

**expelee**

**Building the Futuristic Blockchain Ecosystem**

# **SECURITY AUDIT REPORT**

**Falcon404**

# TOKEN OVERVIEW

## Risk Findings

Severity	Found
● High	4
● Medium	1
● Low	4
● Informational	3

## Centralization Risks

Owner Privileges	Description
● Can Owner Set Taxes >25% ?	Not Detected
● Owner needs to enable trading ?	Yes, owner needs to enable trades
● Can Owner Disable Trades ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner Mint ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner Blacklist ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner set Max Wallet amount ?	Not Detected
● Can Owner Set Max TX amount ?	Not Detected

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# OVERVIEW

The Expelee team has performed a line-by-line manual analysis and automated review of the smart contract. The smart contract was analysed mainly for common smart contract vulnerabilities, exploits, and manipulation hacks. According to the smart contract audit:

<b>Audit Result</b>	<b>Fail</b>
<b>Audit Date</b>	<b>9 March 2024</b>

# CONTRACT DETAILS

**Token Address:** 0x509e2196c9786F49B574df838DcE18c0884f70a6

**Name:** Falcon404

**Symbol:** Falcon404

**Decimals:** 18

**Network:** BSC

**Token Type:** BEP-20

**Owner:** 0x5E67bdb740De026E91C49073f6967578D2894a0b

**Deployer:** 0x5E67bdb740De026E91C49073f6967578D2894a0b

**Token Supply:** 10000000000

**Checksum:** A2032c616934aeb47e6039f76b20d231

**Testnet:** --

# AUDIT METHODOLOGY

## Audit Details

Our comprehensive audit report provides a full overview of the audited system's architecture, smart contract codebase, and details on any vulnerabilities found within the system.

## Audit Goals

The audit goal is to ensure that the project is built to protect investors and users, preventing potentially catastrophic vulnerabilities after launch, that lead to scams and rugpulls.

## Code Quality

Our analysis includes both automatic tests and manual code analysis for the following aspects:

- Exploits
- Back-doors
- Vulnerability
- Accuracy
- Readability

## Tools

- DE
- Open Zeppelin
- Code Analyzer
- Solidity Code
- Compiler
- Hardhat

# VULNERABILITY CHECKS

<b>Design Logic</b>	Passed
<b>Compiler warnings</b>	Passed
<b>Private user data leaks</b>	Passed
<b>Timestamps dependence</b>	Passed
<b>Integer overflow and underflow</b>	Passed
<b>Race conditions &amp; reentrancy. Cross-function race conditions</b>	Passed
<b>Possible delays in data delivery</b>	Passed
<b>Oracle calls</b>	Passed
<b>Front Running</b>	Passed
<b>DoS with Revert</b>	Passed
<b>DoS with block gas limit</b>	Passed
<b>Methods execution permissions</b>	Passed
<b>Economy model</b>	Passed
<b>Impact of the exchange rate on the logic</b>	Passed
<b>Malicious event log</b>	Passed
<b>Scoping and declarations</b>	Passed
<b>Uninitialized storage pointers</b>	Passed
<b>Arithmetic accuracy</b>	Passed
<b>Cross-function race conditions</b>	Passed
<b>Safe Zeppelin module</b>	Passed

# RISK CLASSIFICATION

When performing smart contract audits, our specialists look for known vulnerabilities as well as logical and access control issues within the code. The exploitation of these issues by malicious actors may cause serious financial damage to projects that failed to get an audit in time. We categorize these vulnerabilities by the following levels:

## **High Risk**

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.

## **Medium Risk**

Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance/functionality and should be fixed before moving to a live environment.


## **Low Risk**

Issues on this level are minor details and warning that can remain unfixed.

## **Informational**

Issues on this level are minor details and warning that can remain unfixed.

