

**Name: Saqib**

**Reg no: Fa21-bse-142**

**Submitted to: Iqra sajjad**

**Question**

**How internal threats cause an imbalance in civil-military relations of Pakistan? Discuss how Leadership Crisis is creating an impact on civil-military relations in Pakistan.**

**Answer**

In civil-military relations, there is an unbreakable rule: citizens have the right to be wrong. Supporters of military rule in Pakistan say that civilian governments have failed to deliver security, economic prosperity, and, in certain circumstances, social cohesion. Military action, on the other hand, cannot be used to address civilian inefficiencies.

**Introduction**

In the concept of contemporary states and governance, there are two levels of agency. The first is bestowed by the people on elected leaders, presumably through free and fair elections. This is a broad assignment of authority, which indicates that the people have given their elected representatives the authority to make decisions on their behalf. The second act of agency is provided by elected representatives to specialised bureaucratic institutions such as the military. This is a restricted agency, known as a "administrative agency," in which the agent is obliged to make good and bad decisions based on the principal's directions, in this case civilian leadership.

Logic is incompatible in this situation. Inverting the metaphor, the military's strategy to deposing civilian governments is akin to bringing a needle to a battle (as opposed to bringing a sword to mend torn clothes). The first order of agency, from the people to the government, is significantly more serious than the second order of agency, which the military frequently breaches when removing civilian administrations.

**Military and civilian leadership**

When it came to dealing with terrorist safe havens within the country, civilian and military leaders were on the same page. In 2013, the then-new Sharif government refused to conduct operations against the Taliban and other terrorist groups within the country. Despite the Pakistan Army's repeated advice, the government chose to engage in peace talks with terrorist groups. When the government is weak, terrorist organisations use 'peace discussions,' according to the Pakistani army, to recoup, create legitimacy, and then resume operations. Months later, when terrorists continued to attack Pakistani and American employees despite ongoing talks with the Pakistani government, Sharif was humiliated in front of Pakistan's security apparatus and allowed the military to launch an operation.

In Pakistan's current foreign policy posture, there appears to be no rupture in civil–military ties. Officials from both the civilian and military sectors seek strong ties with China, as well as opening up to Russia, balancing the Middle East, resisting the United States, and securing long-term peace with India and Afghanistan. Even the 'Dawn leaks' issue was more about the civilian administration wishing to embarrass the military establishment than it was about foreign policy differences. While Pakistan's civil and military authorities are at odds, they are on the same page when it comes to foreign and security policy, which explains why the country's foreign and security policies have been relatively consistent over the previous four decades.. To acquire international support that may be used to leverage in the local power struggle, civilian leaders convey this domestic power struggle as a subject of "foreign policy" and a "fight for democracy" to international audiences. More than a defect, the lack of depth in Western academic literature and attitudes on Pakistan is a problem. It's deliberate omission, in which the current picture of Pakistan's civil–military relations is manufactured to suit Western political goals, such as aligning Pakistan's national security policies with those of the West and keeping a close eye on its nuclear programme. The purpose of supporting Pakistan's civil–military divide is to shift the army's principal role away from national security and foreign affairs in order to secure concessions from the civilian government leadership. In terms of security and foreign policy, there are no "two Pakistans" behind the smokescreen. However, in a convoluted game of geopolitics, the notion is effective for pushing agendas. Hussain Nadim is a PhD candidate and the Director of the South Asia Study Group at the University of Sydney. He formerly worked in high-level security and foreign policy advising roles for the Pakistani government, and he just finished a year of study in Pakistan, interviewing major civil and military figures.

**Moderates in civil society**

A coalition of moderates in the military and moderates in civil society is required to remove a military from power. A staunch military dictatorship would feel it could maintain power and would resist any political reform. In the end, this path leads to despotism. Thankfully, Pakistan is not one of them. On the other hand, the extreme opposition wants complete democracy and the punishment of military personnel who committed abuses when the nation was under martial law. Even moderate generals fear them and want to retain their positions of power. As a result, a power-sharing agreement between moderates on both sides is critical to successful democratisation. Several nations, notably Spain and Chile, have documented this phenomenon.

**Misunderstanding of Imbalance**

Pakistan is the most politically unstable of the 25 Asian countries assessed in the Lowy Institute's 2018 Asia Power Index. Meanwhile, Pakistan's military is ranked as Asia's ninth most powerful. Given Pakistan's history of successful and unsuccessful military coups in the 70 years since its independence from India, the rankings make sense.

University of Sydney, Misunderstanding of Pakistan's Civil–Military Mismatch Pakistan is the most politically unstable of the 25 Asian countries assessed in the Lowy Institute's 2018 Asia Power Index. Meanwhile, Pakistan's military is ranked as Asia's ninth most powerful. Given Pakistan's history of successful and unsuccessful military coups in the 70 years since its independence from India, the rankings make sense. On March 23, 2018, Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi attends the Pakistan Day military parade in Islamabad, Pakistan (photo: Reuters/Caren Firouz).

The country's enormous military system, which spends the lion's share of the annual budget, is blamed in Western media, policy, and academic discussions for Pakistan's civil–military mismatch. According to common view, the civil–military divide derives from the Pakistani army's anti-India and anti-Afghanistan sentiments, as well as the military's counter-terrorism policy in the region. The civilian administration is claimed to be attempting to alter these long-held practises in its pursuit for peace and democracy. The fact, on the other hand, is significantly more complicated than this Eurocentric view of civil–military relations in Pakistan, which tends to promote a vision of Pakistan that favours Western powers and interests. This Eurocentrism is characterised by a tendency to see Pakistan's civil–military interactions through the lens of foreign policy, while neglecting the country's internal political and structural issues. In Western discourse, civilian government leaders are typically seen as passive participants, neglecting their role in the imbalance. When it comes to foreign and security affairs, Pakistan's civilian and military leadership are on the same page. Disagreements are merely over the best means to attain these foreign policy goals, and they represent a power struggle inside the military rather than an ideological division between civilian and military organisations. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, for example, was keen to make big efforts toward peace with India after being elected in 2013, often going above and beyond state protocol and forging backdoor links. The Pakistan Army was not uninterested in bringing India and Pakistan closer together. Military leaders just wanted to mend fences in a careful manner that did not jeopardise Pakistan's interests and ensured that peace would last beyond rhetoric. Military leaders urged caution and little steps to secure long-term peace with India, which Sharif dismissed.. Sharif found himself in an unpleasant situation after months of fruitless attempts to court Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who put a lot of pressure on Pakistan after taking office. He conceded that his policy had failed and delegated control to the military to devise a new strategy for dealing with India.