Secure Network Design and Implementation project

CSCE 5585

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Tools Used

Network Emulation: Gns3

Virtualizatio: Vmware Workstation

Pentesting: Kali Linux-nmap,wireshark,hydra,ping

IDS: Fail2ban

Firewall: Watchguard xtmV

Server: Ubuntu Server


Network Topology and Configuration

Network setup

To do the emulation the network GNS3 emulation application was used . Some were devices was imported from the host machine and some from VMware Workstation. The WatchGuard Firewall, DMZ server (Ubuntu server), and penetration testing machine (Kali Linux) were executed on VMware Workstation; GNS3 server and remote machine were directly with the host system. The screenshot below depicts the network topology already set up in GNS3.

Fig 1.1

Network Topology



Layer 3 Switch Configuration

The Layer 3 switch was configured to support two VLANs:

ICT Department (VLAN 40)

Marketing Floor Department (VLAN 50)

The VLAN interfaces were enabled for VLAN communication between the VLANs. To manage the IP addresses dynamically a DHCP pool was created for each VLAN. The VLAN traffic was able to pass through the interfaced connecting the switch to the firewall. Below are the configurations executed on the Layer 3 switch:

VLAN and interfaces configuration

MultilayerSW(config)# vlan 40

MultilayerSW(config-vlan)# name ICTDepartment

MultilayerSW(config-vlan)# exit

MultilayerSW(config)# vlan 50

MultilayerSW(config-vlan)# name MarketingDepartment

MultilayerSW(config-vlan)# exit

MultilayerSW(config)# interface e0/0

MultilayerSW(config-if)# switchport mode access

MultilayerSW(config-if)# switchport access vlan 40

MultilayerSW(config-if)# no shutdown

MultilayerSW(config-if)# exit

MultilayerSW(config)# interface e0/1

MultilayerSW(config-if)# switchport mode access

MultilayerSW(config-if)# switchport access vlan 50

MultilayerSW(config-if)# no shutdown

MultilayerSW(config-if)# exit

MultilayerSW(config)# interface e0/2

MultilayerSW(config-if)# switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q

MultilayerSW(config-if)# switchport mode trunk

MultilayerSW(config-if)# switchport trunk allowed vlan 40,50

MultilayerSW(config-if)# no shutdown

MultilayerSW(config-if)# exit

MultilayerSW(config)# interface vlan 40

MultilayerSW(config-if)# ip address 192.168.40.1 255.255.255.0

MultilayerSW(config-if)# no shutdown

MultilayerSW(config-if)# exit

MultilayerSW(config)# interface vlan 50

MultilayerSW(config-if)# ip address 192.168.50.1 255.255.255.0

MultilayerSW(config-if)# no shutdown

MultilayerSW(config-if)# exit

MultilayerSW(config)# ip routing

MultilayerSW(config)# ip dhcp pool vlan40

MultilayerSW(dhcp-config)# network 192.168.40.0 255.255.255.0

MultilayerSW(dhcp-config)# default-router 192.168.40.1

MultilayerSW(config)# ip dhcp pool vlan50

MultilayerSW(dhcp-config)# network 192.168.50.0 255.255.255.0

MultilayerSW(dhcp-config)# default-router 192.168.50.1

MultilayerSW(config)# ip dhcp excluded-address 192.168.50.1 192.168.50.50

Fig 1.2

Layer 3 configurations

```
### RutilayerSM#sho vlan brief

VLAN Name

Status Ports

active Et0/3, Et1/0, Et1/1, Et1/2
Et1/3, Et2/0, Et2/1, Et2/2
Et2/3, Et3/0, Et3/1, Et3/2
Et2/3, Et3/0, Et3/1, Et3/2
Et2/3, Et3/0, Et3/1, Et3/2
Et3/3, Et3/0, Et3/1, Et3/2
Et3/3, Et3/0, Et3/1, Et3/2
Et3/3

#### RutilayerSM#show ip interface brief
Interface Drief
RutilayerSM#show ip interface brief
Interface Drief
Ethernet0/0 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet0/1 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet0/2 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet0/1 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet1/1 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet1/2 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet1/3 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet2/0 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet2/1 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet2/2 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet2/3 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet2/3 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet3/1 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet3/2 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet3/3 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet3/4 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet3/5 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet3/6 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet3/7 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet3/8 unassigned VES unset up up
Ethernet3/9 unassigned VES unset up up
```

Firewall Setup and Configuration

Three interfaces were configured on the WatchGuard Firewall:

• WAN: Configured to use DHCP.

• LAN: Specifically designed to operate as a bridge interface.

• DMZ: Configured with a static IP.

