


Continue with Linear Cryptanalysis



$$\Pr_{\mathcal{E}}(\psi(X, Y) \oplus \phi(K) = 0) = \frac{1}{2} + \delta, \quad \delta \neq 0$$

Boolean, linear

Known pl.-text attack.

$$x_i, y_i \quad i = 1 \dots n$$

pl.-text/c.-text pairs.


Goal recover some bits of the key K.

find $\phi(K) \Leftrightarrow 1 \text{ bit of } K$.

Improvements on Linear Cryptanalysis.


split encryption into 2 parts

First and the rest



last round and the rest.

$$K_1 \dots K_{N-1} \quad KN$$



assume correlation

$$\Pr(\varphi(x, S_{N-1}) \oplus \varphi(k) = 0) = \frac{1}{2} + \delta_1, \delta_1 \neq 0$$

Based on $N-1$ round encryption,

$|\delta_1| > |\delta|$ (based on N round encryption)

goal find $\varphi(k)$ and K_N (last round key)

Algorithm

1. For each value of $K_N = k$

count

$$n_0(k) = \#\varphi(x_i, S_{N-1}) = 0$$

$$S_{N-1} = R^{-1}(y_i, k)$$

$$i = 1, \dots, n$$

2. decision
decide $K_N = k$ if $|n_0(k) - \frac{n}{2}| \rightarrow \max.$

3. assume $\delta_1 > 0$
decide $\varphi(k) = \begin{cases} 0 & n_0 \geq \frac{n}{2} \\ 1 & n_0 < \frac{n}{2} \end{cases}$

output $\varphi(k), K_N$.

How large n to make this work.

We know if $R > \frac{8}{\delta^2}$ then

success prob. > 0.9

complexity $2^{|K_N|} \cdot n$ very large.

Another improvements

work block cipher constructed with

small S-boxes $S : l\text{-bit} \rightarrow l\text{-bit}$

in SPN, l small. (in AES $l = 8$)
SPN $l = 4$

Correlation

$$P_x(\psi(\bar{x}, \bar{s}_{N-1}) \oplus \phi(k) = 0) = \frac{1}{2} + \delta_1$$

$$\bar{s}_{N-1} = \bar{R}^T(\bar{y}, \bar{k}_N)$$

\bar{x}	substring of	x
\bar{y}	— —	y
\bar{s}_{N-1}	— —	s_{N-1}
\bar{k}_N	— —	k_N

Algorithm

2. For any value of $\bar{K}_N = k$

$$\underline{n}_0(k) = \# \Psi(\bar{x}_i, \bar{s}_{N-i}) = 0$$

$$\bar{s}_{N-i} = R^{-1}(\bar{y}_i, k)$$

$$i=1, \dots, n$$

2. decide $\bar{K}_N = k$

$$|n_0(k) - \frac{N}{2}| \rightarrow \max$$

$$(S_1 > 0) \quad \phi(k) = \begin{cases} 0 & n_0(k) \geq N/2 \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$n > \frac{8/\delta_1^2}{\epsilon} \quad \text{for success prob.} > 0.9$$

complexity

using 2 counters,
 \bar{x}, \bar{y} - strings of bits
 address a, b

$$v_{a,b} = \# \bar{x}_i, \bar{y}_i = a, b \quad i=1, \dots, n$$

$$\Rightarrow \underline{n}_0(k) = \sum_{a,b} f(a,b,k) \cdot v_{a,b}$$

$$f(a,b,k) = \begin{cases} 1 & \Psi(a, \bar{s}_{N-1}) = 0 \\ & \bar{s}_{N-1} = R^{-1}(b, k) \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\boxed{\text{complexity} = n + \frac{|\bar{x}| + |\bar{y}| + |Kn|}{2}}$$

use that round key is xored with state

another formula for $n_0(k) =$

$$\sum_{\substack{a, b \\ B, k}} f(a, \underline{b \oplus k}) \gamma_{a, b}$$

convolution of two real-valued function.

may be efficiently computed with

Walsh-Hadamard transform.


$$|\bar{x}| + |\bar{y}|$$

$$\Rightarrow n + \underline{3} \cdot |\bar{K}_N| \cdot 2$$

complexity.


Further improvements.

split encryption into 3 parts



Example.

Apply Linear Cryptanalysis to SPN from Stinson's book.



active S-boxes

$$\overline{X}, \overline{Y}, \overline{K}_5 = K_5[5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, 16]$$

define $\phi(k)$

round 1

$$X_0 \{5, 6, 8\} \oplus K_1 \{5, 6, 8\} \oplus X_1 \{6\} = 0 \quad \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4}$$

round 2

$$X_1 \{6\} \oplus K_2 \{6\} \oplus X_2 \{6, 14\} = 0 \quad \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{4}$$

round 3

$$X_2 \{6\} \oplus K_3 \{6\} \oplus X_3 \{6, 14\} = 0 \quad \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{4}$$

$$X_2 \{14\} \oplus K_3 \{14\} \oplus X_3 \{8, 16\} = 0 \quad \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{4}$$

$$X_3 \{6, 8, 14, 16\} = X_4 \{6, 8, 14, 16\} \oplus K_4 \{6, 8, 14, 16\}$$

xor all expressions

after cancellation

$$X_0 \{5, 6, 8\} \oplus X_4 \{6, 8, 14, 16\} \oplus$$

$k = 0$ with R

$$\text{prob. } \frac{1}{2} + 2^3 \cdot \frac{1}{4} \cdot \left(-\frac{1}{4}\right)^3 = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{32}$$

$$k = K_1 \{5, 6, 8\} \oplus \dots \oplus K_4 \{6, 8, 14, 16\}$$

analysis of the SPN S-Box

$$S[\overline{X_1} \overline{X_2} \overline{X_3} \overline{X_4}] = \overline{Y_1} \overline{Y_2} \overline{Y_3} \overline{Y_4}$$

use only two correlation

for the S-Box

$$\Pr[Y \{1, 2, 4\} \oplus Y \{2\} = 0] = \frac{3}{4} = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{4} \quad 1)$$

$X_{[1]} \oplus X_{[2]} \oplus X_{[4]} \quad Y_{[2]}$

$X_{[1]} \quad X_{[2]} \quad X_{[4]} \quad Y_{[2]}$

$$\Pr(X\{2\} \oplus Y\{2,4\} = 0) = \frac{1}{4} = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{4}. \quad 3)$$

$\begin{matrix} X\{2\} \\ \downarrow \\ x_2 \end{matrix}$

 $\begin{matrix} Y\{2\} \oplus Y\{4\} \\ \downarrow \\ y_2 \oplus y_4 \end{matrix}$

Apply algorithm
recover 9 key-bits

$$\overbrace{K_5}^{\text{8-bit}}, \underbrace{R}_{\text{1-bit}}$$

How large n to get right success prob.

$$n \geq \frac{8}{\delta_1^2} = \left(\frac{8}{-\frac{1}{32}}\right)^2 = 2^{13} \approx 8000$$

$$\delta_1 = -\frac{1}{32}$$
