


CCNA Day 50

DHCP Snooping




5.0 Security Fundamentals

15%



- 5.1 Define key security concepts (threats, vulnerabilities, exploits, and mitigation techniques)
- 5.2 Describe security program elements (user awareness, training, and physical access control)
- 5.3 Configure device access control using local passwords
- 5.4 Describe security password policies elements, such as management, complexity, and password alternatives (multifactor authentication, certificates, and biometrics)
- 5.5. Describe remote access and site-to-site VPNs
- 5.6 Configure and verify access control lists
- 5.7 Configure Layer 2 security features (DHCP snooping, dynamic ARP inspection, and port security)**
- 5.8 Differentiate authentication, authorization, and accounting concepts
- 5.9 Describe wireless security protocols (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3)
- 5.10 Configure WLAN using WPA2 PSK using the GUI




Things we'll cover

- What is DHCP Snooping?
- How does it work?
- What attacks does it prevent?
- DHCP Snooping configuration


DHCP Snooping

- DHCP snooping is a security feature of switches that is used to filter DHCP messages received on *untrusted* ports.
- DHCP snooping only filters DHCP messages. Non-DHCP messages aren't affected.
- All ports are *untrusted* by default.
 - Usually, **uplink** ports are configured as *trusted* ports, and **downlink** ports remain *untrusted*.




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
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
DHCP Starvation

- An example of a DHCP-based attack is a **DHCP starvation** attack.
- An attacker uses spoofed MAC addresses to flood DHCP Discover messages.
- The target server's DHCP pool becomes full, resulting in a denial-of-service to other devices.




DHCP Poisoning (Man-in-the-Middle)

- Similar to ARP Poisoning, DHCP Poisoning can be used to perform a Man-in-the-Middle attack.
- A *spurious DHCP server* replies to clients' DHCP Discover messages and assigns them IP addresses, but makes the clients use the spurious server's IP as the default gateway.
- *Clients usually accept the first Offer message they receive.
- This will cause the client to send traffic to the attacker instead of the legitimate default gateway.
- The attacker can then examine/modify the traffic before forwarding it to the legitimate default gateway.




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
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DHCP Messages

- When DHCP Snooping filters messages, it differentiates between **DHCP Server** messages and **DHCP Client** messages
- Messages sent by **DHCP Servers**:
 - OFFER
 - ACK
 - NAK = Opposite of ACK, used to decline a client's REQUEST
- Messages sent by **DHCP Clients**:
 - DISCOVER
 - REQUEST
 - RELEASE = Used to tell the server that the client no longer needs its IP address
 - DECLINE = Used to decline the IP address offered by a DHCP server

DHCP Snooping Operations

- If a DHCP message is received on a **trusted port**, forward it as normal without inspection.
- If a DHCP message is received on an **untrusted port**, inspect it and act as follows:
 - If it is a **DHCP Server** message, discard it.
 - If it is a **DHCP Client** message, perform the following checks:

DISCOVER/REQUEST messages: Check if the frame's source MAC address and the DHCP message's CHADDR fields match. Match = forward, mismatch = discard

RELEASE/DECLINE messages: Check if the packet's source IP address and the receiving interface match the entry in the *DHCP Snooping Binding Table*. Match = forward, mismatch = discard

- When a client successfully leases an IP address from a server, create a new entry in the *DHCP Snooping Binding Table*.

DHCP Snooping

```
SW2(config)#ip dhcp snooping
SW2(config)#ip dhcp snooping vlan 1
SW2(config)#no ip dhcp snooping information option
SW2(config)#interface g0/0
SW2(config-if)#ip dhcp snooping trust
```

I will explain this later!


```
SW1(config)#ip dhcp snooping
SW1(config)#ip dhcp snooping vlan 1
SW1(config)#no ip dhcp snooping information option
SW1(config)#interface g0/0
SW1(config-if)#ip dhcp snooping trust
```

RELEASE/DECLINE messages will be checked to make sure their IP address/interface ID match the entry in the DHCP snooping table.

```
SW1#show ip dhcp snooping binding
```

MacAddress	IpAddress	Lease(sec)	Type	VLAN	Interface
0C:29:2F:18:79:00	192.168.100.10	86294	dhcp-snooping	1	GigabitEthernet0/3
0C:29:2F:90:91:00	192.168.100.11	86302	dhcp-snooping	1	GigabitEthernet0/1
0C:29:2F:67:E9:00	192.168.100.12	86314	dhcp-snooping	1	GigabitEthernet0/2