Firewall Policies and VPN Configuration

There were also policies enabled to permit only certain traffic between VLANs, HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, POP3, ICMP for DMZ and traffic to the SSL VPN for LAN.

AES and SHA256 was used for encryption and authentication for SSL VPN for the remote use. This made it possible to manage data access using the identified user groups while the users were authenticated from the firewall level.

The client for the SSL VPN was obtained from the portal of the firewall and then run on the remote machine. Secure access certificate was also installed. The confidentiality of traffic was confirmed by using wireshark protocol.

Fig 1.3

Watchguard Web UI

| ← C ⊗ Not secure https://192.168.163.128:8080/auth/login?from_page=/ | ☆) 😌 🗠 🍕 |
|--|-----------------------|
| | |
| | |
| WatchGuard' | |
| | User Name |
| | User Name |
| | Passphrase |
| | Passphrase |
| | Authentication Server |
| | Firebox-DB 🗸 |
| | LOGIN |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |

Fig 1.4DMZ interface configuration

| ← C 💌 Not secure | https://192.168.163.128:8080/network/intf_config?name=DMZ | A^ 🖒 🗘 🏞 🦚 |
|-----------------------------|---|-----------------|
| (WatchGuard | Fireware Web UI | User: admin ? 🚺 |
| DASHBOARD | This device does not have a feature key so some features are disabled. Add a feature key now. | |
| SYSTEM STATUS | Interfaces / Edit | |
| NETWORK Interfaces | Interface Name (Alias) DMZ | |
| | Interface Description connection to dmz | |
| | Interface Type Optional | |
| | IPv4 IPv6 Secondary MAC Access Control Advanced | |
| | IP Address 192.168.20.1 / 24 | |
| | Disable DHCP v | |
| Gateway Wireless Controller | | |
| SUBSCRIPTION SERVICES | SAVE CANCEL | |
| AUTHENTICATION | | |
| VPN SYSTEM | | |
| | | |
| | | |

Fig 1.5

LAN, WAN and DMZ interface configured





Fig 1.6

Configured firewall rules/policies



Firewall testing


To test the configured policies and the exposed ports to the internet we used Nmap to scan the internet facing interface / gateway. The policies looked good with only the necessary exposed port and in filtered state. The firewall was also able to drop/deny any traffic violating the policies.

Fig 1.7

Firewall policies testing with Nmap

```
kali@kali: ~
                                                                                06:56 PM 🗖 🌓 🔔
                                                    kali@kali: ~
File Actions Edit View Help
___(kali⊕ kali)-[~]
$ nmap 192.168.163.128 -Pn -vv
Host discovery disabled (-Pn). All addresses will be marked 'up' and scan tim
es will be slower.
Starting Nmap 7.91 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-11-17 18:51 EST
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 18:51
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 18:51, 13.00s elapsed
Initiating Connect Scan at 18:51
Scanning 192.168.163.128 [1000 ports]
Connect Scan Timing: About 15.50% done; ETC: 18:55 (0:02:49 remaining)
Connect Scan Timing: About 29.75% done; ETC: 18:55 (0:02:24 remaining)
Connect Scan Timing: About 44.80% done; ETC: 18:55 (0:01:52 remaining)
Connect Scan Timing: About 59.65% done; ETC: 18:55 (0:01:22 remaining)
Connect Scan Timing: About 74.75% done; ETC: 18:55 (0:00:51 remaining)
Completed Connect Scan at 18:55, 201.51s elapsed (1000 total ports)
Nmap scan report for 192.168.163.128
Host is up, received user-set.
All 1000 scanned ports on 192.168.163.128 are filtered because of 1000 no-res
ponses
Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 214.63 seconds
```

Fig 1.8



We configures SSL vpn to allow internal resource/service access by the remote machine. AES and SHA256 was used for encryption and authentication for SSL VPN for the remote use. This made it possible to manage data access using the identified user groups while the users were authenticated from the firewall level.

The client for the SSL VPN was obtained from the portal of the firewall and then run on the remote machine. Secure access certificate was also installed. The confidentiality of traffic was confirmed by using wireshark protocol.

