

uBFT: Microsecond-Scale BFT using Disaggregated Memory

[Extended Version]

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ABSTRACT

We propose uBFT, the first State Machine Replication (SMR) system to achieve microsecond-scale latency in data centers, while using only $2f+1$ replicas to tolerate f Byzantine failures. The Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) provided by uBFT is essential as pure crashes appear to be a mere illusion with real-life systems reportedly failing in many unexpected ways. uBFT relies on a small non-tailored trusted computing base—disaggregated memory—and consumes a practically bounded amount of memory. uBFT is based on a novel abstraction called Consistent Tail Broadcast, which we use to prevent equivocation while bounding memory. We implement uBFT using RDMA-based disaggregated memory and obtain an end-to-end latency of as little as $10\ \mu\text{s}$. This is at least $50\times$ faster than MinBFT, a state-of-the-art $2f+1$ BFT SMR based on Intel’s SGX. We use uBFT to replicate two KV-stores (Memcached and Redis), as well as a financial order matching engine (Liquibook). These applications have low latency (up to $20\ \mu\text{s}$) and become Byzantine tolerant with as little as $10\ \mu\text{s}$ more. The price for uBFT is a small amount of reliable disaggregated memory (less than $1\ \text{MiB}$), which in our prototype consists of a small number of memory servers connected through RDMA and replicated for fault tolerance.

CCS CONCEPTS

- Computer systems organization → Reliability; Availability.

KEYWORDS

Byzantine fault tolerance, microsecond scale, replication, disaggregated memory, fast path, finite memory, RDMA

1 INTRODUCTION

Data center applications such as social networks, web search, e-commerce, and banking increasingly need both microsecond-scale performance [13, 19, 47, 81] and strong fault tolerance, in order to deliver on their promise of being the backbone of today’s online services. Indeed, strong fault tolerance is required by real-life systems which reportedly fail in many unexpected ways. Apart from simple crashes, failures in distributed systems range from software/configuration bugs [57, 75], to hardware failures [66, 67, 72],

to hardly detectable hardware bugs [33, 42, 44, 45] and up to malicious activity [9, 83]. Traditionally, protecting against the plethora of different failures required slow and expensive Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocols.

The standard way to achieve fault tolerance is state machine replication (SMR). A BFT protocol implementing SMR incurs milliseconds of latency [8, 18], requires a large number of replicas ($3f+1$ to tolerate f failures) [23, 68, 92], consumes unbounded memory [88], and/or relies on a large trusted computing base [15, 51, 88]. These reasons might explain why BFT has had no adoption in data centers.

In this paper, we propose uBFT, the first BFT SMR system that simultaneously offers four key features: (1) microsecond-scale latency, (2) few replicas ($2f+1$), (3) practically bounded memory, and (4) a small non-tailored trusted computing base. In the common case, uBFT leverages unanimity to replicate requests in as little as $10\ \mu\text{s}$ end-to-end without invoking the trusted computing base or expensive cryptographic primitives. In the slow path—when there are failures or slowness in the network—uBFT uses a novel protocol that combines digital signatures with judicious use of a trusted computing base. The trusted computing base in uBFT is non-tailored and small: rather than trusted enclaves with arbitrary logic such as Intel’s SGX [28] or trusted hypervisors [94]—which have large attack surfaces due to their complexity [29, 36]—uBFT relies solely on disaggregated memory, a technology increasingly present in data centers due to the availability of RDMA [85] today and CXL [30] in a few years. The key mechanism from disaggregated memory we leverage in uBFT are single-writer regions (regions of memory that can be written by one designated host and can be read by others), implemented in hardware through access permissions.

Providing the above four features is challenging for BFT protocols. To get microsecond-scale latency, BFT protocols need to avoid expensive public-key cryptography and reduce communication rounds in the common path—and doing so has typically required increasing rather than decreasing the number of replicas [1, 53, 64]. Meanwhile, decreasing the number of replicas has usually required unbounded memory, sophisticated, or tailored trusted computing bases such as append-only-memory [24], SGX [15], TrInC [59], or reliable hypervisors [94]. Limiting the amount of memory is a

significant challenge in the design of uBFT, as the standard technique to handle Byzantine behavior in systems with $2f+1$ replicas requires storing all messages received, leading to long message histories [5, 88], which consume unbounded memory. Finally, not tailoring the trusted computing base to our needs requires designing around existing technologies—in our case disaggregated memory—rather than custom hardware.

To respond to these challenges, uBFT introduces a new abstraction called Consistent Tail Broadcast (CTBcast) that we use to prevent equivocation [62], while requiring a practically bounded amount of memory.¹ Equivocation—a major source of problems in a system with Byzantine failures [24]—occurs when a faulty process incorrectly sends different information to different processes, which may cause the state of replicas to diverge. CTBcast prevents equivocation for all messages, but only ensures the delivery of the last t broadcast messages, where t is a parameter that trades memory for latency (we explain how to set it in Section 7).

The price for uBFT is a small amount (less than 1 MiB) of reliable disaggregated memory. uBFT is designed modularly to work with a generic such component; our current prototype implements this component using RDMA and a set of memory nodes that themselves are replicated for fault tolerance. These nodes add to the total number of replicas, but these replicas are tiny and simple: they do not store the state of the application, just a few in-flight coordination messages. Moreover, their functionality is application independent, so they can be shared among many applications, amortizing their cost. The memory nodes that provide the disaggregated memory constitute the trusted computing base in our prototype and are assumed to fail only by crashing. This shrinks the vulnerability of the system compared to currently deployed crash-tolerant SMR systems, in which *all* components can fail only by crashing, effectively making the trusted computing base be the entire data center.

We evaluate uBFT against two state-of-the-art systems. First, we compare it against Mu, the fastest SMR system to our knowledge, but that tolerates only crash failures. Compared to Mu, uBFT increases the end-to-end latency by only 2 \times , while tolerating Byzantine failures. Second, we compare uBFT against MinBFT, a state-of-the-art $2f+1$ BFT SMR system, and showcase that our system has more than 50 \times and 2 \times better latency when operating in its fast and slow path, respectively. We also use uBFT to replicate two low-latency KV-stores (Memcached [48] and Redis [80]), and a financial order matching engine (Liquibook [73]). All these applications have request latencies of less than 20 μ s when unreplicated and become Byzantine-resilient with as little as 10 μ s more.

In summary, our main contributions are the following:

- The design of uBFT, a BFT system for state machine replication with microsecond-scale latency in the common case, using only $2f+1$ replicas, practically bounded memory, and a small trusted computing base (disaggregated memory).
- A new abstraction against equivocation, Consistent Tail Broadcast (CTBcast), and a protocol for CTBcast that uses a small amount of disaggregated memory and has a signature-less fast path.

¹The required memory is logarithmic in the number of operations. Everywhere we use a bounded number of bits except for sequence numbers.

- An open-source implementation of uBFT, CTBcast, and reliable shared disaggregated memory using RDMA, available at <https://github.com/LPD-EPFL/ubft>.
- A thorough evaluation of the performance of uBFT and its applications.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 State Machine Replication

State Machine Replication (SMR) is an approach to replicate a service (e.g., a key-value store) across the memory of multiple machines called *replicas* to tolerate failures. With SMR, replicas receive requests in the same order, and thus remain in sync. If durability of SMR is desired, we rely on persistent rather than volatile memory.

The heart of an SMR system is consensus [21], which ensures total order in the sense that replicas agree on the same sequence of client requests. Consensus protocols are often leader-based [11, 23, 43, 46, 63, 70]: a replica designated as the *leader* orders the client requests, and forwards them to the other *follower* replicas to ensure agreement. Every replica feeds the client requests to its local copy of the service, and forwards the service’s output to the clients.

Consensus and SMR differ in their memory consumption. Consensus must ensure agreement among participants indefinitely, so decided requests must be retained forever if a participant is unresponsive, thereby requiring unbounded memory. In contrast, SMR need not store all requests, as it cares only about replicating the application state, which can be finite even if there are infinitely many requests. Thus SMR systems need to adapt consensus to use finite memory [82].

2.2 Non-Equivocation

Byzantine processes can equivocate, i.e., they can maliciously say different things to different processes. In SMR, specifically, a Byzantine leader may propose different values to try to cause replicas to diverge, justifying why SMR protocols must ensure non-equivocation.

Under the Byzantine asynchronous model, $3f+1$ replicas are needed to prevent equivocation [54]. However, if equivocation is prevented and transferable authentication is available, Byzantine SMR requires only $2f+1$ replicas [27], the same number as in the crash-stop case. With transferable authentication, a process that verifies a proof about the origin of a message can transfer the proof to other processes and be assured they can also verify it. For example, digital signatures provide transferable authentication, while arrays of Message Authentication Codes (MACs) do not [7].

Preventing equivocation using up to $2f+1$ replicas requires a compromise [27], i.e., a hybrid model where part of the system—called the *trusted computing base*—fails only by crashing. Ideally, this base is as small as possible, since a small and simple base is less likely to be susceptible to failures (e.g., vulnerabilities, bugs).

2.3 Disaggregated Memory

Disaggregated memory is an emerging data center technology that separates compute from memory, by providing a shared memory pool that compute nodes access over a network. The memory pool has limited compute capabilities, which it uses for management tasks such as connection handling. Disaggregated memory improves memory utilization, separates the scaling of compute and




Figure 1: Overview of uBFT’s architecture.

memory, and achieves better availability due to the separation of fault domains [89].

Disaggregated memory can be provided by different technologies. The emerging CXL standard will support disaggregated memory in the future [39], while today disaggregated memory is available via Remote Direct Memory Access (RDMA) [85] on InfiniBand [49] or RoCE [14]. RDMA is a networking technology that allows a process to read or write the memory of another machine without involving the CPU of the latter. Combined with kernel-bypass, RDMA enables sub-microsecond communication and stringent tail latency. Access rights to RDMA-exposed memory can be set individually for each accessor.

