Pure Data Foundations of Mathematics

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Abstract

This is an abstract.

11   Introduction   2

If it weren't for the weight of history, it would seem natural to take quantum mechanical phenomena as an indication that something has gone wrong with

probability theory and to attempt to explain such phenomena by modifying probability theory itself, rather than by invoking quantum mechanics. It is actually easy to take this point of view because probability theory is so tightly constrained by Cox's Bayesian arguments[1] that there is only one plausible try. Trying this anyway[2, 3, 4, 5], one finds that Cox's arguments work even without the assumption that probabilities are real and non–negative and one obtains "exotic" copies of standard probability theory where the probabilities may belong to any real associative algebra with unit. With probability theory modified, there is no need for the usual "wave-particle duality" and one is free to assume, for example, that a particle in $\mathbf{R}^3$ is somewhere in $\mathbf{R}^3$ at each time. Introducing such "state spaces" and assuming that probabilities have a square norm, exotic probabilities acquire the power to predict real non-negative frequencies and are limited to three algebras: reals, complex numbers and quaternions. Given this framework, complex probabilities with state spaces $\mathbf{R}^3$ or $\mathbf{R}^4$ lead to the standard quantum theory in complete detail including the Schrodinger equation and "mixed states." Quaternionic probabilities lead, on the other hand, to the Dirac theory[6, 7]. Although one might expect such theories to be ruled out by Bell's arguments, modifying probability theory turns out to evade this and similar restrictions[3]. Because of the simple nature of the state space axioms and the Bayesian nature of the exotic probabilities, the familiar semi–paradoxical measurement and observer questions from quantum theory do not arise[5]. One has a theory which is quite substantially simpler than quantum mechanics both conceptually and mathematically.

Although predictions within state spaces like $\mathbf{R}^3$ and $\mathbf{R}^4$ agree with standard quantum mechanics, Srinivasan has realized that one should expect even more interesting results in field theory because exotic probability theory cannot produce the apparent divergences which are so common in quantum field theory. Indeed, he has shown that with his quaternionic probability version of canonical quantization, he gets the correct result for the Lamb shift without any renormalization procedure[8].

This paper is intended as a review of the basic results from references 2-5 with more detail than is practical in letter sized papers, as a starting point for someone interested in this general subject and as an exposition of unanswered questions where further research is needed. The idea that probability theory might be altered in some way goes back at least to Dirac[9]. For a history of this idea, the review by Muckenheim et al.[10] is a good starting point. Related ideas can be found papers by Srinivasan and Sudarshan[6,

7, 8], Gudder[11], Feynman[12], Tikochinsky[13], Frohner[14], Caticha[15], Steinberg[16], Belinskii[17], Miller[18], Muckenheim[19], Khrennikov[20] and Pitowsky[21]. This work is very influenced by the Bayesian view of probability theory due to Ed Jaynes[22, 23, 24, 25].

12   Cox arguments

In the Bayesian view of probability theory, probabilities begin as real non-negative numbers assigned to pairs (a, b) of arbitrary propositions. These numbers are meant to indicate, in some sense to be defined, how likely it is that proposition b is true given that proposition a is known. Given this setup, Cox argued[1] that if such an assignment of numbers is to be useful as a likelihood, it should satisfy a few plausible conditions. He then demonstrates (it is not a proof for reasons which will be clear below) that these conditions lead unambiguously to the standard Bayesian presentation of probability theory. The basic plan is to simply follow Cox's work while dropping the assumption that probabilities are real and non-negative.

Before beginning, there are a couple of technical points which might cause confusion. Cox[1] and Jaynes[25] discuss probability theory without any restriction on propositions. The idea is that probability theory is meant to be "the logic of science" and is meant to be treated slightly informally in the same sense that ordinary logic is treated slightly informally in mathematics. However, for definiteness, and since we will introduce several copies of probability theory, we work in a distributive lattice. The other technical point is that Cox, Jaynes and my previous papers work in a Boolean lattice as opposed to a distributive lattice. It is easier to deal with a plain distributive lattice and this makes no difference for the results in references 2-5.

Consider a set P and a distributive lattice L with "propositions" $a, b, c \in L$ with minimum element $0 \in L$ and maximal element $1 \in L$. For a function $\rightarrow: L \times L \rightarrow P$ to be a useful measure of "likelihood," we expect, following Cox[1], that $(a \rightarrow b)$ and $(a \wedge b \rightarrow c)$ should determine $(a \rightarrow b \wedge c)$ and denote the implied function by $* : P \times P \rightarrow P$. Similarly, if $b \wedge c = 0$, we also expect that $(a \rightarrow b)$ and $(a \rightarrow c)$ should determine $(a \rightarrow b \wedge c)$ and denote this function by $+ : P \times P \rightarrow P$. Mathematically speaking, Cox's point is that the structure of L has implications for $*$ and $+$. For example, for any

$a, b, c, d \in L$, we have

$$(a \to b \wedge c \wedge d) = (a \to b) * (a \wedge b \to c \wedge d) = (a \to b) * [(a \wedge b \to c) * (a \wedge b \wedge c \to d)] \tag{1}$$

and using the associativity of $\wedge$,

$$(a \to b \wedge c \wedge d) = [(a \to b) * (a \wedge b \to c)] * (a \wedge b \wedge c \to d). \tag{2}$$

Letting $x = (a \to b)$, $y = (a \wedge b \to c)$ and $z = (a \wedge b \wedge c \to d)$, we have

$$x * (y * z) = (x * y) * z \tag{3}$$

for all such triples (x, y, z). Following Cox, we further assume that $*$ is associative in general.

