



Competitive Security Assessment

Mantle-LSD-Oracle-Service-Core

Nov 6th, 2023

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Summary

This report is prepared for the project to identify vulnerabilities and issues in the smart contract source code. A group of NDA covered experienced security experts have participated in the Secure3's Audit Contest to find vulnerabilities and optimizations. Secure3 team has participated in the contest process as well to provide extra auditing coverage and scrutiny of the finding submissions.

The comprehensive examination and auditing scope includes:

- Cross checking contract implementation against functionalities described in the documents and white paper disclosed by the project owner.
- Contract Privilege Role Review to provide more clarity on smart contract roles and privilege.
- Using static analysis tools to analyze smart contracts against common known vulnerabilities patterns.
- Verify the code base is compliant with the most up-to-date industry standards and security best practices.
- Comprehensive line-by-line manual code review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that are categorized in four severity levels: Critical, Medium, Low, Informational. For each of the findings, the report has included recommendations of fix or mitigation for security and best practices.

Overview

Project Detail


Project Name	Mantle-LSD-Oracle-Service-Core
Platform & Language	Go
Codebase	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• https://github.com/TwoFiftySixLabs/services• audit commit - 44c07aec02eaa81fab10ab20c7e88787427bc0bd• final commit - 0416e2ff42461ab131e391b15ea9c8a48e6eec65
Audit Methodology	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Audit Contest• Business Logic and Code Review• Privileged Roles Review• Static Analysis

Audit Scope

File	SHA256 Hash
./oracle/main.go	c00b8087d8f884f62363f4fd81b5c31daae3afa0818d92095d62db79d05dcf80
./oracle/scheduler/scheduler.go	bf8031339ef7b9488c47a03076afd5427832e93492d64f50a9b275e6546f2db2
./oracle/service/service.go	9b06118c3985c7f97361a0499dc4bb5af45688f65c1d7bb b4cc8c20cf4bd30e1
./lib/withdrawals/withdrawals.go	aac9410867fd2450730beaf2696ab6ef88288818941724672a69b33bdd2fde33
./oracle/reporter/reporter.go	f84c04b9ab83d0a13e8a15742aaa75db10132f3dcd7f19f985816bacb3d27e9f
./lib/consensus/finder/finder.go	ae92d1d3d2df3d5071e0e2c73a4cd998ad2eac907752ce29315d88330ab48f0b
./lib/eventsearcher/events.go	a5f34854821f1ff854e543fabecda27bbef26b1394b802d838fe7733794ac6c4
./lib/consensus/blockstamp.go	d59b9bfb7b8ee054bc8a356bd088ea3f7fce5337776d8e22b90aa1d01c7f1c65
./lib/validator/loader.go	216b3285a789b9e5983b49f580b6d63b0ed3b876e1b3d5964a724d26d81968cb
./lib/validator/sourcer/sourcer.go	599e32589fdf325d1d78dc15841bab3613cb7666433aacda7131491b3523bad3
./lib/transaction/gcpkmsigner.go	a34e377cfdb1994699fdbf4277f9477b793c295def694459a8a03f8ee7d38fe2
./oracle/service/config.go	818af00dbcfefb649c663fe1aab7b0378c284fe3f92cfb9a207ccf1515a5a6e8
./lib/validator/validator.go	f3de4ef10678ea238fc582054ea463ce0271500c85347c4b5e6e6ba8d1121af4
./lib/consensus/pubkeyfilter.go	21fd5a93deb2dec6f60fde65cf275a562f4fe529ef0403f1ef8c686a46654da1
./lib/runner/runner.go	89235295ca231598a0ae682403f7b7b4874836cb02764fea1e32b42677fb3c0d

./lib/validator/keyset.go	1d72f98030044d186db700752357e4e56f675bfaeac1efef95f572c3751a5158
./lib/client/multiplex.go	b4f0f34729ca5fadf50d10d4e53a4f962d93e22c4d77715522b297c6637daa14
./lib/consensus/client.go	474c6aefaf489e608a5bda02cb32e8bfaf6e8768dc723ac4527a35d4ff75b458
./lib/validator/filter.go	b29bacc5ac6ae088c4d47f09e28cd8ce7c595f0a6e91e7078d7a93c6aa9d46c5
./lib/consensus/constants.go	7c55057506f1865b6c794020fd08072e6f4c92ad55e1e29d0ad59abde999e558
./lib/validator/predicates.go	90ac9fbce9b02cc693a6bb5d4a819f4706c775ab024767fd8bf6af1ae9613b7a
./oracle/service/clients.go	b7eb356ec7c83c629818ee70c001c62b0bbbeedf8eb797eb3a5575da343b91c3
./lib/validator/sourcer/set.go	342572dff97bcb680a8b6d13459269b0b4f3ddf328f6747b37c3b14cc5782867
./lib/network/network.go	8c85dd08132ee63a647bd97647fa40c9dc4a61bf2084ab857ad5d07c38fb221a

Code Assessment Findings



ID	Name	Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
MTO-1	Potential panic when executing a transaction	Logical	Medium	Fixed	biakia
MTO-2	Potential Nil Dereference	Code Style	Medium	Fixed	lfzkoala
MTO-3	Lack of Rate Limiting Control	DOS	Medium	Fixed	lfzkoala
MTO-4	Change <code>ethclient.Dial(conf.RPCUrl)</code> to <code>ethclient.DialContext(ctx, conf.RPCUrl)</code> Thus timeout function also takes effect on ethclient	Logical	Medium	Fixed	seek.guo

MTO-5	Lack of Authentication for Ethereum RPC	Logical	Medium	Declined	biakia, Ifzkoala
MTO-6	Insufficient Input Validation in <code>ComputeWithdrawals</code> Method	Logical	Medium	Declined	yekong, Ifzkoala, Hacker007
MTO-7	Lack of Secure Headers in HTTP Responses	Code Style	Medium	Declined	Ifzkoala
MTO-8	Resources not released after querying events	Logical	Low	Fixed	biakia
MTO-9	Not check the existence of the block returned from the Beacon.	Logical	Low	Fixed	biakia
MTO-10	Incomplete nil check	Logical	Low	Fixed	Hacker007
MTO-11	Missing parameter validation in <code>withdrawals::NewAnalyzer()</code> function	Logical	Low	Fixed	Hupixiong3
MTO-12	start-block and end-block flags should define Uint64Flag, num-runs and start-index flag should use UintFlag, Because they cannot have negative numbers	Logical	Low	Fixed	seek.guo
MTO-13	Uncontrolled Public Key Input in <code>ValidatorsAt</code>	Logical	Low	Declined	Ifzkoala
MTO-14	No further error handling in <code>scheduler::checkForUpdate()</code> function	Logical	Low	Declined	Hupixiong3
MTO-15	Optimization for the binary search	Logical	Informational	Fixed	biakia, alansh
MTO-16	wrong error info in <code>Reporter::BuildOracleReport</code> function	Logical	Informational	Fixed	alansh
MTO-17	real reason for error from <code>consensusClient</code> is unexpectedly ignored in <code>BinarySearch::BlockStamp()</code> function	Code Style	Informational	Fixed	alansh
MTO-18	Incomplete Configuration Checks	Logical	Informational	Fixed	Ifzkoala
MTO-19	gc optimization for command <code>regenerate-reports</code> and <code>verify-reports</code>	Logical	Informational	Acknowledged	biakia

