



Hagelin



Example. 1) cipher-text may not be uniform.



distribution on the key-stream

$$X = \left(\frac{3}{64}, \frac{3}{64}, \dots, \frac{3}{64}, \frac{2}{64}, \dots, \frac{2}{64} \right) \text{ non-uniform}$$

compute distribution on the cipher-text

$$\left(P_0(c=0), P_1(c=1), \dots, P_{25}(c=25) \right) =$$

$$= (0.039, 0.037, \dots, 0.036, \dots, 0.040, \dots, 0.037)$$

$$\frac{1}{26} \approx 0.038$$

$$P_2(c=j) = \sum_{i=0}^{25} P_2(c=j, x=i) =$$

↑ ↑
cipher-text key-stream
ch. ch.

$$\begin{aligned}
 C &= X - M \xrightarrow{\text{pl.-text char.}} \\
 &= \sum_{i=0}^{25} P_Z(x-m=j, x=i) \\
 &= \sum_{i=0}^{25} P_Z(m=i-j, x=i) = \\
 &= \sum_{i=0}^{25} P_Z(m=i-j) \cdot P_Z(x=i) = \\
 &= \sum_{i=0}^{25} q_{i-j \bmod 26} \cdot \underbrace{P_Z(x=i)}_{\substack{\uparrow \\ \text{language} \\ \text{constants}}} \quad \uparrow \text{known.}
 \end{aligned}$$

compute distribution on the cipher-text
 1) right most wheel position has value 0
 2) 1

1) key-stream distribution
 $\left(\frac{3}{32}, \frac{3}{32}, \dots, \frac{3}{32}, \frac{2}{32}, 0, \dots, 0 \right)$ by cage definition

\Rightarrow cipher-text distribution
 $(0.042, 0.042, 0.042, 0.035, 0.033, \dots)$

2) key-stream distribution is
 $\left(0, \dots, 0, \frac{1}{32}, \frac{3}{32}, \frac{2}{32}, \dots, \frac{2}{32} \right)$

\Rightarrow cipher-text distribution.

$(0.035, 0.034, 0.035, 0.040, 0.041, \dots)$

different-

At-depth Cryptanalysis.

German read $\geq 10\%$ of M-209 cipher-texts

$X = x_1 \dots x_n$ key-stream by M-209

$M = m_1 \dots m_n$ pl.-text

$C = c_1 \dots c_n$ cipher-text

$$c_i \equiv x_i - m_i \pmod{26}$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{write this } C \equiv X - M \pmod{26}$$

(entrywise).

Assume that several pl.-texts M_1, \dots, M_s were encrypted with the same $X \Rightarrow$

system of equations:

$$\begin{cases} C_1 \equiv X - M_1 \\ C_2 \equiv X - M_2 \\ \vdots \\ C_s \equiv X - M_s \end{cases} (*)$$


s called depth.

goal recover all M_1, M_2, \dots, M_s from (*)

Why that may happen for M-209.

period of the key-stream

$$26 \cdot 25 \cdot 23 \cdot 21 \cdot 19 \cdot 17 \approx 2^{20}$$



M^1

x' used to

encrypt M

$X'' M''$
 X'' used to encrypt M''

some part M_1 or M'_1
 M_2 or M''_1

were encrypted with the same key-stream X

$$C_1 = X - M_1$$

$$C_2 = X - M_2$$

depth is 2.

How at-depth cryptanalysis works.


Eliminate X from (*).

$$\begin{cases} C_2 - C_1 = M_1 - M_2 \\ \dots \\ C_s - C_1 = M_1 - M_s \end{cases} \quad (*)$$

observation.

one knows part of some of M_1, \dots, M_s

\Rightarrow one recovers parts of the rest or
the plain-text in those positions.



for $s \geq 3$ works very well

$s=2$ still works

Probable words.

- 1) general context of the communication

| | |
|------------|--|
| military | general " generalstaff " " Headquarters " - - - |
| diplomatic | " embassy " " envoy " - - - |
| scientific | " theory ", " nuclear bomb ", - - - |

2) English probable words are
"of the"
"which"
"there are"

Algorithm

- Algorithm

 - 1) try a probable word at all locations
in the plain-texts M_1, \dots, M_s
 - 2) recover relevant positions of the other
pl.-text
 - a) portion is sensible \Rightarrow guess was
correct
 - b) non sensible \Rightarrow guess was
wrong

↓

try another location
or another probable word.

 - 3) if stopped, then make new guesses with
new probable words

Example.

3 cipher-texts from Lecture Notes

C, 363 cR.

249

234

$$c_i = g_{Cijq} / |R_{xj} R_{zj}| \dots$$

$r = \text{rgx} / \text{rqdml}$

$$C_2 = R \text{Rojm} | a + b u | \dots : C_i \equiv X - M_i$$

eliminate key-stream x : $C_1 - C_3 \equiv M_3 - M_1 = z \times rae / Rdggm | \dots$

$$M_{31} \equiv C_1 - C_3 \equiv M_3 - M_1 = kbcfl / vsgkez | \dots$$

$$M_{32} \equiv C_2 - C_3 \equiv M_3 - M_2 = kbcfl / vsgkez | \dots$$

M_{31} 234-ch. string

M_{32} 249-ch. string.

assume

the discrete logarithm problem

on one of M_1, M_2, M_3 .

trying the prob. word in M_3 at position 35

| | | | | | | | |
|--------|---------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-------------------------|---------------|
| H | A V E M E R | G E D A S | A P R O M | I S I N G | N E W A R | E A I N P U B | L I C K E Y |
| PROT | O L A L S | O C A L L | E D E X P | O N E N T | R I T H M | I A L K E Y A G R E E M | E M A N D I S |
| OCEDON | T H E D I S C R E T | E L O G A | | | | | |

guess correct


recover all pl.-texts.

Vernon project.

Running key cipher.

aperiodic key-stream from a book.

key : name of a book
 page number
 line number
 column number.



without spaces, punctuation, in lower case.

$X = x_1 \dots x_n$
 to encrypt

$M = m_1 \dots m_n$

$C = c_1 \dots c_n$

cipher text

$$c_i \equiv x_i - m_i \pmod{26}$$

OR

$$\equiv x_i + m_i \pmod{26}$$

$$C \equiv X + M \pmod{26}$$

given C find M ,

easy because X, M are two pl-texts

at depth 2 cryptanalysis with depth 2.

Running key cipher is broken
 because English is 75% redundant-

encoding

$X, M \rightarrow C$


of length $2 \cdot n$

of length n .

<-- decoding.

Half of this text is redundant.

But it is known English is 75% redundant.



3n characters are redundant.

⇒ Improve running key cipher.

$$C \equiv M + X_1 + X_2 + X_3 + X_n \pmod{26}$$

↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
ciphertext pl.-text running keys.

If this is not secure.

given C recover M.

by symmetry recover X_1, X_2, X_3, X_n .

⇒ English is 80% redundant.
not the case.

This encryption is perfect.

even if $C = \underline{\underline{M + X_1 + X_2}} \pmod{26}$
very very diff. to recover M.

$$C_1 = X - M_1$$

$$C_2 = X - M_2 \quad \text{depth } \approx 3$$

$$C_3 = X - M_3$$