Similarly, suppose that we have $a, b, c \in L$ with $b \wedge c = 0$. Then $(a \to b \vee c) = (a \to b) + (a \to c) = (a \to c) + (a \to b)$. We then plausibly assume that $+$ is commutative in general.

One can easily complete this picture checking properties of L to see what is correspondingly expected in P.

Property of L	Expected property of P
$\wedge$ is associative	$*$ is associative
$\vee$ is associative	$+$ is associative
$\wedge$ is commutative	——
$\vee$ is cummutative	$+$ is commutative
$\wedge$ distributes over $\vee$	$*$ distributes both ways over $+$
$\vee$ distributes over $\wedge$	——
0 is the minimum	P has an additive identity "0"
1 is the maximum	P has a two–sided multiplicative identity "1"

Although the usual $[0, 1] \subset \mathbf{R}$ probabilities satisfy these conditions, they are only one possibility. At this stage, any ring will do, even a ring with non-commutative multiplication like the quaternions. Actually, the fact that we have to explain interference effects strongly suggests that we will need probabilities with an additive inverse. Plausibly also requiring scaling of probabilities by real numbers, we assume, at this stage, that the probabilities of interest are real associative algebras with unit. Further restrictions are to come in section 3.

13   Predicting frequencies

The exotic probabilities of the last section seem exotic mainly because we are immediately familiar with what, say, $P(b|a) = 0.25$ means in terms of an experiment. On the other hand, what is the predictive meaning of something like $(a \to b) = 2 + 3i$? To answer this, it is helpful to realize that this problem already exists even in standard probability theory. There is nothing in probability theory as such that tells us that probability $P(b|a) = 0.25$ means 25% should be expected in the corresponding frequency. This must be deduced from additional assumptions. In the standard probability case, one considers N copies of the situation where a was known. One then observes that the probability that b is true n/N times peaks at 0.25, and for any interval containing 0.25, the probability to be outside the interval can be reduced as much as one wants by increasing N. Roughly speaking, the frequency meaning of standard probabilities is fixed by the additional assumption that "probability zero propositions never happen." It may help to notice that, as Jaynes points out[25], standard probability theory works equally well on the interval $[1, \infty]$ rather than $[0, 1]$. In this case, probability 4.0 would predict frequency 0.25 and one would be assuming that propositions with probability ∞ never happen.

In the case of exotics, we cannot proceed quite as simply as in standard probability theory since, as will become clear, zero probability propositions may sometimes be true anyway. However, we can progress by assuming that L contains a special subspace for which the standard arguments will hold. Given P–probability $(L, \to)$, let X be a measure space and suppose that the free distributive lattice on $X \times \mathbf{R}$ is a sublattice of L [26]. We'll refer to the second component of $X \times \mathbf{R}$ as "time" and will often denote it as a subscript. For $A \subset X$, A_t denotes $\bigvee_{a \in A} a_t$. We will see below that frequency predictions follow if we assume that X has properties that one would expect of "the state of the system." In particular, we assume that for any time t, $x_t \wedge y_t = 0$ for any $x, y \in X$ with $x \neq y$, meaning that "the system can't be in two different states at the same time." Please note the clash of terminology with standard quantum theory where "state space" means a Hilbert space and not just a measure space.

Given a state space X, and any fixed time t, we can relate probabilities to functions from X to P. For $a, b, c \in L$, let "wave functions" $\Psi_{a \to b} : X \to P$ be defined by

$$(a \rightarrow b \wedge \sigma_t) = \int_\sigma \Psi_{a \rightarrow b} \tag{4}$$

for all measurable $\sigma \subset X$. Such functions are therefore related by

$$\Psi_{a \rightarrow b \wedge c} = (a \rightarrow b) \ \Psi_{a \wedge b \rightarrow c} \tag{5}$$

in general and

$$\Psi_{a \rightarrow b \vee c} = \Psi_{a \rightarrow b} + \Psi_{a \rightarrow c} \tag{6}$$

if $b \wedge c = 0$.

In order to get real non-negative numbers from probabilities, we take P to have a square norm $\| \ \|: P \rightarrow \mathbf{R}^{0,+}$ satisfying $\| \ p \ q \ \| = \| \ p \ \| \ \| \ q \ \|$ for $p, q \in P$. Given this, we will show that, under certain conditions,

$$\text{Prob}_t(b|a) = \frac{\int_X \| \ \Psi_{a \rightarrow b}^t \ \|}{\int_X \| \ \Psi_{a \rightarrow 1}^t \ \|} \tag{7}$$

is a probability in the ordinary sense. When it doesn't cause confusion, we will suppress the function name inside integrals as a notational convenience. We may, for example, write

$$\text{Prob}_t(b|a) = \frac{\int_X \| \ a \rightarrow b \wedge x_t \ \|}{\int_X \| \ a \rightarrow 1 \wedge x_t \ \|}. \tag{8}$$

Note that probabilities like $(a \rightarrow b \wedge c \wedge x_t)$ are typically zero and, of course, $(a \rightarrow x_t)$ isn't equal to $\Psi_a^t(x)$.

