to allow operations by insurgent groups along the Indo-Myanmar border."; (2) "However, till date, the Myanmar Army has not launched full-scale operations against the militant groups."; (3) "[A year later, in November 2014] During the interaction between Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi and Myanmar President Thein Sein on November 12 at Nay Pyi Taw in Myanmar, India has pressed Myanmar to mount a crackdown on ULFA-I. According to sources, India asked the Myanmar President, Thein Sein to assist in getting six wanted militants including Jyotirmoy Bharali, who looks after the ULFA's Myanmar operations."

Sources:  
SATP 2015: 20;  
SATP 2015: 7;  
SATP 2016

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2019, Feb, 2)

**Event description:** (1) "One ULFA (I) rebel was killed and another one apprehended by Myanmar Army during the operations launched by them against Northeast insurgent groups at Taga in Myanmar's Sagaing division. Myanmar army launched offensive to flush out Northeast rebel groups—ULFA-I, NSCN-K, NDFB-S and KLO—who have bases in the Burmese territory."

Sources:  
Chakraborty  
2019

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Crackdown campaign** (Date: 2019, Mar, 30)

**Event description:** (1) "Militants from Northeast are facing heat following the operation launched in Myanmar. Several militants belonging to anti-talk faction of ULFA are coming back and surrendering in Assam."; (2) "the Myanmar Army destroyed several training camps in 2019 under an exercise codenamed, "Operation Sunrise"; (3) "During 2019–2020, the Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) launched three coordinated military operations with the Indian Army codenamed Operation Sunrise against several insurgent groups of the Northeast. Military action by the Tatmadaw destroyed several rebel camps in Myanmar, forcing many of them to cross back into India and surrender. In fact, these operations contributed, to some extent, in ending Bodo militancy in Assam."; (4) "Around a dozen insurgent operating bases and camps have been "smashed" along the India-Myanmar border, with the armies of the two countries working in close coordination to eliminate threats in the region"; (5) "The ULFA (I) has reportedly confirmed the death of its senior leader 'major' Jyotirmoy Asom. As per reports, the body of Jyotirmoy was recovered from somewhere in Taga in Myanmar, where ULFA (I)'s headquarters was located."

Sources:  
Singh 2019;  
Dutta 2022; Das  
2022: 482; The  
Times of India  
2019; Northeast  
Now 2019

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "militants (...) of ULFA are coming back and surrendering in Assam."

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** Yes

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "During 2019–2020, the Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) launched three coordinated military operations with the Indian Army codenamed Operation Sunrise"

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2021, Dec )

**Event description:** (1) "In December 2021, India's foreign secretary, Harsh Vardhan Shringla, visited Myanmar securing assurance for continued action against insurgent groups targeting the Northeast region. "

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*  
Dutta 2022

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## 2.95 UNITA in Angola

**Target:** Angola, **Host:** Angola, **UCDP Actor ID:** 567

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**Domestic territorial loss** (*Date:* 1976, Feb, 7)

**Event description:** (1) "On 7 February 1976 the rebels were forced to evacuate from Huambo and flee to the countryside (...) [re-grouping under conditions] described by one of its members as one of 'complete disorganisation'"; (2) UNITA's attempts at governance in those towns and cities that it controlled were inchoate and brief: by February 1976, Cuban military support for the MPLA had enabled the movement to expel UNITA from urban areas"; (3) "the rebels often had to walk up to 25 miles a day to avoid government patrols (...) In its haste to avoid FAPLA attacks the group had lost control"

**Name of territory:** Huambo; Southern rural areas

*Sources:*  
Hoekstra 2018: 124; Pearce 2012: 451; Hoekstra 2018: 124-25

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## 2.96 UNITA in Congo

**Target:** Angola, **Host:** Congo, **UCDP Actor ID:** 567

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1997, May )

**Event description:** (1) "In May 1997 (...) UNITA began using Congo-Brazzaville as a conduit for the arms and diamond trade"; (2) "Angolan government forces were able to destroy several UNITA bases and networks [in the DRC], which led thousands of UNITA fighters to flee to Cabinda and Congo-Brazzaville"; (3) "This resulted in the defeat of Sassou Nguesso and his replacement by Pascal Lissouba. There was in truth little ideological significance in the change of regime, (...) But the implications for Angola and the external spillage of its war with UNITA were important. Under the new regime UNITA, hitherto firmly excluded from Congo by Sassou Nguesso, was able to extend from Zaire the trading activities which largely funded its war. It was also able to establish alternative supply lines into northern Angola from the Congolese port of Point Noire"