MTO-20	Function Name Mismatch	Code Style	Informational	Fixed	yekong
MTO-21	Inefficient loop statement in <code>withdrawals.go</code>	Gas Optimization	Informational	Acknowledged	Hacker007
MTO-22	Unused function parameter <code>ctx</code>	Language Specific	Informational	Fixed	Hacker007
MTO-23	Inefficiency in Memory Allocation in <code>keyset::PublicKeys()</code> function	Language Specific	Informational	Acknowledged	Hupixiong3
MTO-24	Unused field <code>Epoch</code>	Language Specific	Informational	Fixed	Hacker007

MTO-1: Potential panic when executing a transaction

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Logical	Medium	Fixed	biakia

Code Reference

- [code/lib/transaction/gcpkmssigner.go#L41-L67](#)

```
41:func (s *GCPKMSTransactor) Run(ctx context.Context, f TransactorFunc) (*types.Transaction, error)
42: {
43:     nonce, err := s.noncer.NonceAt(ctx, s.Address(), nil)
44:     if err != nil {
45:         return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to get nonce for transaction")
46:     }
47:     opts := &bind.TransactOpts{
48:         From: s.Address(),
49:         Signer: func(address common.Address, tx *types.Transaction) (*types.Transaction, error) {
50:             return s.sign(ctx, tx)
51:         },
52:         Context: ctx,
53:         Nonce:    big.NewInt(int64(nonce)),
54:     }
55:     tx, err := f(opts)
56:     if tx != nil {
57:         logger.Debugw("Sent transaction", "hash", tx.Hash().Hex(), "nonce", nonce)
58:     }
59:     if err != nil {
60:         extractedError, ok := extractErrorMessage(err)
61:         if ok {
62:             logger.Infow("Transaction failed", "hash", tx.Hash().Hex(), "nonce", nonce,
63: "error", extractedError)
64:             return tx, errors.Wrapf(err, "transaction failed with error from the contract %s", extractedError)
65:         }
66:     }
67:     return tx, err
68: }
```

Description

biakia : The `gcpkmssigner.go` is a Ethereum client using Google Cloud KMS. The function `Run` is used to execute a transaction which is signed remotely with the managed key. If the execution fails, it will handle the returned error:

```
tx, err := f(opts)
if tx != nil {
    logger.Debugw("Sent transaction", "hash", tx.Hash().Hex(), "nonce", nonce)
}
if err != nil {
    extractedError, ok := extractErrorMessage(err)
    if ok {
        logger.Infow("Transaction failed", "hash", tx.Hash().Hex(), "nonce", nonce,
            "error", extractedError)
        return tx, errors.Wrapf(err, "transaction failed with error from the contrac
t %s", extractedError)
    }
}
```

It will call `extractErrorMessage` to get the `extractedError` and log it:

```
logger.Infow("Transaction failed", "hash", tx.Hash().Hex(), "nonce", nonce, "error", extractedError)
```

The issue here is that it is possible that the `tx` is `nil`. If the `tx` is `nil`, the `tx.Hash()` will be panic and the program will be terminated.

Recommendation

biakia : Consider checking the `tx` when logging the error.

Client Response

Fixed

MTO-2: Potential Nil Dereference

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Code Style	Medium	Fixed	lfzkoala

Code Reference

- code/lib/validator/sourcer/set.go#L15

```
15:func (s ValidatorSet) NodeOperatorID(key string) nodeoperators.ID {
```

Description

lfzkoala : When trying to retrieve a `nodeoperators.ID` using a key that doesn't exist in the map, the method `NodeOperatorID` will return the zero value for the type (`nodeoperators.ID`). This may not be an immediate issue, but depending on how the zero value is used or interpreted elsewhere, it might lead to logical errors or potential vulnerabilities.

If a caller assumes that a valid `nodeoperators.ID` is always returned and doesn't handle the zero value, it might lead to bugs or unexpected behavior.

Recommendation

lfzkoala : Provide a mechanism to check if the value actually exists in the map. Return an error or a boolean indicating the presence of the value.

```
func (s ValidatorSet) NodeOperatorID(key string) (nodeoperators.ID, bool) {  
    val, ok := s[key]  
    return val, ok  
}
```

Client Response

Fixed, but severity is inflated as this cannot actually happen in the current code.

MTO-3:Lack of Rate Limiting Control

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
DOS	Medium	Fixed	Ifzkoala

Code Reference

- code/lib/withdrawals/withdrawals.go#L87

```
87:limiter := rate.NewLimiter(rate.Limit(a.maxRPS), a.maxRPS)
```

Description

Ifzkoala : The Analyzer uses a rate limiter (`rate.NewLimiter`) for controlling the frequency of its operations; however, it relies on the `maxRPS` parameter from the user without validating its value. If a user initializes the `Analyzer` with an extremely high `maxRPS` or with a negative value, it could lead to unexpected system behavior. **Proof of Concept of**

Attack with code example: Creating an `Analyzer` with a negative `maxRPS` :

```
analyzer := NewAnalyzer(client, -10, address)
```

Location of the security issue with code snippet:

```
limiter := rate.NewLimiter(rate.Limit(a.maxRPS), a.maxRPS)
```

Recommendation

Ifzkoala : Add validation for `maxRPS` during the `Analyzer` initialization to ensure it's within a safe range.

```
if maxRPS <= 0 || maxRPS > someSafeUpperLimit {  
    return nil, errors.New("Invalid maxRPS value")  
}
```

Client Response

Fixed,

All configurations are currently hardcoded as positive integers. However, we think that it is likely they will become configurable later and therefore it is preferable to have this check.