2.4 Model

We consider a system with $2f+1$ compute nodes and single-writer multiple-reader disaggregated memory. Up to f compute nodes are Byzantine and may thus fail arbitrarily. We assume network connections are authenticated and tamper-proof (processes know who they get messages from and messages cannot be altered) and eventually available (network partitions are intermittent). We also assume that the disaggregated memory is trusted: it may fail only by crashing. The disaggregated memory is divided into chunks, where each chunk is readable by all compute nodes and writable by a designated compute node. We assume the existence of public-key cryptography: processes can sign messages using their private key and verify unforgeable signatures using the pre-published public keys of all processes. We further assume eventual synchrony: network and processing delays are unbounded until an unknown *Global Stabilization Time* (GST) after which delays are bounded by a known δ . Lastly, our system assumes bounded clock drift for safety, i.e., the clocks of correct processes drift from each other with a bounded rate. These assumptions are common for distributed systems in data centers [6, 23, 34, 41, 58, 90].

In our prototype, we do *not* assume that we are given a reliable disaggregated memory [56, 93], but rather show how to implement a reliable disaggregated memory using RDMA.² To do so, we assume $2f_m+1$ memory nodes out of which f_m can fail. Memory nodes are part of the trusted computing base: they are not Byzantine and may fail by crashing only. Memory nodes are simple: they just provide read and write functionality with access control. Their size and

²uBFT’s clean encapsulation of disaggregated memory allows future replacement of its RDMA implementation with CXL-powered memory.




Figure 2: Overview of uBFT’s consensus engine.

functionality do not depend on the application being replicated, and they can be shared among many applications.

3 DESIGN

3.1 Overview

uBFT follows the design of PBFT [23], a seminal paper that describes how to build practical BFT SMR systems. Figure 1 depicts the architecture of uBFT. On the left, a client sends requests to replicas on the right and waits for responses from a majority of them. The replicas go through two stages. First, they totally order client requests using a leader-based BFT consensus protocol. Second, they execute the ordered requests on their local instance of the replicated application before forwarding the outcome of the execution to the client. To achieve microsecond-scale latency, the consensus engine uses a fast/slow path approach. As long as the system is synchronous and all replicas collaborate, the fast path orders requests without signatures. If the fast path does not make progress, uBFT’s consensus switches to the slow path, which makes progress with a mere majority of processes using signatures and disaggregated memory.

uBFT significantly differs from PBFT in the way it prevents equivocation. PBFT, being a $3f+1$ fault tolerant protocol, relies on intersecting quorums to ensure that malicious replicas do not make the state of honest replicas diverge. By contrast, uBFT operates with $2f+1$ replicas, and therefore cannot rely on the same mechanism as PBFT; instead, it relies on trusted disaggregated memory, which is encapsulated within a new primitive called *Consistent Tail Broadcast* (CTBcast).

CTBcast is a variant of Consistent Broadcast [5]. Consistent Broadcast prevents equivocation by ordering all messages broadcast by a given process. With it, a Byzantine leader is constrained from sending different request orderings to different followers. Our *tail* variant is a relaxation that requires correct processes to deliver only the last t messages sent by a correct broadcaster, while preserving non-equivocation for all messages. This relaxation is essential to practically bound the memory use. Importantly, the implementation of CTBcast has a signatureless fast-path to achieve the latency requirements of uBFT.

Figure 2 depicts uBFT’s consensus component with its fast/slow path design. After receiving a request from RPC, the leader proposes its ordering via a round of CTBcast. The rest of consensus tries to turn this ordering into a globally accepted one (i.e., stable across leaders). Depending on the synchrony of the system and the number

of faulty replicas, this round of CTBcast might execute the fast or slow path. In the former case, consensus continues with its fast path and executes two rounds of Tail Broadcast (TBcast), a form of best-effort broadcast designed for finite memory (§4.1). Importantly, none of these three broadcasts involve signatures nor disaggregated memory. If liveness is lost during the fast path of consensus, uBFT activates the slow path, shown by the dashed arrows, which executes a certification round and another round of CTBcast. The slow path is also executed if the fast path of the initial CTBcast fails. Differently from the three rounds of the fast path, the three rounds of the slow path all require signatures, and CTBcast invocations additionally require disaggregated memory.

3.2 Challenges

uBFT addresses the following challenges:

2f+1 Replicas and Finite Memory. Previous theoretical work [2] proposed to prevent equivocation with fewer than $3f+1$ replicas by building Consistent Broadcast on top of shared registers. However, this abstraction requires replicas to use infinite memory in order to store and deliver *all* broadcast messages, which is not implementable in practice. We work around this memory issue by designing CTBcast, a weaker form of Consistent Broadcast where replicas are allowed to skip the delivery of old messages in order to favor the delivery of newer ones (§4).

SMR with CTBcast. The reliance of uBFT on CTBcast brings additional complexity to its consensus algorithm, notably on preventing equivocation *across* messages. Typically, protocols rely on the entire history of messages to prevent equivocation. Yet, CTBcast only guarantees the delivery of the tail, which may lead correct replicas to have gaps in their delivery history. uBFT works around this limitation via *CTBcast summaries*, which allow a replica to make progress in spite of gaps (§5).

Microsecond-Scale Operation. Systems that operate at the microsecond scale should avoid signatures on their critical path. Yet, Aguilera *et al.* [5] show that Consistent Broadcast cannot completely remove signatures. Moreover, recycling memory requires the generation of proofs which also involve signatures. uBFT addresses this challenge by avoiding expensive cryptography in the fast path of CTBcast and relegating the few bookkeeping signatures to a background task (§5.4).

Resilient Disaggregated Memory. uBFT relies on RDMA to implement disaggregated memory. However, raw memory exposed over RDMA is not enough to implement our SMR protocol. Indeed, RDMA-exposed memory does not tolerate failures, and data accesses can be inconsistent, since RDMA provides only 8-byte atomicity. uBFT addresses these limitations of RDMA using efficient, yet Byzantine fault tolerant, algorithms (§6).

4 CONSISTENT TAIL BROADCAST

Consistent Tail Broadcast (CTBcast) is a novel variant of Consistent Broadcast (CBcast) that uBFT uses to prevent equivocation. Briefly, CTBcast resembles CBcast, except that it allows processes not to deliver outdated messages. In this way, CTBcast avoids maintaining the full history of messages, to bound memory use.

4.1 Definition

CTBcast is defined in terms of two primitives, $broadcast(k, m)$ and $deliver(k, m, p)$, where k is a numeric identifier, m is a message, and p is a process. When p invokes $broadcast(k, m)$, we say that p broadcasts (k, m) , i.e., it broadcasts message m with identifier k . A correct broadcaster increments k sequentially at every broadcast, starting with $k = 1$. Similarly, when a process q invokes $deliver(k, m, p)$, we say that q delivers (k, m) from p .

In simple terms, CTBcast is a multi-shot abstraction that prevents correct processes from delivering different messages from a given broadcaster p for the same identifier k . CTBcast is parameterized by a tail t , which specifies which messages are guaranteed to be delivered. Informally, in CTBcast, a correct process q is only required to deliver the last t messages broadcast by a correct process p , while the delivery of previous messages is best-effort.

CTBcast has the following properties:

Tail-validity If a correct process p broadcasts (k, m) and never broadcasts a message (k', m') with $k' \geq k+t$, then all correct processes eventually deliver (k, m) .

Agreement If p and q are correct processes, p delivers (k, m) from r , and q delivers (k, m') from r , then $m = m'$.

Integrity If a correct process delivers (k, m) from p and p is correct, p must have broadcast (k, m) .

No duplication No correct process delivers $(k, *)$ from p twice.

The difference between CTBcast and CBcast lies in their validity property. Tail-validity implies that a correct process is only obliged to deliver a message m from p if m is among the last t messages broadcast by p . When $t=\infty$, tail-validity reduces to CBcast's validity.

The infinite tail of CBcast is what prevents it from recycling memory. Indeed, given that the broadcaster cannot distinguish between network asynchrony and receiver failures [32], it is required to keep re-transmitting all messages until they are explicitly acknowledged. Thus, in CBcast, the broadcaster can garbage collect messages only after they have been acknowledged by all receivers. As a result, once a single process fails, memory cannot be recycled and any correct implementation of CBcast must block after running out of memory. By not enforcing the delivery of *old* messages, CTBcast's tail-validity lets processes recycle the memory dedicated to these messages. This is why CTBcast requires only finite memory while CBcast does not. In Section 5, we show that despite its weaker semantics, CTBcast is sufficient for solving consensus.

4.2 Algorithm

Algorithm 1 implements CTBcast using finite memory with a fast/slow path approach that avoids signatures and disaggregated memory in the common case. For pedagogical reasons, we assume that a designated process is the broadcaster while the others are receivers. Each receiver owns an array of t Single-Writer Multiple-Reader (SWMR) regular registers. Each register is only writable by its owner, but is readable by all processes. The regularity of the registers forces READs that execute concurrently to a WRITE to return either the value being written or the previous one. Moreover, each process uses a Tail Broadcast (TBcast) primitive which ensures the delivery by correct processes of the last $2t$ messages broadcast through it, but does not prevent equivocation. Formally, TBcast has all properties of CTBcast except agreement.

Implementing TBcast using finite memory is simple. The broadcaster buffers its last $2t$ messages and retransmits them until it receives acknowledgements from all receivers. To broadcast a new message when the buffer is full, the broadcaster makes room for it by evicting the oldest buffered message.

