White identity, Donald Trump, and the mobilization of extremism

Sean Long

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Check for updates

White identity, Donald Trump, and the mobilization of extremism

Sean Long

University of California, Riverside, CA, USA

ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to examine the relationship between extremist mobilization and elite cues. Specifically, I explore how political elites can mobilize fringe extremists by looking at a specific example where Trump's 2016 candidacy mobilized members of the White extremist alt-right by appealing to their sense of White in-group identification. It will first be shown how the alt-right was responsive to Trump's rhetoric by performing interrupted time series analyses on blog texts from the prominent extremist *Daily Stormer*. Then, I will incorporate results from a survey experiment showing how White identity motivates those high in alt-right sentiment to support candidates who use racialized and White identity-related rhetoric. Finally, I connect these observations using data from the 2016 ANES pilot to show how White identity uniquely motivated primary-era support for Trump, showing how Trump was distinct in his appeal to those high in White identity. Across these last three analyses, I also show how out-group animus in the form of racial resentment consistently fails to predict the unique support that Trump received from the alt-right. Overall, this paper shows how White identity can result in White extremist support for a mainstream political candidate.

1. Introduction

Donald Trump's primary victories emerged despite the widespread denunciations of Republican party elites throughout the early primary period. Many senior politicians and even prominent *Fox News* and radio talk show hosts initially rejected Trump's credentials, conservatism, and inflammatory comments. However, he was supported early and enthusiastically by a series of White extremist groups and personalities who praised his divisive language and emphasized that he stood as a symbol for the hopes of White America. Such support is notable, as White extremists have long refrained from supporting mainstream politicians (Blee et al. 2017).

This early support for Trump included endorsements by the *Daily Stormer's* Andrew Anglin and former Klan leader David Duke. Another major White nationalist, Don Black, who runs the prominent forum *Stormfront*, described Trump in December 2015 as "the man on the White horse" and "the great White hope ," crediting Trump's rhetoric for a dramatic increase in traffic to his *Stormfront* website and a general growth in White

---

CONTACT Sean Long ✉ Slong008@ucr.edu

nationalist sentiment.[1] Other major alt-right and White supremacist voices have heralded Trump's primary campaign as signaling that "a new day is dawning in America"[2] or declared that "voting against Donald Trump…is really treason to your [White] heritage."[3]

This phenomenon is particularly notable, because it represents a historical shift in White extremists' relationships to the political mainstream. For much of U.S. history, White extremists were active in mainstream politics, notably through Klan activity during the 1920s and 1960s. During these periods, especially the 1920s, violent groups like the Klan enjoyed mainstream success and perhaps could not even be safely called "extremist" given that their form of racial animus was generally popular, despite their use of violent tactics. Regardless, the Klan still served as a distinctive organization from either political party, representing less than 5 percent of the population and maintaining an aggressive racial rhetoric that still stood outside of the norms of mainstream discourse (McVeigh and Estep 2019).[4]

However, the intervening years, starting in the 1970s, have seen a significant shift where extremist groups began to see themselves as militant subversives on the edge of society, opposed both to the federal government and to the electoral system more broadly (Belew 2018). This led to a long period where extremists organized in private spaces, nourishing the movement on the fringes (Simi and Futrell 2010). There were certainly trends of activity that sought to promote a more mainstream appeal, but many of those efforts were thwarted by intra-movement divisions and a lack of general desire to re-orient activity to appeal to mainstream politics (Tenold 2018; Saslow 2018). Yet with the emergence of Trump, that appeared to shift decisively. Now, White extremists were endorsing a primary candidate, urging supporters to vote, and even engineering robocalls in support of Trump.[5] This paper seeks to understand how this transition was possible.

In order to explain this apparent puzzle, this paper theorizes that it was a correspondence between the high levels of White group consciousness among alt-right sympathizers and the prominent racialized appeals used by Donald Trump during his primary campaign that led members of the alt-right to mobilize in support of his candidacy. Importantly, this distinguishes the alt-right's support of Trump from either conservative ideology or the racial resentment that is linked with the prominent Tea Party movement (Parker and Barreto 2014).

However, attempting to study White extremists is extremely difficult. Previous efforts, primarily in sociology, have emphasized the use of ethnography and interviews, but access for such research has been increasingly difficult in recent years (Blee 2017). Instead, this paper takes a novel approach by using unsupervised learning techniques on a large text corpus of blogs from the prominent *Daily Stormer* to understand how extremist discourse was impacted by Trump's candidacy. This will then be paired with analyses from the 2016 ANES Pilot, as well as a survey experiment to explore the relationships between White identity, the alt-right (the most prominent modern White extremist movement), and evaluations of Trump.

This analysis will show that Trump's announcement of candidacy had two major impacts on White extremist discourse. First, they responded with overt support in the form of pro-Trump blog articles praising Trump as the "Glorious Leader" and calling on readers to support him, consistently appealing to him as a representative of "White interests." Second, *Daily Stormer* increasingly began focusing on topics related to

extremist mobilizing, discussing other activists as part of a pan-extremist movement with an eye to taking collective political action. Further support is provided for the link between Trump's racialized rhetoric and alt-right support, as pro-Trump sentiment also spiked following Trump's controversial support for a Muslim ban in December 2015.

While the mechanism by which Trump had this effect is not immediately obvious from the text data, initial expectations related to the role of White group consciousness were supported through a survey experiment which exposed participants to a range of racialized cues, asking them whether or not they would be likely to support that hypothetical candidate. While most respondents were lukewarm on their support of the hypothetical candidate, those who identified strongly with the alt-right were more likely to do so, especially when they had high levels of White identity and group consciousness. This finding is expanded more clearly to Trump, by turning to observational data to show how support for Trump in the 2016 primary was heavily predicted by White consciousness measures in a unique way, helping to explain how the alt-right would then have been motivated to support him.

Overall, this paper shows that Trump's racialized rhetoric had a significant mobilizing effect on White extremists, bringing them out of the fringes and into the mainstream of American politics. This helps expand on emerging research into White identity by outlining a particularly salient consequence of politicians using appeals to White identity, as well as increasingly prominent racial cues. Moreover, given the considerable contributions that extremist groups and lone wolf shooters have had in rising racial violence, a further understanding of what motivates these groups and how they operate is critical.

2. Theoretical framework

Emerging research on White group identity, namely (Jardina 2019), helps demonstrate that White in-group sentiment is becoming an increasingly important factor in American politics. That piece tracks how a sense of group identification by Whites, i.e., seeing being White as important to their identity, can be tied to a broader sense of politicized group consciousness when paired with beliefs about the group's "orientation towards the political world" (60).

Whereas past research, such as Knowles and Peng (2005) did not find White in-group identity to be particularly salient, Jardina (2019) showed how, as part of a larger group consciousness, it has become a major predictor of political mobilization, policy preferences, and candidate evaluations, and Jardina (2020) further explicates how White identity predicted support for Donald Trump, in an independent way from out-group animus. While the most comprehensive, hers is not the first study of its kind, as Schildkraut (2014) also finds that White identity has increased in recent years and predicts preferences for White politicians, although that piece measured White identification, perceived threat, and linked fate, rather than something closer to Jardina's measures.

This paper expands on that research by connecting the salience of White identity to extremist mobilization. Specifically, like (Jardina 2019), I look at a combination of White identity and related variables surrounding group consciousness, as the two phenomenon are deeply intertwined. When analyses are performed on White identification alone, the results are comparable, though less impactful. Overall, I use Jardina (2019)'s three-part measure of White identity, including subjective identification,

perceived threats, and collective orientation, to measure an overall sense of political group identity.

