


Code Assessment Findings



ID	Name	Category	Severity	Status	Contributor
PAR-1	Lack view function specified in EIP- 2535	Code Style	Informational	Reported	comcat
PAR-2	NTokenMoonBirds may not be able to receive airdrops	Logical	Medium	Reported	thereksfour
PAR-3	WETH9 Compatibility issues in PoolCore contract supplyWithPermit function	Logical	Low	Reported	w2ning
PAR-4	WETHGateway.repayETH will fail when msg.value > paybackAmount due to incorrect parameter setting	Logical	Medium	Reported	thereksfour
PAR-5	WPunkGateway functions should declare payable to buy punks	Logical	Medium	Reported	thereksfour



PAR-1:Lack view function specified in EIP-2535

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Code Style	Informational	code/contracts/protocol/libraries/ paraspace- upgradeability/ParaProxy.sol#L13	Reported	comcat

Code

```
13: constructor(address _contractOwner) payable {
```

Description

comcat: The ParaProxy is a custom implementation of EIP-2535, it implements the core concept of diamond proxy, for example the updateImplementaion function, as well as the ImplementationUpdated event. however, according to EIP-2535, it should also implement the following view function, for the purpose of easy check.

```
function facets() external view returns (Facet[] memory facets_);
function facetFunctionSelectors(address _facet) external view returns (bytes4[] memory
facetFunctionSelectors_);
function facetAddresses() external view returns (address[] memory facetAddresses_);
function facetAddress(bytes4 _functionSelector) external view returns (address facetAddress_);
```

currently, the ProxyStorage is private, and it is hard to check the corresponding facet address and selectors.

Recommendation

comcat: Stick to the EIP-2535 standard, implement those view function.

Client Response



PAR-2:NTokenMoonBirds may not be able to receive airdrops

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Logical	Medium	code/contracts/protocol/tokenization/ NTokenMoonBirds.sol#L63-L77 code/contracts/protocol/tokenization/ NToken.sol#L136-L149	Reported	thereksfour

Code

```
function onERC721Received(
           address operator,
           address from,
           uint256 id,
67:
           bytes memory
       ) external virtual override returns (bytes4) {
           require(msg.sender == _underlyingAsset, Errors.OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
           if (operator == address(P00L)) {
               return this.onERC721Received.selector;
77:
        function rescueERC721(
137:
            address token,
            address to,
138:
            uint256[] calldata ids
        ) external override onlyPoolAdmin {
            require(
                token != _underlyingAsset,
                Errors.UNDERLYING_ASSET_CAN_NOT_BE_TRANSFERRED
            for (uint256 i = 0; i < ids.length; i++) {</pre>
                IERC721(token).safeTransferFrom(address(this), to, ids[i]);
147:
            emit RescueERC721(token, to, ids);
```

Description

thereksfour: For most NToken, some airdrops that are actively minted to the holder's address can be withdrawn and later distributed by the PoolAdmin calling the rescueERC721 function.

```
function rescueERC721(
address token,
address to,
```

```
uint256[] calldata ids
) external override onlyPoolAdmin {
    require(
        token != _underlyingAsset,
        Errors.UNDERLYING_ASSET_CAN_NOT_BE_TRANSFERRED
);
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < ids.length; i++) {
        IERC721(token).safeTransferFrom(address(this), to, ids[i]);
    }
    emit RescueERC721(token, to, ids);
}</pre>
```

However, in the onERC721Received function of the NTokenMoonBirds contract, due to the requirement that the sender can only be the MoonBird contract, when safemint()/safetransferfrom() is called to send the airdrop NFTs to the NTokenMoonBirds contract, the transaction will fail, thus preventing NTokenMoonBirds from receiving these airdrops.

```
function onERC721Received(
    address operator,
    address from,
    uint256 id,
    bytes memory
) external virtual override returns (bytes4) {
    // only accept MoonBird tokens
    require(msg.sender == _underlyingAsset, Errors.OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
```