Algorithm 1: Consistent Tail Broadcast

```

1  # at the broadcaster
2  def broadcast(k, m):
3      TBcast-broadcast <LOCK, k, m>
4      TBcast-broadcast <SIGNED, k, m, sign((k, m))>
5
6  # at receivers:
7  SWMR[me] = [(-1, ⊥, ⊥), ... ] # array of t slots
8  delivered = [-1, ... ] # array of t slots
9  locks = [(-1, ⊥), ... ] # array of t slots
10 locked = [[(-1, ⊥), ... ], ... ] # array of t*n slots
11
12 upon TBcast-deliver <LOCK, k, m> from p:
13     k', _ = locks[k%t]
14     if k > k':
15         locks[k%t] = (k, m)
16         TBcast-broadcast <LOCKED, k, m>
17
18 upon TBcast-deliver <LOCKED, k, m> from q:
19     k', _ = locked[q][k%t]
20     if k > k':
21         locked[q][k%t] = (k, m)
22     if locked[r_0][k%t] == ... == locked[r_{n-1}][k%t]:
23         deliver_once(k, m)
24
25 upon TBcast-deliver <SIGNED, k, m, sig> from p:
26     if valid(sig, (k, m), p):
27         k', m' = locks[k%t]
28         if k > k' or k == k' and m == m':
29             locks[k%t] = (k, m)
30             SWMR[me][k%t].write((k, sig, m))
31             for each (k', s', m') in SWMR[*][k%t]:
32                 if valid(s', (k', m'), p):
33                     if k' == k and m' != m:
34                         return # Byzantine broadcaster
35                     if k' > k and k' ≡ k (mod t):
36                         return # out of tail
37                     deliver_once(k, m)
38
39 def deliver_once(k, m):
40     if k > delivered[k%t]:
41         delivered[k%t] = k
42         trigger deliver(k, m)

```

As mentioned, Algorithm 1 has a low-latency fast path that avoids signatures and disaggregated memory. It also incorporates a fall-back slow path for liveness. For presentation simplicity, it triggers the slow path in parallel to the fast path (lines 3 and 4), but in reality, uBFT triggers it when replicas fail to decide on new client requests after some configurable duration. In addition to the shared SWMR registers, receivers use three finite-size local arrays for bookkeeping (lines 8-10).

In the fast path, the broadcaster first TBcast-broadcasts its message alongside its identifier within a LOCK message (line 3). When receivers deliver this message (line 12), they commit not to deliver any other message for the given identifier, and tell other receivers about their commitment by broadcasting a LOCKED message (line 16). Receivers use locks (lines 13-15) to avoid committing to different messages for the same identifier. Importantly, receivers store only up to t commitments in this array, by evicting earlier commitments that alias to the same index $k \% t$ (line 15). When receivers

learn that everyone committed to the same message (lines 18-22), they know that no correct replica will deliver a different message and thus deliver it (line 23).

In the slow path, the broadcaster additionally TBcast-broadcasts a signed version of its message (line 4). After TBcast-delivering a signed message (line 25), receivers verify its signature (line 26). Then, they check that they have not committed to a different message for the same k (line 28), and ensure that they will not do so in the future (line 29). Subsequently, they copy the signed message to their SWMR register associated with the message identifier k (line 30), before reading the associated SWMRs owned by other receivers (line 31). Receivers ignore messages with invalid signatures (line 32) and abort delivery if they detect a different message for the same identifier (line 33). In case receivers detect another message with a higher identifier that is associated with the same SWMR registers (line 35), they drop their own message as it no longer belongs to the tail. Otherwise, they deliver it (line 37).

The correctness of the slow path of Algorithm 1 hinges on that all correct processes will find the message copied by the *fastest* correct replica when reading the registers. Thus, they can deliver no message other than the first copied, hence preserving agreement. The fast and slow paths are linked together via the `locks` array (lines 15 and 29), which ensures that whichever path executes first forces the value of the message for the other path. Note that when the broadcaster is Byzantine, correct processes are allowed not to deliver. A more detailed proof of correctness is given in Appendix A.

5 STATE MACHINE REPLICATION

Like all leader-based BFT consensus protocols, uBFT's protocol has the same high-level layout as PBFT [23]: it shares naming conventions and splits the protocol in similar phases. However, uBFT has different goals ($2f+1$ fault tolerance, finite memory, microsecond latency), different assumptions (disaggregated memory), and a different non-equivocation mechanism (Consistent Tail Broadcast (CTBcast)). As a result, uBFT's protocol is structurally different from PBFT, as we describe in this section.

We start by giving an overview of our consensus protocol. Then, we analyse its slow path and explain how it deals with finite memory and view changes. Finally, we describe how its fast path leverages unanimous and timely collaboration of replicas to achieve microsecond-scale latency. For presentation clarity, this section gives only an informal description of our protocol. Its pseudocode is given in Appendix B alongside detailed arguments of its correctness.

5.1 Basic Protocol

From a high-level point of view, the slow path of our consensus protocol—shown in Figure 3—has three phases: *Prepare*, *Certify* and *Commit*. After the leader receives a signed request from a client, it *proposes* it by broadcasting a `Prepare` message via CTBcast. When replicas (including the broadcaster) deliver this message, they proceed to its certification. Each replica signs the proposal and TBcast-broadcasts its signature in a `CERTIFY` message. Then, it waits to aggregate $f+1$ signatures on the proposal, which constitute an unforgeable proof that the proposal was emitted by the




Figure 3: Communication pattern of uBFT’s slow path. Bold lines represent messages sent over CTBcast. Thinner lines represent direct messages.

leader. Moving on to the Commit phase, the replicas broadcast via CTBcast a COMMIT message containing the aforementioned proof. Finally, after delivering $f+1$ COMMIT messages, replicas apply the client’s request to their local state machine and reply to the client. Note that we use TBcast instead of the more expensive CTBcast when broadcasting CERTIFY messages: equivocation of CERTIFY messages does not harm correctness as all certificates involve at least one correct replica, and all correct replicas certify the same proposal due to the CTBcast in the Prepare phase.

So far, the described protocol replicates a single client request. Similarly to PBFT, uBFT uses a sliding window to run its consensus protocol on a series of slots. As the leader receives multiple requests, it proposes each one in a different slot, handling many slots in parallel. uBFT also uses PBFT’s application checkpoints to throttle the number of concurrent request proposals. This mechanism limits the impact of a Byzantine leader, and bounds the number of relevant messages at any point in time. An application checkpoint is signed by $f+1$ replicas and includes (1) the state of the application after applying the first i replicated requests to it, and (2) an implicit authorization to work on slots $[i+1, i+window]$.

5.2 Non-Equivocation at the Consensus Level

An important aspect of uBFT’s consensus protocol is how it prevents the leader from sending conflicting proposals. CTBcast only partially solves this issue: it prevents a Byzantine leader from sending conflicting proposals in a single message, but it does not prevent it from sending conflicting proposals across multiple messages. Conceptually, a process can ensure that another process has not equivocated if the former knows the entire history of messages broadcast by the latter. For this reason, processes in our protocol interpret messages of other processes in FIFO order. However, CTBcast does not guarantee the delivery of all broadcast messages due to its tail-validity property, which might prevent processes from delivering *all* the messages from a correct one in FIFO order. We solve this issue by pairing CTBcast with *CTBcast summaries*.

A CTBcast summary is an unforgeable synopsis of what has been broadcast by a process p via CTBcast up to a given CTBcast identifier. Summaries constitute certificates that are signed by $f+1$ replicas, which have witnessed the messages broadcast by p and assert that p has not equivocated at the consensus level. When a process receives a summary about p up to a certain CTBcast identifier i , it is able to continue handling p ’s new messages above i

in FIFO order. Essentially, CTBcast summaries restore FIFO delivery that may have been broken by the tail-validity of CTBcast.

CTBcast summaries are generated interactively. Every t consecutive CTBcast messages (t is CTBcast’s tail parameter) that a replica r delivers from p , r participates in creating a summary about the state of p . Replica p knows how many messages it has broadcast and blocks waiting for a summary of its state every t messages. Using its previous summary, p can bring correct processes that missed some of its messages up to speed, and help them deliver the last t messages it broadcast so far. Even if f Byzantine replicas fail to help building p ’s next summary, all correct replicas would eventually collaborate to generate it, thus ensuring the liveness of the summaries and allowing p to keep broadcasting.

It is important to ensure that CTBcast summaries have finite size. To this end, a process keeps only a limited number of messages that it CTBcast-delivers from others, by maintaining a window of consensus slots for every other broadcasting process. If a process p CTBcast-delivers a message from another process q out of the window it maintains for q , p considers q as being Byzantine. uBFT requires processes to CTBcast-broadcast application checkpoints in order to slide their window on the receivers’ side. When a receiver slides a broadcaster’s window forward, it drops messages referring to slots that fall out of it, since the consensus slots they refer to have been checkpointer. This way, the entire relevant state of a broadcaster is a combination of a consensus window range and the collection of CTBcast messages that fall into it.

5.3 View Change

To tolerate faulty leaders, uBFT follows PBFT’s *view change* approach. Briefly, every view has a dedicated leader determined in a round-robin manner. If a replica does not make progress or believes that the leader is censoring client requests, it moves to the next view by CTBcast-broadcasting a *SEAL_VIEW* message. The leader of the new view first transfers any potentially applied requests to the new view by CTBcast-broadcasting a *NEW_VIEW* message before proposing new requests, as detailed below.

The *NEW_VIEW* message contains the latest application checkpoint, as well as all COMMIT messages about the open slots following this checkpoint from $f+1$ replicas. More precisely, when a replica p receives a *SEAL_VIEW* message from another replica q , p proceeds with generating a certificate share about q ’s state. In fact, this state includes q ’s latest application checkpoint, as well as the latest COMMIT messages sent by q for each one of q ’s open slots. The content of the *NEW_VIEW* message consists of $f+1$ matching certificate shares about $f+1$ different replicas. The broadcast *NEW_VIEW* message constrains the values that the new leader can propose for open slots. That is, for every open consensus slot, the new leader is required to propose the value of the COMMIT message with the highest view number (if any).

The view change mechanism prevents a leader from omitting requests that were decided in previous views. Intuitively, if a correct replica decided on a request in some view, it must have received $f+1$ matching COMMIT messages. As the leader collects certificates about $f+1$ replicas, it must necessarily include at least one certificate with a COMMIT message for all decided requests.




Figure 4: Communication pattern of uBFT’s fast path. Bold lines represent messages sent over CTBcast. Thinner lines represent direct messages.