There has been a growing body of literature discussing the notion of group identity and political mobilization, attempting to connect these in-group attitudes to political action. For instance, Huddy (2001) focuses on the way in which individuals internalize a sense of group identity when that identity becomes particularly salient. As Gurin (1985) argues, group consciousness evolves from that sort of social identity when a perception of a disparity between one's group and other groups emerges, especially when this disparity is seen as harmful and unfair. This consciousness develops into a sense of collective orientation, where the group should work together to advance group-wide aims. Similar points are emphasized in Miller et al. (1981)'s work on outlining the connection of group consciousness and political participation.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, such attitudes become more salient within certain political contexts and result in corresponding political action. Huddy (2013) emphasizes that these identities become politically relevant when they are either made salient by current events or by the increased relevance of group interests. The latter is more common when deprivation is perceived or feared in such a way that it is deeply connected with out-group hostility. Further research, including Miller et al. (1981); Duncan (1999); Bishin (2010), find that group consciousness is a strong predictor of political action. Miller et al. (1981) find that, when activated, group consciousness significantly increases vote choice for the in-group, while Bishin (2010) emphasizes the ways that activated social identities lead to profound political activity, often determining elections where group interests are particularly salient.

Politicized group identity often results in identification with a prototypical member of the group. These themes are emphasized in Huddy (2013) and in Hogg and Reid (2006). Both papers discuss the ways in which group members perceive that certain attributes constitute a prototypical exemplification of the group. This can be imbued in a particular individual, such as a group leader, such as a candidate like Trump who many extremists saw as exemplifying White norms with his rhetoric and policy stances.

In order to assess how these identities can be activated by political elites' cues, in the sense of Zaller (1992), it is necessary to look at changing norms on racial discourse. Mendelberg (2001) exemplifies the historical trend in political science research finding that campaigns often employ implicitly racist cues but face backlash when such cues become perceived as explicitly racial. However, emerging research by Valentino, Brader, and Jardina (2013) finds that the negative cost of explicit cues has declined, fitting with current observations about Donald Trump's racial provocations and the apparent mainstreaming of alt-right ideas. Similarly, Newman, Shah, and Collingwood (2018) found that Trump's inflammatory anti-immigration comments primed support for his candidacy in areas that had seen a high growth in Latino populations, a common indicator of perceived threat. In terms of appeals to White in-group identities, Jardina (2019) contends that these have a clear potential for acceptance among those who identify strongly as White, although there has been little research examining their potential.

This helps connect directly to why extremists would begin to support Trump. Hajnal and Lee (2011) explain that many radicals do not join mainstream parties, because they see them as failing to pay attention to the issues about which they are particularly radical.

Under this framework, it then makes sense that extremists will begin to work with a party if they perceive that its candidate is beginning to pay attention to perceived threats against Whites. This would be especially true if Trump is perceived as being a "prototype" of White identity, which is reflected in extremist praise of him as the "God-Emperor" or the "man on the White horse."

Importantly, the phenomena under emphasis needs to be distinguished from contemporary conservative politics and populist conservatism like the Tea Party. The hypotheses under question do not emphasize racial resentment or authoritarian attitudes which have been linked to Tea Party support, Parker and Barreto (2014) nor do they emphasize partisanship and conservative ideology as measures. White extremists have been historically distinct from such conservatives and, despite the role of out-group animus, this paper builds on extremist research which emphasizes the role of White identification in extremist motivations (Blee 2017). Notably, White identity fails to predict support for the Tea Party the way out-group animus measures like racial resentment do (Jardina 2019).

Despite the many differences between these movements, this paper will draw from Tea Party research methodologically, looking at the alt-right social movement in a similar way as Parker and Barreto (2014) looks at the Tea Party. That piece contends that the Tea Party is more than just active membership in Tea Party-related groups, but is constituted by a constellation of Tea Party-adjacent sympathizers. They operationalize this through sympathy, measured by feeling thermometers, to the Tea Party, just as this paper looks at sympathy to the alt-right, rather than deriving measures for objective membership.

3. White extremists and the alt-right

White supremacists serve as an effective exemplification of White group consciousness as their rhetoric is consistently marked by perceived threats to their White status, such as alleged discrimination and cultural displacement (Morris 2014). While Jardina (2019) goes to great lengths to distinguish White supremacists from those simply high in White identity, she also contends that members of White supremacist groups are likely very high in White identity and that a growth in White consciousness nationally has the clear potential to lead to a growth in White supremacist activity. This is further supported by Blee (2017) who argues that White extremists need to be seen as exemplifying a sense of White in-group identification, so logically their political mobilization would be equally situated into notions of group consciousness.

The recent history of White extremism in the United States lends significant credence to the notion that the movement has become increasingly engaged politically. As Simi and Futrell (2010) outline, White supremacist groups have long continued to flourish inside "hidden spaces," or enclaves where they can inundate their children into racist belief structures and affirm their own, even if they are unable to act openly in public or politics. However, they also emphasize how the advent of the Internet has been able to bring these spaces to people that once lacked in-person connections to the White power movement, as they call it. The increased online presence of White supremacists has allowed disparate groups to organize real-world activities and further sustain their movement (Simi and Futrell 2006). This certainly played out through Don Black's efforts with *Stormfront* during the 1990s but also connects to the rapid emergence of a

far-right online community during the 2010s and to Bimber (2017)'s understanding of how identity can lead to self-motivated political behavior based on cues seen online.

This paper will largely discuss the White supremacist movement as it is presented by that blog: *Daily Stormer*. This site, which the Southern Poverty Law Center notes became the largest White supremacist website during July 2016, after surpassing the forum *Stormfront*,[6] offered consistent and full-throated support for Donald Trump's campaign from as early as June 2015 and explicitly tied that support to Trump's uniquely racialized discourse. In an article on June 28, 2015, *Daily Stormer* editor, Andrew Anglin, wrote his "official endorsement," emphasizing that Trump's most significant stance was "about Mexicans" before quoting the infamous line from Trump's announcement address that: "When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not sending you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people." Anglin ended his endorsement by urging his readers to "do whatever they can to make Donald Trump President."

The *Daily Stormer* was selected because it serves as both the largest White supremacist news organization but also because it is a focal point for the alt-right. Not only does it situate itself within the alt-right movement, commenting on other leading members and associated news, but it also has opened its pages to contributions – though the extent of author complicity is unknown – by leading supremacists like David Duke, Jared Taylor, and Michael Enoch, as well as more mainstream so-called "alt-light" conservatives like Ann Coulter and Pat Buchanan.

The inclusion of both aspects of the American far-right is revealing. David Duke, a close friend of *Stromfront's* Don Black, is a central figure in the old-guard White nationalist movement, bringing *Daily Stormer* a perspective that emphasizes dramatic anti-Semitism and, along with Jared Taylor's *American Renaissance*, situates traditional White nationalism into *Daily Stormer's* discourse. Moreover, more contemporary alt-right figures, including the podcast host Mike Enoch, organizations affiliated with Richard Spencer, and "boots on the ground" neo-Nazis like Matt Parrot and Matthew Heimbach, combine the blatant racism of old-guard White nationalists with alt-right figures' attempts at mainstream respectability. Between Spencer and Enoch's broad appeal, and Anglin's more extreme rhetoric, the three figures have been described as the "triumvirate" of the alt-right and despite an often tenuous relationship, form a central hub of alt-right discourse ("A Truce In The Battle" 2017). Finally, far-right conservatives have often flirted with alt-right talking points. This includes both Buchanan and Coulter who have seen inclusion on the pages of the *Daily Stormer* and are known for aggressive rhetoric on immigration, as well as support for Donald Trump. The presence of such a wide range of far-right views helps situate the *Daily Stormer* as a representative vehicle for far-right extremist discourse, beyond the simple fact that it is the largest White extremist blog.