*Sources:*  
Kisangani and Bobb 2009: 27; Duquet 2006: 107-108; May and Furley 2017: 100

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1998, Oct, 25)

**Event description:** (1) "In October 1997, 3,000 heavily armed Angolan troops entered Congo-Brazzaville from Cabinda and helped the Sassou-Nguesso fighters take control of the country"; (2) "the [Angolan] intervention had been short, sharp and decisive and had succeeded in achieving clear and limited objectives. UNITA was now effectively removed from Congo and the FLEC campaign, denied external bases and

*Sources:*  
Duquet 2006: 108; McQueen 2017: 102; Reed 2009: 191



supply routes, could be expected to subside once more.”; (3) “FAA troops launched an invasion on Congo-Brazzaville in October 1997. At the same time, an unnamed American defense contractor shipped nearly 500 former U.S. Special Forces operatives to Cabinda. By extending Angola’s influence over Congo-Brazzaville, a country that habitually harbored FLEC and UNITA forces, the invasion served both Angola’s and Chevron’s interests.”

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) “Angolan army troops’ intervention and continued presence in (...) Congo-Brazzaville (...) blocked UNITA’s supply lines of fuel, of munitions and of spare parts” (Duquet 2006: 108); (2) Later, an Angolan general said “a withdrawal would allow the Angolan rebel group UNITA to slip back into Congo-Brazzaville to set up rear bases”, entailing that there was no longer a UNITA presence there (The New Humanitarian 1999).

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) “3,000 heavily armed Angolan troops entered Congo-Brazzaville”

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## 2.97 UNITA in DR Congo (Zaire)

**Target:** Angola, **Host:** DR Congo (Zaire), **UCDP Actor ID:** 567

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1975, Jul )

**Event description:** (1) “Since Angolan independence in 1975, the rebel group União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) which was once supported by both the US and South Africa, had relied on Mobutu’s patronage and had established bases inside Zaire”; (2) “Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (...) UNITA (...) had been supplied, courtesy of the CIA, from the hamina base in Katang. UNITA could freely use Zaire as a rear base in its conflict with the ruling Movimento Popular de Liberacao de Angola (MPLA)”; (3) “Apart from providing support to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the Mobutu regime also let them set up bases in the DRC. (...) Mobutu’s support to the Angolan rebel government UNITA did not end with the 1994 Lusaka peace accords”; (4) “Zaire has become the most important source of support for UNITA. UNITA uses Zaire as a transit area and conduit for diamond sales and weapons transfers, maintains a number of small rear bases in Zaire, and receives operational support from Zairian troops.”; (5) “by the summer of that year [1975] (...) the [Ford] Administration began to finalise its plans to extend covert military aid to Roberto and Savimbi [of UNITA] with Zaire’s assistance.”; (6) “With FNLA defunct as a military force, Zaire became the main conduit for American covert and overt help to UNITA, its new proxy”

*Sources:*  
Shearer 1999: 96;  
Prunier 2009: 74;  
Venugopalan  
2016: 3; HRW  
1994: 53; Odinga  
2018: 700;  
Malaquias 2007:  
79

**Pledge** (*Date:* 1976, Feb, 29)

**Event description:** (1) “In an effort to isolate Roberto, on 29 February 1976 Neto met Mobutu in Brazzaville and signed a nonaggression pact. In return for Neto’s pledge to disarm and repatriate the FAPLA’s 6,000 Katangese allies, Mobutu promised to expel all remaining FNLA and UNITA personnel from Zaire”; (2) “President Neto and Mobutu met in late February 1976 in Brazzaville, seeking a quick diplomatic detente.”

*Sources:*  
George 2005:  
117; Minter 1994:  
28 (see also  
Ademan 1979:  
115)

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Pledge** (*Date: 1978, Aug, 19*)

**Event description:** (1) "In July 1978 (...) Neto and Mobutu signed a second non-aggression pact (...) In a simple quid pro quo, Neto pledged to disarm and repatriate the Katangese if Mobutu pulled back FNLA, FLEC and UNITA bases from the border (...) This time the deal stuck and the Katangese were disarmed and repatriated (with the assistance from Cuban troops) while FNLA, FLEC and UNITA bases along the Angolan-Zairian border were shut down"; (2) "The two leaders made the accord public on August 19 as Neto made a two-day visit to Kinshasa."

