

# Evasive and efficient distributed adversarial attacks using PSO

Intermediate presentation II

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#### 0 Outline

1 Background


2 Research

3 Threat model

4 Evaluation

**5** Remaining evaluations


## 1 Boundary attack<sup>1</sup>



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Wieland Brendel, Jonas Rauber, and Matthias Bethge. "Decision-Based Adversarial Attacks: Reliable Attacks Against Black-Box Machine Learning Models". In: *arXiv:1712.04248* [cs, stat] (Feb. 2018). arXiv: 1712.04248. URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/1712.04248 (visited on 08/04/2021).


## 1 Biased boundary attack<sup>2</sup>

- Improvement on boundary attack
  - Low frequency noise sampling
  - Regional masking
  - Gradients of surrogate models




<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Thomas Brunner et al. "Guessing Smart: Biased Sampling for Efficient Black-Box Adversarial Attacks". In: 2019 IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV) (Oct. 2019). arXiv: 1812.09803, pp. 4957–4965. DOI: 10.1109/ICCV.2019.00506. URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/1812.09803 (visited on 08/04/2021).

#### 1 Stateful defense<sup>3</sup>




<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Steven Chen, Nicholas Carlini, and David Wagner. "Stateful Detection of Black-Box Adversarial Attacks". In: *arXiv:1907.05587 [cs]* (July 2019). arXiv: 1907.05587. URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/1907.05587 (visited on 08/04/2021).

## 1 Particle swarm optimization



- ► Can be used to optimize hyperparameters at attack level
- ► Can be used to to guide adversarial examples closer to original

### 1 Multiple starting points



#### 2 Goal

- Propose new family of attacks
  - Evade stateful detection
  - Still be efficient
- Define threat model
- Experiment with the proposed attack
- Answer the following research questions:
  - What are the (dis)advantages of using PSO in relation to vanilla adversarial attacks?
  - How can PSO be combined with state of the art adversarial attacks?
  - What are the (dis)advantages of distributing an adversarial attack?

#### 3 Threat model

- Decision based attack
- ► Targeted attack
- ► Stateful detection mechanism
  - Query bounded buffer
  - One buffer per account
- Cost per account
- Cost per query

#### 4 Evaluation protocol

- ► MNIST<sup>4</sup> and CIFAR-10<sup>5</sup>
- ▶ Black box model<sup>6</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Y. Lecun et al. "Gradient-based learning applied to document recognition". In: *Proceedings of the IEEE* 86.11 (1998), pp. 2278–2324. DOI: 10.1109/5.726791.

 $<sup>^5</sup> Alex$  Krizhevsky. "Learning Multiple Layers of Features from Tiny Images". In: (2009), pp. 32–33. URL: https://www.cs.toronto.edu/~kriz/learning-features-2009-TR.pdf.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Nicholas Carlini and David Wagner. *Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks.* 2017. arXiv: 1608.04644 [cs.CR].

#### 4 Evaluation protocol

- MNIST and CIFAR-10
- Black box model
- List of experiments
  - Original image (+label)
  - Target label
  - Starting position(s)
- Query bounded detector buffer of size 1000
- Number of neighbors is 50
- Query budget of 25000

#### 4 Baseline results

- lacktriangle Determine baseline distance  $(L_2)$  and number of detections for biased boundary attack
- ► Hyperparameters as suggested in original paper<sup>7</sup>

	IM	VIST	CIFAR		
Attack	Distance	Detections	Distance	Detections	
Baseline BBA	2.807	413	1.306	474	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Brunner et al., "Guessing Smart".

#### 4 Combining BBA and PSO

- Multiple starting positions
- ► More aggressive
- Communication between particles
- Fitness function


$$f(x) = \begin{cases} ||x - x'||_2, & \text{if } x \text{ is adversarial} \\ +\infty, & \text{else} \end{cases}$$


# 4 Combining BBA and PSO

	MNIST		CIFAR	
Attack	Distance	Detections	Distance	Detections
Baseline BBA	2.807	413	1.306	474
PSO-BBA (5 particles)	2.712	138	1.239	257
PSO-BBA (10 particles)	3.157	44	2.290	184


#### 4 Combining BBA and PSO

▶ Detections happen at the end of attack





- ► Round-Robin (RR)
- ► Modified Round-Robin (MRR)



- ► Round-Robin (RR)
- ► Modified Round-Robin (MRR)
- ► Distance based (DB)
- ► Embedded distance based (EDB)

	MNIST		CIFAR	
Attack	Distance	Detections	Distance	Detections
Baseline BBA	2.807	413	1.306	474
PSO-BBA	2.712	138	1.239	257
RR-PSO-BBA (5 nodes)	2.712	124	1.239	224
RR-PSO-BBA (10 nodes)	2.712	104	1.239	202
MRR-PSO-BBA (5 nodes)	2.712	110	1.239	227
MRR-PSO-BBA (10 nodes)	2.712	93	1.239	206
DB-PSO-BBA (5 nodes)	2.712	107	1.239	230
DB-PSO-BBA (10 nodes)	2.712	87	1.239	207
EDB-PSO-BBA (5 nodes)	2.712	108	1.239	229
EDB-PSO-BBA (10 nodes)	2.712	88	1.239	205

### 5 Remaining evaluations

- Inserting random queries
- Optimizing hyperparameters
- Running optimized attack on larger test sample
- Comparing with HopSkipJump attack