

# Department of Computer Science California State University, Channel Islands


COMP-524: Security


Lab Report

Lab Number: 3

Lab Topic: Environment Variable


# **TASK - 01:**







The printenv job prints all of the environment variables, and the export keyword causes the new environment variable to be exported. We can try try with PWD and PATH env but syntax will be "printenv PWD" and "printenv PATH".

# **TASK - 02:**








./bin task2 prints the environmental variables in the parent process, while./bin task2 child prints the environmental variables in the child process.

File1.txt and file2.txt contain the results of the child and parent process environment variables. Then use cmp or diff to compare the results.

In the end, nothing is written, indicating that the environment variables of the child and parent processes are the same. Both are the same.

### **TASK - 03:**




execve(): The execve function is used to overlay a process image formed by a call to the fork function. is the name of the file that contains the new process's executable image.

The third argument in the first step will be none, so the program will not print anything.


The third input in the second step is environ, which prints the environment variables, thus we need to manage what to provide on the shell command in execve. It's a secure method for a developer to employ, as it prevents shell syntax from accessing all of the environment variables.

### **TASK - 04:**



The variables in the environment are all printed out. If a developer does not wish to list all of the environmental variables, the exceve syntax is a safer option.


#### **TASK - 05:**



I converted a supplied program to setuid and added the env variable. LD LIBRARY PATH=/home/seed is exported to the entire env list.

The default library path is LD LIBRARY PATH, which is used to look for dynamic and shared libraries.

# **TASK - 06:**





Created a setuid program from a provided C program. The cal command displays the current calendar in the terminal.

```
Terminal
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                                                       ◆I)) 5:18 AM ひ
          lab.c
     [02/16/22]seed@VM:~/.../task6$ cal
        February 2022
     Su Mo Tu We Th Fr Sa
            1
               2
                   3
                      4
     6
            8
              9 10 11 12
     13 14 15 <mark>16</mark>
                 17 18 19
     20 21 22 23 24 25 26
     27 28
     [02/16/22]seed@VM:~/.../task6$ which cal
     /usr/bin/cal
     [02/16/22]seed@VM:~/.../task6$ cp /usr/bin/cal ls
     [02/16/22]seed@VM:~/.../task6$ pwd
     /home/seed/Desktop/sec task2/task6
     [02/16/22]seed@VM:~/.../task6$ export PATH=/home/seed/D
     esktop/sec task2/task6:$PATH
     [02/16/22]seed@VM:~/.../task6$ ./lab
         February 2022
            6 13 20 27
     Su
    Mo
            7 14 21 28
            8 15 22
     Tu
         1
```


which cal gives it's path transferring the current path to Is path Instead of listing, it will run the cal program. If it runs with root access, it can change the default commands to malicious commands, as illustrated.


# **TASK - 07:**





```
user1@VM: /home/seed/Desktop/sec_task2/task7
                                             t En 🕟 🕩 2:17 PM 🖔
             Full Name []: user1
             Room Number []:
             Work Phone []:
             Home Phone []:
             Other []:
    Is the information correct? [Y/n] Y
    [02/16/22]seed@VM:~/.../task7$ id
    uid=1000(seed) gid=1000(seed) groups=1000(seed),4(adm),
    24(cdrom), 27(sudo), 30(dip), 46(plugdev), 113(lpadmin), 128
     (sambashare)
    [02/16/22]seed@VM:~/.../task7$ sudo adduser user1 sudo
    Adding user `userl' to group `sudo'
    Adding user userl to group sudo
    Done.
    [02/16/22]seed@VM:~/.../task7$ sudo newgrp
     [02/16/22]root@VM:~/.../task7# sudo su seed
     [02/16/22]seed@VM:~/.../task7$ sudo su user1
    To run a command as administrator (user "root"), use "s
    udo <command>".
    See "man sudo root" for details.
    user1@VM:/home/seed/Desktop/sec task2/task7$
```





#### The four scenarios are as follows:

- Run a normal program by a normal user The sleep() method is overridden when a normal user creates, compiles, and runs a program. "I am not asleep" is the message we receive.
- 2. Normal user runs set-uid to root program myprog.c is compiled by root and the executable is set-uid, but the sleep() function is not overwritten. After a one-second pause, the prompt appears again.
- 3. Root user runs set-uid root program myprog.c was compiled by root and the executable is set-uid, therefore the sleep() method isn't overwritten. After a one-second pause, the prompt appears again. However, if the root user additionally exports LD PRELOAD, the sleep() method is rewritten, resulting in the message "I am not sleeping."
- 4. When a non-root user calls a set-uid user program, the sleep() method is not overridden because myprog.c was compiled by a non-root user and the executable is set-uid.

There is a one-second pause before prompt reappears.

As a result, if the real uid of the user id differs from the same user's effective uid, the linker ignores the LD PRELOAD environment setting. This serves as a safeguard against set-uid assaults.