

### CS 6156

# Safety Properties and Monitoring

Owolabi Legunsen

Spring 2022

# Some Logistics

- Homework was due today
  - Any problems?
- Reading 3 will be assigned (due 11:59pm AoE on 2/14)

You will start leading the discussion in ~2 weeks

#### Intro to RV: what we talked about

- Events
- Traces
- Properties
- Specification languages
- Specifications

# Intro to RV: today

- Safety Properties
- Monitors
- Monitorability

#### Let's start with some reminders

Alphabets

Words

Languages

#### A conversation from CS6156 Fa'20

 Owolabi: In theory, RV can force the system to always be correct

 Student 1: but... doesn't that depend on how "correctness" is specified, i.e., bad things will never happen, or good things will eventually happen?

• Owolabi: ©

#### More conversation from Fa'20

 Owolabi: Partial traces may be in "don't know" category. So, notions of set or language membership should be extended for RV.

 Students 2 & 3: Wait... are you relaxing the notion of a safety property?

• Owolabi: ©

# Some goals...

 Formalize the intuition of "correctness" from the previous classes and reading

 Provide a framework for answering similar questions in the future

 Such formalization and framework are important for a deeper understanding of RV

#### What we'll discuss

A synopsis of this paper

Scientific Annals of Computer Science vol. 22 (2), 2012, pp. 327–365 doi: 10.7561/SACS.2012.2.327

On Safety Properties and Their Monitoring

Grigore ROŞU<sup>1</sup>

 Goal: give you the intuition you'll need to read it on your own (if interested)

# What kinds of correctness properties have you heard about?

Safety ports Livenas profs partial consect terminan time and Grace complexity Cairness (distr. Systems)

Give examples of these properties?

# Q1: Which of these kinds of correctness properties can RV check?

Your answer:

• Why?

# Intuition: what is a safety property?

Your answers:

# Questions that the paper answers

- What are some formal definitions of safety properties?
- Do all the definitions of safety properties agree?
- How many safety properties are there?
- What's the complexity of monitoring safety properties?
- Is there a formalism that can express all safety properties?

# Recall: properties as sets of traces

• In practice, traces are always finite

 In theory, traces can be infinite, e.g., the ideal reactive system

• Traces are strings over  $\Sigma$ , so we can talk about their prefixes

# Def 1: safety property

 A safety property is a prefix-closed set of "good" finite traces. Let the set of all such finite-trace prefix-closed properties be Safety\*

• L is prefix-closed if for all prefixes u of w,  $w \in L \rightarrow u \in L$ .

- Let P ∈ Safety\*
  - If !P(w), then  $\nexists u$  s. t. P(wu), where w,  $u \in \Sigma^*$
  - Equivalently, if P(wu) then P(w)

# Implication of Def 1

 Once a "bad" event occurs, the resulting trace cannot be extended to be in P ∈ Safety\*

 So, as soon as a "bad" event is concatenated with a trace that is in P ∈ Safety\*, RV can report a violation and stop checking

# Illustrating Def 1 (1)

 Safety property: a one-time-access key issued to a client can be activated, then used at most once, then closed

• Prefix-closed set:  $\{\epsilon, activate, activate close, activate use, activate use close\}$ 

 Any trace that is not in this prefix-closed set is a violation of the safety property

# Illustrating Def 1 (2)

 Safety property: a one-time-access key issued to a client can be activated, then used multiple times, then closed

• The prefix-closed set now has infinitely many finite traces:  $\{\epsilon\}$   $\cup$   $\{activate\} \cdot \{use^n \mid n \in \mathbb{N} \} \cdot \{\epsilon, close\}$ 


• RV can still detect traces that are not in this set, e.g., {activate activate, activate use close use, ...}

# A practical implication of Def 1

A "convenient" translation of the FSM to RE accepting state white no de white no de is the property of the pr

 $(abc)^*$ 

Translation to FSM



Should JavaMOP print a violation as soon as it sees [a], [ab]?

# Is prefix closure sufficient?

Safety\* contains the safety properties {} and all prefix-closed finite set of traces

 Any reactive system will eventually violate such safety properties even if no "bad" event occurs (reactive systems should run "forever")

So, we need more than prefix closure

# Def 2: persistent safety properties

 We need prefix closure, but we also want (reactive) systems to be able to progress safely

 PersistentSafety\* is the set of all safety properties that allow a system in a safe state to continue execution onto the next safe state

**PersistentSafety\*** = { 
$$P \in Safety^* \mid P(w) \rightarrow \exists a \in \Sigma \text{ s. t. } P(wa)$$
}

# On Safety\* and PersistentSafety\*

 PersistentSafety\* provides a way of thinking about infinite behaviors in terms of finite traces

• |Safety\*| = |PersistentSafety\*| = c

• ∀P ∈ Safety\* ∃P° ∈ PersistentSafety\* s.t. P° is the largest persistent safety property in P

See paper for more details and proofs

# Any questions so far?



#### Problems with Defs 1 & 2?

 Another view of safety: a "bad" infinite trace must have a finite "bad" prefix

 Safety\* and PersistentSafety\* seem not to say anything about "bad" infinite traces

 Is there a relationship between this view, Safety\*, and PersistentSafety\*?