To derive properties of Prob_t, note that

$$\text{Prob}_t(b \wedge c|a) = \frac{\int_X \| \ a \rightarrow b \wedge c \wedge x_t \ \|}{\int_X \| \ a \rightarrow x_t \ \|} \tag{9}$$

is equal to

$$\frac{\int_X \| \ a \rightarrow b \ \| \ \| \ a \wedge b \rightarrow c \wedge x_t \ \|}{\int_X \| \ a \rightarrow x_t \ \|} * \frac{\int_X \| \ a \wedge b \rightarrow x_t \ \|}{\int_X \| \ a \wedge b \rightarrow x_t \ \|} \tag{10}$$

and, rearranging and using $\| \ a \rightarrow b \ \| \ \| \ a \wedge b \rightarrow x_t \ \| = \| \ a \rightarrow b \wedge x_t \ \|$, we have

$$\text{Prob}_t(b \wedge c|a) = \text{Prob}_t(b|a) \ \text{Prob}_t(c|a \wedge b) \tag{11}$$

as desired. If we also knew that for $b \wedge c = 0$,

$$\text{Prob}_t(b \vee c|a) = \text{Prob}_t(b|a) + \text{Prob}_t(c|a) \tag{12}$$

then we would have a complete standard probability theory and a frequency meaning would follow as in the standard argument. However, (12) is true if and only if

$$\int_X \parallel \Psi^t_{a \to b} + \Psi^t_{a \to c} \parallel = \int_X \parallel \Psi^t_{a \to b} \parallel + \int_X \parallel \Psi^t_{a \to c} \parallel \tag{13}$$

which, in a Hilbert space setting, is equivalent to requiring $\Psi^t_{a \to b}$ and $\Psi^t_{a \to c}$ to be orthogonal. Thus, we've concluded that we can predict frequencies, but only for sublattices of L for which (12) holds. This includes the sublattice X at any fixed time and the sublattice of propositions associated with a Hermitian operator in the Hilbert space case.

For example, suppose that we have an orthogonal set of functions $\{\phi_1, ..., \phi_n\}$ in the Hilbert space $L^2(X)$ and suppose that L contains the sublattice $B = \{b_1, b_2, \ldots, b_n\}$ where b_i is the proposition "ϕ_i is the best description of the system at time t." B is a sublattice and (12) is satisfied because $< \phi_i, \phi_j >$ is zero for $i \neq j$ and so Prob_t on the sublattice B is therefore a probability theory in the ordinary sense and, for example $\text{Prob}_t(b_j | \bigvee_{i=1}^n b_i)$ is the expected frequency that ϕ_j is the best description of the system at time t assuming that one of the $\phi_1, \phi_2, \ldots \phi_n$ is optimal.

As another example, consider how we would describe a Stern–Gerlach experiment with quaternion probabilities and state space $X = \mathbf{R}^3$. At any time t while the particle is heading towards the magnet, X_t is a sublattice of L and Prob_t is a standard probability theory and predicts how often various subsets of X are occupied. At a time t' when the particle has gone through the magnet and either gone up or down, $X_{t'}$ is also a sublattice and $\text{Prob}_{t'}$ is also standard and predicts the results of the experiment. However, although $X_t \cup X_{t'}$ is a a sublattice of L, we cannot conclude that either Prob_t or $\text{Prob}_{t'}$ are standard probabilities because interference terms may prevent (12) from being satisfied. This is why exotic probabilities aren't eliminated by Bell's inequalities (see section 8). You can also see that this implies that the Stern–Gerlach experiment is not a dynamical system. If there was a function $f : X \to X$ such that a particle at x_t always arrives at $f(x)_{t'}$, probabilities on $X_t \cup X_{t'}$ would be determined by Prob_t and f. In this sense the Stern–Gerlach system is realistic but not deterministic.

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Thus, we have found that exotic probabilities can indeed acquire predictive power provided we introduce a "state space" within L and a square norm on P. Since the square norm property $\parallel p\ q \parallel = \parallel p \parallel \parallel q \parallel$ is crucial, we conclude that probabilities must be real associative algebras with a square norm. There are, however, only are only three such algebras: the reals, the complex numbers and the quaternions[27]. This means that particles may only be spin 0 or spin 1/2. Since (12) is only prevented by "interference terms" we see that, in this sense, "standard probability theory is restored in the classical limit."