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*  
George 2005:  
136; Powell 2016:  
27

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1978, Sep*)

**Event description:** (1) "[Soon after] UNITA bases along the Angolan-Zairian border were shut down"; (2) "[The crackdowns] would keep UNITA with a lowered profile for some time"; (3) "Angola then imposed strong controls on the FLNC [the Katanga rebels]; Mobutu also took action, albeit less consistent, to curb Angolan exiles."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Expulsion

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) [The crackdowns] would keep UNITA with a lowered profile for some time (Leao 2005: 22)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
George 2005:  
136; Leao 2005:  
22; Minter 1994:  
29

**Pledge** (*Date: 1996, Dec*)

**Event description:** (1) "In December 1996, Angolan president Eduardo Dos Santos, and DRC Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo, met in Brazzaville and agreed to respect each other's security concerns. Angola was to prevent the Katanga Tigers rebel group from using its territory as an operational base to make incursions into DRC. In return, DRC would prevent UNITA from using DRC territory (...) and would dismantle UNITA bases on its territory"

**Pledge form:** Written pact

*Sources:*  
Theuri 2002:  
43-44, 81

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1997, May*)

**Event description:** (1) "After sustaining heavy losses, UNITA abandoned the theatre and retreated into Angola"; (2) "Kabila disrupted the flow of UNITA's weaponry and diamonds through Congo"; (3) "The rapid and total exclusion of UNITA from the DRC that Luanda had expected after the fall of the Mobutu regime had not happened. Old Zairean habits continued, with lucrative relationships being established between UNITA and local officials in the south of the country. Angola's military leaders were said to be particularly frustrated at the continued tolerance of UNITA in the DRC."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
Reyntjens 2010:  
1272; Atzili 2006:  
167; McQueen  
2017: 105

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1997, Aug, 22*)

**Event description:** (1) "During August, Angola committed 2-3,000 FAA soldiers to support Laurent Kabila's increasingly embattled regime in the DRC"; (2) "22 August 1998: Zimbabwe and Angola moved troops to support Congolese president Laurent

*Sources:*  
Simon 1998: 71;  
World  
Investment 2002;  
McQueen 2017:  
109

Kabila in his fight against anti-government rebels"; (3) "With the 'Cabinda corridor' secure after the expulsion of the rebels from Matadi and their base at Kitona in the first days of the intervention, Angola's aims had essentially been achieved."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "During August, Angola committed 2-3,000 FAA soldiers to support Laurent Kabila's increasingly embattled regime in the DRC (...) The Angolans quickly secured the coastal strip and parts of southwestern DRC" (Simon 1998: 71)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Angola's intervention in the conflict therefore led to the dismantling of UNITA's bases in the DRC territory"; (2) "Angola committed 2-3,000 FAA soldiers"

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 1998, Jun )

**Event description:** (1) "By mid 1998, Angola's intervention in the conflict therefore led to the dismantling of UNITA's bases in the DRC territory"; (2) "With the 'Cabinda corridor' secure after the expulsion of the rebels from Matadi and their base at Kitona in the first days of the intervention, Angola's aims had essentially been achieved."

*Sources:*  
Theuri 2002:  
43-44, 81;  
McQueen 2017:  
109

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "By mid 1998, Angola's intervention in the conflict therefore led to the dismantling of UNITA's bases in the DRC territory" (Theuri 2002: 44)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** Yes

**Joint:** No

**Evidence of operational design** (see Event description for sources): (1) "Angola's intervention in the conflict therefore led to the dismantling of UNITA's bases in the DRC territory"; (2) "Angola committed 2-3,000 FAA soldiers"

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## **2.98 UNITA in Zambia**

**Target:** Angola, **Host:** Zambia, **UCDP Actor ID:** 567

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### **Sanctuary start** (Date: 1966, Winter)

**Event description:** (1) "By 1966 the [Savimbi] had created his own organization, UNITA (...) Savimbi based himself in Zambia [in 1966]"

*Sources:*  
Prunier 2009: 90

### **Crackdown campaign** (Date: 1967, Aug )

**Event description:** (1) "In August of that year [1967], his guerrillas attacked and disrupted traffic on Angola's Benguela railroad (...) [which, among other things listed] led the Zambian government to arrest and expel him (...) A year later (1968), with the help of Namibian nationalists of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), Savimbi successfully slipped back through Zambia into Angola. Once inside, he renounced exile and, on the rebound, undertook to lead an internally-based insurgency of attrition; (3) "Thereafter UNITA was unwelcome in Zambia"; (2) "Zambia's actions against UNITA – perhaps as much as the organization's leaders' training in Mao's China – effectively forced UNITA to operate completely inside Angola. Initially, UNITA made