Fig 1.9

SSL vpn user and group configuration




Fig 2.0
SSL vpn configuration

| ← C 🛽 🗴 Not secure | https://192.168.163.128.8080/vpn/ssl A ^N ☆ ③ ⑤ ↓ ★ | 🥠 |
|---|---|-----|
| WatchGuard | Fireware Web UI User: admin ? | ① î |
| DASHBOARD SYSTEM STATUS NETWORK FIREWALL SUBSCRIPTION SERVICES AUTHENTICATION VPN Branch Office VPN BOVPN Virtual Interfaces BOVPN Over TLS Phase 2 Proposals | This device does not have a feature key so some features are disabled. Add a feature key now. Mobile VPN with SSL When you activate Mobile VPN with SSL, the "SSLVPN-Users" group and the "WatchGuard SSLVPN" policy are created to allow Mobile VPN with SSL connections from the Internet to the external interface. Activate Mobile VPN with SSL General Authentication Advanced Firebox IP Addresses or Domain Names Type a firebox IP or domain name for SSL VPN users to connect to. Primary | |
| IKEv2 Shared Settings Mobile VPN with IPSec Mobile VPN with IKEv2 Mobile VPN with SSL Mobile VPN with SSL Mobile VPN with L2TP Global Settings SYSTEM | Networking and IP address pool Choose the method the Firebox uses to send traffic through the VPN tunnel. Select Bridge VPN traffic if you want to bridge the user to a network you specify. Select Route VPN traffic if you want the Firebox to route VPN traffic to specified networks and resources. Routed VPN traffic Force all client traffic through tunnel Allow access to all Trusted, Optional, and Custom networks Specify allowed resources ALLOWED NETWORK ADDRESSES | |

Fig 2.1

Configured firewall rules/policies

| ← C × Not secure | https://192.168.163.128.0080/vpn/ssl A ♀ ♀ ♀ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ | |
|---|--|---|
| (WatchGuard | Fireware Web UI User: admin 🔞 🕡 | • |
| FIREWALL | interface. Activate Mobile VPN with SSL | |
| SUBSCRIPTION SERVICES | | |
| AUTHENTICATION | General Authentication Advanced | 1 |
| VPN | Firebox IP Addresses or Domain Names | ш |
| Branch Office VPN | THEOCY IF ACCIONATE OF THE INTERIOR OF THE INT | ш |
| BOVPN Virtual Interfaces BOVPN Over TLS | Primary 192 168 163 128 | ı |
| Phase 2 Proposals IKEv2 Shared Settings | Backup 192.168.219.136 | I |
| Mobile VPN with IPSec Mobile VPN with IKEv2 Mobile VPN with SSL | Networking and IP address pool Choose the method the Firebox uses to send traffic through the VPN tunnel. Select Bridge VPN traffic if you want to bridge the user to a network you specify. Select Route VPN traffic if you want the Firebox to route VPN traffic to specified networks and resources. | I |
| Mobile VPN with L2TP Global Settings | Routed VPN traffic | I |
| SYSTEM | Force all client traffic through tunnel Allow access to all Trusted, Optional, and Custom networks Specify allowed resources | ı |
| | ALLOWED NETWORK ADDRESSES | ı |
| | / 24 ADD REMOVE | ı |
| | Virtual IP Address Pool | ı |
| | Enter a subnet to be used as virtual address pool. Your Firebox allows 5 Mobile VPN with SSL users. | ı |
| | 192.168.113.0 / 24 | • |
| | SAVE | • |

Fig 2.2

SSL vpn authentication and encryption configuration

| ← C 🛛 🗴 Not secure | https://192.168.163.128:8080/vpn | /ssl | | A ^N ☆ G G | 🥠 |
|--|---|---|---|--|-----|
| (WatchGuard | Fireware Web UI | | | User: admin ? | • |
| SUBSCRIPTION SERVICES | ✓ Activate Mobile VPN with St | L | | | |
| AUTHENTICATION | General Authentica | tion Advanced | | | |
| VPN | | | | | _ |
| | Authentication | SHA-256 ~ | | | - 1 |
| | | | | | - 1 |
| | Encryption | AES (256-bit) | | | - 1 |
| | Data channel | TCP ~ | 443 | | - 1 |
| IKEv2 Shared Settings Mobile VPN with IPSec | | | | | - 1 |
| Mobile VPN with IKEv2 | Keep-Alive Interval | 10 | seconds | | - 1 |
| Mobile VPN with SSL | | | | | - 1 |
| | Keep-Alive Timeout | 60 | seconds | | - 1 |
| | Renegotiate Data Channel | 61 | minutes | | - 1 |
| SYSTEM | | | | | - 1 |
| | DNS and WINS Serve | | | | - 1 |
| | For Mobile VPN with SSL clients specified on the Interfaces page | to resolve unqualified names and FQDN do not apply to Mobile VPN with SSL cl | Ns for your domain, you must specify a di ients. | omain name and at least one DNS or WINS server. The Firebox DNS settings you | - 1 |
| | Domain Name | ,,,, | | | - 1 |
| | | | | | - 1 |
| | DNS Servers | 8.8.8.8 | 1.1.1.1 | | - 1 |
| | | | | | - 1 |
| | WINS Servers | | | | - 1 |
| | SAVE | | | | - 1 |
| | SAVE | | | | - 1 |
| | | | | | |
| | WINS Servers SAVE | 0.00 | | | |

Fig 2.3

SSL vpn user portal





Fig 2.4

SSL vpn connection establishment




Testing SSL vpn encryption

To test the remote access vpn we monitored the specific vpn traffic with wireshark to verify the encryption which showed that the traffic was encrypted .