MTO-4:Change `ethclient.Dial(conf.RPCUrl)` to `ethclient.DialContext(ctx, conf.RPCUrl)` Thus timeout function also takes effect on ethclient

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Logical	Medium	Fixed	seek.guo

Code Reference

- code/oracle/service/clients.go#L25

```
25:ethClient, err := ethclient.Dial(conf.RPCUrl)
```

Description

seek.guo : Change `ethclient.Dial(conf.RPCUrl)` to `ethclient.DialContext(ctx, conf.RPCUrl)` Thus timeout function also takes effect on ethclient

Recommendation

seek.guo : change this

```
ethClient, err := ethclient.Dial(conf.RPCUrl)
if err != nil {
    return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to create execution client")
}
```

to

```
ethClient, err := ethclient.DialContext(ctx, conf.RPCUrl)
if err != nil {
    return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to create execution client")
}
```

Client Response

Fixed

MTO-5:Lack of Authentication for Ethereum RPC

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Logical	Medium	Declined	biakia, lfzkoala

Code Reference

- code/oracle/service/clients.go#L25
- code/oracle/main.go#L262-L281

```
25:ethClient, err := ethclient.Dial(conf.RPCUrl)

262:go func(port int) {
263:    logger.Infow("Health check", "port", port)
264:    http.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
265:        w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
266:        _, err := w.Write([]byte("ok"))
267:        if err != nil {
268:            logger.Logger.Fatal("error health check", "error", err)
269:        }
270:    })
271:
272:    addr := ":" + strconv.Itoa(port)
273:    server := &http.Server{
274:        Addr:    addr,
275:        ReadHeaderTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
276:    }
277:    err := server.ListenAndServe()
278:    if err != nil {
279:        logger.Logger.Fatal("error health check", "error", err)
280:    }
281: }(conf.HealthCheckPort)
```

Description

biakia : In `main.go`, there is a health-check http service without authentication mechanism:

```
go func(port int) {
    logger.Infow("Health check", "port", port)
    http.HandleFunc("/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
        _, err := w.Write([]byte("ok"))
        if err != nil {
            logger.Logger.Fatal("error health check", "error", err)
        }
    })

    addr := ":" + strconv.Itoa(port)
    server := &http.Server{
        Addr:          addr,
        ReadHeaderTimeout: 30 * time.Second,
    }
    err := server.ListenAndServe()
    if err != nil {
        logger.Logger.Fatal("error health check", "error", err)
    }
}(conf.HealthCheckPort)
```

If the server port is exposed to the public, the service may be subject to a ddos attack, which can cause the entire program to crash.

lfzkoala : The code uses `ethclient.Dial` to connect to the Ethereum RPC endpoint without any checks for authentication. If the RPC endpoint is not publicly accessible (which it generally shouldn't be), this can expose it to unauthorized access.

Someone can scan for open RPC ports and if they find one, they can gain unrestricted access to the Ethereum node, potentially leading to various attack vectors, like reading private information, broadcasting malicious transactions, etc.

Recommendation

biakia : Consider using JWT or making sure the server not be exposed to the public.

lfzkoala : 1. Always ensure that your Ethereum node's RPC endpoint is not exposed to the public. 2. If you must expose it, use an authentication mechanism. `ethclient.Dial` supports basic authentication via URL. The URL can be of the form `http://username:password@localhost:8545`. 3. Another more secure method would be to use a VPN or another networking solution to ensure that only authorized clients can connect to the RPC.

Client Response

Declined, The service is not exposed to the public and has no endpoints other than health or metrics, neither of which do RPC calls. Regardless, the client is authenticated through the usual mechanism of including the token in the URL.

Secure3 comment : Taking this measure can add one more layer of security to your intranet.

MTO-6:Insufficient Input Validation in ComputeWithdrawals Method

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Logical	Medium	Declined	yekong, Ifzkoala, Hacker007

Code Reference

- [code/lib/withdrawals/withdrawals.go#L57-L69](#)
- [code/lib/withdrawals/withdrawals.go#L71-L74](#)

```
57:func (a *Analyzer) ComputeWithdrawals(ctx context.Context, begin, end *consensus.BlockStamp, endV
alidators []*validator.Validator) (principal *big.Int, reward *big.Int, err error) {
58:    withdrawals, err := a.findWithdrawalsInRange(ctx, begin, end)
59:    if err != nil {
60:        return nil, nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to find withdrawals")
61:    }
62:    // Find only withdrawals for our validators.
63:    ourWithdrawals := a.filterOurWithdrawals(withdrawals, valIndicesSet(endValidators))
64:
65:    // Find validators which are withdrawn (i.e. have become withdrawn in this range).
66:    withdrawnValidators := validator.Filter(endValidators, validator.HasState(v1.ValidatorStateW
ithdrawalDone))
67:    principal, reward = a.sumWithdrawals(ourWithdrawals, withdrawnValidators)
68:    return principal, reward, nil
69:}

71:func (a *Analyzer) findWithdrawalsInRange(ctx context.Context, begin, end *consensus.BlockStamp)
([]*Withdrawal, error) {
72:    logger.Debugw("Finding withdrawals in slots", "begin", begin.SlotNumber, "end", end.SlotNumb
er)
73:
74:    tasks := make([]runner.TaskFunc([]*Withdrawal], end.SlotNumber-begin.SlotNumber+1)
```

Description

yekong : The `ComputeWithdrawals` function in the `withdrawals` package accepts external parameters `begin` and `end` representing block stamps. However, the function doesn't appear to validate the legitimacy, range, or validity of these parameters before processing them. This lack of input validation may expose the system to unexpected behavior or potential vulnerabilities when given malicious or malformed inputs.

lfzkoala : The function `ComputeWithdrawals` accepts `begin` and `end` `BlockStamp` without validating if `begin` is truly before `end`.

An attacker could reverse `begin` and `end` timestamps to create an invalid range.

Hacker007 : The function `findWithdrawalsInRange()` is intended to find all the available `Withdrawal` between the `begin` and `end` Blockstamp.

```
func (a *Analyzer) findWithdrawalsInRange(ctx context.Context, begin, end *consensus.BlockStamp) ([]
*Withdrawal, error) {
    logger.Debugw("Finding withdrawals in slots", "begin", begin.SlotNumber, "end", end.SlotNumber)

    tasks := make([]runner.TaskFunc[[]*Withdrawal], end.SlotNumber-begin.SlotNumber+1
    //...
}
```

However, the function does not check if `begin.SlotNumber` is greater than `end.SlotNumber` plus 1, a panic raised caused by an underflow error.

Traversing the following call stack revealed no additional checks.

- `func (a *Analyzer) ComputeWithdrawals()`
- `func (r *Reporter) BuildOracleReport()`
- `func (s *Service) GenerateReport()`
- `func (s *Service) processUpdate()`
- `func New(ctx context.Context, conf *Config, clients *Clients) (*Service, error)`

Proof of concept

Add a test case in the `withdrawals_test.go`

```

{
    name: "Nil block1",
    blocks: []testBlock{
        {
            slotNumber: 103,
            data:      nil,
        },
        {
            slotNumber: 100,
            data:      nil,
        },
    },
    expectedPrincipal: big.NewInt(0),
    expectedReward:    big.NewInt(0),
    expectedError:     nil,
},

```

The test result:

```

--- FAIL: TestComputeWithdrawals (0.00s)
    --- FAIL: TestComputeWithdrawals/Nil_block1 (0.00s)
panic: runtime error: makeslice: len out of range [recovered]
panic: runtime error: makeslice: len out of range

```

Recommendation

yekong : Before processing the inputs, validate the range, format, and legitimacy of `begin` and `end`.

lfzkoala : Add a validation check at the beginning of the function:

```

if begin.SlotNumber > end.SlotNumber {
    return nil, nil, errors.New("Invalid range: begin should be before end")
}

```

Hacker007 : Check if `end.SlotNumber` is not smaller than `begin.SlotNumber`.

```

if end.SlotNumber < begin.SlotNumber {
    return []*Withdrawal{}, nil
}

```

Client Response

Declined, These values are not given by users, but arise programatically in such a way that it is not possible for the start block to be after the end block, as the end block is computed as the start + target in the scheduler.