14   More about state spaces

As pointed out in reference 4, modifying probability theory means that we are free to simply assume that if a particle arrives at a point $x_{t'}$ at a detecting screen in a two slit experiment, the particle was therefore somewhere in $\mathbf{R}^3$ at any previous $t \leq t'$. In general, we assume that

$$x_{t'} = x_{t'} \wedge X_t \tag{14}$$

for all $x \in X$, $t \leq t'$. This has immediate implications. For $t \leq t' \leq t''$,

$$(X_t \to X_{t''}) = (X_t \to X_{t'} \wedge X_{t''}) = (X_t \to X_{t'})(X_{t'} \to X_{t''}) \tag{15}$$

and if we also assume that probabilities are time invariant in the sense that $(A_t \to B_{t'}) = (A_{t+\tau} \to B_{t'+\tau})$ for any $A, B \subset X$, $t, t', \tau \in \mathbf{R}$, then $(X_t \to X_{t'}) = e^{\lambda(t'-t)}$ for some $\lambda \in P$. This implies that $\Psi^{t'}_{X_t}(x) = e^{\lambda(t'-t)}\phi(x)$ for time independent $\phi : x \mapsto \int_\sigma (X_{t'} \to \sigma_{t'})$. For those used to quantum mechanics, this may seem puzzling because, after assuming very little, we concluded that "the system is in an energy eigenstate." What if the system is, in fact in some other state? If this question occurs to you, remember that an exotic probability like $(X_t \to A_{t'})$ is only the best estimate that $A_{t'}$ is true given that X_t is known. If one knows some additional facts F about the system, one should instead calculate $(X_t \wedge F \to A_{t'})$. Thus, our wave functions only represent what one knows about a system and can't be interpreted as "the state of the system" in any reasonable sense. Different observers will have different knowledge about a system and they may also describe a single system with different wave functions. This means that if an observer does not know all the relevant facts about a system, their wave

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functions may give incorrect predictions. Of course, this is not a failure of exotic probability theory any more than it is a failure of ordinary probability theory when the usual analysis of a die fails in the case of loaded die. In both cases, the theories are successful to the extent that relevant facts are known. From the Bayesian view, the particular result above means that if one knows only that the system was somewhere in state space at time t, then the best description of the system at any later time is one of the energy eigenfunctions.

One last assumption completes what one intuitively means by a "state space." Intuitively, if one knows the "state" x_t at time $t \in \mathbf{R}$, then any previous knowledge should be irrelevant. In this sense, it is natural to assume

$$(A_t \wedge x_{t'} \to B_{t''}) = (x_{t'} \to B_{t''}). \tag{16}$$

for any $t \leq t' \leq t''$, $A, B \subset X$, $x \in X$. This assumption also has immediate consequences. For $A, B \subset X$, letting subscripts indicate time ordering and using $\Psi_{a \to b}^t(x) = \Psi_a^t(x) \ (a \wedge x_t \to b)$,

$$(A_o \to B_n) = \int_{x \in X} \Psi_{A_o}^1(x) \ (A_o \wedge x_1 \to B_n) = \int_{x_1 \in X} (A_o \to x_1)(x_1 \to B_n) \tag{17}$$

and, repeating the same argument,

$$(A_o \to B_n) = \int_{x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_{n-1}} (A_o \to x_1)(x_1 \to x_2) \ldots (x_{n-1} \to B_n) \tag{18}$$

for any sequence of intermediate times $t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_{n-1}$. We can refer to such an expression as a "path integral." Note that this expression together with the definition of Prob means that "paths interfere if they end at the same point in X." This is the exotic probability version of the "which path" principle of quantum mechanics.

15 Definitions

Before continuing on to physics, let's collect the definitions so far and establish some terminology. For the rest of the paper, we assume lattices to be distributive and to have minimum and maximum elements denoted "0" and "1" respectively. By a "measure space," we always mean a measure space with a finite real non-negative measure.

Fix $P = \mathbf{R}$, $\mathbf{C}$ or $\mathbf{H}$. A P–probability is a lattice L together with a function $\to: L \times L \to P$ satisfying

$$(a \to b \wedge c) = (a \to b)\ (a \wedge b \to c) \tag{19}$$

for all $a, b, c \in L$ and satisfying

$$(a \to b \vee c) = (a \to b) + (a \to c). \tag{20}$$

for all $a, b, c \in L$ with $b \wedge c = 0$.

Here are a few simple examples. Let L be the lattice $\{0, 1\}$ and let $(a \to b)$ be 0 if b is the minimum and 1 if b is the maximum. This is a P–probability. Given a lattice L, let $\phi : L \to P$ be some function satisfying $\phi(a \wedge b) = \phi(a)\phi(b)$ in general and $\phi(a \vee b) = \phi(a) + \phi(b)$ if $a \wedge b = 0$. Then $(a \to b) = \phi(b)$ makes $(L, \to)$ into a P–probability. Let L be a totally ordered lattice and let $(a \to b)$ be 1 if $a \leq b$ and 0 otherwise. This is also a P–probability. Given a P–probability $(L, \to)$ and a sublattice M of L, let l be an element of L. We can then define a new P–probability $(M, \to_l)$ by letting $(a \to_l b) = (a \wedge l \to b)$ for $a, b \in M$.

Following standard probability theory, we say that propositions $a, b \in L$ are independent if $(a \wedge q \to b) = (q \to b)$ for all $q \in L$ and this implies $(q \to a \wedge b) = (q \to a)(q \to b)$ as usual. We say that subsets A, B of L are independent if a and b are independent for all $a \in A$ and $b \in B$.