*Sources:*  
Marcum 1983: 2;  
Cann 2010: 11;  
Malaquias 2007:  
69

a virtue out of this necessity by claiming that, unlike MPLA and FNLA who operated from bases outside the country, it was the only genuine liberation movement. But this bravado hid an untenable situation for UNITA. For the next two years, UNITA's main struggle was not against the Portuguese army – it was for its own survival."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "Once inside, he renounced exile and, on the rebound, undertook to lead an internally-based insurgency of attrition." (Marcum 1983: 2)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## 2.99 UNLF in Bangladesh

**Target:** India, **Host:** Bangladesh, **UCDP Actor ID:** 315

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1984, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "By 1984, the [rebels from] Tripura had also set up ten camps in the Chittagong Hill Tracts [in Bangladesh]"

*Sources:*  
Bhaumik 2007:  
31

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2009, Jan )

**Event description:** (1) "[Upon inauguration in January] 2009, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina pledged not to allow her country's territory to be used by groups inimical to India's interests."; (2) "After the pro-India Awami League swept to power in [Bangladesh in] 2008, the ULFA rank and file knew their days in the country were numbered. The safer option was to relocate to the camps in Myanmar, but that would have meant crossing over to Arakan in Burma from Bangladesh, which entailed a month-long arduous journey through hundreds of kilometres of inhospitable terrain to Chin Province and then onward to Sagaing Division."; (3) "Dhaka and New Delhi took significant steps to formalise security cooperation when Sheikh Hasina visited New Delhi in January 2010. Three agreements on security cooperation were signed at the summit meeting with Manmohan Singh: Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters; Transfer of Sentenced Persons; and Combating International Terrorism, Organised Crime, and Illicit Drug Trafficking. The two countries have also initiated discussions on an extradition treaty"; (4) "February 8: Telegraph reports that the Unified Command Structures of Assam and Arunachal Pradesh have launched a joint operation to neutralize transit camps (...) The objective is to stop the militants from moving out of Bangladesh and from reaching Myanmar. The Sheikh Hasina regime has made her stand very clear vis-à-vis militant groups from India operating from Bangladeshi soil. Things will only get tough for the rebels in Bangladesh," he added."; (5) "after the AL came to power with a huge mandate, in 2009, the government took steps for course correction. As a result, India showed a positive outlook for the AL-led Bangladesh Government, which, in turn, established a strong bond between them."

*Sources:*  
Bhattacharjee  
2018: 305;  
Bhattacharyya  
2014: 106;  
Chakma 2012:  
13; SATP 2010:  
24; Rana 2018:  
566

**Pledge form:** Speech

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2010, Oct )

**Event description:** (1) "Tripura Police Chief Pranay Sahaya said that with crackdowns on the camps in neighbouring Bangladesh (...) UNLF have already shifted their bases to Myanmar"; (2) "The UNLF 'chairman', Rajkumar Meghen alias Sanayaima, was arrested in Bangladesh on an unspecified date in October 2010"

*Sources:*  
SATP 2012;  
SATP 2012

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "UNLF have (...) shifted their bases to Myanmar" (SATP 2012)

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) "The UNLF 'chairman', Rajkumar Meghen alias Sanayaima, was arrested in Bangladesh on an unspecified date in October 2010" (SATP 2012)

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## 2.100 UNLF in Myanmar

**Target:** India, **Host:** Myanmar, **UCDP Actor ID:** 315

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1980, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "[In 1980] UNLF (...) were allowed by the Nagas to set up camps and training facilities in Myanmar."; (2) "A camp of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) (...) is located about 30 km from the border in Chandel"

*Sources:*  
Bhattacharyya  
2015: 98;  
Bhattacharyya  
2018: 256

**Pledge** (*Date:* 1994, Jan, 21)

**Event description:** (1) "The India–Myanmar Border Trade Agreement was signed on 21 January 1994"; (2) "In the mid-1990s, the two states agreed on the intention of increasing cooperation and preventing insurgency and crime, and the Indian Army Chief visited Myanmar."; (3) "A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on 21 January 1994 to increase cooperation between civilian border authorities of the two countries and to prevent "illegal and insurgent activities" (...) [Still,] it was only with the advent of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in 1998 that a real transformation started gaining pace. (...) "During this phase (which continues to date), there have been military to military dialogues and political rapprochement. The stakes have also included management of security situation in the North-east";