# INHERITANCE TREES



# STATIC ANALYSIS

A static analysis of the code was performed using Slither. No issues were found.

```

INFO:Detectors:
FatTokenV5.swapTokenForFund(uint256,uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#799-865) uses arbitrary from in transferFrom: _c.transferFrom(address(_tokenDistributor),address(this),currencyBal) (FatTokenV5.sol#827-831)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#arbitrary-from-in-transferfrom
INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in FatTokenV5._transfer(address,address,uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#615-725):
    External calls:
        - swapTokenForFund(numTokensSellToFund,swapFee) (FatTokenV5.sol#708)
            - swapRouter.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount - lpAmount,0,path,address(_tokenDistributor),block.timestamp) (FatTokenV5.sol#811-821)
                - _c.transferFrom(address(_tokenDistributor),address(this),currencyBal) (FatTokenV5.sol#827-831)
                - IWBNB(currency).withdraw(toFundAmt) (FatTokenV5.sol#841)
                - _c.transfer(fundAddress,toFundAmt) (FatTokenV5.sol#844)
                - _swapRouter.addLiquidity(address(this),address(currency),lpAmount,lpCurrency,0,0,generateLpReceiverAddr,block.timestamp) (FatTokenV5.sol#858-863)
            External calls sending eth:
        - swapTokenForFund(numTokensSellToFund,swapFee) (FatTokenV5.sol#708)
            - fundAddress.transfer(toFundAmt) (FatTokenV5.sol#842)
State variables written after the call(s):
    - _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee,isSell,isTransfer) (FatTokenV5.sol#724)
        - _balances[sender] = _balances[sender] - tAmount (FatTokenV5.sol#748)
        - _balances[to] = _balances[to] + tAmount (FatTokenV5.sol#872)
BaseFatToken._balances (FatTokenV5.sol#300) can be used in cross function reentrancies:
    - BaseFatToken._balances (FatTokenV5.sol#300)
    - FatTokenV5._basicTransfer(address,address,uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#573-582)
    - FatTokenV5._takeTransfer(address,address,uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#867-874)
    - FatTokenV5._tokenTransfer(address,address,uint256,bool,bool,bool) (FatTokenV5.sol#740-790)
    - FatTokenV5._transfer(address,address,uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#615-725)
    - BaseFatToken.balanceOf(address) (FatTokenV5.sol#367-372)
    - FatTokenV5.constructor(string[],address[],uint256[],bool[]) (FatTokenV5.sol#436-517)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities
INFO:Detectors:
FatTokenV5.swapTokenForFund(uint256,uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#799-865) ignores return value by _c.transferFrom(address(_tokenDistributor),address(this),currencyBal) (FatTokenV5.sol#827-831)
FatTokenV5.swapTokenForFund(uint256,uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#799-865) ignores return value by _c.transfer(fundAddress,toFundAmt) (FatTokenV5.sol#844)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unchecked-transfer

```

```

INFO:Detectors:
FatTokenV5._transfer(address,address,uint256).isSell (FatTokenV5.sol#652) is a local variable never initialized
FatTokenV5._tokenTransfer(address,address,uint256,bool,bool,bool).feeAmount (FatTokenV5.sol#749) is a local variable never initialized
FatTokenV5._transfer(address,address,uint256).takeFee (FatTokenV5.sol#651) is a local variable never initialized
FatTokenV5._transfer(address,address,uint256).isTransfer (FatTokenV5.sol#719) is a local variable never initialized
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#uninitialized-local-variables
INFO:Detectors:
TokenDistributor.constructor(address) (FatTokenV5.sol#416-418) ignores return value by IERC20(token).approve(msg.sender,uint256(- uint256(0))) (FatTokenV5.sol#417)
FatTokenV5.constructor(string[],address[],uint256[],bool[]) (FatTokenV5.sol#436-517) ignores return value by IERC20(currency).approve(address(swapRouter),MAX) (FatTokenV5.sol#448)
FatTokenV5.swapTokenForFund(uint256,uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#799-865) ignores return value by _swapRouter.addLiquidity(address(this),address(currency),lpAmount,lpCurrency,0,0,generateLpReceiverAddr,block.timestamp) (FatTokenV5.sol#858-863)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-return
INFO:Detectors:
BaseFatToken.allowance(address,address).owner (FatTokenV5.sol#375) shadows:
    - Ownable.owner() (FatTokenV5.sol#71-73) (function)
BaseFatToken._approve(address,address,uint256).owner (FatTokenV5.sol#389) shadows:
    - Ownable.owner() (FatTokenV5.sol#71-73) (function)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing
INFO:Detectors:
BaseFatToken.changeSwapLimit(uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#310-312) should emit an event for:
    - maxBuyAmount = _maxBuyAmount (FatTokenV5.sol#311)
BaseFatToken.changeWalletLimit(uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#314-316) should emit an event for:
    - maxWalletAmount = _amount (FatTokenV5.sol#315)
BaseFatToken.completeCustoms(uint256[]) (FatTokenV5.sol#335-350) should emit an event for:
    - _buyLPFee = customs[0] (FatTokenV5.sol#337)
    - _buyBurnFee = customs[1] (FatTokenV5.sol#338)
    - _buyFundFee = customs[2] (FatTokenV5.sol#339)
    - _sellLPFee = customs[3] (FatTokenV5.sol#341)
    - _sellBurnFee = customs[4] (FatTokenV5.sol#342)
    - _sellFundFee = customs[5] (FatTokenV5.sol#343)
FatTokenV5.setkb(uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#555-557) should emit an event for:
    - kb = a (FatTokenV5.sol#556)
FatTokenV5.setAirdropNumb(uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#586-589) should emit an event for:
    - airdropNumb = newValue (FatTokenV5.sol#588)
FatTokenV5.setNumTokensSellRate(uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#604-607) should emit an event for:
    - numTokensSellRate = newValue (FatTokenV5.sol#606)
FatTokenV5.setSwapAtAmount(uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#611-613) should emit an event for:

```

# STATIC ANALYSIS

```

INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in FatTokenV5._transfer(address,address,uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#615-725):
  External calls:
    - swapTokenForFund(numTokensSellToFund,swapFee) (FatTokenV5.sol#708)
      - _swapRouter.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount - lpAmount,0,path,address(_tokenDistributor),block.timestamp) (FatTokenV5.sol#811-821)
        - _c.transferFrom(address(_tokenDistributor),address(this),currencyBal) (FatTokenV5.sol#827-831)
        - IWBNB(currency).withdraw(toFundAmt) (FatTokenV5.sol#841)
        - _c.transfer(fundAddress,toFundAmt) (FatTokenV5.sol#844)
        - _swapRouter.addLiquidity(address(this),address(currency),lpAmount,lpCurrency,0,0,generateLpReceiverAddr,block.timestamp) (FatTokenV5.sol#850-863)
  External calls sending eth:
    - swapTokenForFund(numTokensSellToFund,swapFee) (FatTokenV5.sol#708)
      - fundAddress.transfer(toFundAmt) (FatTokenV5.sol#842)
  Event emitted after the call(s):
    - Transfer(sender,to,tAmount) (FatTokenV5.sol#873)
      - _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee,isSell,isTransfer) (FatTokenV5.sol#724)
Reentrancy in FatTokenV5.swapTokenForFund(uint256,uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#799-865):
  External calls:
    - _swapRouter.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount - lpAmount,0,path,address(_tokenDistributor),block.timestamp) (FatTokenV5.sol#811-821)
  Event emitted after the call(s):
    - Failed_swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens() (FatTokenV5.sol#820)
Reentrancy in FatTokenV5.swapTokenForFund(uint256,uint256) (FatTokenV5.sol#799-865):
  External calls:
    - _swapRouter.swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount - lpAmount,0,path,address(_tokenDistributor),block.timestamp) (FatTokenV5.sol#811-821)
    - _c.transferFrom(address(_tokenDistributor),address(this),currencyBal) (FatTokenV5.sol#827-831)
    - IWBNB(currency).withdraw(toFundAmt) (FatTokenV5.sol#841)
    - _c.transfer(fundAddress,toFundAmt) (FatTokenV5.sol#844)
    - _swapRouter.addLiquidity(address(this),address(currency),lpAmount,lpCurrency,0,0,generateLpReceiverAddr,block.timestamp) (FatTokenV5.sol#850-863)
  External calls sending eth:
    - fundAddress.transfer(toFundAmt) (FatTokenV5.sol#842)
  Event emitted after the call(s):
    - Failed_AddLiquidity() (FatTokenV5.sol#862)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3

```

```

INFO:Detectors:
Variable IPancakeRouter01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountADesired (FatTokenV5.sol#193) is too similar to IPancakeRouter01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountBDesired (FatTokenV5.sol#194)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-too-similar
INFO:Detectors:
BaseFatToken.deadAddress (FatTokenV5.sol#297) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
INFO:Detectors:
BaseFatToken._mainPair (FatTokenV5.sol#300) should be immutable
BaseFatToken._swapRouter (FatTokenV5.sol#304) should be immutable
BaseFatToken.currency (FatTokenV5.sol#275) should be immutable
BaseFatToken.currencyIsEth (FatTokenV5.sol#264) should be immutable
BaseFatToken.decimals (FatTokenV5.sol#290) should be immutable
BaseFatToken.enableKillBlock (FatTokenV5.sol#267) should be immutable
BaseFatToken.enableOffTrade (FatTokenV5.sol#266) should be immutable
BaseFatToken.enableRewardList (FatTokenV5.sol#268) should be immutable
BaseFatToken.totalSupply (FatTokenV5.sol#295) should be immutable
FatTokenV5._tokenDistributor (FatTokenV5.sol#591) should be immutable
FatTokenV5.enableTransferFee (FatTokenV5.sol#591) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
INFO:Slither:FatTokenV5.sol analyzed (11 contracts with 93 detectors), 80 result(s) found

```

# MANUAL REVIEW

## Severity Criteria

Expelee assesses the severity of disclosed vulnerabilities according to methodology based on OWASP standarts.