Secure3 comment : adding an extra check method is recommended for extra security.

MTO-7:Lack of Secure Headers in HTTP Responses

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Code Style	Medium	Declined	Ifzkoala

Code Reference

- code/oracle/main.go#L265

```
265:w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
```

Description

Ifzkoala : The health check server does not set any secure HTTP headers, which can protect against certain types of attacks, like Clickjacking.

Proof of Concept: No HTTP headers like `X-Content-Type-Options`, `X-Frame-Options`, and `Strict-Transport-Security` are set in the response.

Recommendation

Ifzkoala : Set secure HTTP headers in the response:

```
w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
w.Header().Set("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains")
```

Client Response

Declined, This is an internal health endpoint and does not require security headers.

MTO-8:Resources not released after querying events

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Logical	Low	Fixed	biakia

Code Reference

- code/lib/validator/sourcer/sourcer.go#L47-L71

```
47:func (c *stakingLoader) Load(ctx context.Context, start, end uint64) ([]*wrappedInitEvent, error)
48: {
49:     opts := &bind.FilterOpts{
50:         Context: ctx,
51:         Start:    start,
52:         End:      &end,
53:     }
54:     events, err := metrics.Instrumented("staking_event_loader_filter", nil, func() (*staking.Sta
55: kingValidatorInitiatedIterator, error) {
56:         return c.contract.FilterValidatorInitiated(opts, nil, nil)
57:     })
58:     if err != nil {
59:         return nil, err
60:     }
61:     wrappedEvents := []*wrappedInitEvent{}
62:     for events.Next() {
63:         wrappedEvents = append(wrappedEvents, &wrappedInitEvent{events.Event})
64:     }
65:     if events.Error() != nil {
66:         return nil, errors.Wrap(events.Error(), "failed to iterate over events")
67:     }
68:     metrics.Count("staking_event_loaded_events", float64(len(wrappedEvents)))
69:     return wrappedEvents, nil
70: }
71: }
```

Description

biakia : In `sourcer.go`, the function `Load` will query all `ValidatorInitiated` events between the given start and end block numbers. It will call the function `FilterValidatorInitiated` in `staking.go`:

```
events, err := metrics.Instrumented("staking_event_loader_filter", nil, func() (*staking.StakingValidatorInitiatedIterator, error) {  
    return c.contract.FilterValidatorInitiated(opts, nil, nil)  
})
```

The `staking.go` is a generated binding contract. It provides three helper functions to query events:


```
// Next advances the iterator to the subsequent event, returning whether there
// are any more events found. In case of a retrieval or parsing error, false is
// returned and Error() can be queried for the exact failure.
func (it *StakingValidatorInitiatedIterator) Next() bool {
    // If the iterator failed, stop iterating
    if it.fail != nil {
        return false
    }
    // If the iterator completed, deliver directly whatever's available
    if it.done {
        select {
        case log := <-it.logs:
            it.Event = new(StakingValidatorInitiated)
            if err := it.contract.UnpackLog(it.Event, it.event, log); err != nil {
                it.fail = err
                return false
            }
            it.Event.Raw = log
            return true

        default:
            return false
        }
    }
    // Iterator still in progress, wait for either a data or an error event
    select {
    case log := <-it.logs:
        it.Event = new(StakingValidatorInitiated)
        if err := it.contract.UnpackLog(it.Event, it.event, log); err != nil {
            it.fail = err
            return false
        }
        it.Event.Raw = log
        return true

    case err := <-it.sub.Err():
        it.done = true
        it.fail = err
        return it.Next()
    }
}
```

```
// Error returns any retrieval or parsing error occurred during filtering.
func (it *StakingValidatorInitiatedIterator) Error() error {
    return it.fail
}

// Close terminates the iteration process, releasing any pending underlying
// resources.
func (it *StakingValidatorInitiatedIterator) Close() error {
    it.sub.Unsubscribe()
    return nil
}
```

The `sourcer` will call `Next()` to iterate the returned events and `Error()` to find any errors:

```
wrappedEvents := []*wrappedInitEvent{}
for events.Next() {
    wrappedEvents = append(wrappedEvents, &wrappedInitEvent{events.Event})
}

if events.Error() != nil {
    return nil, errors.Wrap(events.Error(), "failed to iterate over events")
}
```

However, the function `Close()` is not called after all events have been handled. This means that there may be a risk of memory leakage.

Recommendation

biakia : Consider closing the `StakingValidatorInitiatedIterator` after all events have been handled:

```
defer events.Close()
```

Client Response

Fixed

MTO-9:Not check the existence of the block returned from the Beacon.

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Logical	Low	Fixed	biakia

Code Reference

- code/oracle/scheduler/scheduler.go#L355-L359

```
355:// Load the current block from the chain, and ensure that there's an execution layer block for i
t.
356:   currentBlock, err := s.consensusClient.SignedBeaconBlock(ctx, consensus.BlockIdentifierHead)
357:   if err != nil {
358:       return 0, 0, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to get current block")
359:   }
```

Description

biakia : In `scheduler.go`, the function `alignBlockWindow` will call the function `SignedBeaconBlock` to get a Beacon block:

```
// Load the current block from the chain, and ensure that there's an execution layer block f
or it.
currentBlock, err := s.consensusClient.SignedBeaconBlock(ctx, consensus.BlockIdentifierHead)
if err != nil {
    return 0, 0, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to get current block")
}
```

As per the document(<https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/attestantio/go-eth2-client@v0.18.3/http#Service.SignedBeaconBlock>) of the function `SignedBeaconBlock`, it says `SignedBeaconBlock` fetches a signed beacon block given a block ID. N.B if a signed beacon block for the block ID is not available this will return `nil` without an error. However, in the above code, it only checks the returned error. When the block is not available, the `currentBlock` will be `nil` and the `err` will be `nil` too. Finally, the `if` condition will be ignored.