5.4 Fast Path

To operate at the microsecond scale, uBFT incorporates a fast path—shown in Figure 4—that moves signatures out of the critical path in times of synchrony and unanimous collaboration. Similar to the slow path, the fast path has three phases: *Prepare*, which is common with the slow path but executes the fast path of CTBcast, followed by *WillCertify* and *WillCommit*. The last two phases replace the *Certify* and *Commit* phases of the slow path with inexpensive rounds of Tail Broadcast.

The operation of the fast path is simple. For a given consensus slot, after the end of the *Prepare* phase, replicas broadcast a `WILL_CERTIFY` message and wait to receive the same message from all others. Once received, they proceed with broadcasting a `WILL_COMMIT` message and again wait for unanimity before deciding on the proposed value. Both messages contain solely the view number and the consensus slot. These messages are essentially promises that their broadcaster will run the slow path before CTBcast-broadcasting its next `SEAL_VIEW` message. By broadcasting `WILL_CERTIFY`, a replica promises to participate in certifying the `PREPARE` message. With `WILL_COMMIT`, it promises to CTBcast-broadcast the resulting certificate within a `COMMIT` message.

The safety of this scheme is intuitive. If a replica receives $2f+1$ `WILL_CERTIFY` messages, it knows that at least $f+1$ correct replicas will certify the `PREPARE` message in the *Certify* phase. Similarly, receiving $2f+1$ `WILL_COMMIT` messages means that at least $f+1$ correct replicas will send a `COMMIT` message in the *Commit* phase and thus no other value will be decided for this slot.

The fast path also takes care of finite memory as it does not keep promises forever: it drops the promises that refer to consensus slots included in an application checkpoint. These checkpoints along with the CTBcast summaries make up the required background signatures of uBFT’s fast path.

Lastly, the fast path eschews signatures between clients and replicas by having the clients send unsigned requests to all replicas, instead of a signed request to the leader. A replica endorses a `PREPARE` message on a client request only if it also received it from the client. Thus, the fast path contains an additional communication round (denoted *Echo Req*) in which the leader waits for the followers to echo the client request before proposing it. This way, a Byzantine client cannot cause a leader to get stuck (and thus incur a view change) by not sending its requests to all correct replicas.




Figure 5: Reliable SWMR Regular registers using RDMA.

6 IMPLEMENTATION

The design of uBFT relies on disaggregated memory to build the shared registers used by CTBcast, and on a fast networking fabric to achieve its microsecond-level latency. This section explains how we use RDMA [85] to achieve these goals.

6.1 Reliable SWMR Regular Registers

The CTBcast component of uBFT requires reliable SWMR regular registers. *Reliable* means that the registers do not fail, i.e., READs and WRITEs always complete. *SWMR* means Single-Writer Multiple-Reader: each register has an owner, which is a replica that is allowed to write to it, while all other replicas may only read the register. *Regular* means that, when a READ executes concurrently to a WRITE, the former should return either the value that is being written or the previous one. We explain below how to implement each property using RDMA.

SWMR Register. We implement SWMR registers using RDMA permissions. RDMA splits memory into regions, each with different access permissions based on a token. We create a read-write and a read-only region for the same memory range, give the read-write token to the writer of the register, and the read-only token to the other replicas.

Regular Register. RDMA-exposed memory is atomic (hence regular), but only at an 8-byte granularity. While RDMA WRITEs have left-to-right ordering, RDMA READs do not. Thus, an RDMA READ concurrent with a WRITE may return partially written data, mixing old and new values. To detect this problem, we use checksums, as in Pilaf [69]. A simple approach, where a reader retries until the checksum is valid, violates liveness as a Byzantine writer can write bogus checksums. To avoid such scenario, we follow an evolved double-buffering strategy, which ensures that a reader is always able to find a complete WRITE or detect the owner of the register as being Byzantine. As depicted in Figure 5, each register is made of two sub-registers. Each WRITE to a given register is directed to one of the sub-registers in a round-robin manner. To write a value, the writer prefixes it with a logical timestamp (denoted *ts*) and a checksum. Importantly, the writer waits for δ (the known communication bound after GST) between two WRITES to the same register. To perform a READ, the reader reads both sub-registers at once and, out of the values with a valid checksum, returns the




Figure 6: uBFT’s RDMA-powered message-passing primitive.

one with the highest timestamp.³ If both checksums are invalid and the READ took less than δ , the writer is Byzantine and a default value is returned. Otherwise, the READ is retried. The writer is also deemed Byzantine if both sub-registers have the same timestamp. This scheme works in an eventually synchronous system with bounded-drift clocks [34, 41]: when the writer and a reader are correct, a READ does not overlap with two WRITES, so one of the sub-registers will have a valid checksum, and ordering based on timestamps ensures regular register semantics.

Reliable Register. We replicate each register to $2f_m + 1$ memory nodes, where each memory node exposes its memory over RDMA (Figure 5). Here, f_m is the maximum number of memory nodes that may crash. While memory nodes add to the total number of replicas in the system, these nodes do not replicate the application, and they can be shared among many replicated applications, as each application takes a small amount of space in the memory nodes (§7.6). Our register replication scheme is straightforward. WRITES are issued to all memory nodes in parallel and return after having completed at $f_m + 1$ of them. READs are also issued to all nodes in parallel, wait for $f_m + 1$ of them to complete, and return the value of the regular register with the highest timestamp. This scheme tolerates Byzantine replicas, as READs and WRITES always complete at a majority, and preserves regular semantics. Indeed, when a READ is not concurrent to any WRITE, intersecting quorums ensure that the last written value is returned. In case of concurrency, the READ intersects with the concurrent WRITE in some register and with the last completed WRITE in some other register. Thus, it will return a value no older than the value of the last completed WRITE, ensuring regularity.

6.2 A Fast Message-Passing Primitive

To achieve microsecond-scale communication, uBFT implements a fast one-way messaging primitive between a sender and a receiver, where the receiver is required to deliver only the last t messages

³The hardware is allowed to reorder RDMA READs following RDMA WRITEs when issued to different Queue Pairs (QPs) [10]. To ensure regularity, i.e., that subsequent register READs see the RDMA-written value, a register WRITE only returns after the PCIe WRITE transaction reaches the last-level cache (L3). We do so by issuing an RDMA READ after the RDMA WRITE to the same QP—which acts as a PCIe fence [40]—and only considering that the register WRITE completes when the RDMA READ completes.

of the sender, similarly to CTBcast. This primitive allows an implementation without receiver acknowledgements, which we found to be important for microsecond-scale performance.

Figure 6 depicts the implementation of this primitive over RDMA. The receiver has a circular buffer exposed over RDMA; the buffer is divided into t slots of equal size large enough for the largest message. Briefly, the sender RDMA-writes messages to the receiver’s buffer, while the latter scans its local buffer for new messages. There are no acknowledgments: the sender overwrites old messages with newer ones, even if they were not yet received.

We now explain this implementation in detail. The sender allocates a mirror image of the receiver’s buffer in its local memory, and maintains locally a *write pointer* to the slot for its next message. Each slot has a header composed of a checksum, an incarnation number (the number of times it was written), and a message size. To send a new message, the sender writes it to the slot pointed by the writer pointer and fills its header. Then, it issues an RDMA WRITE to the corresponding slot in the receiver’s memory, and marks the slot as unavailable until it is notified of the completion of the WRITE by the RDMA NIC. Finally, the sender advances its write pointer. If the pointed slot is unavailable, the new message is queued in a second (not depicted) circular buffer. This buffer acts as a staging area: it forwards its messages for transmission when slots become available, and evicts the oldest queued message to accommodate a newer one.

The receiver maintains a *read pointer* to the slot where it will read the next message. The receiver polls this slot for a particular incarnation number, which identifies the next message it expects to find. Once this incarnation number is seen, the receiver copies the entire message to a private buffer in order to avoid interfering WRITEs on the same slot. Then, the receiver checks the incarnation number again in the copied message. If the incarnation number has not changed, the sender verifies the checksum before delivering the message (rescheduling the polling if the checksum is invalid). If the receiver finds a higher incarnation number than expected, it concludes that some older messages may exist in other slots of the buffer that will have to be delivered first. So, the receiver aborts the delivery and advances its pointer to the oldest undelivered message. With this strategy, the receiver guarantees FIFO delivery of the last t messages.

This scheme has two benefits: it uses practically bounded memory and avoids acknowledgements. The latter—even when batched—increases the application’s tail latency as scheduling an acknowledgement alone takes ≈ 300 ns [50], which is time lost handling incoming events. Instead, by the End-to-End Principle [79], acknowledgements are piggybacked in SMR-level messages.

7 EVALUATION

We evaluate the various performance traits of uBFT and verify its suitability as a BFT SMR system for microsecond applications. We aim to answer the following:

- How much latency does uBFT induce on the replicated applications (§7.1)?
- How does the replication latency of uBFT compare to other SMR systems (§7.2)?

Table 1: Hardware details of machines.

CPU	2x Intel Xeon Gold 6244 CPU @ 3.60 GHz (8 cores/16 threads per socket)
NIC	Mellanox ConnectX-6 MT28908
Switch	Mellanox MSB7700 EDR 100 Gbps
OS/Kernel	Ubuntu 20.04.2 / 5.4.0-74-generic
RDMA Driver	Mellanox OFED 5.3-1.0.0.1

- How do the internal components of uBFT contribute to its end-to-end latency (§7.3)?
- How does our implementation of CTBcast perform in comparison to SGX-based non-equivocation mechanisms (§7.4)?
- How does the tail parameter of CTBcast impact uBFT’s tail-latency (§7.5)?
- What is the memory consumption of uBFT (§7.6)?

We evaluate uBFT in a 4-node cluster, the details of which are given in Table 1. Our dual-socket machines are NUMA and their RDMA NIC lies on the first socket. For this reason, we ensure that all threads during our experiments execute on cores of the first socket. We also exclusively use the memory bank closest to this socket.