Vulnerabilities are divided into three primary risk categories:

High

Medium

Low

High-level considerations for vulnerabilities span the following key areas when conducting assessments:

- Malicious input handling
- Escalation of privileges
- Arithmetic
- Gas use

Overall Risk Severity				
Impact	HIGH	Medium	High	Critical
	MEDIUM	Low	Medium	High
	LOW	Note	Low	Medium
		LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
Likelihood				

# HIGH RISK FINDING

## Centralization – Enabling Trades

**Severity:** High

**function:** Launch

**Status:** Open

### Overview:

The Launch function permits only the contract owner to activate trading capabilities. Until this function is executed, no investors can buy, sell, or transfer their tokens. This places a high degree of control and centralization in the hands of the contract owner.

```
function launch() external onlyOwner {  
    require(startTradeBlock == 0, "already started");  
    startTradeBlock = block.number;  
}
```

### Suggestion

To reduce centralization and potential manipulation, consider one of the following approaches:

1. Automatically enable trading after a specified condition, such as the completion of a presale, is met.
2. If manual activation is still desired, consider transferring the ownership of the contract to a trustworthy, third-party entity like a certified "PinkSale Safu" developer. This can give investors more confidence in the eventual activation of trading capabilities, mitigating concerns of potential bad-faith actions by the original owner.

# HIGH RISK FINDING

**Centralization – The owner can Blacklist Wallet**

**Severity: High**

**function: multi bclist**

**Status: Open**

**Overview:**

The owner can blacklist multiple wallets.

```
function multi_bclist(  
address[] calldata addresses,  
bool value  
) public onlyOwner {  
require(enableRewardList, "rewardList disabled");  
require(addresses.length < 201);  
for (uint256 i; i < addresses.length; ++i) {  
    _rewardList[addresses[i]] = value;  
}  
}
```

# HIGH RISK FINDING

**Centralization – The owner can lock the token**

**Severity: High**

**function: setMaxWalletAmount**

**Status: Open**

**Overview:**

In this changeWalletLimit.

```
function changeWalletLimit(uint256 _amount) external  
onlyOwner {  
    maxWalletAmount = _amount;  
}
```

**Suggestion**

It is recommended that there be a required check for zero address.

# HIGH RISK FINDING

## Centralization – Unsafe Usage of tx.origin

**Severity:** High

**function:** Tx.origin

**Status:** Open

### Overview:

Avoid using TX.origin for authorization, another contract can have a method that will call your contract (where the user has some funds for instance) and your contract will authorize that transaction as your address is in tx. origin.

```
_feeWhiteList[tx.origin] = true;  
}
```

### Suggestion

You should use msg. sender for authorization (if another contract calls your contract msg.sender will be the address of the contract and not the address of the user who called the contract).

# LOW RISK FINDING

**Centralization –Liquidity is added to EOA**

**Severity:** Medium

**function:** addLiquidity

**Status:** Open

## Overview:

Liquidity is added to EOA. It may be drained by the generateLpReceiverAddr.

```
if (lpAmount > 0 && lpCurrency > 0) {  
try  
    _swapRouter.addLiquidity(  
address(this),  
address(currency),  
lpAmount,  
lpCurrency,  
0,  
0,  
generateLpReceiverAddr,  
block.timestamp  
)
```

## Suggestion

It is suggested that the address should be a contract address or a dead address.

# LOW RISK FINDING

## Centralization – Missing Zero Address

**Severity:** Low

**function:** excludeFromLimits

**Status:** Open

### Overview:

functions can take a zero address as a parameter (0x00000...). If a function parameter of address type is not properly validated by checking for zero addresses, there could be serious consequences for the contract's functionality.

```
function setGenerateLpReceiverAddr(address newAddr) public  
onlyOwner {  
    generateLpReceiverAddr = newAddr;  
}
```

### Suggestion

It is suggested that the address should not be zero or dead.