Recommendation

biakia : Consider adding a check on the returned value:

```
// Load the current block from the chain, and ensure that there's an execution layer block for it.  
currentBlock, err := s.consensusClient.SignedBeaconBlock(ctx, consensus.BlockIdentifierHead)  
if err != nil || currentBlock == nil {  
    return 0, 0, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to get current block")  
}
```

Client Response

Fixed

MTO-10:Incomplete nil check

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Logical	Low	Fixed	Hacker007

Code Reference

- [code/lib/consensus/blockstamp.go#L91-L105](#)
- [code/lib/consensus/blockstamp.go#L115-L124](#)

```
91:case spec.DataVersionBellatrix:
92:    if v.Bellatrix == nil || v.Bellatrix.Message.Body.ExecutionPayload == nil {
93:        return 0, ErrInvalidBlock
94:    }
95:    return v.Bellatrix.Message.Body.ExecutionPayload.BlockNumber, nil
96:case spec.DataVersionCapella:
97:    if v.Capella == nil || v.Capella.Message.Body.ExecutionPayload == nil {
98:        return 0, ErrInvalidBlock
99:    }
100:    return v.Capella.Message.Body.ExecutionPayload.BlockNumber, nil
101:case spec.DataVersionDeneb:
102:    if v.Deneb == nil || v.Deneb.Message.Body.ExecutionPayload == nil {
103:        return 0, ErrInvalidBlock
104:    }
105:    return v.Deneb.Message.Body.ExecutionPayload.BlockNumber, nil

115:case spec.DataVersionCapella:
116:    if v.Capella == nil || v.Capella.Message.Body.ExecutionPayload == nil {
117:        return nil, ErrInvalidBlock
118:    }
119:    return v.Capella.Message.Body.ExecutionPayload.Withdrawals, nil
120:case spec.DataVersionDeneb:
121:    if v.Deneb == nil || v.Deneb.Message.Body.ExecutionPayload == nil {
122:        return nil, ErrInvalidBlock
123:    }
124:    return v.Deneb.Message.Body.ExecutionPayload.Withdrawals, nil
```

Description

Hacker007 : Per the Go file `versionedsignedbeaconblock.go` from `go-eth2-client`, the function `Slot()` will check if `Phase0.Message` is nil before returning the slot number

```
func (v *VersionedSignedBeaconBlock) Slot() (phase0.Slot, error) {
    switch v.Version {
    case DataVersionPhase0:
        if v.Phase0 == nil || v.Phase0.Message == nil {
            return 0, errors.New("no phase0 block")
        }
        return v.Phase0.Message.Slot, nil
    //...
}
```

However, in the file `blockstamp.go`, the functions `BlockNumberFromBlock()` and `WithdrawalsFromBlock()` do not check if `Message` is nil before dereferencing it. An example.

```
func WithdrawalsFromBlock(v *spec.VersionedSignedBeaconBlock) ([]*capella.Withdrawal, error) {
    switch v.Version {
    case spec.DataVersionCapella:
        if v.Capella == nil || v.Capella.Message.Body.ExecutionPayload == nil {
            return nil, ErrInvalidBlock
        }
    }
```

Recommendation

Hacker007 : Check if `v.Capella.Message` is nil before dereferencing `Message`. An example.

```
        if v.Capella == nil || v.Capella.Message == nil || v.Capella.Message.Body.ExecutionP
ayload == nil {
            return nil, ErrInvalidBlock
        }
```

Client Response

Fixed

MTO-11:Missing parameter validation in `withdrawals::NewAnalyzer()` function

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Logical	Low	Fixed	Hupixiong3

Code Reference

- code/lib/withdrawals/withdrawals.go#L46-L51

```
46:func NewAnalyzer(client consensus.Client, maxRPS int, clReturnsReceiver common.Address) *Analyzer
47:{
48:    return &Analyzer{
49:        maxRPS:           maxRPS,
50:        consensusClient: client,
51:        clReturnsReceiverAddress: clReturnsReceiver,
```

Description

Hupixiong3 : In the NewAnalyzer function: maxRPS should be a valid positive integer: The maxRPS parameter represents the maximum requests per second and should be a positive integer. If it's not a positive integer or if it's zero or negative, it would indicate an invalid configuration.consensusClient should not be nil: The consensusClient parameter represents the consensus client used for interacting with the blockchain. If it's nil, the analyzer won't be able to perform its functions, leading to runtime errors.

Recommendation

Hupixiong3 : Check if maxRPS is greater than zero and if consensusClient is not nil. If either condition is not met, an error is returned, preventing the creation of an Analyzer instance with invalid or missing parameters.

Client Response

Fixed

MTO-12:start-block and end-block flags should define Uint64Flag, num-runs and start-index flag should use UintFlag, Because they cannot have negative numbers

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Logical	Low	Fixed	seek.guo

Code Reference

- code/oracle/main.go#L131
- code/oracle/main.go#L154
- code/oracle/main.go#L162
- code/oracle/main.go#L186
- code/oracle/main.go#L193
- code/oracle/main.go#L198
- code/oracle/main.go#L203
- code/oracle/main.go#L215
- code/oracle/scripts/verify.go#L21
- code/oracle/scripts/verify.go#L37
- code/oracle/scripts/events.go#L19
- code/oracle/scripts/events.go#L21
- code/oracle/scripts/events.go#L23
- code/oracle/service/config.go#L38
- code/oracle/service/config.go#L39
- code/oracle/service/config.go#L43


```
19:func LoadEvents(conf *service.Config, startBlock, endBlock uint64, numRuns int) error {

21:func VerifyReports(srv *service.Service, startIndex int, quietLogging bool) error {

21:wg.Add(numRuns)

23:for i := 0; i < numRuns; i++ {

37:for i := startIndex; i < int(numRecords.Int64()); i++ {

38:PrometheusPort:           c.Int("prometheus-port"),

39:HealthCheckPort:          c.Int("health-check-port"),

43:ChainID:                   c.Int("chain-id"),

131:&cli.IntFlag{

154:startBlock := uint64(c.Int("start-block"))

162:&cli.IntFlag{

186:return scripts.VerifyReports(srv, c.Int("start-index"), c.Bool("quiet-logging"))

193:&cli.IntFlag{

198:&cli.IntFlag{

203:&cli.IntFlag{

215:return scripts.LoadEvents(conf, uint64(c.Int("start-block")), uint64(c.Int("end-block")), c.Int("num-runs"))
```

Description

seek.guo : start-block and end-block flags should define Uint64Flag, num-runs, start-index, port and chainId flag should use UintFlag, Because they cannot have negative numbers

Recommendation

seek.guo : code can change as follow

```

Commands: []*cli.Command{
    {
        Name: "regenerate-reports",
        Usage: "Regenerate reports for a given range of records",
        Flags: []cli.Flag{
            &cli.Uint64Flag{
                Name: "start-block",
                Usage: "The first block that reports should be generated from. This should correspond to the start block of the first report.",
                Required: true,
            },
            &cli.StringFlag{
                Name: "output-file",
                Usage: "The file to write the output to. If not specified, the output will be written to stdout.",
            },
        },
        Action: func(c *cli.Context) error {
            conf, err := service.ParseConfig(c)
            if err != nil {
                return err
            }
            clients, err := service.NewClients(context.Background(), conf)
            if err != nil {
                return err
            }
            srv, err := service.New(context.Background(), conf, clients)
            if err != nil {
                return err
            }
            startBlock := c.Uint64("start-block")
            return scripts.RegenerateReports(srv, startBlock, c.String("output-file"))
        },
    },
    {
        Name: "verify-reports",
        Usage: "Verify the integrity of the oracle reports",
        Flags: []cli.Flag{
            &cli.UintFlag{
                Name: "start-index",
            },
        },
    },
}