Given a P–probability $(L, \to)$, we can define the product of independent sublattices M and N of L. Letting $(M \times N, \to_\times)$ be defined by

$$(m, n) \to_\times (m', n') = (m \to m')(n \to n'). \tag{21}$$

This defines a P–probability, even if P is not commutative.

Let X be a measure space and let $\mathcal{F}X$ be the free lattice on $X \times \mathbf{R}$ subject to

$$x_t \wedge y_t = 0 \tag{22}$$

for all $x, y \in X$, $x \neq y$, $t \in \mathbf{R}$ and

$$x_{t'} = x_{t'} \wedge X_t \tag{23}$$

for $x \in X$ and times $t \leq t'$. A P–probability $(L, \to)$ is said to "have a state space X" if $\mathcal{F}X$ is a sublattice of L and if

$$(A_t \wedge x_{t'} \to B_{t''}) = (x_{t'} \to B_{t''}) \tag{24}$$

for all times $t \leq t' \leq t''$ for all subsets $A, B \subset X$ and for all $x \in X$.

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16   A simple interferometer

To exercise our ideas so far, let's analyze the interferometer shown in figure 1 in some detail. Although one is instinctively shy at first, we are free to use simple language to describe what happens as if the particle was a marble.

Figure 1: A simple interferometer where a particle enters as indicated and encounters a beam splitter (S_1), a mirror (M_1 or M_2) and a second beam splitter (S_2) ending up either in detector (D_1) or (D_2).

Working within a **C**–probability with state space $X = \mathbf{R}^3$, we can say that a particle hits S_1 and either goes on the P_1 branch or the P_2 branch. After hitting either mirror M_1 or M_2, the particle is on the Q_1 or the Q_2 branch respectively. The particle will hit S_2 and will end up in either detector D_1 or in detector D_2. Experimentally, one surprisingly finds that particles always end up in D_2. Letting "e" informally denote the experimental arrangement, we would like to calculate $(e \to D_1)$ and $(e \to D_2)$. Since D_j implies both $P_1 \vee P_2$ and $Q_1 \vee Q_2$, we have $(e \to D_j) = (e \to (P_1 \vee P_2) \wedge (Q_1 \vee Q_2) \wedge D_j)$. Using $P_1 \wedge P_2 = Q_1 \wedge Q_2 = 0$, we mechanically apply axioms to produce

$$(e \to D_j) = \sum_{n,m=1}^{2} (e \to P_n)(e \wedge P_n \to Q_m)(e \wedge P_n \wedge Q_m \to D_j). \qquad (25)$$

Since P_1 is equivalent to a point in X, previous knowledge is irrelevant and we have $(e \wedge P_n \to Q_m) = (P_n \to Q_m)$. We also clearly want to assume that the particle can't hop the rails, in other words we assume that $(P_n \to Q_m)$ is zero unless $n = m$. This causes one of the sums to disappear giving

$$(e \to D_j) = \sum_{n=1}^{2} (e \to P_n)(P_n \to Q_n)(Q_n \to D_j) \qquad (26)$$

This result is not surprising, but the point to focus on is that the result follows rigorously from the exotic probability axioms with natural assumptions given the marble–like picture of what is happening.

To proceed further, we have to define what happens at the mirrors and the beam splitters. Naturally, in either this case or in standard quantum

theory, what one means by "a mirror" and "a beam splitter" has to be put in by hand. In the ideal case, what one means by a "mirror" is that complex probabilities of particle bouncing off of it pick up a factor of i. A good experimentalist would naturally test this assumption in other measurements. Similarly, the beam splitters multiply probabilities by a factor of i when there is a "bounce." Thus, $(e \to P_2) = i * (e \to P_1)$, $(Q_1 \to D_2) = i * (Q_1 \to D_1)$, $(Q_2 \to D_1) = i * (Q_2 \to D_2)$, and $(P_1 \to Q_1) = (P_2 \to Q_2)$ and so $(e \to D_1) = 0$ as expected.

Suppose now that the interferometer is such that a device could be attached to M_1 such that it registered "hit" or "nohit" depending on whether the particle struck M_1 or not. Experimentally the results are different and about half the particles go into D_1. In quantum theory, one says that this is due to the "which path" principle. The two paths ending in D_1 no longer interfere because "you can tell which path was taken." You can see that this result also follows mechanically with exotic probabilities. In the described situation, $\mathbf{R}^3$ is evidently not a sufficient state space and one should use at least $\mathbf{R}^3 \times \{\text{hit}, \text{nohit}\}$. In this case, one can explicitly calculate that the interference is lost because two paths ending in D_1 no longer end at the same point in the state space. One can also calculate that if the device detecting whether M_1 is hit works so poorly that $\{\text{hit}, \text{nohit}\}$ are independent of Q_1 and Q_2, then the interference effect is entirely restored[2].

Note the difference with standard quantum theory. Quantum mechanics has no problem with this interferometer in the sense that the wave equation can be solved for any desired input wave packet. Of course, no one wants to do this, especially to get such simple results. This explains the popularity of the "which path" principle even though it is not completely clear what it means or how it follows from the fundamental wave equation. This is analogous to doing probability theory knowing the diffusion equation but not knowing Kolmogorov's axioms. In exotic probabilities, on the other hand, both a rigorous version of the "which path" principle and any wave equation are consequences of the underlying exotic probability theory.

