

PS2

Q1. CE consists of prices  $\{p_t, w_t, r_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  and  
allocations for firm  $\{k_t^d, l_t^d, k_t^s, l_t^s, y_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ ,  
 $\{c_t, i_t, x_{t+1}, k_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  s.t.

- given prices  $\{p_t, w_t, r_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ , the allocation of repr. NY  
 $\{c_t, i_t, x_{t+1}, k_t^s, l_t^s\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  solves user's problem

$$\max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, l_t)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \begin{cases} c_t, i_t, x_{t+1}, k_t^s, l_t^s \\ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t (c_t + i_t) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t (r_t k_t + w_t l_t) + \pi \end{cases}$$

$$x_{t+1} = (1-\delta)x_t + i_t$$

$$0 \leq k_t \leq x_t$$

$$0 \leq l_t \leq 1 \quad t \geq 0$$

$$c_t, x_{t+1} \geq 0$$

- given prices  $\{p_t, w_t, l_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$

$\{k_t^d, l_t^d, y_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ , the allocation of repr. firms  
 $\{y_t, k_t^s, l_t^s\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$  solves firm's problem:

$$\pi^* = \max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} p_t (y_t - r_t k_t - w_t l_t)$$

$$\text{s.t. } y_t = F(k_t, l_t) \quad t \geq 0$$

$$y_t \geq r_t k_t, l_t \geq 0$$

- markets clear,  $i_t$

$$i_t = c_t + i_t$$

$$l_t^d = l_t^s$$

$$k_t^d = k_t^s$$

$$u(c_t, l_t) = \frac{c_t^{1-\alpha}}{1-\alpha} - \gamma \frac{l_t^\alpha}{1+\gamma}$$

$$F(k_t, l_t) = \alpha K^\alpha l_t^{1-\alpha}$$

(2)

d) Rewrite the problem!

assume  $t=0$ 

$$l_t = 1 \quad \forall t$$

 $u$  is strictly  $\eta$  & concave.

$$k_t = x_t \quad \forall t$$

$$\max_{\{c_t, k_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( \frac{c_t^{1-\delta}}{1-\delta} - \gamma \frac{k_t^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta} \right)$$

$$\text{to } \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( c_t + k_{t+1} - \left( 1-\delta \right) x_t \right) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( r_t k_t + w_t \right)$$

$$c_t, k_{t+1} \geq 0 \quad \forall t$$

so given

$$\begin{aligned} \text{FOC}_c: & \\ \text{and } c_t \sqrt[1-\delta]{\frac{1-\delta}{1+\eta}} c_t^{-\delta} &= \mu_t \\ \beta^{t+1} c_{t+1}^{-\delta} &= \mu_{t+1} \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{and } k_t: \beta \frac{r_t \cdot (1+\eta)}{1+\eta} k_t^\eta = 0$$

$$\text{and } k_{t+1}: \mu_t = \mu [1-\delta + r_{t+1}] / \mu_{t+1}$$

$$\frac{\beta c_{t+1}^{-\delta}}{c_t^{-\delta}} = \frac{\mu_{t+1}}{\mu_t} = \frac{1}{1+r_{t+1}-\delta} \quad \forall t$$

$$\beta \left( \frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} \right)^{-\delta} = \frac{1}{1+r_{t+1}-\delta}$$

Firm's FOC: (same as in PS1)

$$-r_t \mu_t + \mu_t F_k(k_t, c_t) = 0$$

$$F_k(k_t, c_t) = \alpha \times k_t^{\alpha-1} \times c_t^{1-\alpha}$$

$$\begin{aligned} -w_t \mu_t + F_k(k_t, c_t) &= 0 \\ w_t &= (1-\delta) \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \alpha^t k_t^{\alpha-1} \end{aligned}$$

Substitute market clearing conditions & using firm's FOCs:

$$C = F(k_t, l_t) - [k_{t+1} - (1-\delta)k_t]$$

$$\frac{\beta \left( \frac{z k_t^{\alpha} l_t^{1-\alpha}}{z k_{t+1}^{\alpha} l_{t+1}^{1-\alpha}} - k_{t+1} + (1-\delta)k_t \right)^{-\delta}}{(z k_t^{\alpha} l_t^{1-\alpha} - k_{t+1} + (1-\delta)k_t)^{-\delta}} = \frac{1+r_{t+1}-\delta}{1}$$

$$(z k_{t+1}^{\alpha} l_{t+1}^{1-\alpha})^{-1}$$

at steady state:

$$C_t = C^* = C_{t+1}$$

$$k_{t+1} = k^* = k_{t+2}, r_t = r_{t+1} = r^*$$

$$l_t = l^* = l_{t+1}$$

$$\frac{1}{1+r-\delta} = \beta$$

$$1+r-\delta = \frac{1}{\beta}$$

$$r^* = \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta$$

$$\frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta = \alpha z k^{*\alpha-1}$$