Our implementation [4] measures time using the `clock_gettime` function with the `CLOCK_MONOTONIC` parameter. The function uses the TSC clock source of Linux for efficient and accurate timestamping [76].

In all experiments we deploy 1 client and 3 replicas, and take at least 10,000 measurements. Additionally, we set the consensus window to 256 requests and—unless stated otherwise—the tail parameter of CTBcast to 128 messages.

Applications. We integrate uBFT with MemCached [50], Redis [80] and Liquibook [73]. MemCached and Redis are non-replicated high-performance KV-stores. Liquibook is a data structure that implements a financial order matching engine. We also integrate all the aforementioned applications with Mu [3], the SMR system that has the lowest replication latency (to our knowledge) but tolerates only crash faults. In all applications, the client sends messages using uBFT’s RPC mechanism. Additionally, using a no-op application, we compare uBFT against MinBFT [88], a state-of-the-art $2f+1$ BFT SMR system with a publicly available implementation which uses Intel’s SGX [28]. SGX provides a secure CPU enclave for executing arbitrary code, thus offering a general-purpose trusted computing base.

Implementation Effort. We implemented uBFT on top of a framework [41] that facilitates the use of RDMA. Our prototype spans 11,750 lines of C++, out of which 2,966 are dedicated to CTBcast. The prototype includes all features on the critical path of a complete implementation: the only major unimplemented features are application and replica state transfers. We use Dalek’s implementation of EdDSA over Curve25519 [61] for public-key cryptography, BLAKE3 [74] for HMACs and xxHash [26] for checksums.

7.1 End-to-End Application Latency

Figure 7 explores the replication overhead that uBFT induces to end applications. We compare the latency of its fast path against




Figure 7: End-to-end latency of different applications when either not replicated or replicated via Mu and uBFT’s fast path. The printed values are the 90th %iles. The whiskers show the 50th and 95th %iles.

the unreplicated latency, and the latency when replicating with Mu. We study four applications: Flip, a toy application that reverses its input, as well as Memcached, Redis, and Liquibook.

The KV-stores use 16 B keys and 32 B values. Our workload is 30% GETs, out of which 80% succeed and return a non-empty value. Liquibook’s requests are 32 B. Its responses range from 32 B to 288 B, depending on how many orders match. 50% of the orders are BUY and 50% SELL. Finally, Flip’s requests and responses are 32 B long.

From the figure, observe that uBFT is consistently slower than Mu by approximately 7.5 μs at the 90th percentile. uBFT’s additional induced end-to-end latency is most significant for ultra fast applications, such as Flip, for which our system is 3 times slower than Mu. As the application’s unreplicated latency increases, uBFT’s latency overhead diminishes. For Liquibook, it is 2× slower than Mu and for the KV-stores, it is only 1.5× slower. At the same time, uBFT’s replication increases the latency variance (i.e., the difference between the 50th and 95th percentiles) compared to Mu, which is a consequence of the complexity of our system. More precisely, uBFT’s RPC requires one more round of communication than Mu’s to ensure that all correct replicas have received the client request. Additionally, uBFT’s replication scheme requires 4 rounds of broadcast before replying to the client instead of a single majority WRITE in Mu. Overall, uBFT’s fast path has 4 additional rounds of communication compared to Mu, hence the higher tail latency. Nevertheless, uBFT does not worsen the variance by more than 3 μs.

In a nutshell, with uBFT, assuming a timely network and the absence of failures, an unreplicated application that operates at the microsecond-scale envelope requires at most an extra 10 μs to become Byzantine fault tolerant.

7.2 End-to-End Replication Latency

We now explore the impact of the size of requests on the end-to-end latency of uBFT. Figure 8 shows the median client-side latency for various request sizes to a no-op application with different replication schemes. The service replies with responses matching the size of requests.

As expected, the lowest latency is achieved without any replication (denoted *Unrepl.*). Here, the end-to-end latency ranges from




Figure 8: Median end-to-end latency for different request sizes of an unreplicated no-op application, as well as its latency when replicated with Mu, uBFT and MinBFT.

2.2 μ s to 20 μ s, which is attributed to communicating with the server side using our RPC. The other lines show the service replicated with: Mu, our BFT SMR solution, and MinBFT, a 2f+1 BFT alternative.

Mu’s replication increases the end-to-end latency by up to 64% for small requests and by at most 26% for 8 KiB ones. In the absence of failures, Mu’s leader replicates the requests it receives by just RDMA-writing them to its followers. uBFT’s fast path exhibits higher latency than Mu due to its 4 additional rounds of communication, yet it only increases the overhead compared to the latter by at most 175%, even though it offers Byzantine fault tolerance.

One could expect that uBFT’s fast path would come at the cost of high latency in the slow path, yet this is not the case. We compare our slow path against MinBFT, with the latter operating in two configurations. In its vanilla configuration, MinBFT uses HMACs only between the replicas, however the clients sign the requests sent to the service using public-key cryptography, leading to a minimum end-to-end latency of 566 μ s. We modify MinBFT to also use SGX in the clients, thus replacing their expensive cryptography with HMACs. Since our setup does not offer SGX, we stub it using the latency results of Section 7.4. Note that MinBFT is not an RDMA-tailored application and it uses standard TCP in its implementation.

To increase the fairness of our comparison with MinBFT, we use Mellanox’s VMA library [86] to replace MinBFT’s TCP stack with a kernel-bypass alternative that uses RDMA NICs for increased performance. The end result is that uBFT’s slow path is faster than vanilla MinBFT (up to 109%) and at most 24% slower than its purely HMAC-based variant, even though our slow path uses public-key cryptography.

7.3 Latency Breakdown

To get a better understanding of uBFT’s end-to-end latency, we analyze the latency of its internal components.

Figure 9 shows a recursive decomposition of the latency of an 8 B Flip request into its constituents: remote-procedure call, Consistent Tail Broadcast and replication (denoted *RPC*, *CTB* and *SMR* respectively). The rightmost columns of the figure show the client perceived latency (denoted *E2E*). Each bar has two regions: the




Figure 9: Recursive decomposition of the end-to-end latency of uBFT’s fast and slow path when replicating Flip with requests of 8 B.

narrow left one shows the overall latency of the component, while the wider right one shows its decomposition.

In our decomposition, we identify four primitive sources of latency. First is the time for communication over our message-passing primitive (denoted *P2P*). Next is the time for producing and verifying signatures (denoted *Crypto*), and the time for reading and writing to the disaggregated memory registers (denoted *SMR*). Both of these are only relevant in uBFT’s slow path. The *Crypto* primitive goes beyond pure cryptographic computation, as it includes the synchronization cost of issuing the operation to a thread pool and getting back the result. Lastly, there is the time spent in bridging these basic primitives and connecting the components (denoted *Other*). This last category includes copying buffers, delays between the arrival and processing of asynchronous events, etc.

We can see that, in the fast path, most of the time is spent in communication. Given the small size of the messages, the potential avenues for improving the overall latency is to either reduce the number of communication steps or reduce the latency of the underlying network fabric. In the slow path, public-key cryptography dominates. Given that signatures are unavoidable in our setting [5], achieving better latency requires faster cryptographic primitives. Also, notice that the cost of accessing disaggregated memory—which is part of *CTB*—is negligible, as it accounts for 14 μ s (3.5%) of the end-to-end latency.

7.4 Latency of Non-Equivocation

Figure 9 demonstrates that CTBcast accounts for a substantial portion of the end-to-end latency of our system’s fast and slow paths. By using disaggregated memory, our implementation of CTBcast has an advantage over solutions that use CPU enclaves, since disaggregated memory is a much smaller and simpler trusted computing base. Moreover, the fast/slow path approach of our implementation allows it to operate fast in the common case by entirely bypassing signatures and the trusted computing base. This section quantifies the performance of our implementation of CTBcast against the de facto way of preventing equivocation in modern systems [15, 60, 88], namely a trusted counter implemented on Intel’s SGX.




Figure 10: Median latency of multiple non-equivocation mechanisms for different message sizes.

Non-equivocation mechanisms based on trusted counters work by securely binding a monotonically increasing sequence number to each message broadcast by a process. All enclaves store a local *counter* and share a common *secret*. Before broadcasting a message, a process feeds it to its local enclave and gets back a proof of non-equivocation of the form $HMAC_{secret}(msg||counter||process\ id)$. The recipients of a message use their own local enclave to verify the authenticity of the HMAC, and thus prevent equivocation. Note that, as authentication takes place exclusively in the enclaves, this non-equivocation mechanism avoids the use of expensive public-key cryptography.

Figure 10 shows the median latency of the two non-equivocation mechanisms between a sender and two receivers. The lowest latency is achieved by the fast path of our implementation of CTBcast and ranges from $2.2\ \mu s$ to $11\ \mu s$ depending on the message size. In this mode of operation, CTBcast delivers on unanimous and timely participation of all processes to avoid signatures and prevent equivocation using merely two rounds of Tail Broadcast. CTBcast’s slow path (triggered under failures) relies on public-key cryptography, which dominates the latency and raises it to approximately $86\ \mu s$. The latency of preventing equivocation using SGX includes accessing the enclave twice, once in the sender and once in the receiver, as well as broadcasting the message.

Due to the lack of SGX in our RDMA experimental setup, we evaluate the cost of accessing the SGX on different hardware to get a good approximation. The SGX hardware is provided by a machine with an Intel i7-7700K CPU running at 4.2 GHz, which is 0.6 GHz higher than the CPU frequency of our RDMA setup. Accessing the enclave (once) ranges from $7\ \mu s$ to $12.5\ \mu s$, which makes preventing equivocation using the SGX take at least $16\ \mu s$. The resulting latency is shown in the middle line of Figure 10.

Overall, for both non-equivocation approaches, larger message sizes lead to a linearly higher latency, due to the hashing and communication latency. CTBcast’s fast path is up to $6.5\times$ faster than the SGX solution, by taking advantage of the ultra fast communication.