```

```

Usage:  "The first report to start checking from.",
        Required: true,
    },
    &cli.BoolFlag{
        Name:  "quiet-logging",
        Usage: "Only log results rather than the full logs o
f the process.",
        Value: true,
    },
},
Action: func(c *cli.Context) error {
    conf, err := service.ParseConfig(c)
    if err != nil {
        return err
    }
    clients, err := service.NewClients(context.Background(), con
f)
    if err != nil {
        return err
    }
    srv, err := service.New(context.Background(), conf, clients)
    if err != nil {
        return err
    }
    return scripts.VerifyReports(srv, c.Uint("start-index"), c.B
ool("quiet-logging"))
},
{
    Name:  "load-events",
    Usage: "Load validator initiation events for a block range",
    Flags: []cli.Flag{
        &cli.Uint64Flag{
            Name:  "start-block",
            Usage: "The first block to load events from (incl
usive)",
            Required: true,
        },
        &cli.Uint64Flag{
            Name:  "end-block",
            Usage: "The last block to load events

```

```

from (inclusive)",

                                Required: true,
                                },
                                &cli.UintFlag{
                                    Name:      "num-runs",
                                    Required: false,
                                    Value:     1,
                                },
                            },
                            Action: func(c *cli.Context) error {
                                conf, err := service.ParseConfig(c)
                                if err != nil {
                                    return err
                                }

                                return scripts.LoadEvents(conf, uint64(c.Int("start-block")),
                                uint64(c.Int("end-block")), c.Uint("num-runs"))
                            },
                        },
                    },

func LoadEvents(conf *service.Config, startBlock, endBlock uint64, numRuns uint) error {
    wg.Add(int(numRuns))
    for i := 0; i < int(numRuns); i++ {
        ....
    }
    ....
}

func VerifyReports(srv *service.Service, startIndex uint, quietLogging bool) error {
    ...
    for i := int64(startIndex); i < numRecords.Int64(); i++ {
        ....
    }
}

```

Client Response

Fixed

MTO-13:Uncontrolled Public Key Input in ValidatorsAt

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Logical	Low	Declined	Ifzkoala

Code Reference

- code/lib/validator/loader.go#L60-L62

```
60:valSet, err := metrics.Instrumented("load_validator_set", nil, func() (sourcer.ValidatorSet, error) {
61:    return l.sourcer.ValidatorSetAt(ctx, bs.BlockNumber)
62:    }, metrics.WithBuckets(metrics.TimingBucketsLong))
```

Description

Ifzkoala : The function `ValidatorsAt` processes a list of public keys sourced from a third party (`l.sourcer.ValidatorSetAt`). If the source is compromised or the public keys are not verified elsewhere, this could lead to data contamination or unexpected behavior. The code only checks the length of the public key.

If an attacker can influence the list of public keys returned by the `l.sourcer.ValidatorSetAt`, they might cause the system to process invalid or malicious public keys.

Recommendation

Ifzkoala : Ensure that public keys are validated before use. Implementing cryptographic checks or validation against a whitelist of trusted public keys can be a safeguard.

Client Response

Declined, The data is sourced from the blockchain and cannot be manipulated.

Secure3 comment : The chance of this happening is low meanwhile ensuring the credibility of data sources remains important.

MTO-14:No further error handling in `scheduler::checkForUpdate()` function

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Logical	Low	Declined	Hupixiong3

Code Reference

- code/oracle/scheduler/scheduler.go#L275-L281

```
275:lastRecord, err := s.oracleContract.LatestRecord(&bind.CallOpts{
276:    Context: ctx,
277: })
278: if err != nil {
279:     logger.Errorw("Error loading latest record", "error", err)
280:     return
281: }
```

Description

Hupixiong3 :

```
    lastRecord, err := s.oracleContract.LatestRecord(&bind.CallOpts{
        Context: ctx,
    })
    if err != nil {
        logger.Errorw("Error loading latest record", "error", err)
        return
    }
```

when an error occurs during the invocation of the `s.oracleContract.LatestRecord` contract method, the error message is logged, but there is no further error handling.

Recommendation

Hupixiong3 : Retry Operation: Some contract call errors may be due to transient issues. You can choose to retry the operation within a certain time frame to succeed on the next attempt. In this case, be cautious in handling retry logic to avoid infinite loops. Return Default or Backup Data: If it's not possible to retrieve the latest record, you can return default values or backup data to ensure the application continues running. This is applicable in situations where a failure in the contract call won't disrupt the core functionality. Report Error and Exit: In some cases, if it's not possible to retrieve the latest record, and there's no reasonable alternative, you may choose to report the error and exit the application.

Client Response

Declined, The proposed fix is already implemented - the service will retry the operation on the next scheduled tick.

Secure3 comment : The issue is valid and fixed. So we think the question is valid.

MTO-15: Optimization for the binary search

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Logical	Informational	Fixed	biakia, alansh

Code Reference

- code/lib/consensus/finder/finder.go#L78

```
78:func (f *BinarySearch) BlockStamp(ctx context.Context, blockNumber uint64) (*consensus.BlockStamp, error) {
```

Description

biakia : The `finder.go` provides a function `BlockStamp` to obtain consensus layer information. It will use a binary search. The `slotLowerBound` is the lower bound of the slot range and the `consensus.BlockIdentifierHead` is the upper bound of the slot range. This function will check if the given block is out of the upper bound:

```
block, err := f.consensusClient.SignedBeaconBlock(ctx, consensus.BlockIdentifierHead)
if err != nil || block == nil {
    return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to obtain the head block")
}

bn, err := consensus.BlockNumberFromBlock(block)
if err != nil {
    return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to obtain block number from head block")
}
if blockNumber == bn {
    return consensus.NewFromSignedBeaconBlock(block)
}
if bn < blockNumber {
    return nil, errors.Errorf("latest canonical head block's number is %d but trying to retrieve %d", bn, blockNumber)
}
```

However, it will not check if the given block is out of the lower bound. It means if the `blockNumber` is less than the lower bound, the binary search will still be applied.

alansh : Currently this function tries to find the block by binary search.

But it can do better, since empty slots are quite few compared with non-empty slots.

For example, suppose we're searching for block number 100, and the high block number of slot S is 300, we can search slot $S-200$ directly, this will converge much faster than binary search, $O(1)$ vs $O(\lg n)$.

Recommendation

biakia : Consider checking the lower bound in function `BlockStamp`:

```
l := f.slotLowerBound
lowerBlock,err:=f.consensusClient.SignedBeaconBlock(ctx, f.slotLowerBound)
if err != nil || lowerBlock == nil {
    return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to obtain the lower block")
}
lbn, err := consensus.BlockNumberFromBlock(lowerBlock)
if err != nil {
    return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to obtain block number from lower block")
}
if blockNumber == lbn {
    return consensus.NewFromSignedBeaconBlock(lowerBlock)
}
if lbn > blockNumber {
    return nil, errors.Errorf("lower block's number is %d but trying to retrieve %d", lbn, blockNumber)
}
```

alansh : Apply the above idea for $O(1)$ convergence.