Total number of bindings: 3




DHCP Snooping Rate-Limiting

- DHCP snooping can limit the rate at which DHCP messages are allowed to enter an interface.
- If the rate of DHCP messages crosses the configured limit, the interface is err-disabled.
- Like with Port Security, the interface can be manually re-enabled, or automatically re-enabled with errdisable recovery.

```
SW1(config)#interface range g0/1 - 3
SW1(config-if-range)#ip dhcp snooping limit rate 1
```

```
*Jun  5 13:15:14.180: %DHCP_SNOOPING-4-DHCP_SNOOPING_ERRDISABLE_WARNING: DHCP Snooping received 1 DHCP packets on
interface Gi0/1
*Jun  5 13:15:14.181: %DHCP_SNOOPING-4-DHCP_SNOOPING_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED: The interface Gi0/1 is receiving more
than the threshold set
*Jun  5 13:15:14.182: %PM-4-ERR_DISABLE: dhcp-rate-limit error detected on Gi0/1, putting Gi0/1 in err-disable
state
*Jun  5 13:15:15.185: %LINEPROTO-5-UPDOWN: Line protocol on Interface GigabitEthernet0/1, changed state to down
*Jun  5 13:15:16.190: %LINK-3-UPDOWN: Interface GigabitEthernet0/1, changed state to down
```



DHCP Snooping Rate-Limiting

```
SW1(config)#errdisable recovery cause dhcp-rate-limit
```

```
SW1#show errdisable recovery
```

ErrDisable Reason	Timer Status
-----	-----
arp-inspection	Disabled
bpduguard	Disabled
channel-misconfig (STP)	Disabled
dhcp-rate-limit	Enabled
dtp-flap	Disabled
gbic-invalid	Disabled
inline-power	Disabled
![output omitted due to length]	

Rate-limiting can be very useful to protect against DHCP exhaustion attacks.

```
Timer interval: 300 seconds
```

```
Interfaces that will be enabled at the next timeout:
```


Interface	Errdisable reason	Time left(sec)
-----	-----	-----
Gi0/1	dhcp-rate-limit	293

DHCP Option 82 (Information Option)

- Option 82, also known as the 'DHCP relay agent information option' is one of many DHCP options.
- It provides additional information about which DHCP relay agent received the client's message, on which interface, in which VLAN, etc.
- DHCP relay agents can add Option 82 to messages they forward to the remote DHCP server.
- With DHCP snooping enabled, by default Cisco switches will add Option 82 to DHCP messages they receive from clients, even if the switch isn't acting as a DHCP relay agent.
- By default, Cisco switches will drop DHCP messages with Option 82 that are received on an untrusted port.

SW2#


```
*Jun  6 01:36:15.298: %DHCP_SNOOPING-5-DHCP_SNOOPING_NONZERO_GIADDR: DHCP_SNOOPING drop message with non-zero giaddr or option82 value on untrusted port, message type: DHCPDISCOVER, MAC sa: 0c29.2f67.e900
```



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```
SW1(config)#no ip dhcp snooping information option
```




```
R1#
*Jun  6 01:46:46.763: DHCPD: inconsistent relay information.
*Jun  6 01:46:46.763: DHCPD: relay information option exists, but giaddr is zero.
```

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```
SW1(config)#no ip dhcp snooping information option
```

```
SW2(config)#no ip dhcp snooping information option
```



```
SW1(config)# ip dhcp snooping
```

```
SW1(config)# ip dhcp snooping vlan vlan-number
```

```
SW1(config)# errdisable recovery cause dhcp-rate-limit
```

```
SW1(config)# no ip dhcp snooping information option
```

```
SW1(config-if)# ip dhcp snooping trust
```

```
SW1(config-if)# ip dhcp snooping limit rate packets-per-second
```

```
SW1# show ip dhcp snooping binding
```

Things we'll cover

- What is DHCP Snooping?
- How does it work?
- What attacks does it prevent?
- DHCP Snooping configuration

Which of the following DHCP message types will always be discarded if received on a DHCP snooping untrusted interface? (select three)

- a) DISCOVER
- b) REQUEST
- c) NAK
- d) OFFER
- e) DECLINE
- f) RELEASE
- g) ACK

Which of the following is NOT stored in the DHCP snooping binding database?

- a) IP address
- b) Interface
- c) VLAN
- d) Default gateway
- e) MAC address

```
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MacAddress      IpAddress      Lease(sec)  Type           VLAN  Interface
-----
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Total number of bindings: 3
```

Which of the following are functions of DHCP snooping? (select two)

- a) Limiting the rate of DHCP messages
- b) Filtering DHCP messages on trusted ports
- c) Filtering DHCP messages on untrusted ports
- d) Filtering all DHCP messages


When DHCP snooping inspects a DHCP DISCOVER message that arrives on an untrusted interface, what does it check? (select the two best answers)

- a) Source MAC address
- b) CHADDR
- c) IP address
- d) Interface







































DHCP snooping rate-limiting is configured on SW1's G0/1 interface. What happens if DHCP messages are received on G0/1 at a rate faster than the configured limit?

- a) The messages that cross the limit will be dropped
- b) The interface will be disabled
- c) All DHCP messages on the interface will be dropped
- d) A warning syslog message will be displayed

- Review flash cards
(link in the description)



JCNP-Level Channel Members

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	 V Viktor Balogh	 Donald Sabusap	 john goff	 Vance Simmons

*as of June 7th, 2021