7.5 Impact of CTBcast’s Tail on Tail Latency

Figure 11 shows how the size of the tail in CTBcast (parameter t) affects the client’s tail latency. We focus on uBFT’s fast path and




Figure 11: uBFT’s tail latency for different CTBcast tails t for 2 KiB requests (top) and 64 B requests (bottom).

execute Flip with small 64 B requests and larger 2 KiB ones. For both request sizes, we explore four *tail* parameters.

For smaller values of t , we see a latency spike indicative of thrashing as we move to higher percentiles. This spike occurs because CTBcast uses a double buffering mechanism with cryptographic summaries (§5.2) to switch between them; if both buffers fill before a summary occurs (due to a small t), CTBcast stalls. The smaller the t , the sooner the buffers fill, the more often CTBcast stalls, and hence the lower the percentile of the spike. For small requests, a tail $t=128$ avoids thrashing up to the 99th percentile. For larger requests, $t=64$ suffices, as filling the buffers takes more time, giving more time for the summary to occur.

7.6 Memory Consumption

Given the fundamental goal of uBFT to operate using finite memory, we monitor the consumption of disaggregated memory and the local memory consumption at the leader replica, while re-running the experiment of Section 7.5.

Table 2 summarizes the results for two different request sizes (64 B and 2 KiB) and four different *tail* parameters of CTBcast (16, 32, 64 and 128). For the small 64 B requests, the local memory consumption starts at $0.46\ GiB$. This is the entire memory that uBFT preallocates at startup and uses during its lifetime. When CTBcast’s tail t increases, uBFT’s memory consumption increases linearly by $\approx 1\ MiB$ for each additional message in the tail. For the large 2 KiB requests, the memory consumption starts at $4.3\ GiB$ ($t=16$) and increases at a rate of $\approx 11\ MiB$ per message.

uBFT consumes little disaggregated memory. The last row of Table 2 shows the memory used at a single memory node. This amount is independent of the size of requests and depends only on CTBcast’s tail t : messages sent over CTBcast are transmitted using

Table 2: uBFT replica (top) and disaggregated (bottom) memory usage for different CTBcast tails t and request sizes.

Request size	$t = 16$	$t = 32$	$t = 64$	$t = 128$
64 B	0.46 GiB	0.47 GiB	0.49 GiB	0.53 GiB
2 KiB	4.3 GiB	4.5 GiB	4.8 GiB	5.5 GiB
Disag. Mem.	20 KiB	40 KiB	81 KiB	162 KiB

our fast message-passing primitive; upon receiving a message, a receiver writes to disaggregated memory only the message’s id and its fingerprint (a 32 B cryptographic hash); the register implementation (§6.1) stores two copies, each with an 8 B checksum. To save space, registers use the identifiers of messages as their timestamps.

8 RELATED WORK

uBFT uses RDMA to instantiate disaggregated memory. Prior work identifies some benefits and downsides of using RDMA in an adversarial environment. Aguilera *et al.* [2, 5] propose new RDMA-based techniques to enhance the resilience and performance of BFT algorithms. That work is abstract and far from practical solutions: it requires infinite memory and solves only single-shot consensus, stopping short of a solution for an SMR system. Rüsch *et al.* [78] design a Byzantine fault tolerant system that uses RDMA to improve performance, but requires $3f+1$ processes.

Prior work identifies vulnerabilities in the current generation of RDMA hardware and proposes ways to mitigate them [77, 84]. That work is orthogonal to uBFT and could be applied to it. We expect that these problems will eventually be fixed with future NICs.

With a black-box mechanism to prevent equivocation, only $2f+1$ replicas are required for BFT [16, 17, 25, 27]. Several BFT systems achieve that using trusted hardware as the black box: attested append-only memory (A2M) [24] uses a trusted log, TrInc [59] and MinBFT [88] use a trusted counter, Hybster [15] uses Intel’s SGX, CheapBFT [51] uses FPGAs, and H-MFT [94] uses trusted hypervisors to implement write-once tables. By separating execution from agreement [91], one can reduce the number of execution replicas to $2f+1$, but $3f+1$ replicas are still required for agreement. Avocado [12] implements a high-performance replicated confidential KV-store using CPU enclaves as the trusted computing base.

Blockchain systems also tolerate Byzantine failures, but their latency is in the seconds or minutes due to their heavy use of cryptography [37, 52], proof of work [35, 71], and/or batching [20, 92]. The recent SplitBFT [65] uses SGX and $3f+1$ replicas to strengthen the safety and confidentiality of blockchains in public clouds.

While most of the prior work is not focused on microsecond-scale latency (and hence came up with different solutions from ours), some recent SMR systems aim for lower latency. Mu [3] is highly optimized and provides microsecond-scale performance, but tolerates only crash failures. SBFT [38] tolerates Byzantine failures and uses a fast path to improve latency, but does not achieve microsecond-scale performance due to its use of cryptography. BFT SMR systems with $3f+1$ replicas can avoid cryptographic signatures, for example, in PBFT’s optimized implementations [23]. However, this is impossible in a system with $2f+1$ replicas [27]; the key to uBFT’s performance is thus avoiding signatures on the fast path.

Carbink [93] and Hydra [56] build reliable disaggregated memory to improve memory utilization in a cluster, albeit without support for concurrent shared access. MIND [55], GAM [22] and Clover [87], on the other hand, provide reliable shared memory, but they do not tolerate Byzantine writers.

9 DISCUSSION

Does microsecond $2f+1$ BFT require disaggregated memory?

To achieve microsecond-scale BFT SMR, one must avoid the use of expensive signatures and trusted components in the critical path. uBFT does so via a fast/slow path design that uses disaggregated memory in the slow path. This leads to a small trusted computing base, but there may be other ways to achieve non-equivocation in CTBcast’s slow path without affecting fast-path performance.

Can uBFT work with a Byzantine network? uBFT assumes network connections are authenticated and tamper-proof, which is realistic in data centers, where widely deployed protocols such as IPsec and SSL provide such guarantees at line rate. What if such protocols are not available? We can implement simple authenticated channels within uBFT without signatures in the critical path, by augmenting messages with an HMAC. With BLAKE3, creating or verifying 256-bits HMACs takes ≈ 100 ns. As a result, we expect less than 2 μ s of additional overhead on the fast path of uBFT.

What about uBFT’s throughput? Any system can provide a throughput that is inverse of its latency. For uBFT, that amounts to ≈ 91 kops for small 32 B requests. uBFT doubles this figure, by exploiting the slack between the processing of events in a consensus slot to interleave two requests with minimal latency penalty. Throughput can be further optimized using well-known techniques, such as batching [31] and running parallel consensus instances on multiple cores [15], but we have not done so.

10 CONCLUSION

uBFT is the first BFT SMR system to achieve microsecond-scale latency, $2f+1$ replicas, practically bounded memory, and a small non-tailored trusted computing base. To do that, uBFT introduces Consistent Tail Broadcast to prevent equivocation, and a matching consensus algorithm. uBFT uses disaggregated memory as a trusted computing base, which our prototype implements using RDMA. We applied uBFT to three applications to show that BFT can be realistic in data centers even in latency-critical settings.

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A CORRECTNESS OF CONSISTENT TAIL BROADCAST

In this section, we provide a correctness argument for the implementation of CTBcast given in Algorithm 1.

OBSERVATION 1. *A correct broadcaster p TBcast-broadcasts at most one `LOCK` message and at most one `SIGNED` message per sequence number k . Moreover, both of these broadcasts hold the same message m .*

OBSERVATION 2. *A correct process p TBcast-broadcasts at most one `LOCKED` message per sequence number k .*

PROOF. Correct processes only broadcast `LOCKED` messages at line 16. Moreover, $\text{locks}[k\%t]$, which is only modified at lines 15 and 29, is updated strictly monotonically. Thus, once the branch is entered at line 14 (and thus $\text{locks}[k\%t]$ updated at line 15), it cannot be entered for the same k , which ensures that line 16 is executed at most once per k at correct processes. \square

LEMMA A.1 (TAIL-VALIDITY). *If a correct process p broadcasts (k, m) and never broadcasts a message (k', m') with $k' \geq k + t$, then all correct processes eventually deliver (k, m) .*

PROOF. Let p, k, m be as in the statement of the lemma and let q be a correct receiver. We will show that q eventually delivers (k, m) , which is sufficient to prove the lemma.

Since p is correct, p TBcast-broadcasts $\langle \text{SIGNED}, k, m, \text{sig} \rangle$ with a valid signature. Since both p and q are correct, q eventually TBcast-delivers it.

The $\langle \text{SIGNED}, k, m, \text{sig} \rangle$ message of p will trigger at q the event at line 25. Given that p 's signature is valid, the check at line 26 succeeds. By the premise, p does not broadcast any message with sequence number $k' \geq k + t$, so $\text{locks}[k\%t]$, which is only modified at lines 15 and 29, cannot contain a value greater than k . Moreover, since no other message m is broadcast for k (Observation 1), if $\text{locks}[k\%t]$ already contains k , it must also contain the message m . Thus, q enters the if branch at line 28. Since p is correct and no process can forge p 's signature, no validly signed entry (k, m') with $m \neq m'$ can exist in any process's SWMR slot, so q does not return by triggering the check at line 33. Finally, since p does not broadcast any message with sequence number $k' \geq k + t$, no process's SWMR slot can contain a validly signed entry (k', \cdot) with $k' > k$ and $k' \equiv k \pmod{t}$, so q does not return by triggering the check at line 35. Therefore, q must call $\text{deliver_once}(k, m)$ at line 37. If this call does not deliver (k, m) , it must have been delivered before. Thus, q eventually delivers (k, m) . \square

LEMMA A.2 (AGREEMENT). *If p and q are correct processes, p delivers (k, m) from r , and q delivers (k, m') from r , then $m = m'$.*

PROOF. Assume towards a contradiction that $m \neq m'$. We consider two cases: (1) at least one process delivers via the fast path, and (2) both processes deliver via the slow path.