17 Exponential Decay

The interferometer from the previous section suggests that exotics may be particularly helpful in situations where one wants predictions which are independent of details of initial wave functions and potentials. "Exponential

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decay" provides simple examples of such situations and also brings up one of the lesser known mysteries of quantum theory. Consider a system such as a Co^{60} nucleus or a muon which may decay irreversibly. Given such a system, if the probability for a decay within a time interval t only depends on t and not on the history of the system, then a familiar argument in probability theory implies that the probability density for decay is exponential. Quantum mechanics, however, does not generally predict this[29] and so it would seem that for such non–exponential systems, the assumption that they decay independent of their history is not correct. As with other paradoxes[5], we can resolve this by realizing that the physical assumptions are correct; the problem is caused by probability theory itself. Applying the physical assumptions to exotic probability theory instead, we suppose that in a P–probability with state space X, $(A_t \rightarrow B_{t'}) = (A_{t+\tau} \rightarrow B_{t'+\tau})$ for all $t, t', \tau \in \mathbf{R}$. Suppose also that X contains a subset α whose complement β is a "trap" in the sense that β_t implies $\beta_{t'}$ for any $t \le t'$. This means that $\alpha_{t'}$ implies α_t for any $t \le t'$ also. With arguments similar to those in section 4, we find $(\alpha_0 \rightarrow \alpha_t) = e^{\lambda t}$, $(\beta_0 \rightarrow \beta_t) = 1$, $(\alpha_0 \rightarrow \beta_t) = a (1 - e^{\lambda t})$, and $(\beta_0 \rightarrow \alpha_t) = 0$ for some $\lambda \in P$ and $a \in \mathbf{R}$. Although the exotic probabilities are simple exponentials, this isn't preserved in the predicted frequencies. The ordinary probability to remain free for time t is

$$\text{Prob}(\alpha_t|\alpha_0) = \frac{\int_\alpha \| \alpha_0 \rightarrow x_t \|}{\int_\alpha \| \alpha_0 \rightarrow x_t \| + \int_\beta \| \alpha_0 \rightarrow x_t \|} \tag{27}$$

and, using $\int_\alpha \| \alpha_0 \rightarrow x_t \| = \| \alpha_0 \rightarrow \alpha_t \| \int_\alpha \| \alpha_t \rightarrow x_t \|$ and $\int_\beta \| \alpha_0 \rightarrow x_t \| = \| \alpha_0 \rightarrow \beta_t \| \int_\beta \| \alpha_0 \wedge \beta_t \rightarrow x_t \|$, we have

$$\text{Prob}(\alpha_t|\alpha_0) = \frac{1}{1 + k(t) \| e^{-\lambda t} - 1 \|} \tag{28}$$

where

$$k(t) = a^2 \frac{\int_\beta \| \alpha_0 \wedge \beta_t \rightarrow x_t \|}{\int_\alpha \| \alpha_t \rightarrow x_t \|}. \tag{29}$$

For small t and assuming that λ is real an negative, $\text{Prob}(\alpha_t|\alpha_0)$ will decrease more slowly than $1 - 2\lambda t$. If we also know that α_0 and $x_t \in \beta_t$ can be taken to be independent for sufficiently large t, then we say that the system is "forgetful." In this case, $k(t)$ is asymptotically constant and $\text{Prob}(\alpha_t|\alpha_0)$ will be exponential for large times. Such deviations from exponential decay have only recently been observed experimentally[30].

The examples of the last two sections show the usefulness of applying exotic probability theory directly as opposed to solving a PDE. This sort of reasoning is mostly missing in standard quantum theory.

18   Bell's inequalities

Bell's well known analysis of the spin version of the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen experiment[28] is almost universally summarized as showing that local realistic theories are incompatible with the predictions of quantum mechanics and are therefore wrong. One might then expect that exotic probabilities would be ruled out by Bell because they are "realistic" in the state space sense. Bell's analysis, however, does not follow once we modify probability theory. To see the problem, you only have to notice that the first step in Bell's analysis assumes that $P(M_{t'}|e) = P(M_{t'} \wedge \Lambda_t|e)$ and

$$P(M_{t'} \wedge \Lambda_t|e) = \int_{\lambda \in \Lambda} P(M_{t'} \wedge \lambda_t|e) = \int_{\lambda \in \Lambda} P(\lambda_t|e)P(M_{t'}|e \wedge \lambda_t) \qquad (30)$$

for initial setup e, final measurement $M_{t'}$ and assuming that the final results are determined by some "hidden variable" $\lambda \in \Lambda$ at some time t during the flight from decay to detectors. As pointed out in section 3, equation 33 fails to hold in general due to "interference terms"[3]. In fact, Bell has shown exactly that if one wants local realism one must modify probability theory. Ironically, the standard summary of his results gives the opposite impression.