# Def 3: safety properties on traces

• Let **Safety** $^{\omega}$  be the set of infinite trace properties Q  $\in \mathcal{P}(\Sigma^{\omega})$  s.t. if  $u \notin Q$  then there is a finite trace  $w \in \operatorname{prefixes}(u)$  s.t.  $wv \notin Q$  for any  $v \in \Sigma^{\omega}$ .

Probably the most common definition of safety<sup>1</sup>

• Safety<sup> $\omega$ </sup> and Safety<sup> $\star$ </sup> agree (see proof in the paper): |PersistentSafety<sup> $\star$ </sup>|=|Safety $^{\omega}$ |=c

#### Notice a common theme?

 Safety\*: the sequence of past events in a "good" trace must be in the property

PersistentSafety\*: to proceed to a new safe state,
the sequence of past events must have been safe

• Safety $^{\omega}$ : an infinite trace becomes "bad" after a finite sequence of past events

# "Always past" characterization

 A safety property as an arbitrary (not necessarily prefix-closed) property on finite traces s.t. all finite prefixes of "good" traces are in the property

- Bijection to **Safety** $^*$  and **Safety** $^\omega$  (proof in paper)
  - any safety property can be expressed as "always past"
- Connects very nicely with past-time LTL
  - one reason why LTL is a popular spec language in RV

### We saw an example before...

- Property: keys must be authenticated before use
- LTL spec:  $\forall k. \Box$  (use  $\rightarrow \otimes$  authenticate)
- "always (b implies eventually in the past a)"
- $\Box$ (b  $\rightarrow$   $\diamondsuit$ a) compactly represents this set:

{wsw's' | w, w'  $\in \Sigma^*$ , s, s'  $\in \Sigma$ , a(s) and b(s') hold}  $\cup$  {ws | w  $\in \Sigma^*$ , s  $\in \Sigma$ , b(s) does not hold}

# There are more notions of safety

 The paper discusses at least two other notions that we omit

 They all refer to the same set of safety properties, even though they are expressed differently

# Why go through all the math?

1: "something bad will not happen"

 2: "always in the past, something bad did not happen"

Math showed a bijection between 1 & 2

RV can check properties expressed as 2, but not 1

## Revisiting fa'20 conversation

- Owolabi: Partial traces may be in "don't know" category. So, notions of set or language membership should be extended for RV.
- Students 2 & 3: Wait... are you relaxing the notion of a safety property?
- Owolabi: No, we are expressing safety properties in a checkable way that has a bijection to other notions of safety properties

# Monitoring safety properties

- Checking safety properties as sets of traces is hard
  - Those sets can contain infinitely many traces
  - Analyzing those sets can be inconvenient
- We need to specify safety properties in formalisms that are easier to represent and reason about

#### Recall definition from lecture 2

• A  $\Sigma$ -property is a function  $P: \Sigma^* \to C$  partitioning the set of traces into (verdict) categories C

RV operationalizes P through a monitor

#### Def 4: What is a monitor?

• A  $\Sigma$ -monitor is a triple  $\mathcal{M} = (S, s_0, M : S \times \Sigma \rightarrow S)$ , where S is a set of events,  $s_0$  is the initial event and M is a deterministic partial transition function

#### Notes:

- No final state, allows checking reactive systems
- ${\mathcal M}$  is driven by events generated by the observed system
- Each event drives the monitor from one state to another
- If M is undefined for the current state and current event,  ${\mathcal M}$  declares a violation

# Why is Def 4 important?

 A property is monitorable if it can be specified as a monitor

- All safety properties can be specified by their monitor (see paper for proof)
  - But transition function M may be undecidable
- Synthesizing monitors from compact specifications of safety properties is critical in RV

# The complexity of monitoring (1)

Let P be a safety property

• The complexity of monitoring P is the complexity of checking if  $w \in \text{prefixes}(P)$ , where  $w \in \Sigma^*$ 

 Problem: assumes that we can always store w, and ignores complexity due to online monitoring

# The complexity of monitoring (2)

Let P be a safety property

 The complexity of monitoring P is a function of the size of a finite specification or representation of P

#### • Problems:

- P may have different sizes in different spec languages
- Spec of P may take more space than needed to monitor P ("every  $2^n$ -th event is a" as FSM with  $2^n$  states)

# The complexity of monitoring (3)

Let P be a safety property

• Complexity of monitoring P is the functional complexity of M in a "best"  $\mathcal{M}=(S, s_0, M:S \times \Sigma \rightarrow S)$ 

Good: complexity of processing each event is important

Bad: ignores the accumulating cost of M with time

# Monitoring is arbitrarily hard

Proof is in the paper

 Implication 1: P is monitorable does not always imply that monitoring P is feasible

 Implication 2: One needs to carefully choose P and to design efficient monitor synthesis algorithms

#### Review

 Formalizations of notions of safety properties and their consensus

 "Always past" characterization allows us to express safety properties in ways that we can check

Monitoring safety properties is arbitrarily hard

#### Next class

- Instrumentation (how to observe events)
  - There will likely be live coding in class
- Reading(s) will be released soon

#### Also next week...

Assign paper presentations