Fig 2.5

SSLvpn encryption testing



IDS Implementation

A Linux Ubuntu based DMZ server was deployed on virtual machines with content IDS system called Fail2ban IDS. A custom SSH intrusion rule was configured as follows:

```
[sshd]

enabled = true

port = ssh

logpath = /var/log/auth.log

bantime = 3600
```

Fig 2.6

Installing Fail2ban IDS

```
Bebantupubuntuserveez2001/homes sudo apt install —y failZbban
Reading pactage Lists. Done
Building dependency tree... Done
Reading state information... Done
The following additional packages will be installed:
Supposted packages:

amil mont! Sqlitc3 python-pyinotify-doc
The following NEW packages will be installed:
failZbban python3-pyinotify whois

uppraded, 3 newly installed, 0 to remove and 200 not upgraded.

fer this operation, 2,405 kg of additional disk space will be used.

After this operation, 2,405 kg of additional disk space will be used.

Get: http://in.archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu jammy/main amd60 python3-pyinotify all 0.9.6-1.3 [24.8 kg]

Get:3 http://in.archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu jammy/main amd60 python3-pyinotify all 0.9.6-1.3 [24.8 kg]

Get:1 http://in.archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu jammy/main amd60 python3-pyinotify all 0.9.6-1.3 [24.8 kg]

Get:2 http://in.archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu jammy/main amd60 python3-pyinotify all 0.9.6-1.3 [24.8 kg]

Get:3 http://in.archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu.jammy/main amd60 python3-pyinotify all 0.9.6-1.3 [24.8 kg]

Get:3 http://in.archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu.jammy/main amd60 python3-pyinotify.

Greading distabage (0.12.2-6)

Unpacking failZban (0.11.2-6)

Selecting previously unselected package python3-pyinotify.

Selecting previously unselected package python3-pyinotify.

Selecting previously unselected package whois.

Freparing to unpack .../Apinos-pyinotify.0.9.6-1.3 [11.deb ...

Unpacking whois (3.6.13) ...

Setting up unpack .../Apinos-pyinotify (0.9.6-1.3) ...

Freparing to unpack .../Apinos-pyinotify (0.9.6-1.3) ...

Setting up python3-pyinotify (0.9.6-1.3) ...

Setting up python3-pyinotify (0.9.6-1.3) ...

Freparing to unpack .../Getic package whois.

Frep
```

IDS status

```
### biliban.service — Fail2Ban Service
Loaded: loaded (/lib/system/fail2ban.service; enabled; vendor preset: enabled)
Active: active (running) since Mon 2824—11—18 14:49:14 UTC; lmin 24s ago
Docs: man:fail2ban(1)
Main PID: 801 (fail2ban-server)
Tasks: 5 (limit: 2289)
Memory: 15.7H
CPU: 441as
CGroup: /system.slice/fail2ban.service
__801 /usr/bin/python3 /usr/bin/fail2ban-server ~xf start

Nov 18 14:49:14 server systemd[1]: Started Fail2Ban Service.
Nov 18 14:49:21 server fail2ban-server[801]: Server ready
ubuntu@server:-$ [
```

Fig 2.8

IDS configuration and adding custom rule

To verify that the IDS can detect anomalous traffic we simulated ssh bruteforce attack to ward the server and Fail2ban successfully detected the traffic.

Fig 2.9

Testing IDS with simulated attack



Fig 3.0


IDS testing: log shows ssh bruteforce blocked

Testing and Security Assessment


To test and verify the implemented security we used nmap to footprint the network and tried bruteforce attack to the firewall web UI which actually had positive results meaning it even went to an extent of the set policies recognizing the malicious traffic and dropping the attacking machine traffic. We used Nmap and hydra in this two cases. One of the weakness identified was that port 22 was exposed to the internet which can be a risk of being exploited by a zero day.

Fig 3.1

IDS testing: log shows ssh bruteforce blocked



Attack vector II: firewall web UI login bruteforce.



Firewall blocked hydra bruteforce probes





Fig 3.4

Firewallweb ui login bruteforce attack failed.



Risk Assessment

The risks identified during the vulnerability assessment and exploitation in the network include expose of unsued ports like ssh.

Mitigation

Exposing only required/used ports and with different ports not well known ports