Over the years, there have been more than twenty variations on Bell's result each with a different experimental arrangement and each concluding that local realistic theories are impossible. Bell's result and two of the more well known variations are considered in reference 3 in some detail and are shown not to eliminate exotic probabilities. There has also been an increasing tendency to refer to Bell and similar results as "non–local" effects because they cannot be explained by local correlations[3]. The point is, however, that if one has the wrong probability theory, one may also have the wrong notion of what is just a correlation. Within exotic probability theory, we expect that Bell's results are just correlations in the new probability theory. It's helpful to think of a classical experiment where one cuts a penny into a heads half and a tails half and mails one half penny to house A and the other half to house B. The results at the two houses are correlated, but nothing travels between them to insure the proper results. One therefore expects that there

is nothing that one can do at house A to affect the fact that, at house B, one will find heads 50% of the time and tails 50% of the time. The same holds true in the EPR experiment. The results at one end of the experiment are 50% spin up and 50% spin down independent of the magnet orientation nothing that happens on the other side can affect this.

19   Time evolution

Given some initial knowledge such as A_t with $A \subset X$, the exotic probability to arrive at some $B \subset X$ at some later time t'' is given by

$$(A_t \rightarrow B_{t''}) = \int_{x \in X} (A_t \rightarrow x_{t'})(x_{t'} \rightarrow B_{t''}) \tag{31}$$

for any time t' with $t \leq t' \leq t''$. This is called the Chapman–Kolmogorov equation in the probability literature. In the complex case with state space $\mathbf{R}^d$, one can either follow reference 4 or Risken[31] to conclude that for small $\tau \in \mathbf{R}$ and small $z \in X$, $(x_t \rightarrow (x+z)_{t+\tau})$ is given by

$$\frac{1}{(2\pi\tau)^{d/2}\sqrt{\det(\nu)}} \exp(-\tau[\frac{1}{2}(\frac{z_j}{\tau} - \nu_j)\nu_{jk}^{-1}(\frac{z_k}{\tau} - \nu_k) + \nu_o]) \tag{32}$$

where ν_o, ν_j and ν_{jk} are moments of the time derivative of $\omega(x, z, \tau) \equiv (x_t \rightarrow (x+z)_{t+\tau})$ defined by complex functions $\nu_o(x) \equiv \int_X \omega_\tau(x, z, 0)$, $\nu_j(x) \equiv \int_X \omega_\tau(x, z, 0)z_j$, $\nu_{jk}(x) \equiv \int_X \omega_\tau(x, z, 0)z_j z_k$. This is a central–limit–theorem–like phenomena where the details of the unknown function $(x_t \rightarrow (x+z)_{t+\tau})$ are smoothed over and only a dependence on it's lowest moments survives. Identifying z_j/τ as the velocity, equation 35 is equivalent, for example, to the Schrodinger equation in $\mathbf{R}^3$ identifying $\nu_o = -ieA_o$, $\nu_j = \frac{e}{m}A_j$ and $\nu_{jk} = (i/m)\delta_{jk}$. Similarly, quaternion probabilities in result in the Dirac equation[6, 7]. These arguments need to be made into proofs, but there is also a mystery as to why only parts of the available moments seem to be used by nature. Why, for instance, must ν_j be purely real in $\mathbf{R}^3$?

20   Comparison with quantum theory

In standard quantum theory, the state of the system is a ray in a Hilbert space. To define such a theory one must define a Hilbert space and a complete

set of mutually commuting self-adjoint operators to serve as observables. In addition, one chooses a Hamiltonian and labels the states in the Hilbert space by irreducible representations of the Hamiltonian's symmetry group. For Hamiltonians invariant under the Lorentz group, states have spin and four–momenta. Time evolution is a one parameter semigroup given by the Hamiltonian operator. If "mixed states" occur, they must be described by density matrices. Quite a bit of functional analysis must be understood to define this precisely.

In an exotic probability theory, on the other hand, the state of the system is a point in a measure space X. To define the theory, one simply chooses X and picks $\mathbf{R}$, $\mathbf{C}$ or $\mathbf{H}$. Particles are not thought of as having momentum or spin, or any other internal structure. The only thing that a particle can do is to be somewhere. This is all that is required, however, because experiments which measure things like momentum and spin are always ultimately measuring position. Wave functions have the same status as densities do in Bayesian theory. People with different knowledge about a system will, in general, use different wave functions. Those who have more knowledge can expect better predictions. Situations requiring "mixed states" in quantum theory are described by the same exotic theory without modification[2] and, similarly, there is no sensible concept of "being in a mixed state." Rather than choosing a Hamiltonian, one notes that wave functions are propagated in time by the unknown $(x_t \to x'_{t'})$. In typical state spaces this propagation obeys a PDE which depends only upon the lowest moments of $(x_t \to x'_{t'})$ and these moments are identified with the vector potential and metric tensor. The relevant moments can either be measured experimentally with test particles or computed with some external theory like Maxwell's equations. One does not assume Lorentz or gauge invariance to get these results.

21 Implications for the rest of physics and open questions

Physical theories are thought to be quantum theories in only in a somewhat general sense. The successful predictions of quantum mechanics, must, of course, be reproduced, but this is not taken to mean that any theory must literally satisfy the axioms of quantum theory. There is, however, an independent reason why physical theories must be precisely exotic probability

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theories. The results of section two and three indicate that any theory which assigns likelihoods to pairs of propositions from a distributive lattice must exactly be an exotic probability theory or must violate one of our two Cox conditions or must fail to reduce to standard probability theory when predicting frequencies. Physical theories are constrained by the results here just as alternatives to standard probability theory are constrained by Cox's original arguments. The implications of this raise many questions about how this should be done for the rest of physics.