Client Response

Fixed, Cannot happen in normal operation (lower bound is given by the init block number from the contract), but done for completeness

MTO-16:wrong error info in Reporter::BuildOracleReport function

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Logical	Informational	Fixed	alansh

Code Reference

- code/oracle/reporter/reporter.go#L133

```
133: return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "failed to load validators at start block %d", startBlock)
```

Description

alansh :

```
previousEndBlockVals, err := r.validatorLoader.ValidatorsAt(ctx, previousEndBlockStamp)
if err != nil {
    return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "failed to load validators at start block %d", startBlock)
}
```

The block corresponding to `previousEndBlockStamp` is not `startBlock` but `lastRecord.UpdateEndBlock`

Recommendation

alansh :

```
previousEndBlockVals, err := r.validatorLoader.ValidatorsAt(ctx, previousEndBlockStamp)
if err != nil {
    return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "failed to load validators at previous end block %d",
lastRecord.UpdateEndBlock)
}
```

Client Response

Fixed

MTO-17:real reason for error from `consensusClient` is unexpectedly ignored in `BinarySearch::BlockStamp()` function

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Code Style	Informational	Fixed	alansh

Code Reference

- code/lib/consensus/finder/finder.go#L116

```
116: return nil, &ErrorBlockNotFound{BlockNumber: blockNumber}
```

Description

alansh :

```
midBlock, err = f.consensusClient.SignedBeaconBlock(ctx, fmt.Sprintf("%d",
m))

if err != nil {
    return nil, &ErrorBlockNotFound{BlockNumber: blockNumber}
}
```

Here the real reason for error from `consensusClient` is replaced with `ErrorBlockNotFound`, it may not be good for diagnosing the system from log.

Recommendation

alansh : Should not hide the transient error if possible.

Client Response

Fixed

MTO-18:Incomplete Configuration Checks

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Logical	Informational	Fixed	lfzkoala

Code Reference

- code/oracle/service/config.go#L52-L65

```
52:if c.String("service-private-key") != "" {
53:    conf.SigningMode = transaction.SigningModeLocal
54:    pk, err := crypto.HexToECDSA(c.String("service-private-key"))
55:    if err != nil {
56:        return nil, errors.Wrap(err, "failed to parse private key")
57:    }
58:    conf.ReporterPrivateKey = pk
59:}
60:
61:if c.String("kms-signing-key") != "" && c.String("kms-account-json") != "" {
62:    conf.SigningMode = transaction.SigningModeRemote
63:    conf.KMSSigningKey = c.String("kms-signing-key")
64:    conf.KMSAccountJSON = c.String("kms-account-json")
65:}
```

Description

lfzkoala : The code checks for the existence of the `service-private-key` and `kms-signing-key` & `kms-account-json`. However, it doesn't explicitly handle cases where neither of them is provided. This might lead to a misconfigured service running without the capability to sign transactions or interact securely.

Run the application without providing either of the key configurations and observe potential issues.

Recommendation

lfzkoala : Add an explicit check after these conditions to verify that at least one signing mechanism is provided and properly configured. If neither is available, the application should raise an error and prevent further execution.

Client Response

Fixed

MTO-19:gc optimization for command `regenerate-reports` and `verify-reports`

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Logical	Informational	Acknowledged	biakia

Code Reference

- [code/oracle/main.go#L127-L188](#)

```
127:{
128:    Name: "regenerate-reports",
129:    Usage: "Regenerate reports for a given range of records",
130:    Flags: []cli.Flag{
131:        &cli.IntFlag{
132:            Name: "start-block",
133:            Usage: "The first block that reports should be generated from. This should correspond to the start block of the first report.",
134:            Required: true,
135:        },
136:        &cli.StringFlag{
137:            Name: "output-file",
138:            Usage: "The file to write the output to. If not specified, the output will be written to stdout.",
139:        },
140:    },
141:    Action: func(c *cli.Context) error {
142:        conf, err := service.ParseConfig(c)
143:        if err != nil {
144:            return err
145:        }
146:        clients, err := service.NewClients(context.Background(), conf)
147:        if err != nil {
148:            return err
149:        }
150:        srv, err := service.New(context.Background(), conf, clients)
151:        if err != nil {
152:            return err
153:        }
154:        startBlock := uint64(c.Int("start-block"))
155:        return scripts.RegenerateReports(srv, startBlock, c.String("output-file"))
156:    },
157:},
158:{
159:    Name: "verify-reports",
160:    Usage: "Verify the integrity of the oracle reports",
161:    Flags: []cli.Flag{
162:        &cli.IntFlag{
163:            Name: "start-index",
```

```

164:                                     Usage:  "The first report to start checking fro
m.",
165:                                     Required: true,
166:                                     },
167:                                     &cli.BoolFlag{
168:                                         Name:  "quiet-logging",
169:                                         Usage: "Only log results rather than the full logs o
f the process.",
170:                                         Value: true,
171:                                     },
172:                                 },
173:                                 Action: func(c *cli.Context) error {
174:                                     conf, err := service.ParseConfig(c)
175:                                     if err != nil {
176:                                         return err
177:                                     }
178:                                     clients, err := service.NewClients(context.Background(), con
f)
179:                                     if err != nil {
180:                                         return err
181:                                     }
182:                                     srv, err := service.New(context.Background(), conf, clients)
183:                                     if err != nil {
184:                                         return err
185:                                     }
186:                                     return scripts.VerifyReports(srv, c.Int("start-index"), c.Bo
ol("quiet-logging"))
187:                                 },
188:                             },

```

Description

biakia : In `main.go`, there are two commands which will create a local service:


```

{
    Name: "regenerate-reports",
    Usage: "Regenerate reports for a given range of records",
    Flags: []cli.Flag{
        &cli.IntFlag{
            Name: "start-block",
            Usage: "The first block that reports should be generated from. This should correspond to the start block of the first report.",
            Required: true,
        },
        &cli.StringFlag{
            Name: "output-file",
            Usage: "The file to write the output to. If not specified, the output will be written to stdout.",
        },
    },
    Action: func(c *cli.Context) error {
        conf, err := service.ParseConfig(c)
        if err != nil {
            return err
        }
        clients, err := service.NewClients(context.Background(), conf)
        if err != nil {
            return err
        }
        srv, err := service.New(context.Background(), conf, clients)
        if err != nil {
            return err
        }
        startBlock := uint64(c.Int("start-block"))
        return scripts.RegenerateReports(srv, startBlock, c.String("output-file"))
    },
},
{
    Name: "verify-reports",
    Usage: "Verify the integrity of the oracle reports",
    Flags: []cli.Flag{
        &cli.IntFlag{
            Name: "start-index",
            Usage: "The first report to start checking",
        },
    },
    Action: func(c *cli.Context) error {
        conf, err := service.ParseConfig(c)
        if err != nil {
            return err
        }
        clients, err := service.NewClients(context.Background(), conf)
        if err != nil {
            return err
        }
        srv, err := service.New(context.Background(), conf, clients)
        if err != nil {
            return err
        }
        startIndex := c.Int("start-index")
        return scripts.VerifyReports(srv, startIndex)
    },
},
}