# LOW RISK FINDING

## Centralization – Missing Events

**Severity:** Low

**function:** Missing Events

**Status:** Open

### Overview:

They serve as a mechanism for emitting and recording data onto the blockchain, making it transparent and easily accessible.

```
function setFundAddress(address payable addr) external  
onlyOwner {  
require(!isContract(addr), "fundaddress is a contract ");  
fundAddress = addr;  
_feeWhiteList[addr] = true;  
}  
function setAirdropNumbs(uint256 newValue) public onlyOwner {  
require(newValue <= 3, "newValue must <= 3");  
airdropNumbs = newValue;  
}  
function setNumTokensSellRate(uint256 newValue) public onlyOwner {  
require(newValue != 0, "greater than 0");  
numTokensSellRate = newValue;  
}  
  
function setSwapAtAmount(uint256 newValue) public onlyOwner {  
swapAtAmount = newValue;  
}  
function setTransferFee(uint256 newValue) public onlyOwner {  
require(newValue <= 2500, "transfer > 25!");  
transferFee = newValue;  
}
```

# LOW RISK FINDING

```
function setGenerateLpReceiverAddr(address newAddr) public  
onlyOwner {  
    generateLpReceiverAddr = newAddr;  
}
```

## Suggestion

Add an event to these important functions where address updation is happening. This can also be marked as an indexed event for better off-chain tracking.

# LOW RISK FINDING

## Centralization – Local Variable Shadowing

Severity: Low

function: Shadowing Local

Status: Open

Overview:

```
function allowance(address owner, address spender) public view
override returns (uint256) {
    return _allowances[owner][spender];
}

function _approve(address owner, address spender, uint256
amount) private {
    require(owner != address(0), "BEP20: approve from the zero
address");
    require(spender != address(0), "BEP20: approve to the zero address");
    _allowances[owner][spender] = amount;
    emit Approval(owner, spender, amount);
}
```

### Suggestion

Rename the local variable that shadows another component.

# LOW RISK FINDING

## Centralization – Missing Threshold

**Severity:** Low

**function:** Missing Threshold

**Status:** Open

**Overview:**

```
function changeSwapLimit(uint256 _maxBuyAmount) external  
onlyOwner {  
    maxBuyAmount = _maxBuyAmount;  
}
```

### Suggestion

It is recommended that there should be a threshold limit for changeswaplimit.

# INFORMATIONAL & OPTIMIZATIONS

**Optimization**

**Severity: Informational**

**subject: Remove Safe Math**

**Status: Open**

**Line: 84-146**

**Overview:**

compiler version above 0.8.0 can control arithmetic overflow/underflow, it is recommended to remove the unwanted code to avoid high gas fees.

# INFORMATIONAL & OPTIMIZATIONS

## Optimization

**Severity:** Informational

**subject:** FloatingPragma

**Status:** Open

### Overview:

It is considered best practice to pick one compiler version and stick with it. With a floating pragma, contracts may accidentally be deployed using an outdated.

***pragma solidity ^0.8.4;***

### Suggestion:

Adding the latest constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.

# INFORMATIONAL & OPTIMIZATIONS

## Optimization

**Severity:** Optimization

**subject:** Remove Unused Code

**Status:** Open

**Overview:**

Unused variables are allowed in Solidity, and they do. not pose a direct security issue. It is the best practice though to avoid them.

```
function _msgData() internal view returns (bytes memory) {  
    this; // silence state mutability warning without generating  
bytecode - see  
https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/issues/2691  
return msg.data;  
}
```

# ABOUT EXPELEE

Expelee is a product-based aspirational Web3 start-up. Coping up with numerous solutions for blockchain security and constructing a Web3 ecosystem from deal making platform to developer hosting open platform, while also developing our own commercial and sustainable blockchain.



[www.expelee.com](http://www.expelee.com)



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[expelee-co](#)

The Expelee logo features the word "expelee" in a lowercase, sans-serif font. The letter "e" is unique, with a small upward-pointing arrow above the top of the "e". The "e" is white, while the rest of the letters are orange.

Building the Futuristic **Blockchain Ecosystem**

# DISCLAIMER

All the content provided in this document is for general information only and should not be used as financial advice or a reason to buy any investment. Team provides no guarantees against the sale of team tokens or the removal of liquidity by the project audited in this document.

Always do your own research and protect yourselves from being scammed. The Expelee team has audited this project for general information and only expresses their opinion based on similar projects and checks from popular diagnostic tools.

Under no circumstances did Expelee receive a payment to manipulate those results or change the awarding badge that we will be adding in our website. Always do your own research and protect yourselves from scams.

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