In the case of field theory, Srinivasan has pioneered application of exotic probabilities to quantum field theory by calculating the Lamb shift in a quaternionic version of canonical quantization. His results agree with QED without any renormalization procedure. In addition to Srinivasan's approach it is clear in a very simple sense that electrons must emit photons because the vector potential remains unknown even when the electromagnetic field has been measured. Even in the case of a single electron, one must therefore sum over the various possible gauge equivalent vector potentials. One has no choice but to predict that an electron will have various possible motions and these will be correlated with various possible vector potentials. It is reasonable to expect that this simple effect should fit naturally in the framework of a complete field theory. This, however, has not been done. Also, similar considerations hold for the metric tensor and weighted sums over various possible metric tensors must similarly be finite. Does this then mean that one could calculate gravitational radiation?

Exotic probability theories are much more restrictive than quantum mechanics in the sense that the form of the vector potential and metric tensor is already determined by the choice of state space and probability. Since the choice of probability seems to be fixed by spin, one apparently only has the state space left to explain things like other gauge theories besides QED. Can Yang-Mills theories be formulated as exotic probability theories, and, if so, with what state space?

Other questions arise if we sketch the general procedure for finding a PDE for wave functions. The basic theory here is formulated with a state space X only assumed to be a measure space. Assuming that X also has a topology, consider a point x in an open set $O \subset X$. One assumes that a time difference $t' - t$ can be chosen such that $(x_t \to x'_{t'})$ is negligible for x' outside of O. In addition, we suppose that O can be chosen such that $(x_t \to x'_{t'})$ can be approximated by a function of only $x' - x$ and $t' - t$. Given this, the path integral within O collapses to a convolution and this can be inverted with a

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Fourier transform resulting in a kernel depending only on the lowest moments of the time derivative of $(x_t \to x'_{t'})$ as in section 9. Another way to think about this is to consider the ring of P–valued functions on O with pointwise addition and convolution as multiplication. In this case, we assume that these rings have units K_t in a "Dirac sequence" sense[32] $\lim_{t\to 0} K_t * f = f$ and $\lim_{s,t\to 0} K_s * K_t = K_{s+t}$. This can be solved by considering a slight generalization of the standard quadratic form: a function $q : V \to P$ where $q(x+y) - q(x) - q(y) = b(x, y)$ for a symmetric bilinear $b : V \times V \to P$. Then $K_t : x \mapsto e^{q(x-a)/t}/I_t$, $a \in V$, $I_t = \int_O e^{q(x)/t}$ provides solutions. As mentioned in section 9, this raises the question of why only certain of these K_t are seen in nature. There is also the question of what exactly must be assumed about X since, besides a topology, we only seem to need subtraction of nearby points in O. For instance, it is perhaps interesting to remove geometry entirely by allowing any multiplication on $\text{Hom}(O, P)$ which forms a ring with pointwise addition and has a unit in the Dirac sequence sense.

Although Srinivasan has worked in field theory directly, simple multi–particle systems have not been done with exotic probabilities. In particular, what is the relationship between spin and statistics for exotic probabilities? This seems likely to be interestingly different than in standard field theory.

Although the time parameter in exotics seems essential once the state space axioms are introduced, this does not mean that exotics are nonrelativistic. "Time" in the complex $\mathbf{R}^4$ theory, for example, can be interpreted as the proper time or path length parameter. One suspects however, that "time" is really the order in which one discovers facts about the system rather than anything more intrinsic. In this case, one might expect that automorphisms of the time parameter should result in equivalent theories with modified moments of $(x_t \to x'_{t'})$. Is this correct and, if so, what are the consequences of invariance under time automorphisms?

The fact that the vector potential appears as the first moment of the time derivative of $(x_t \to x'_{t'})$ suggests that Maxwell's equations should describe complex or quaternionic vector potentials. Are there complex and quaternionic versions of Maxwell's equations and, if so, are it's classical predictions correct?

The whole area of "Bayesian Inference" in ordinary probability theory is based on the idea that one can used Bayes theorem (which also follows in exotics) to systematically improve probabilities based on "prior" knowledge. It is clear that the same thing should be possible with exotic probabilities. In the standard Bayesian case, this is often based on the maximum entropy

principle. The issue, then, is how to do Bayesian inference and is there an analogue of maximum entropy?

22   Summary

Exotic probability theories as described here appear to be the only generalization of probability theory consistent with the basic Bayesian framework. In addition to standard probability theory, we find that three exotic copies are possible where probabilities are real, complex or quaternion valued respectively. Although the exotic theories are substantially simpler that quantum mechanics both conceptually and mathematically, they nevertheless give the same predictions as standard quantum theory. These theories constrain physical theories in the same sense that Cox's original arguments constrain possible alternatives to standard probability theory. The implications of this beyond basic quantum theory are mostly unexplored, but we have attempted to at least formulate some fundamental open questions where new insights are needed.

23   Acknowledgement

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