In case (1), assume wlog that p delivers via the fast path. Then p must have TBcast-delivered a `LOCKED` message from q for (k, m) . So q must have TBcast-broadcast a `LOCKED` message at line 16. By Observation 2, q cannot have broadcast a `LOCKED` message for (k, m') . Thus, it cannot have delivered m' via the fast path.

Moreover, q must have put m in $\text{locks}[k\%t]$ at line 15. Thus q cannot enter the if branch at line 28 and cannot deliver (k, m') via the slow path either, hence a contradiction.

In case (2), assume wlog that p writes (k, sig, m) to $\text{SWMR}[p][k\%t]$ (line 30) before q writes (k, sig', m') to $\text{SWMR}[q][k\%t]$. Thus, when q reads p 's $k\%t$ slot at line 31, q sees either (i) (k, sig, m) or (ii) (k'', \cdot, \cdot) with $k'' > k$, and $k'' \equiv k \pmod{t}$. In case (i), q will return by triggering the check at line 33, and thus not deliver (k, m') , a contradiction. In case (ii), q will return by triggering the check at line 35, and thus not deliver, a contradiction. \square

LEMMA A.3 (INTEGRITY). *If a correct process delivers (k, m) from p and p is correct, p must have broadcast (k, m) .*

PROOF. Let p and q be correct processes and assume q delivers (k, m) from p . There are two possible cases: (1) q delivers using the fast path at line 23, or (2) q delivers using the slow path at line 37.

In case (1), q must have TBcast-delivered `LOCKED` messages for (k, m) from all processes, including itself. Therefore q must have TBcast-broadcast a `LOCKED` message for (k, m) at line 16 after TBcast-delivering a `LOCK` message for (k, m) from p . Thus, p must have TBcast-broadcast a `LOCK` message, which p can only do as part of the CTBcast-broadcast call. So p must have broadcast (k, m) .

In case (2), q must have TBcast-delivered a valid `SIGNED` message from p for (k, m) . Since p is correct and no process can forge its signature, p must have broadcast a `SIGNED` message for (k, m) . So p must have broadcast (k, m) . \square

LEMMA A.4 (NO DUPLICATION). *No correct process delivers $(k, *)$ from p twice.*

PROOF. Correct processes only deliver through `deliver_once`. Lines 40 and 41 ensure that a correct process only triggers `deliver` at most once per sequence number k . \square

THEOREM A.5. *From Lemmas A.1, A.2, A.3 and A.4, Algorithm 1 implements all the properties of Consistent Tail Broadcast.* \square

B CORRECTNESS OF CONSENSUS

This section gives the pseudocode of uBFT's consensus alongside a correctness argument. Algorithm 2 describes uBFT's operation under a stable leader. Algorithm 3 describes view changes. Algorithm 4 describes how summaries let uBFT handle the gaps caused by CTBcast's tail-validity. Finally, Algorithm 5 gives the explicit requirements for messages to pass CTBcast's Byzantine checks.

B.1 Validity

LEMMA B.1. *For a fixed slot s , with no faulty processes, if some process p delivers and accepts $\langle \text{PREPARE}, v, s, r \rangle$ in Algorithm 2 at line 18, then r must have been proposed by some correct process.*

PROOF SKETCH. We will prove the lemma by induction on the view v in which p accepts the `PREPARE` message. The base case is $v = 0$. Process p must have delivered a `PREPARE` message for r from the leader ℓ_0 of view 0. Since ℓ_0 is correct, it only sends `PREPARE` messages for values that are in its input, or for values that are part of a valid view change certificate from the previous view. Since there is no previous view in view 0, it must be that r was ℓ_0 's input.

Algorithm 2: Common Case (stable leader)

```

1   CTBcasts FIFO-deliver and block upon a Byzantine message

3 upon Init:
4   view = 0
5   next_slot = 0
6   checkpoint = (app_state: Initial, open_slots: [0, 99]) $\Sigma$ 
7   for each replica:
8     state[replica] = {
9       view = 0, seal_view = ⊥, new_view = ⊥,
10      prepares: Map<slot, PREPARE> = {},
11      commits: Map<slot, COMMIT> = {},
12      checkpoint = (Initial, [0, 99]) $\Sigma$  }

14 def Propose(req):
15   wait (leader(view) == me and next_slot in checkpoint.
16     ↪ open_slots and NEW_VIEW broadcast if view > 0)
17   CTBcast-bcast <PREPARE, view, next_slot++, req>

18 upon CTBcast-dlvr <PREPARE, v, s, r> from p as P:
19   state[p].prepares[s] = P
20   if v != view or s  $\notin$  checkpoint.open_slots: return
21   TBcast-bcast <WILL_CERTIFY, v, s> # Fast path
22   TBcast-bcast <CERTIFY, sign(P)> # Slow path

24 # Fast path
25 upon TBcast-dlvr <WILL_CERTIFY, v, s> from 2f+1:
26   if v != view or s  $\notin$  checkpoint.open_slots: return
27   TBcast-bcast <WILL_COMMIT, v, s>

29 upon TBcast-dlvr <WILL_COMMIT, v, s> from 2f+1:
30   if v != view or s  $\notin$  checkpoint.open_slots: return
31   trigger once Decide(s, state[leader(v)].prepares[s].req)

33 # Slow path
34 upon TBcast-dlvr <CERTIFY, <P., v, s, _> $_\sigma$ > from f+1 as P $\Sigma$ :
35   if v != view or s  $\notin$  checkpoint.open_slots: return
36   CTBcast-bcast <COMMIT, P $\Sigma$ >

38 upon CTBcast-dlvr <COMMIT, P $\Sigma$ > from p as C:
39   state[p].commits[P $\Sigma$ .slot] = C
40   if dlvred f+1 COMMIT with a matching PREPARE:
41     trigger once Decide(P $\Sigma$ .slot, P $\Sigma$ .req)

43 # Checkpoints
44 after having decided on all checkpoint.open_slots:
45   wait for all decided requests to be applied to the App
46   next_cp = (App.Snapshot(), checkpoint.open_slots + 100)
47   TBcast-bcast <CERTIFY_CHECKPOINT, sign(next_cp)>

49 upon TBcast-dlvr <CERTIFY_CHECKPOINT, c $_\sigma$ > from f+1 as C $\Sigma$ :
50   MaybeCheckpoint(C $\Sigma$ )

52 upon CTBcast-dlvr <CHECKPOINT, C $\Sigma$ > from p as CP:
53   state[p].checkpoint = CP
54   forget state[p].commits and prepares  $\notin$  C $\Sigma$ .open_slots
55   MaybeCheckpoint(C $\Sigma$ )

57 def MaybeCheckpoint(C $\Sigma$ ):
58   if C $\Sigma$  supersedes checkpoint:
59     checkpoint = C $\Sigma$ 
60     App.BringUpToSpeed(checkpoint)
61     TBcast-bcast <CHECKPOINT, checkpoint>

```

Now, for the induction step, assume that the lemma is true up to view v , and examine the case in which p accepts $\langle \text{PREPARE}, v+1, s, r \rangle$ in view $v+1$. All processes are assumed to be correct, so the PREPARE message must have been sent by ℓ_{v+1} , the leader of view $v+1$. Correct processes only send one PREPARE message per slot per view, so ℓ_{v+1} must have sent $\langle \text{PREPARE}, v+1, s, r \rangle$ either as a new proposal, or during the view change from v to $v+1$, in Algorithm 3 at line 18. In the first case, r is by definition proposed by a correct

Algorithm 3: View Change

```

1 upon suspicion of leader(view): ChangeView()

3 def ChangeView():
4   for each <WILL_COMMIT, v| $_{\sigma==view}$ , s> bcast via TBcast:
5     wait to have broadcast a matching COMMIT or CHECKPOINT
6     CTBcast-bcast <SEAL_VIEW, ++view>

8 upon CTBcast-dlvr <SEAL_VIEW, v> from p as SV:
9   state[p].seal_view = SV
10  state[p].view = v
11  sendleader(v) <CRTFY_VC, v, sign((p, state[p]\new_view))>

13 upon dlvr f+1 matching <CRTFY_VC, v| $_{\sigma==view}$ , s $_\sigma$ > about f+1
14   ↪ replicas as C:
15   if me != leader(view): return
16   CTBcast-bcast <NEW_VIEW, C>
17   MaybeCheckpoint(highest checkpoint in C)
18   for s in checkpoint.open_slots:
19     CTBcast <PREPARE, v, s, MustPropose(s, C)>
20   next_slot = checkpoint.open_slots.last + 1

21 upon CTBcast-dlvr <NEW_VIEW, certificates> from p as NV:
22   state[p].new_view = NV
23   while view != NV.view + 1: ChangeView()

25 def MustPropose(slot, certificates):
26   if slot > max open slot in certificates: return Any
27   return latest committed req for slot in certificates or ⊥

```

Algorithm 4: CTBcast Summaries

```

1 after CTBcast-dlvr the message with id % tail == 0 from p:
2   sendp <CERTIFY_SUMMARY, sign((p, id, state[p]))>

4 every tail invocations of CTBcast-bcast:
5   block calls to CTBcast-bcast

7 upon dlvr <CERTIFY_SUMMARY, (me, id, _) $_\sigma$ > from f+1 as S $\Sigma$ :
8   TBcast-bcast <SUMMARY, S $\Sigma$ >
9   unblock calls to CTBcast-bcast

11 upon TBcast-dlvr <SUMMARY, (p, id, history) $_\Sigma$ >:
12   when a gap is detected in the dlvr of CTBcast from p:
13     if the latest message dlvred from p is lower than id:
14       dlvr in order p's missed CTBcast messages in history
15         ↪ without running the Byzantine checks (Alg. 5)
16       continue dlvrng p's CTBcast messages after id

```

process as part of ℓ_{v+1} 's input. In the second case, r must be a valid value (i.e., be returned by MustPropose), given the view change certificates for view v . There are two cases in which r is such a valid value: (1) one of the certificates contains a COMMIT messages for r in v' with $v' \leq v$, or (2) none of the certificates contain a COMMIT message for r , and r is the input of ℓ_{v+1} . In case (1), a quorum of processes must have delivered and accepted $\langle \text{PREPARE}, v', s, r \rangle$ messages in view v' with $v' \leq v$ and thus, by induction, r must have been proposed by some correct process. In case (2), r is also proposed by a correct process. This concludes the induction step and the proof. \square