For example, Moonbirds Oddities are actively minted to the holder's address. https://etherscan.io/tx/0x3af5de8b6a8c55aac033d57e1b110e8340abf4dcd289ebda889a44f9f9dc613d

Recommendation

thereksfour: Consider allowing the NTokenMoonBirds contract to receive NFTs from other addresses and only call POOL.supportERC721FromNToken when msg.sender == _underlyingAsset

```
function onERC721Received(
       address operator,
       address from,
       uint256 id,
       bytes memory
    ) external virtual override returns (bytes4) {
       // only accept MoonBird tokens
                               _underlyingAsset, Errors.OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
        require(msg.sender ==
       // if the operator is the pool, this means that the pool is transferring the token to this
contract
        // which can happen during a normal supplyERC721 pool tx
        if (operator == address(POOL)) {
            return this.onERC721Received.selector;
      if(msg.sender == _underlyingAsset){
        // supply the received token to the pool and set it as collateral
       DataTypes.ERC721SupplyParams[]
            memory tokenData = new DataTypes.ERC721SupplyParams[](1);
        tokenData[0] = DataTypes.ERC721SupplyParams({
            tokenId: id,
            useAsCollateral: true
        });
```

Client Response



PAR-3:WETH9 Compatibility issues in PoolCore contract supplyWithPermit function

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Logical	Low	code/contracts/protocol/pool/Pool Core.sol#L156	Reported	w2ning

Code

156: function supplyWithPermit(

Description

w2ning: Same Issue as Multichain router v4 vulnerability.

https://medium.com/multichainorg/action-required-critical-vulnerability-for-six-tokens-6b3cbd22bfc0

WETH9 contract has no permit function, But there is a fallback function, when you call WETH9 with permit function would not be revert.

The impact is that It may cause some unexpected calls to complete successfully

Recommendation

w2ning: Check the token address that does not support the 'permit' function Consider below fix in the PoolCore.supplyWithPermit() function

```
function supplyWithPermit(
    ...
    ) external virtual override nonReentrant {
    require(asset != weth9,"WETH9 does not support Permit");
    ...
}
```

Client Response



PAR-4: WETHGateway.repayETH will fail when msg.value > paybackAmount due to incorrect parameter setting

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Logical	Medium	code/contracts/ui/WETHGateway.sol# L92-L113 code/contracts/protocol/libraries/logi c/BorrowLogic.sol#L188-L194	Reported	thereksfour

Code

```
function repayETH(uint256 amount, address onBehalf0f)
93:
           external
94:
           payable
95:
           override
96:
           nonReentrant
97:
           uint256 variableDebt = Helpers.getUserCurrentDebt(
                IPool(pool).getReserveData(address(WETH)).variableDebtTokenAddress
            );
            uint256 paybackAmount = variableDebt;
            if (amount < paybackAmount) {</pre>
                paybackAmount = amount;
107:
            require(
                msg.value >= paybackAmount,
                "msg.value is less than repayment amount"
            WETH.deposit{value: paybackAmount}();
            IPool(pool).repay(address(WETH), msg.value, onBehalfOf);
            } else {
                IERC20(params.asset).safeTransferFrom(
                    msg.sender,
                    reserveCache.xTokenAddress,
                    paybackAmount
                );
```

Description

thereksfour: In WETHGateway.repayETH, if msg.value > paybackAmount, since the amount parameter of pool.repay is msg.value instead of paybackAmount, BorrowLogic.executeRepay will fail due to insufficient WETH amount. Consider user A has a debt of 5 ETH, user A calls WETHGateway.repayETH to repay the debt, where amount = 2 ETH, msg.value = 3 ETH.

Since amount = 2 ETH, the paybackAmount is also 2 ETH, and exchanged for 2 WETH, the excess 1 ETH will be refunded, and when calling pool.repay, amount = msg.value = 3 ETH.