It is certainly important to re-emphasize that not all of those who report themselves as high in White identity are members of White extremist groups or the alt-right, but it is equally important to stress that the modern alt-right is not a matter of membership in clear organizations, such as the Ku Klux Klan or American Nazi Party. Instead, the alt-right serves as a social movement that combines a series of discourse, memes, and ideologies. Somebody could be well described as alt-right, even if they have no affiliation

with the Klan nor read *Daily Stormer*. Thus *Daily Stormer* discourse serves as a proxy for a wider series of attitudes that are also captured in measures asking about support for the alt-right as a fluid, rather than static, category. This is reflected in the survey measures used, namely measuring sympathy to the alt-right via a feeling thermometer. This, in similar manner as aforementioned research on the Tea Party, helps operationalize adjacency to and sympathy with the movement and its aims.

4. Hypotheses

This paper is fundamentally grounded in emerging work on White identity as a mechanism by which members of the alt-right would be mobilized by Trump's rhetoric. Essentially, the puzzle of how the alt-right mobilized is explained by arguing that racial cues led to the mobilization of the alt-right, working by motivating a sense of White group consciousness rather than racial resentment or conservatism. This is diagrammed in Figure 1.

Initially, this theory would predict that Trump's announcement of candidacy, and specifically his inflammatory rhetoric, will result in White extremist mobilization. This leads to the first hypothesis predicting that Trump's candidacy will inspire extremists to endorse him explicitly, pushing pro-Trump rhetoric and a sense of mobilization after his campaign announcement:

- $H0_1$ Neither Trump's announcement of candidacy or discussion of a Muslim ban will lead to an increase in pro-Trump and pro-mobilization topics from the *Daily Stormer*.
- Ha_1 Both Trump's announcement of candidacy and discussion of a Muslim ban will lead to a significant increase in pro-Trump and pro-mobilization topics from the *Daily Stormer*.

More information as to the actual mechanism that is leading to support must be analyzed. Given the emerging importance of research on White identity, the survey-


Figure 1. Hypothesized mechanism.

experiment component of this paper will seek to understand the role that White identity has in support for candidates who use racialized rhetoric. This is suspected to be the crucial mechanism that drives White extremist support for Trump. This basic mechanism will be tested with the following:

- $H0_4$ When interacted with White group consciousness, sympathy for the alt-right will not predict support for candidates using White identity and explicitly racial appeals.
- Ha_4 When interacted with White group consciousness, sympathy for the alt-right will predict support for candidates using White identity and explicitly racial appeals.

However, it is necessary to further connect the White identity mechanism to Trump. Thus I will examine different predictors of support for Trump in the 2016 primary. This is intended to pick a period where members of the American Right have a selection of options and where political elites are not united behind one candidate, as they generally were post-nomination. If White identity is unique and powerful in predicting support for Trump, this will help show how it was White identity that explains the likewise unique support the alt-right held for Trump.

- $H0_3$ Measures of White group consciousness will not predict positive evaluations of Trump's primary campaign at a significantly greater level than other measures such as ideology and out-group animus.
- Ha_3 Measures of White group consciousness will consistently predict positive evaluations of Trump's primary campaign at a significantly greater level than other measures such as ideology and out-group animus.

5. Data and methods

5.1. Text-based

The first hypothesis will be evaluated through text analysis from the *Daily Stormer*. Blog text was collected from their surface website by using R's *rvest* web scraping package and subjected to unsupervised learning techniques to determine topics including support for Trump and a sense of White supremacist movement mobilization. Overall, 14,560 *Daily Stormer* blogs were collected from the site's inception in August 2013 until data collection in February 2018. On average, the *Daily Stormer* corpus has 596 words per blog. On average, 8.25 blogs were posted per day. These were analyzed using LDA learning via R's *topicmodels* package. I machine coded the data based on established guidelines for unsupervised topic modeling process, basing my method largely on past uses of text models, especially as spelled out in Blei, Ng, and Jordan (2003), Quinn et al. (2010), Grimmer and Stewart (2013), and Wilkerson and Casas (2017). Wilkerson and Casas (2017), for instance, lay out a basic framework, beginning with careful attention to converting text into data, as is discussed further in Appendix 1's discussion of preprocessing, leading to the process of evaluating its performance. Grimmer and Stewart (2013), moreover, provides the basic framework of robustness checks used to ensure that the models are valid, as will be discussed in Appendix 3.

Finally, as these papers emphasize, the number of topics must be determined. Here, I drew on Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley (2014) use of the *stm* R package. Using that package's SearchK function, each corpus is subjected to automated tests to determine the optimal number of topics. This process is elaborated on in Appendix 1 but resulted in 50 distinct *Daily Stormer* topics which are listed in the codebook in Appendix 2.

These were then subjected to interrupted time series analyses, using ARIMA models, to determine whether Trump's announcement of candidacy on June 16, 2015, as well as his announcement of a proposed Muslim ban on December 7, 2015 had immediate and significant impacts. In each case, the basic unit is the number of topics on a given day. All ARIMA model specifications are presented in Appendix 4.

One topic was selected from the topic modeling corpus to measure pro-Trump sentiment. The process for verifying and selecting topics is further elaborated on in Appendix 3. That topic, topic 7, was designated as a pro-Trump topic, based in part from the list of most likely terms. These included "Donald Trump," of course, but also "Vote Trump," "Support Trump," and "Glorious Leader." Moreover, the top 10 articles were read, sorted on topic prevalence, to verify that this could be safely considered a "Pro-Trump" topic.

The language of topic 7 bears some discussion in its overt and aggressive support of Trump. In one article dated November 7, 2016, editor Anglin contended that "Trump is going to get a lower percentage of the Jewish vote than any Presidential candidate in the history of the country ," arguing that this says good things about Trump. Anglin continues by declaring that "Against this massive assemblage of criminal gang-members, we have one man. An immortal warrior. An eternal hero. A dark horse who dgaf.[7] A Glorious Leader."

This language is relatively typical of how other posts under this topic portrayed Trump. In an article from November 10, 2015, Anglin praises Trump for saying "Merry Christmas" by describing the alleged "War on Christmas" as a "deeply symbolic instance of the Jewish war on White culture and society," while declaring that "It is truly glorious, what Donald Trump has done for our race ." Other contributors besides Anglin described Trump in much the same way. James Kirkpatrick of the alt-right VDare praised Trump's primary debate performance on March 9, 2016, calling Trump "the alpha of the GOP", while *Daily Stormer* contributor Zeiger gushed on August 2, 2016, that "the Clinton campaign is being utterly devastated by…Trump's cunning strategies" and that "Our enemies must learn to fear us."

Two additional topics (12 and 30) were selected to measure a sense of political mobilization. Top terms for the first were "Richard Spencer," "White Nationalist," and "White Nation." This topic also featured "Trump support," "Donald Trump," and "Hail Victory," the last of which was a common inclusion in articles urging support for Trump. The second of these topics featured terms like "White Supremacist," "David Duke," and "Race War," while also featuring "Donald Trump." In both cases, the top 10 articles were hand read to verify that they were discussions about White identity and the White nationalist movement. Because both topics appeared to be largely comparable, just shifting focus between figures like Richard Spencer and David Duke and the ideas associated with both, the topics were combined for subsequent analysis. These will be referred to as "Mobilization I" and "Mobilization II".