*Sources:*  
ERIA 2020: 23;  
Basit 2018: 77;  
Routray 2011:  
305

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Pledge** (*Date:* 1999, Jul )

**Event description:** (1) "In July 1999, the Indian and Myanmar home ministries held a meeting in New Delhi to identify means to strengthen cooperation on issues like cross-border terrorism and setting up better communication links."; (2) "the officials of India and Myanmar [did] hold meetings [in July] 1999. Both the countries agreed on the following issues (i) to check movement of separatist across border (ii) to strength communication network along the internal borderline, (iii) to set up measures to check narcotics smugglings and to launch joint operation against the separatist on the both sides of border"

*Sources:*  
Routray 2011:  
306; Singh and  
Sandu 2014: 389

**Pledge form:** Speech

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2001, Nov )

**Event description:** (1) "media reports suggested the arrest of nearly 200 UNLF cadres and leaders in raids conducted by the Myanmar army."

*Sources:*  
SATP 2012

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Raids

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2010, Jul, 26)

**Event description:** (1) "In 2010, India and Myanmar signed an agreement allowing Indian forces to pursue insurgents across the border."; (2) "A strategic pact signed between India and Myanmar has been hailed in the country's northeast as a major step forward in combating terror and boosting trade and commerce between the two neighbouring nations. "The agreement between the two countries to offer mutual legal assistance in criminal matters would surely help in tackling insurgency in the northeast with a number of militant groups active in the region having bases inside Myanmar," Biren Singh, senior Manipur minister and state government spokesperson, told IANS. The pact was signed in New Delhi Tuesday during Myanmar military ruler Than Shwe's visit."; (3) "India has signed a mutual legal assistance agreement through which Indian insurgents held in Myanmar can be deported for trial under Indian laws. India had been pushing for the pact with Myanmar for two-and-a-half decades. It was signed during the 25-29 July visit of Than Shwe, the leader of Myanmar's military government."

*Sources:*  
Vishwanathan  
2015: 2; Hussain  
2010; Roche  
2010

**Pledge form:** Written pact

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 2011, Sep, 14)

**Event description:** (1) "September 14: According to NSCN-K sources, at least one cadre each from NSCN-K and UNLF were killed as their camps were heavily attacked by the Myanmar Army in Sagaing division. "Myanmar military has carried out a midnight attack on NSCN and UNLF camps in northern Sagaing division last night""

*Sources:*  
SATP 2012

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

**Pledge** (*Date:* 2014, May, 10)

**Event description:** (1) "India and Myanmar have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Border Cooperation. The MOU was signed by Mr Gautam Mukhopadhyaya, Ambassador of India to Myanmar, and Major General Kyaw Nyunt, Deputy Defence Minister of Myanmar, in Nay Pyi Taw on May 8, 2014. The MoU provides a framework for security cooperation and exchange of information between Indian and Myanmar security agencies. A key provision is that of conduct of coordinated patrols on their respective sides of the international border and the maritime boundary by the Armed Forces of the two countries Both sides have agreed to exchange information in the fight against insurgency"; (2) "[The 2010 Agreement] was followed by a memorandum of understanding signed in May 2014 that provided for coordinated patrolling and intelligence sharing."; (3) "[Still, five months later,] An MHA [Indian] Source stated that "We will raise the issue of NSCN-IM sending even more people to Myanmar" during meeting with Myanmar officials on October 12."

*Sources:*  
Ministry of  
External Affairs  
2014;  
Vishwanathan  
2015: 2; SATP  
2014

**Pledge form:** Written pact

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## 2.101 UNRF II in Sudan

**Target:** Uganda, **Host:** Sudan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 491

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### **Sanctuary start** (*Date: 1997, Feb* )

**Event description:** (1) "In early February 1997 the UNRF II guerrilla group led by Ali Bamuze had attacked the village of Midigo (Aringa County) in West Nile. This move had been organized by the Sudanese secret services"; (2) "These former soldiers were either left in Sudan, the location of most UNRF bases (...) a group created by (...) the Sudanese government with a goal of overthrowing the Ugandan government. (...) By 1996, (...) Oris, the groups leader, was rumored to intend to strike a deal with Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni. Fearing that a similar fate would occur to them as in 1986, a group of former UNRF members refused any negotiations with Museveni, left WNBF, and formed UNRF II. UNRF II (...) [then] operations against both the Government of Uganda and SPLM/A (Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement/Army) from bases inside South Sudan."; (3) "[It] was no secret that the UNRF II was supported by the Sudanese government. (...) They were in Sudan in 1998 with a force of 3,000 (after a period of slow formation from 1988 onwards, when Bamuze fled to Zaire initially"