In the BorrowLogic.executeRepay function, paybackAmount = 3 ETH, and try to transfer 3 WETH from WETHGateway to the pool, because only 2 WETH was exchanged before, this step will fail.

Note: If there are WETHs accidentally sent by users in the contract, malicious users will be able to use these WETHs to repay debts.

Recommendation

thereksfour: Change to

Client Response



PAR-5: WPunkGateway functions should declare payable to buy punks

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Logical	Medium	 code/contracts/ui/WPunkGateway. sol#L77-L95 code/contracts/ui/WPunkGateway. sol#L129-L155 code/contracts/ui/WPunkGateway. sol#L167-L193 	Reported	thereksfour

Code

```
function supplyPunk(
           DataTypes.ERC721SupplyParams[] calldata punkIndexes,
           address onBehalfOf,
           uint16 referralCode
       ) external nonReentrant {
           for (uint256 i = 0; i < punkIndexes.length; i++) {</pre>
               Punk.buyPunk(punkIndexes[i].tokenId);
               Punk.transferPunk(proxy, punkIndexes[i].tokenId);
               WPunk.mint(punkIndexes[i].tokenId);
87:
           Pool.supplyERC721(
               address(WPunk),
               punkIndexes,
               onBehalfOf,
               referralCode
           );
        function acceptBidWithCredit(
            bytes32 marketplaceId,
            bytes calldata payload,
            DataTypes.Credit calldata credit,
            uint256[] calldata punkIndexes,
            uint16 referralCode
        ) external nonReentrant {
            for (uint256 i = 0; i < punkIndexes.length; i++) {</pre>
                Punk.buyPunk(punkIndexes[i]);
137:
                Punk.transferPunk(proxy, punkIndexes[i]);
                WPunk.mint(punkIndexes[i]);
                IERC721(wpunk).safeTransferFrom(
                    address(this),
                    msg.sender,
```

```
punkIndexes[i]
                );
            }
            Pool.acceptBidWithCredit(
                marketplaceId,
                payload,
                credit,
                msq.sender,
                referralCode
            );
167:
        function batchAcceptBidWithCredit(
            bytes32[] calldata marketplaceIds,
            bytes[] calldata payloads,
            DataTypes.Credit[] calldata credits,
            uint256[] calldata punkIndexes,
            uint16 referralCode
        ) external nonReentrant {
            for (uint256 i = 0; i < punkIndexes.length; i++) {</pre>
                Punk.buyPunk(punkIndexes[i]);
                Punk.transferPunk(proxy, punkIndexes[i]);
                WPunk.mint(punkIndexes[i]);
                IERC721(wpunk).safeTransferFrom(
                     address(this),
                    msg.sender,
                     punkIndexes[i]
                );
            }
            Pool.batchAcceptBidWithCredit(
187:
                marketplaceIds,
                payloads,
                credits,
                msg.sender,
                referralCode
            );
```

Description

thereksfour: WPunkGateway.supplyPunk, WPunkGateway.acceptBidWithCredit and WPunkGatewaybatchAcceptBidWithCredit should declare payable and send Ether when calling Punk.buyPunk.

Recommendation

thereksfour: Consider adding the payable attribute to

WPunkGateway.providePunk/acceptBidWithCredit/batchAcceptBidWithCredit and sending ETH when calling Punk.buyPunk in WPunkGateway to allow users to buy punk directly from the sale.

```
function supplyPunk(
   DataTypes.ERC721SupplyParams[] calldata punkIndexes,
   address onBehalfOf,
   uint16 referralCode
```

```
- ) external nonReentrant {
+ ) external payable nonReentrant {
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < punkIndexes.length; i++) {
        Punk.buyPunk(punkIndexes[i].tokenId);
        Punk.buyPunk{value:msg.value}(punkIndexes[i].tokenId);</pre>
```

Client Response



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