Mobilizations I and II show similar concerns about discussing the alt-right and "pro-White" political movements. The former topic includes articles such as Anglin's strident attacks on individuals such as Milo Yiannopoulos, statements such as "I care about my own race and people first. When I see a conflict between whites and nonwhites, I am inclined to side with the whites in every case ," and concerns over how "Sir Richard Spencer" was treated at the 2017 CPAC. Similarly, the latter topic showcased Anglin praising David Duke and calling for Trump to pick him as Vice President and discussing other alt-right leaders' support of Trump, such as Klanswoman Rachel Pendergraft and White nationalist Jared Tyler. Other articles by Anglin and contributors discussed mass shooter Dylan Roof, with one by Benjamin Garland describing Roof as having been "overwhelmed by the truth and extent to which his people are under attack on a daily basis without even fighting back." These topics both consistently show an understanding of the alt-right as a united movement, which is particularly salient given the historically strong divisions between factions on the far-right.

5.2. Survey and experimental data

In order to better understand how the use of appeals helps explain the connections between the alt-right, Trump, and White identity, I investigate the results of a survey experiment which exposed participants to a series of in-group and out-group appeals and asked them to evaluate whether they would be likely to vote for the candidate in question. Specifically, the treatments were divided between fictionalized accounts of a political candidate utilizing explicit and implicit appeals to both White in-group attitudes and negative out-group attitudes to Latinos to discuss crime and immigration from Mexico. Pre-treatment questions included White consciousness, racial resentment, support for the alt-right, conservatism, and standard demographic questions (sex, age, income, education, and state of residence), while post treatment participants were simply asked if they were likely to vote for the candidate. The White in-group attitudes are captured by the same measures that Jardina (2019) uses: a measure asking how important being White is to their identity, how likely it is for a White person to not get a job because they are given to minorities instead (perceived threat), and if it was important for Whites to work together to change laws that are unfair to Whites (collective orientation). Further details of the experimental process are present in Appendix 5, including vignette text, the specific wordings of questions, and a discussion of the manipulation checks.

This survey does not directly mention Trump, however. Instead, the findings will be connecting to him as a concrete example by employing an OLS regression model applied to data from the 2016 ANES pilot study, conducted during January 2016. While this will measure more than just members of the alt-right, the goal of this analysis is to explore how Trump was uniquely perceived, among his primary rivals, as the candidate of White identity. This helps apply the findings of the experiment to Trump, as he can then be seen as very much the sort of hypothetical candidate who uses racial cues. This was subset to only include White respondents. The 2016 pilot provides 875 White respondents during Trump's primary campaign. I then compiled a White identity scale using the same measures as were used in the survey experiment. These were combined into one scale (alpha = 0.66). The analysis used four dependent variables: feeling

thermometers for Trump, Rubio, Cruz, and Bush. Other covariates include racial resentment, whether there should be higher/lower levels of immigration, political ideology, party, gender, income, age, education, and how closely respondents follow politics. While this analysis is very close to that done in Jardina (2019), it differs both in the covariates used and the explicit effort to compare racial resentment and immigration attitudes to support for other candidates.

6. Results

6.1. Text analysis (H1)

The first analysis on time series data demonstrates strong support for my hypothesis. The interrupted time series analysis shows an immediate impact of both Trump's announcement of candidacy and his Muslim ban had on pro-Trump and Mobilization discourse.

This confirms my first hypothesis, showing a significant and very impactful effect of Trump's racial comments about Mexicans as "criminals" and desire to ban Muslims entirely from entering the United States on instances of *Daily Stormer's* pro-Trump topic. While it would be surprising to have seen much of such an election-focused topic before the election, these results show that extremists almost immediately responded to Trump's announcement with calls for support, as such support could have been delayed. The announcement's effect was also more than a modest increase (*B*=0.56), indicating an average of one pro-Trump blog every 2 days, given approximately eight blogs per day on average. Thus the analysis successfully tested White extremist responsiveness to the Trump candidacy, as the hypothesis would be contradicted by findings that this topic rose significantly only sometime after the announcement. By also testing responsiveness to Trump's controversial support of banning Muslims from the U.S.A. on December 7, 2015, this analysis comes closer to testing the impact of Trump's racialized rhetoric, specifically. When using the same ARIMA model to test an intervention at that date, I find another significant increase (*B*=0.79), actually larger than his original announcement.

Similarly, interrupted time series results for the topics dealing with White activism again confirmed my hypotheses. After Trump's announcement *Daily Stormer* began releasing White activism articles at a significant and positive level (*B*=0.21). While this topic appears to have been increasing even before Trump's announcement, these results indicate that the announcement spurred the topic on even further. This is only a modest increase of one topic every 5 days, but it continues to show how Trump's announcement primed attention to political activism. Apparently, this sense of political mobilization was further spurred on by Trump's announcement of a Muslim ban, with another relatively small increase (*B*=0.13). While this clearly showed an increase in daily data with my interrupted analysis, it is unclear whether this had a long-term impact. As Figure 3 shows, when aggregating to the month, there is little apparent increase, so this finding is not as robust as the response to his campaign announcement.

Both of these trends can be further visualized in Figures 2 and 3, while the full specifications of the ARIMA analyses present in Appendix 4.

Daily Stormer's Pro-Trump Rhetoric

Figure 2. Pro-Trump topic.

6.2. Experimental analysis (H2)

While the connection between support for Trump and extremist mobilization ought to seem clear here, more work is needed to done to show that it was White Identity and Trump's use of racial appeals that were the important mechanisms here. Thus this section looks at the relationship between sympathy for the alt-right and support for a hypothetical candidate who used a range of racial cues, as discussed in Appendix 5.

This involved first looking at whether support for the alt-right predicts support for the hypothetical candidate by performing a simple OLS regression, looking at the effect of support for the alt-right on support for hypothetical candidates. This involved controlling for racial resentment, white identity, party, income, age, education, and state of residence, finding that support for the alt-right was significant, though so were racial resentment, conservatism and White identity. The results are shown in Table 1. Importantly, White identity serves as the most importnt predictor here.

Daily Stormer's Pro-Mobilization Rhetoric

Figure 3. Mobilization topics.

While these results help show the relationship between support for candidates who used racial appeals and those who support the alt-right, it appeared to mute the impact, given that very few participants were high in measures of alt-right support. It

Table 1. Experimental results.