THEOREM B.2 (WEAK VALIDITY). *For a fixed slot s , with no faulty processes, if some process p decides value r in s , then r must have been proposed by some correct process.*

PROOF SKETCH. Process p may decide r either at (1) line 31 (fast path), or (2) at line 41 (slow path) of Algorithm 2. Let v be the view in which p decides r . In case (1), p must have delivered and accepted

Algorithm 5: CTBcast's Byzantine Checks

```

1  def valid <PREPARE, v, s, r> from p:
2    state[p].view == v and leader(v) == p and
3    s in state[p].checkpoint.open_slots and
4    p never prepared slot s before in v and
5    (v == 0 or (state[p].new_view != ⊥ and
6      r == MustPropose(s, state[p].new_view)))
7
8  def valid <COMMIT, PΣ> from p as C:
9    PΣ.slot in state[p].checkpoint.open_slots and
10   PΣ.view == state[p].view and
11   state[p].commits[PΣ.slot] != C
12
13 def valid <CHECKPOINT, CΣ> from p:
14   CΣ supersedes state[p].checkpoint
15
16 def valid <SEAL_VIEW, v> from p:
17   state[p].view < v
18
19 def valid <NEW_VIEW, certificates> from p:
20   leader(state[p].view) == p and
21   it is p's first non-CHECKPOINT message in this view and
22   each certificate is about a different replica and
23   each certificate is signed by f+1 different replicas and
24   each certificate is about view state[p].view

```

a $\langle \text{PREPARE}, v, s, r \rangle$ in view v , so by Lemma B.1, r must have been proposed by some correct process. In case (2), p must have received valid COMMIT messages for r from a quorum. Thus, a quorum of processes must have delivered and accepted a PREPARE message for r , so by Lemma B.1, r must have been proposed by some correct process. \square

B.2 Agreement

OBSERVATION 3. *For a fixed slot s and view v , two correct processes never deliver and accept conflicting PREPARE messages.*

PROOF SKETCH. Correct processes deliver and accept PREPARE messages only when coming from the leader. Furthermore, they deliver and accept at most one PREPARE message per view per slot. Thus, by the Agreement property of CTBcast, if two correct processes deliver and accept PREPARE messages in the same view, then those messages are for the same value and thus do not conflict. \square

COROLLARY B.3. *For a fixed slot s and view v , two processes never broadcast conflicting valid COMMIT messages.*

PROOF SKETCH. Assume towards a contradiction that two processes q and p broadcast conflicting valid COMMIT messages. Given that each valid COMMIT message is made of a quorum of valid CERTIFY messages, p and q must have delivered two quorums of valid CERTIFY messages about different PREPARE messages. By definition, each quorum must contain one correct process. Moreover, a correct process only broadcasts a CERTIFY message about the PREPARE message it delivered. Thus, two correct processes delivered different PREPARE messages for the same slot in the same view. This contradicts Observation 3. \square

COROLLARY B.4. *For a fixed slot s , the view change certificates corresponding to two processes cannot have conflicting COMMIT messages from the same view.*

PROOF SKETCH. Assume not. Then there exist processes p_1 and p_2 such that their view change certificates at the end of view v are conflicting: they contain different COMMIT messages for values r_1 and r_2 , respectively, from the same view. Since each certificate contains an approval from a quorum, each certificate must have been approved by at least one correct process. Thus, a correct process must have received a COMMIT from p_1 for r_1 and, in the same view, a correct process (not necessarily the same) must have received a COMMIT from p_2 for r_2 . By the Integrity property of CTBcast, this implies that p_1 and p_2 must have sent conflicting commits for the same slot and view, which is impossible by Corollary B.3. \square

LEMMA B.5. *For a fixed slot s and view v , if a quorum broadcasts COMMIT messages for the same value r , then no correct process accepts a PREPARE message for any other value $r' \neq r$ in any view $v' \geq v$.*

PROOF SKETCH. We proceed by induction on v' . The base case is $v' = v$. Since a quorum broadcasts COMMIT messages for r in view v , at least one correct process p must have broadcast a COMMIT for r . Thus, some correct process must have delivered and accepted a PREPARE message for r . Thus, by Observation 3, no correct process may accept a PREPARE for a different value $r' \neq r$ in the same view.

Now, for the induction step, assume the lemma is true up to view v' , and assume that in view $v'+1$, some correct process p accepts a PREPARE message for some other value $r' \neq r$. For this to happen, r' must be a valid value according to the view change certificates provided by the leader $\ell_{v'+1}$ of view $v'+1$. Thus, at least one process q must have sent a COMMIT message C for r' in a view $v'' \leq v'$. Furthermore, C must have been accepted by at least one correct process w , in order for q 's state to have been certified by a quorum. In order for w to accept C , C 's corresponding PREPARE message must have been certified, and thus accepted, by at least one correct process in view v'' . This contradicts our induction hypothesis. So it is impossible for any correct process to accept a PREPARE message for r' in view $v'+1$. This completes the induction step and the proof. \square

THEOREM B.6 (AGREEMENT). *For a given slot s , correct processes cannot decide different values.*

PROOF SKETCH. Assume by contradiction that there exist two correct processes p_1 and p_2 , such that p_1 decides r_1 in view v_1 and p_2 decides $r_2 \neq r_1$ in view v_2 . Assume further wlog that $v_1 \leq v_2$. We consider four cases, based on whether p_1 and p_2 decide on the fast path or the slow path.

Case 1: Fast-fast. Both p_1 and p_2 decide their respective values on the fast path. If $v_1 = v_2$, then p_1 and p_2 must have accepted conflicting PREPAREs in the same view, which is impossible by Observation 3. Otherwise, if $v_1 < v_2$, then at least $f+1$ correct processes (a quorum) must have broadcast COMMIT messages for r_1 before sealing view v_1 . Thus, by Lemma B.5, no correct process can accept a PREPARE for r_2 in v_2 , so p_2 cannot decide r_2 on the fast path in v_2 .

Case 2: Fast-slow. p_1 decides on the fast path and p_2 decides on the slow path. Then, p_1 must have accepted a PREPARE for r_1 in view v_1 (call this Fact 1). Moreover, p_2 must have accepted COMMIT messages for r_2 from a quorum. This implies that a quorum broadcast COMMIT messages for r_2 in some view $v'_2 \leq v_2$ (call this

Fact 2). If $v'_2 \leq v_1$, then we reach a contradiction with Fact 1 by Lemma B.5. If $v'_2 > v_1$, then a quorum of correct processes must have broadcast COMMIT messages for r_1 before sealing v_1 ; thus, by Lemma B.5, we reach a contradiction with Fact 2, since no correct process could have accepted a PREPARE for r_2 in v_2 .

Case 3: Slow-fast. This case is symmetric with Case 2 above.

Case 4: Slow-slow. If both p_1 and p_2 decide on the slow path, then both processes must have accepted COMMIT messages from a quorum. Let v'_1 and v'_2 be the views in which the COMMIT messages accepted by p_1 and p_2 , respectively, were sent. Assume wlog that $v'_1 \leq v'_2$. Then, by Lemma B.5, no correct process could have accepted a PREPARE for r_2 in view v_2 . Thus, no correct process could have sent a COMMIT message for r_2 in v_2 , and thus it is impossible for a quorum to have sent COMMIT messages for r_2 in v_2 .

We have reached a contradiction in all four cases. This completes the proof of the theorem. \square

B.3 Liveness

In this section, we provide informal arguments for the liveness of our protocol. We assume that the system is eventually synchronous and that correct processes propose values infinitely often. Intuitively, liveness is ensured by three mechanisms: (1) the view change mechanism, (2) checkpoints and (3) CTBcast summaries. First, we assume that CTBcast messages are not dropped and explain why liveness is ensured by the first two mechanisms. Then, we complete our explanation with the way CTBcast summaries help overcome the problem of dropped messages.

The view change mechanism ensures that at least one correct process is able to decide forever. Assume towards a contradiction that all correct processes stop deciding. Then, as long as they do not make progress, correct processes will change view thanks to the view change protocol in Algorithm 3. Eventually, after the global stabilization time (GST), all correct processes are guaranteed to (1) reach a view v in which the leader is correct, and (2) communicate with each other in a timely manner. Thus, given that the timely collaboration of $f+1$ processes is enough for the common path described in Algorithm 2 to be live, the correct replicas decide, hence a contradiction.

However, having a single correct process deciding infinitely often is not enough for the overall system to make progress as clients need to obtain a response from $f+1$ processes. The checkpoint mechanism guarantees that, if a correct process p decides on slots infinitely often, then all correct processes also make progress. This is because, in order to keep on making progress (and thus maintain correct processes under its control), the leader of a view is mandated to broadcast a CHECKPOINT message periodically. This message is then re-broadcast by the potentially single correct process in the view and, after GST, delivered by all correct processes. Because checkpoints are transferable, when another correct process receives a checkpoint, it is able to decide on the slots contained in the checkpoint and bring its application state up to speed with the latest decided requests.

Lastly, CTBcast summaries ensure that, if the system were to be reduced to only $f+1$ correct processes, they would be able to continue making progress in spite of CTBcast's delivery gaps. The worst scenario is arguably the one in which a correct process p used

to make progress with f faulty processes before being let down by them, and the other f correct processes ending up with a gap in their CTBcast delivery of p 's messages due to asynchrony. In this case, Algorithm 4 ensures that p will not risk creating a gap before having obtained a summary to help overcoming it. Using this summary, p can let correct processes continue delivering its messages by convincing them that they will not violate the safety of the protocol due to missed messages. Moreover, p will always obtain a new summary: either it will be helped by Byzantine processes, or, after GST, it will get help from correct processes by combining the previous summary with the last t messages it broadcast.

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