*Sources:*  
Prunier 2004:  
376;  
UCDP/actor/491;  
Both 2017: 67

### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 1997, Mar* )

**Event description:** (1) "by March 1997, a series of SPLM/A offensives destroyed most of the group's operational capacities"

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** No

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

*Sources:*  
UCDP/actor/491

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## **2.102 UTO in Afghanistan**

**Target:** Tajikistan, **Host:** Afghanistan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 345

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### **Sanctuary start** (*Date: 1993, Jan* )

**Event description:** (1) "December 1992, following the group's stint in power, UTO suffered major defeats at the hands of the new Rakhmanov government and subsequently regrouped in Afghanistan. (...) UTO was formally set up in Afghanistan in 1993 by the Islamist-oriented Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (...) UTO used Afghan territory controlled by warlords such as Ahmad Shah Massoud and Gulbeddin Hekmatyar to train and rebuild its forces, and during 1993 it launched attacks from these areas into Tajikistan. However, there was no direct military or economic support given to UTO from external actors."

*Sources:*  
UCDP/actor/345

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## **2.103 WNBF in DR Congo (Zaire)**

**Target:** Uganda, **Host:** DR Congo (Zaire), **UCDP Actor ID:** 490

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### **Sanctuary start** (*Date: 1994, Nov* )

**Event description:** (1) "The West Nile Bank Liberation Front (WNBLF) was born in November 1994 in Faradje and, with Sudanese help, immediately started harassing Ugandan forces in West Nile from the Zairian side of the border"; (2) "In August 1995 the Sudanese army, operating inside Zaire with WNBLF support"

*Sources:*  
Prunier 2004:  
376; Prunier  
2004: 373

### **Crackdown campaign** (*Date: 2003, Dec* )

*Sources:*  
Prunier 2004:  
381; Fahey 2010:  
358

**Event description:** (1) "The WNBFLF faded away during 2000"; (2) "in December 2003, MONUC repatriated most of the remainder of the West Nile Bank Front (WNBFLF) from eastern Congo to Uganda, who were from the so-called 'Sierra battalion'."

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Arrests/extraditions

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "MONUC repatriated most of the remainder of the West Nile Bank Front (WNBFLF) from eastern Congo to Uganda" (Fahey 2010: 358)

**Leadership decapitation:** No

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No

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## 2.104 WNBFLF in Sudan

**Target:** Uganda, **Host:** Sudan, **UCDP Actor ID:** 490

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**Sanctuary start** (*Date:* 1993, Spring)

**Event description:** (1) "The West Nile Bank Liberation Front (WNBFLF) was born in November 1994 in Faradje and, with Sudanese help, immediately started harassing Ugandan forces in West Nile from the Zairian side of the border"; (2) "The WNBFLF was then formed (...), based in the Sudanese towns of Morobo, Kaya, and Dudulabe."

*Sources:*

Prunier 2004:  
376; Day 2012:  
96

**Crackdown campaign** (*Date:* 1997, Mar )

**Event description:** (1) "by March 1997, the SPLA's advance towards Yei in Equatoria completely overran a fragmenting WNBFLF. A seven-mile ambush killed up to two thousand rebels and Sudanese and Zairian soldiers, captured most of the WNBFLF high command, and severely wounded [their leader] Oris. The group scattered into Sudan and Zaire."; (2) "In March 1997, a SPLM/A offensive crippled the WNBFLF, basically destroying the Sudanese wing of the group and forcing most of its remnants to relocate in Zaire"

*Sources:*

Day 2012: 101;  
UCDP/actor/490

**Crackdown form (first attack):** Militarised operations

**Dislodged:** Yes

**Evidence of dislodging:** (1) "The group scattered into Sudan and Zaire." (Day 2012: 101)

**Leadership decapitation:** Yes

**Evidence of decapitation:** (1) "A seven-mile ambush killed up to two thousand rebels and Sudanese and Zairian soldiers, captured most of the WNBFLF high command" (Day 2012: 101)

**Intrusive:** No

**Joint:** No



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