	Dependent variable: Candidate Support
Alt-Right FT	0.360*** (0.041)
Racial Resentment	0.483*** (0.056)
White Identity	0.946*** (0.053)
Conservatism	0.118*** (0.039)
Constant	0.094 (0.115)
Observations	2,567
R^2	0.454
Adjusted R^2	0.441
Residual Std. Error	0.559 (df = 2505)
F Statistic	34.158*** (df = 61; 2505)

Note: *$p < 0.1$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

Support of Racial Appeals by White Identity

Figure 4. Support for racial cues: alt-right and white identity interaction.

also does not fully capture the effect of White identity for those high in sympathy for the alt-right which is specifically under question. Therefore, an additional OLS regression was performed looking at an interaction between sympathy with the alt-right and White identity across treatment vignettes. This interaction proved significant and highly impactful ($B=0.715$), in fact more impactful than either White identity alone (0.513) or racial resentment ($B=0.560$). Figure 4 shows how those high in White identity were the most likely to see their alt-right sympathy predict support for the hypothetical candidate, leading to those high in both to overwhelmingly support the use of racial appeals. However, it was important to test the impact of racial resentment, as well. As Figure 5 demonstrates in presenting an interaction between alt-right support and racial resentment, while those with low levels of racial resentment saw support increase alongside their alt-right sympathy, those with high levels of racial resentment saw little impact from alt-right sympathy, suggesting that these are independent mechanisms. The interaction term even indicates a negative interaction ($B=-0.597$), despite the

Figure 5. Support for racial cues: alt-right and racial resentment interaction.

positive impacts of each variable in isolation. Full readouts for these interaction regressions are displayed in Appendix 5.

6.3. Survey analysis (H3)

Finally, much of the text analysis was dedicated to examining support for Trump during the 2016 primary, which unfortunately utilized no measure for alt-right support. However, observational data helps generalize the findings in the experiment which alleged that White identity was a key variable in predicting support by alt-right sympathizers. If White identity proves to be a key predictor of Trump, and we already know that alt-right sympathizers are mobilized by racial appeals and by Trump specifically, it helps draw the full connection for White identity as the crucial mechanism for Trump specifically. This involved performing an OLS regression with White identity as an independent variable regressed against the feeling thermometers for Trump, Bush, Rubio, and Cruz.

Table 2. Candidate Support: 2016 Primary.

	Dependent variable:			
	Trump FT (1)	Bush FT (2)	Rubio FT (3)	Cruz FT (4)
White identity	0.156*** (0.040)	−0.081** (0.035)	−0.036 (0.035)	−0.065* (0.034)
Racial resentment	0.314*** (0.045)	0.113*** (0.039)	0.198*** (0.039)	0.315*** (0.038)
Reduce immigration	0.029*** (0.007)	−0.012* (0.006)	−0.007 (0.006)	0.0002 (0.006)
Conservatism	0.032*** (0.008)	0.003 (0.007)	0.031*** (0.007)	0.057*** (0.007)
Constant	−0.141** (0.070)	0.459*** (0.061)	0.379*** (0.060)	0.159*** (0.060)
Observations	869	866	860	864
R^2	0.417	0.112	0.264	0.404
Adjusted R^2	0.409	0.101	0.255	0.397
Residual Std. Error	0.277 (df = 857)	0.241 (df = 854)	0.238 (df = 848)	0.236 (df = 852)
F Statistic	55.677*** (df = 11; 857)	9.822*** (df = 11; 854)	27.688*** (df = 11; 848)	52.545*** (df = 11; 852)

Note: *$p < 0.1$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

Controls included racial resentment, immigration attitudes, gender, age, education, income, ideology, how closely they followed the campaign, and party. This analysis is closely modeled on that done by Jardina (2019) and attempts to build on that by explicitly contrasting measures of White identity with other indicators, namely ideology, racial resentment, and the desire to reduce levels of immigration.

As is shown in Table 2, Trump was the only primary candidate who saw support driven by White identity, and the impact of White identity dwarfed the impact of conservatism. While these findings are consistent with Jardina (2019)'s work, by looking at the full White identity measure, the differences are even more pronounced, with Bush and Cruz seeing a negative impact of White identity. While racial resentment certainly proved to be significant, it was not uniquely so for Trump and proved significant for each candidate, as did conservatism which was much more modest of a predictor. Finally, despite the emphasis of immigration during the 2016 election and by Trump specifically, it only slightly predicted support for Trump.

This helps show not only that White identity only predicts support for Trump but that it is perhaps the most unique aspect of Trump's support, as he appears quite similar to the other candidates in most other measures. This completes the picture that my survey experiment and text analysis found surrounding the alt-right and White identity by helping to show that the White identity mechanism which explained why alt-right sympathizers supported racially charged candidates was very much at play in support for Trump more generally, showing why White extremists would be so historically enthusiastic about his candidacy.

7. Discussion

Overall, these results broadly support my hypotheses. The text-based methods indicate that White extremists responded to Trump's presidential campaign, namely his

inflammatory comments about Mexican "criminals and rapists" and the need to ban Muslim entry into the country, with vocal support for Trump and increased calls for White mobilization and White supremacist-related political activity.

Similarly, when looking more closely at the impact of racial cues on candidate support, it appears that there is a close connection between White identity, alt-right sympathy, and candidate support. Namely, I find that the higher one's White identity is, the more impact alt-right sympathy has on candidate support for candidates using racial cues. This demonstrates that White identity serves as a critical mechanism through which the alt-right evaluates candidates, while racial resentment did not have this sort of effect.

Finally, observational data helps expand these experimental results to the 2016 election. During the 2016 primary, racial resentment and conservatism proved to be the most impactful predictors for support of non-Trump candidates, i.e., those who did not employ the explicitly racialized appeals that Trump did. White identity proved uniquely powerful in predicting support for Trump's uniquely racialized campaign.

Thus it can be seen that Trump's racial rhetoric was able to motivate the alt-right to support his candidacy by appealing to their sense of White in-group identity.

8. Conclusion

This paper has examined the role that Trump's campaign, especially his primary campaign, had on White extremists. Building on social identity literature, I sought to examine the role of Trump's inflammatory campaign on both White supremacist discourse and political activity, explaining this through the salience of White identity in alt-right political orientations. Such an analysis makes two clear contributions to the existing literature and to our understanding of American politics. First, it helps elaborate on Jardina (2019)'s findings that White identity plays a crucial role in American politics. Second, it helps expand on her findings by showing how the use of White identity by political candidates can have the corresponding result of mobilizing violent White extremists.

Notes

1. http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-helping-White-supremacist-website-2015-12
2. https://www.amren.com/news/2016/01/conservatives-blast-trump/
3. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2015/12/21/how-donald-trump-is-breathing-life-into-americas-dying-White-supremacist-movement/
4. In many ways this may be the best parallel to the contemporary situation, as formerly fringe groups are becoming politically mobilized, seeking to influence mainstream politics, and amassing larger popular movements while still employing in violence and terrorism.
5. https://www.thedailybeast.com/cheats/2016/01/10/White-nationalists-campaigning-for-trump
6. Https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2017/eye-stormer.
7. "doesn't give a f**k"

Disclosure statement

References

"A Truce In The Battle". December, 2017. "A Truce in the Battle for the Soul of American White Nationalism?" Southern Poverty Law Center. https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2016/12/20/truce-battle-soul-american-white-nationalism.

Belew K. 2018. *Bring the War Home*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Bimber B. 2017. "Three Prompts for Collective Action in the Context of Digital Media." *Political Communication* 34: 6–20.

Bishin B. 2010. *Tyranny of the Minority*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Blee K. 2017. *Understanding Racist Activism*. Milton Park: Routledge.

Blee K., M. DeMichele, P. Simi, and M. Latif. 2017. "How Racial Violence is Provoked and Channeled." *Socio* 9: 257–276.

Blei D., A. Ng, and M. Jordan. 2003. "Latent Dirichlet Allocation." *Journal Of Machine Learning Research* 3: 993–1022.

Coppock A., and O. McClellan. 2019. "Validating the Demographic, Political, Psychological, and Experimental Results Obtained From a New Source of Online Survey Respondents." *Research and Politics* 6: 2053168018822174.