$$k^{*\alpha-1} = \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta \quad | \quad \frac{1}{\alpha-1}$$

$$k^* = \left( \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}}$$

$$C^* = z k^{*\alpha} - k^* + (1-\delta)k^* =$$

$$= z k^{*\alpha} + k^*(1-\delta-1) = z k^{*\alpha} - k^*$$

$$= z \left( \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}} - \delta \left( \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}}$$

$$y^* = C^* + k^* - (1-\delta)k^* =$$

$$= C^* + k^*(1-1+\delta) = C^* + k^*\delta =$$

$$= z \left( \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}} - \delta \left( \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}} +$$

$$+ \delta \left( \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha-1}}$$

$$w^* = (1-\alpha)z k^{*\alpha} = (1-\alpha)z \left( \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}}$$

$$= z \left( \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha-1}}$$

(4)

(3)

$$w(\bar{k}_0) = \max_{\{c_t, k_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t w(c_t, k_t)$$

$$\text{s.t. } F(k_t, c_t) = z k_t^\alpha c_t^{1-\alpha}$$

$$F(k_t, c_t) = c_t + k_{t+1} - (1-\delta)k_t$$

$$c_t \geq 0$$

$$k_t \geq 0$$

$$0 \leq c_t \leq k_t$$

$$k_0 \leq \bar{k}_0$$

$k_0$  given

$$u(c_t, k_t) = \frac{c_t^{1-\delta}}{1-\delta} + \frac{k_t^{\gamma}}{1+\gamma}$$

all info is contained  
in past capital

bc choice is static,  
so we can find it.  
solution given  $k_t, k_{t+1}$

$$c_t = F(k_t, c_t) + (1-\delta)k_t - k_{t+1}$$

$$w(k_0) = \max_{\substack{k'_t, k_t \\ 0 \leq k' \leq z k_t^\alpha \\ k^0 \text{ given}}} \{ u(z k_t^\alpha + (1-\delta)k_t - k'_t, k_t) \}$$

The idea is to use MRE,

$$\chi(k, k') = F(k, \tilde{\chi}(k, k')) -$$

$$- k' + (1-\delta)k$$

where  $\tilde{\chi}(k, k')$  is from static problem.

Static problem:

$$\max_{c_t, k_t} \left( \frac{c_t^{1-\delta}}{1-\delta} - \chi \frac{c_t^{1+\gamma}}{1+\gamma} \right)$$

$$\text{s.t. } c_t = z k_t^\alpha c_t^{1-\alpha} - k_{t+1} + (1-\delta)k_t$$

$$k_t, c_t \geq 0$$

$$\frac{\partial \chi}{\partial k} = \frac{1}{1-\delta} \cdot 1 - \frac{1}{1-\delta} c_t^{-\delta} = 0$$

$$\text{s.t. } -\chi \frac{1}{1-\delta} c_t^{-\delta} k_t^{\gamma} + z k_t^\alpha c_t^{-\alpha} = 0$$

$$\chi c_t^{-\delta} = (z - \alpha) z k_t^\alpha c_t^{-\alpha}$$

$$k_t^\gamma = (z - \alpha) c_t^{-\delta}$$

$$\frac{k_t^\gamma}{c_t^{-\delta}} = \frac{(z - \alpha) c_t^{-\delta}}{z k_t^\alpha}$$

$$V(k) = \max_{\substack{k'_t \\ 0 \leq k' \leq z k_t^\alpha \\ k^0 \text{ given}}} \{ F(k, \chi) + (1-\delta)k - k' + \beta V(k') \}$$

$$k_t^\gamma = \frac{(1-\delta) c_t^{-\delta} k_t^\alpha}{\beta}$$

$$\Leftrightarrow (k_t^\gamma)^{1+\delta} = \frac{(1-\delta) c_t^{-\delta} k_t^\alpha}{\beta}$$

(5)

(4)

$$l_{ss} = 0.4$$

$$l_{ss} = \left[ \frac{(1-\alpha)C^{*-2} Z K^{*\alpha}}{J} \right]^{1/(1+\alpha)}$$

$\alpha = 1/3$   
 $Z = 1$   
 $\sigma = 2$   
 $J = 1$

$$0.4 = \left[ \frac{(1-\frac{1}{3})C^{*-2} \cdot 1 \cdot K^{*1/3}}{J} \right]^{1/1/3}$$

$$K^* = \left( \frac{\frac{1}{0.16} - 1 + 1}{\frac{1}{3} \cdot 1} \right)^{1/3-1}$$

$$\det \beta = 0.96$$

$$\delta = 0.9$$

$$C^* = 1 \cdot \left( \frac{\frac{1}{0.96} - 1 + 1}{\frac{1}{3} \cdot 1} \right)^{1/3-1} - 1 \left( \frac{\frac{1}{0.96} - 1 + 1}{\frac{1}{3} \cdot 1} \right)^{1/3-1}$$

Code is attached.

$$\gamma = 0.0817 \text{ based on code}$$

(5), (6) code and figures attached.