```

```

king from.",

                                Required: true,
                                },
                                &cli.BoolFlag{
                                    Name: "quiet-logging",
                                    Usage: "Only log results rather than the full logs o

f the process.",

                                Value: true,
                                },
                                },
                                Action: func(c *cli.Context) error {
                                    conf, err := service.ParseConfig(c)
                                    if err != nil {
                                        return err
                                    }
                                    clients, err := service.NewClients(context.Background(), con

f)

                                    if err != nil {
                                        return err
                                    }
                                    srv, err := service.New(context.Background(), conf, clients)
                                    if err != nil {
                                        return err
                                    }
                                    return scripts.VerifyReports(srv, c.Int("start-index"), c.Bo

ol("quiet-logging"))
                                },
                                },

```

Although go lang has a gc mechanism to ensure that the `srv` is destroyed, we still recommend calling the `Stop()` function to shut down the service after using it.

Recommendation

biakia : Consider calling the `Stop()` function in command `regenerate-reports` and `verify-reports`.

Client Response

Acknowledged, irrelevant as scripts are not long running services

MTO-20:Function Name Mismatch

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Code Style	Informational	Fixed	yekong

Code Reference

- code/lib/validator/keyset.go#L15-L22

```
15:// NewPublicKeySetFromValidators creates a new public key set from a list of validators.
16:func NewPublicKeySet[T Keyer](keys []T) PublicKeySet {
17:    set := PublicKeySet{}
18:    for _, v := range keys {
19:        set.Add(v.Key())
20:    }
21:    return set
22:}
```

Description

yekong : In other functions in the file, comments and function names remain consistent. The function is declared as `NewPublicKeySetFromValidators`, but it's implemented as `NewPublicKeySet`.

Recommendation

yekong : Keep comments and function names consistent

Client Response

Fixed

MTO-21: Inefficient loop statement in `withdrawals.go`

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Gas Optimization	Informational	Acknowledged	Hacker007

Code Reference

- code/lib/withdrawals/withdrawals.go#L169-L180

```
169: slot, err := block.Slot()
170:     if err != nil {
171:         return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "failed to get slot from block %s", block.String())
172:     }
173:     withdrawals = append(withdrawals, &Withdrawal{
174:         ValidatorIndex: uint64(w.ValidatorIndex),
175:         AmountWei:      consensus.ConvertGweiToWei(uint64(w.Amount)),
176:         Address:        common.BytesToAddress(w.Address[:]),
177:         Slot:           uint64(slot),
178:     })
179: }
180: return withdrawals, nil
```

Description

Hacker007 : Since the ws are requested from the same block, the slot number will be the same value, thus there is no need to request a slot in every iteration.

```
for _, w := range ws {
    slot, err := block.Slot()
    if err != nil {
        return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "failed to get slot from block %s", block.String())
    }
    withdrawals = append(withdrawals, &Withdrawal{
        ValidatorIndex: uint64(w.ValidatorIndex),
        AmountWei:       consensus.ConvertGweiToWei(uint64(w.Amount)),
        Address:         common.BytesToAddress(w.Address[:]),
        Slot:            uint64(slot),
    })
}
```

Recommendation

Hacker007 : Place the getting slot code before the loop statement.

```
slot, err := block.Slot()
if err != nil {
    return nil, errors.Wrapf(err, "failed to get slot from block %s", block.String())
}
for _, w := range ws {
    withdrawals = append(withdrawals, &Withdrawal{
        ValidatorIndex: uint64(w.ValidatorIndex),
        AmountWei:       consensus.ConvertGweiToWei(uint64(w.Amount)),
        Address:         common.BytesToAddress(w.Address[:]),
        Slot:            uint64(slot),
    })
}
```

Client Response

Acknowledged, We are not in the business of shaving nanoseconds off a multiple-minute process

MTO-22:Unused function parameter `ctx`

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Language Specific	Informational	Fixed	Hacker007

Code Reference

- `code/oracle/reporter/reporter.go#L208`
- `code/oracle/reporter/reporter.go#L216`
- `code/oracle/reporter/reporter.go#L226`

```
208:func (r *Reporter) computeNumValidatorsFullyWithdrawn(ctx context.Context, endVals []*validator.  
Validator) uint64 {  
  
216:func (r *Reporter) computeCurrentTotalValidatorBalance(ctx context.Context, validatorsWithBalance  
 []*validator.Validator) (*big.Int, error) {  
  
226:func (r *Reporter) computeProcessedDepositAmount(ctx context.Context, beginVals, endVals []*vali  
dator.Validator) (*big.Int, error) {
```

Description

Hacker007 : The function parameter `ctx` is declared but never used in the following functions.

- `computeProcessedDepositAmount()`
- `computeCurrentTotalValidatorBalance()`
- `computeNumValidatorsFullyWithdrawn()`

Recommendation

Hacker007 : Remove the unused parameter in the aforementioned functions.

Client Response

Fixed

MTO-23: Inefficiency in Memory Allocation in `keyset::PublicKeys()` function

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Language Specific	Informational	Acknowledged	Hupixiong3

Code Reference

- code/lib/validator/keyset.go#L25-L31

```
25:func (s PublicKeySet) PublicKeys() []phase0.BLSPubKey {
26:    var keys []phase0.BLSPubKey
27:    for k := range s {
28:        keys = append(keys, k)
29:    }
30:    return keys
31:}
```

Description

Hupixiong3 : The function `PublicKeys` dynamically appends keys to the slice without preallocating space. If the set is large, this can cause multiple memory reallocations.

Recommendation

Hupixiong3 : Preallocate space for the slice: `keys := make([]phase0.BLSPubKey, 0, len(s))`

Client Response

Acknowledged, We prefer to be consistent with our general style rather than save a few small allocations

MTO-24:Unused field Epoch

Category	Severity	Client Response	Contributor
Language Specific	Informational	Fixed	Hacker007

Code Reference

- code/lib/withdrawals/withdrawals.go#L22-L28

```
22:type Withdrawal struct {  
23:     Epoch      uint64  
24:     Slot        uint64  
25:     ValidatorIndex uint64  
26:     AmountWei   *big.Int  
27:     Address     common.Address  
28: }
```

Description

Hacker007 : The field `Epoch` is declared in the struct `Withdrawal` but never used in the codebase.

```
type Withdrawal struct {  
    Epoch      uint64  
    Slot        uint64  
    ValidatorIndex uint64  
    AmountWei   *big.Int  
    Address     common.Address  
}
```

Recommendation

Hacker007 : Remove the redundant field `Epoch`.

Client Response

Fixed

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