Denny M., and A. Spirling. 2018. "Text Preprocessing for Unsupervised Learning: Why It Matters, When It Misleads, and What To Do About It." *Political Analysis* 26: 168–189.

Duncan L. 1999. "Motivation for Collective Action: Group Consciousness as Mediator of Personality, Life Experiences, and Women's Rights Activism." *Political Psychology* 20: 611–634.

Grimmer J., and B. Stewart. 2013. "Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts." *Political Analysis* 21: 267–297.

Gurin P. 1985. "Women's Gender Consciousness." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49: 143–163.

Hajnal Z., and T. Lee. 2011. *Why Americans Don't Join the Party*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hogg M., and S. Reid. 2006. "Social Identity, Self-Categorization, and the Communication of Group Norms." *Communication Theory* 16: 7–30.

Huddy L. 2001. "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory." *Political Psychology* 22: 127–156.

Huddy L. 2013. "From Group Identity to Political Cohesion and Commitment." *The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*.

Jardina A. 2019. *White Identity Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jardina A. 2020. "In-Group Love and Out-Group Hate: White Racial Attitudes in Contemporary U.S. Elections." *Political Behavior* 43: 1535–1559.

Knowles E., and K. Peng. 2005. "White Selves: Conceptualizing and Measuring a Dominant-Group Identity." *Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology* 89: 223–241.

McVeigh R., and K. Estep. 2019. *The Politics of Losing*. New York City: Columbia University Press.

Mendelberg T. 2001. *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Miller A., P. Gurin, G. Gurin, and O. Malanchuk. 1981. "Group Consciousness and Political Participation." *American Journal Of Political Science* 25: 494–511.

Morris T. 2014. "Networking Vehement Frames: Neo-Nazi and Violent Jihadi Demagoguery." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression* 6: 163–182.

Newman B., S. Shah, and L. Collingwood. 2018. "Race, Place, and Building a Base." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 82: 122–134.

Parker C., and M. Barreto. 2014. *Change They Can't Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America-Updated Edition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Quinn K., B. Monroe, M. Colaresi, M. Crespin, and D. Radev. 2010. "How to Analyze Political Attention with Minimal Assumptions and Costs." *American Journal Of Political Science* 54: 209–228.

Roberts M., B. Stewart, and D. Tingley. 2014. "STM: R Package for Structural Topic Models." *Journal of Statistical Software* 55: 1–42.

Saslow E. 2018. *Rising Out of Hatred: The Awakening of a Former White Nationalist*. New York City: Penguin Random House.

Schildkraut D. 2014. "White Attitudes About Descriptive Representation in The US: The Roles of Identity, Discrimination, and Linked Fate." *Politics, Groups, And Identities* 5: 84–106.

Simi P., and R. Futrell. 2006. "White Power Cyberculture: Building a Movement." In *Political Research Associates*.

Simi P., and R. Futrell. 2010. *American Swastika: Inside the White Power Movement's Hidden Spaces of Hate*. Lanham: Rowman Littlefield Publishers.

Tenold V. 2018. *Everything You Love Will Burn: Inside the Rebirth of White Nationalism in America*. Paris: Bold Type Books.

Valentino N., T. Brader, and A. Jardina. 2013. "Immigration Opposition Among U.S. Whites: General Ethnocentrism or Media Priming of Attitudes About Latinos?" *Political Psychology* 34: 149–166.

Wilkerson J., and A. Casas. 2017. "Large-Scale Computerized Text Analysis in Political Science: Opportunities and Challenges." *Annual Review of Political Science* 20: 529–544.

Zaller J. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Preprocessing and K selection

Each corpus was analyzed to determine exactly what steps to take in the preprocessing stage. While many packages simply default to stemming, removing stop words, lowercasing, etc., such decisions have significant impacts on the overall relations between words (Denny and Spirling 2018). This concern was broader than simply dealing with basic questions of preprocessing but also extended to the use of bigrams. Many phrases within both corpuses, such as "White genocide," "illegal immigrant," and "radical Islam," express strikingly different meanings than each given word would in isolation. The preText R package Denny and Spirling (2018) allowed me to see the net effect of each preprocessing decision in changing the average distance between documents in a given document term matrix.

I chose to engage in all preprocessing steps, including the use of bigrams (PNLSWI3). As can be seen in the accompanied figure, this has minimal impacts as doing more limited versions of pre-processing, and was the most optimal set of features, given the need to remove stopwords, numbers, and infrequently used terms which was seen as theoretically necessary to remove, as otherwise they result in a series of bizarre topic results.

Moreover, the search K function in the STM package allows for topic models to be repeatedly run at different numbers of topics, yielding a series of measures of fit. This was employed on each corpus for values of K (topics) between 10 and 80.

- Held Out likelihood: For a subset of documents, half the document is withheld for creating a model, and the likelihood of it containing the held-out words is calculated. Higher values of this measure indicate that the held-out words are more likely and thus the model is more predictive.
- Residual analysis: When creating a model, this measures how dispersed the residuals are. The lower the value indicates a better fit.
- Semantic coherence: This measures the extent to which the top words in a given topic co-occur. When this is higher, it means that they frequently co-occur, suggesting a good fit.
- Lower bound: This approximates the lower bound of the marginal likelihood, as an internal measure of fit.

In each case, attention was made to minimize or maximize the above values, selecting topics where the values of held-out likelihood, residuals, and lower bound begin leveling off, while still picking the highest value of semantic coherence.

Figure A1. Daily stormer PreText.

Appendix 2. Codebook

These are *Daily Stormer* topics explicated.

- 1: Here, they explicate fake news and conspiracy theories, specifically related to Russian conspiracy
- 2: New York City politics, especially as they relate to health
- 3: This is not a coherent category
- 4: They outline Hitler apologism and Holocaust denial
- 5: This focuses on the Obama administration as it relates to national security/foreign affairs
- 6: This is not a coherent category
- 7: This is a pro-Trump primary topic
- 8: These are negative discussions of Israel
- 9: Hitler apologism combined with anti-Semitism
- 10: Western cultural degradation via multiculturalism
- 11: This topic describes Jewish control of society broadly
- 12: White nationalism as a movement around White identity
- 13: Not a coherent topic
- 14: The crimes caused by refugees into Europe
- 15: This is not a coherent category

- 16: This portrays Trump as standing against illegal immigration
- 17: This discusses the 2016 election, focusing on Clinton's campaign
- 18: This is not a coherent category
- 19: This is not a coherent category
- 20: This describes how feminism is leading to cultural degradation
- 21: This argues for a pro-nationalist foreign policy
- 22: This warns of the notion of "White genocide" as a result of mass immigration
- 23: This is not a coherent category
- 24: This provides defense of and advice for those battling anti-racism
- 25: This expresses a strong resistance to multiculturalism
- 26: This is general indictment of U.S. foreign policy/trade
- 27: This warns of widespread sexual assaults allegedly committed by refugees
- 28: Here, they denigrate Black Lives Matter and discuss police shootings
- 29: This is discussions of and advocacy for Greece's Golden Dawn Party
- 30: This also describes White nationalism as a movement around White identity
- 31: This is largely dealing with the internal politics of European countries and the European Union more broadly
- 32: Here, they denigrate Black Lives Matter and discuss police shootings again
- 33: This discusses Putin, ISIS, and Middle Eastern foreign policy more broadly
- 34: This deals with defenses of free speech/hate speech, as well as social media censorship
- 35: This deals with defenses of free speech/hate speech, as well as social media censorship
- 36: This discusses the "differences" between Whites and blacks and denigrates the idea of White privilege
- 37: This is not a coherent category
- 38: Here, they talk about refugees committing sexual violence, especially surrounding the attacks in Cologne, Germany
- 39: They denigrate the media as run by Jewish people
- 40: This discusses the Trump administration's foreign policy
- 41: This involves endorsements of Trump's general-election candidacy, including serving as an uncritical platform for his Twitter
- 42: Here they decry tensions between black and White people, focusing especially on South Africa
- 43: Here, they argue for fallacies in the ideas black integration/multiculturalism
- 44: This discusses the threat of Islamic terrorism
- 45: This explicates black on White crime, amidst general denigrations of non-Whites
- 46: This is not a coherent category
- 47: This discusses the Trump administration's law enforcement policies
- 48: This is not a coherent category
- 49: Here, they talk about the interests of White people and the threats they allegedly face
- 50: Here, they talk about the interests of White people and the threats they allegedly face