(7) Below is based on paper "Improved & Generalized Upper bounds on the Complexity of PD" by B. Scherrer  
 State space  $X$  is finite;  $A$ , action space, at each stage there is a reward function  $r(a)$ ;  $\pi: X \rightarrow A$ , policy map. max the expected discounted sum of rewards from  $t$  state;  $\beta \in (0, 1)$   
 $v_* = \max_{\pi} v_{\pi}$  optimal value;  $V_{\pi} = \pi + \beta V_{\pi}$  is BE wts

$V_{\pi}$  is a fixed point of operator  $T_{\pi}: v \rightarrow r_{\pi} + \beta v_{\pi}$

$v_* = \max \{ r_{\pi} + \beta v_{\pi} \} = \max T_{\pi} v_*$ , where  $v_*$  is a fixed point of operator  $T: v \rightarrow \max_{\pi} T_{\pi} v$ .

WTS, the sequence  $|v_{\pi} - v_{\pi+1}|$  will be built by Howard's PT is contraction wts coeff.  $\beta$ .

(6)


$$t_K \geq 0$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 v_{\pi^*} - v_{\pi_K} &= T_{\pi^*} v_{\pi^*} - T_{\pi_K} v_{\pi_{K-1}} + T_{\pi_K} v_{\pi_{K-1}} - \\
 &\quad - T_{\pi_K} v_{\pi_{K-1}} + T_{\pi_K} v_{\pi_{K-1}} - T_{\pi_K} v_{\pi_K} \leq \\
 &\leq \beta(v_{\pi^*} - v_{\pi_{K-1}}) + \beta(v_{\pi_{K-1}} - v_{\pi_K}) \leq \\
 &\leq \beta(v_{\pi^*} - v_{\pi_{K-1}})
 \end{aligned}$$


Because  $v_{\pi^*} - v_{\pi_K}$  is non-negative,

$$\|v_{\pi^*} - v_{\pi_K}\|_\infty \leq \beta \|v_{\pi^*} - v_{\pi_{K-1}}\|_\infty \Rightarrow \text{contradiction.}$$

## Consumption



## Value Function



$$l_{ss} = 0.4$$

$$l_{ss} = \left( \frac{(1-\alpha)C^{*\alpha}}{\beta} \right)^{1/\alpha}$$

$\alpha = 1/3$   
 $\beta = 1$   
 $\sigma = 2$   
 $\gamma = 1$

$$0.4 = \left[ \frac{(1-\frac{1}{3})C^{*-2}}{\beta} \cdot 1 \cdot k^{*1/3} \right]^{1/1/3}$$

$$R^* = \left( \frac{\frac{1}{0.96} - 1 + 1}{\frac{1}{3} \cdot 1} \right)^{1/1/3-1}$$

$\det \beta = 0.96$   
 $\delta = 0.9$

$$C^* = 1 \cdot \left( \frac{\frac{1}{0.96} - 1 + 1}{\frac{1}{3} \cdot 1} \right)^{1/1/3-1} - 1 \left( \frac{\frac{1}{0.96} - 1 + 1}{\frac{1}{3} \cdot 1} \right)^{1/1/3-1}$$

From screen

Code is attached.

$$\gamma = 0.0817 \text{ based on code}$$

VFI-Grid Search - h t=50  
 Iterations = 431  
 Distance =  $g. \frac{8932e^{-89}}{430.89 \text{ seconds}}$

⑤, ⑥ Code and figures attached.

⑦ Below is based on paper "Improved & Generalised Upper bounds on the Complexity of DO" by B. Scherrer

State space  $X$  is finite;  $A$ , action space, at each stage there is a reward  $r(a)$ ;  $\pi: X \rightarrow A$ , policy map. max over expected discounted sum of rewards from  $t$  state;  $\beta \in (0, 1)$

$v_* = \max_{\pi} v_{\pi}$  optimal value;  $V_{\pi} = r_{\pi} + \beta V_{\pi}$  is BE w.r.t

$V_{\pi}$  is a fixed point of operator  $T_{\pi}: v \rightarrow r_{\pi} + \beta v$

$v_* = \max \{ r_{\pi} + \beta v_{\pi} \} = \max T_{\pi} v_*$ , where  $v_*$  is a fixed point of operator  $T: v \rightarrow \max_{\pi} T_{\pi} v$ .

WTS, one sequence  $|v_{\pi_k} - v_{\pi_{k+1}}| \rightarrow 0$  built by Howard's PT is contraction w.r.t. coeff.  $\beta$ .