Appendix 3. Construct validity checks

Building off of Grimmer and Stewart (2013), this section provides a pair of robustness checks for my models. In that paper, they suggest the use of supplements to automated analysis, specifically naming the use of keyword searches. These were used to generate graphs which show comparable trends to the LDA models and respond to major events, such as Trump's announcement, in comparable ways.

For both the mobilization and pro-Trump topics, word searches were performed which demonstrate a comparable trend. The pro-Trump search simply used "realdonaldtrump" to designate Trump's Twitter handle which from hand reading this corpus is almost exclusively cited favorably, but it paired that with uses of the phrase "Make America Great Again", i.e., Trump's

Diagnostic Values by Number of Topics

Figure A2. Daily stormer K.

2016 campaign slogan. The mobilization keywords were "davidduke", "supremacist", "nationalist", "richardspencer ," and "hailvictory ." These figures are included below. While the pro-Trump key-words clearly provide support for my findings, the Mobilization word search is more tempered. There is strong support for the effect post-candidacy announcement, though little long-term effect from the Muslim ban announcement. This was also true when looking at monthly data, suggesting that, while there was some boost at the daily level, this did not have a huge impact when aggregating monthly.

Similarly, the STM package was again used to independently replicate the LDA findings. This yielded 50 topics based on the same preprocessing steps. Of those topics, election-related topics were examined to determine two as pro-Trump topics. Similarly, two mobilization topics were selected, one emphasizing David Duke, with the other emphasizing modern White nationalists like Richard Spencer. The first of these topics shows an admitted counter-trend to my hypotheses and the other models, but this appears to be an indicator that the type of activists being discussed in light of Trump were newer members of the alt-right like Spencer, rather than old stalwarts like Duke.

Moreover, Grimmer and Stewart (2013) also urge analysts to validate models by looking at a subset of 10–15 of articles to ensure that they reflect the topic in question. This was done

Daily Stormer's Pro-Trump Word Search

Figure A3. Pro-Trump word search.

Daily Stormer's Mobilization Word Search

Figure A4. Mobilization word search.

specifically by sorting the articles within each topic based on topic prevalence. Topic prevalence measures the extent to which an article exemplifies the topic in which it is placed, so looking at the most "prototypical" topics allows for verification as to what LDA is conceptually grouping based on. The verification table below gives the topic name, number for reference to the codebook, and the percent of topics that clearly exemplified the construct.

Figure A5. Pro-Trump STM.

Figure A6. Mobilization STM.

Table A1. Topic verification.

Topic number	Name	Percent
7	Pro-Trump	1.00
12	Mobilization 1	0.90
30	Mobilization 2	0.80

Appendix 4. ARIMA model specification

The first ARIMA model measured the effect of Trump's announcement on pro-Trump articles. I compared different ARIMA models with differing levels of autocorrelation (which predictably was severe) and moving averages. The best fit model had no moving average but autocorrelation up to AR-9. Thus this ARIMA model is a 9-0-0 model. The full table is shown below, and the Box–Ljung test which insignificant at p=0.06 and an X-squared of 43.72.

The second ARIMA model was that which evaluated changes in blogs discussing extremist mobilization. I again compared different ARIMA models before settling on one with AR-10. Thus this ARIMA model is a 10-0-0 model. The full table is shown below, and the Box–Ljung test insignificant at p=0.08 and an X-squared of 41.74.

Appendix 5. Details on survey experiment

We fielded a survey experiment from October 28 to November 4, 2020, using Lucid Marketplace, an online survey platform that is becoming a tool widely used by social scientists to recruit

Table A2. Pro-Trump ARIMA.

	Candidacy	Muslim Ban
AR1	0.17***	0.16***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
AR2	0.15***	0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
AR3	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)
AR4	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)
AR5	0.11***	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
AR6	0.04	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)
AR7	0.08**	0.08**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
AR8	0.06*	0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.02)
AR9	0.05	0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Intercept	0.10	0.22**
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Drift	−0.00	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Intervention	0.56***	0.79***
	(0.15)	(0.13)
AIC	2480.73	2467.10
AICc	2480.96	2467.33
BIC	2550.90	2537.27
Log Likelihood	−1227.37	−1220.55
Num. obs.	1632	1632

Note: ***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$.

Table A3. Mobilization ARIMA.

	Candidacy	Muslim Ban
AR1	0.06*	0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
AR2	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)
AR3	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
AR4	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
AR5	0.05	0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
AR6	0.08**	0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
AR7	0.06**	0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
AR8	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
AR9	0.06*	0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.02)
AR10	0.08**	0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Intercept	0.08	0.09
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Drift	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Intervention	0.21*	0.13
	(0.09)	(0.09)
AIC	2870.75	2874.09
AICc	2871.01	2874.35
BIC	2946.32	2949.65
Log Likelihood	−1421.38	−1423.04
Num. obs.	1632	1632

Note: ***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$

respondents (Coppock and McClellan 2019). To collect national sample of adults across the United States, we employed demographic quotas for respondents' sex (male, female), age (18–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55-64, 65–over), ethnicity (White, Black, Hispanic, not Hispanic, other ethnicity), and region (West, Midwest, Northeast, South). To fill these quotas, we used respondent answers to standard qualifications questions asked by Lucid prior to entering our Qualtrics survey. The total number of respondents who completed the survey is 3500.

At the beginning of the survey, participants were asked about their age, income, education, race, gender, the U.S. state in which they resided, and their voting and political participation history. They were also asked a battery of white identity questions (Jardina 2019), a feeling thermometer for the alt-right, a battery taken from the ANES about immigration attitudes, their level of trust in the federal government, the ANES racial resentment battery, and a political ideology scale.

After this, they read a short randomized vignette. We used four vignettes, each of which expose participants to three short paragraphs describing immigration-related crime near the U.S.–Mexico border. Participants are prompted to see each vignette as a speech delivered by a potential candidate for Congress. Rather than including a control vignette that was unrelated to the issue, we chose to slightly vary the racial appeal in each vignette, as the goal was not to determine the efficacy of racial appeals but to compare the efficacy of different types of appeals. Specifically, the vignettes were divided between an explicit out-group, implicit out-group, explicit in-group, and implicit in-group appeal. All of the vignettes described the issue of undocumented immigration as a problem that is resulting in violent crimes, with specific victims named.

The implicit out-group appeal referred simply to "illegal immigrants" with Latino names, while the explicit out-group appeal instead emphasized that the crimes were committed by "Mexicans"

who "refused to assimilate." Similarly, the implicit in-group vignette differed from the implicit out-group appeal by emphasizing the victims of the crimes as being "Americans" in "suburban neighborhoods" and refrained from describing the assailants beyond connecting the crimes to "illegal immigration." This was contrasted with the explicit in-group appeal by emphasizing the victims were "white" rather than "American" or "suburban." The full vignettes of in Appendix 1.

After exposure to the vignette participants were asked simply if they would be likely to vote for the candidate giving the vignette as a speech. Specifically, respondents are asked "How likely would you be to vote for the candidate who gave that speech?" The possible answers included "Not at all likely, somewhat likely, very likely." At times these were aggregated to include "somewhat" and "very" in the same binary variable, but this generally did not produce difference results.

The full regression results for the interaction terms are presented in Table A4 and A5, although I excluded state of residence for display purposes.

Vignettes: Implicit Out-Group Over the last two decades, immigration has steadily increased over the U.S. border with Mexico. While many immigrants have entered legally, many have entered illegally. Unfortunately, there are an increasing number of violent incidents associated with rising illegal immigration.

Despite the fact that border security provisions could prevent the flow of illegal immigration, political gridlock has impeded solutions to this problem from being adopted. Most immigrants who illegally enter the United States are allowed to stay, even when they commit violent crimes. This has allowed individuals such as Luiz Alfonso, who had previously been deported multiple times, to rape and murder Susan Wayfeather in San Diego, CA.

In fact, incidents like this are not uncommon. This immigration crisis has overburdened police forces and federal authorities who lack the ability to effectively police illegal communities, leaving American citizens at risk of rising crime and drug rates. As a result, there have been other grisly murders, such as a double homicide in Houston last week that was committed by Carlos Lopez, an illegal immigrant.

Explicit Out-Group Over the last two decades, immigration has steadily increased over the U.S. border with Mexico. While many immigrants have entered legally, many have entered illegally. Unfortunately, there are an increasing number of violent incidents associated with rising Mexican immigration.

Despite the fact that border security provisions could prevent the flow of Mexican immigration, political gridlock has impeded solutions to this problem from being adopted. Many Mexicans refuse to assimilate and are shielded from effective law enforcement, even when they commit

Table A4. Candidate support: white identity and alt-right interaction.

	Dependent variable: Candidate Support
Racial Resentment	0.560*** (0.058)
Alt-Right FT	0.030 (0.071)
White Identity	0.513*** (0.093)
Democratic	−0.160*** (0.030)
Independent	−0.130*** (0.031)
Income	0.179*** (0.056)
Some College	−0.024 (0.034)
College Degree	0.034 (0.037)
Post-College Degree	0.102** (0.040)
Conservatism	0.127*** (0.039)
Age	−0.005*** (0.001)
Alt-Right FT: White Identity	0.715*** (0.126)
Constant	0.244** (0.117)
Observations	2,567
R^2	0.461
Adjusted R^2	0.448
Residual Std. Error	0.556 (df = 2504)
F Statistic	34.542*** (df = 62; 2504)

Note: $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table A5. Candidate support: racial resentment and alt-right interaction.

	Dependent variable: Candidate Support
White identity	0.930*** (0.053)
Alt-Right FT	0.665*** (0.081)
Racial resentment	0.718*** (0.078)
Democratic	−0.162*** (0.030)
Independent	−0.141*** (0.031)
Income	0.184*** (0.056)
Some College	−0.021 (0.034)
College Degree	0.050 (0.037)
Post-College Degree	0.124*** (0.040)
Conservatism	0.109*** (0.039)
Age	−0.005*** (0.001)
Alt-Right FT: Racial Resentment	−0.597*** (0.136)
Constant	−0.019 (0.117)
Observations	2,567
R^2	0.458
Adjusted R^2	0.445
Residual Std. Error	0.557 (df = 2504)
F Statistic	34.161*** (df = 62; 2504)

Note: $^*p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

violent crimes. This has allowed individuals such as Mexican national Luiz Alfonso, who had previously been deported multiple times, to rape and murder Susan Wayfeather in San Diego, CA.

In fact, incidents like this are not uncommon. This immigration crisis has overburdened police forces and federal authorities who lack the ability to effectively police communities, leaving American citizens at risk of rising crime and drug rates. As a result, there have been other grisly murders, such as a double homicide in Houston last week that was committed by Carlos Lopez, a Mexican immigrant.

Implicit In-Group Over the last two decades, immigration has steadily increased over the U.S. border with Mexico. While many immigrants have entered legally, many have entered illegally. Unfortunately, there are an increasing number of violent incidents associated with rising illegal immigration.

Despite the fact that border security provisions could prevent the flow of illegal immigration, political gridlock has impeded solutions to this problem from being adopted. This has put increased pressure on American communities to deal with an influx of violence in areas previously safe from conflict. One recent example was last week's rape and murder of American Susan Wayfeather in her suburban home outside of San Diego, CA.

This crisis has overburdened police forces and federal authorities who lack the ability to effectively police communities, especially as suburban neighborhoods are becoming more diverse. As a result, there have been other grisly murders, such those of Americans like Robert and Jennifer Rose in their Houston home last week.

Explicit In-Group Over the last two decades, immigration has steadily increased over the U.S. border with Mexico. While many immigrants have entered legally, many have entered illegally. Unfortunately, there are an increasing number of violent incidents associated with rising illegal immigration.

Despite the fact that border security provisions could prevent the flow of illegal immigration, political gridlock has impeded solutions to this problem from being adopted. This has put increased pressure on white communities to deal with an influx of violence in areas previously safe from conflict. One recent example was last week's rape and murder of a white woman, Susan Wayfeather, in her private home outside of San Diego, CA.

This crisis has overburdened police forces and federal authorities who lack the ability to effectively police communities, especially as white neighborhoods are becoming more racially diverse. As a result, there have been other grisly murders, such as those of Robert and Jennifer Rose, both white, in their Houston home last week.

Comprehension Checks Here, I discuss further the four comprehension questions which were asked of MTurk workers before fielding the full experiment, in order to determine that the racial primes in each vignette are being read and noticed.

The first simply asked for the topic of the article (Immigration), while the second asked them for something more detailed – the location of these crimes. These served as basic comprehension checks, with the first checking if they had paid even cursory attention and the second asking for more specific details about the locations of the events described. Our analysis of the responses to other questions removed responses (only four) that failed the first question, as we were concerned with verifying that those who read the treatment picked up on relevant racialized cues. The latter two questions asked for information on descriptive characteristics of the perpetrators or victims (illegal immigrant, Mexican, American, or white, depending on the vignette). The fourth question asked for specific names of the perpetrators or victims, intending to be a more difficult check on comprehension with an eye towards whether it was in-group or out-group. While most respondents showed effective comprehension to the vignettes, we considered comprehension of the implicit in-group vignette to be initially insufficient (only 63 percent responded correctly to the fourth question, as opposed to 81 percent of the other treatments) and revised the vignette by changing "private home" to "suburban home" before re-fielding an additional comprehension check that yielded better results (with 87 percent responding correctly. The results of our two pre-tests suggest that respondents would have noticed and understood the small differences in our experimental vignettes, i.e., the differences that prime racial cues.

In terms of duration, a total of 163 respondents were dropped for low duration. Specifically, only respondents who's duration was at least one-third of the full sample's median of 749 s were included, i.e., removing those who only spent 249 s or fewer. This led to a median duration of 775 s and a mean duration of 1417.5 s. Importantly, this survey was embedded in a larger survey with approximately 150 questions for each, although due to randomization that varied slightly.