

Competitive Security Assessment

Star Name Service

Jan 20th, 2023



Summary	3
Overview	4
Audit Scope	5
Code Assessment Findings	6
STA-1:Code Style in Airdrop contract consume function	9
STA-2:Design flaw of StarNameService NFT and NameServices resource	10
STA-3:Expired SNS NFTs are not processed	12
STA-4:Index out of bound.	14
STA-5:Input parameter to has not been used by the function airdrop_mint	17
STA-6:Lack of limiting the length of prefix in function check_prefix_length_isLegal	19
STA-7:No need for ex_expire_time in StarNameService contract renew_name_script function	21
STA-8:Redundant codes in multiple functions of StarNameService contract	22
STA-9:Redundant initialize_token_store operation	26
STA-10:Resource operation type usage error	27
STA-11:Risk of registered domain being front-run	29
STA-12:The relationship of two parameters has not been checked	33
STA-13:Typographical errors in multiple contracts	35
STA-14:User can free from fee by registering a very short time domain	37
STA-15:Wrong main_uri append	40
STA-16: Airdrop.airdrop() incorrect amount logic	41
STA-17: StarNameService.LengthRange is empty and not used	44
STA-18:resource_account variable is unused in StarNameService.move contract initialize_name_services function	45
STA-19:uri parameter is not used in StarNameService.move contract create_name_script function	46
Disclaimer	47



Summary

This report is prepared for the project to identify vulnerabilities and issues in the smart contract source code. A group of NDA covered experienced security experts have participated in the Secure3's Audit Contest to find vulnerabilities and optimizations. Secure3 team has participated in the contest process as well to provide extra auditing coverage and scrutiny of the finding submissions.

The comprehensive examination and auditing scope includes:

- Cross checking contract implementation against functionalities described in the documents and white paper disclosed by the project owner.
- Contract Privilege Role Review to provide more clarity on smart contract roles and privilege.
- Using static analysis tools to analyze smart contracts against common known vulnerabilities patterns.
- Verify the code base is compliant with the most up-to-date industry standards and security best practices.
- Comprehensive line-by-line manual code review of the entire codebase by industry experts.

The security assessment resulted in findings that are categorized in four severity levels: Critical, Medium, Low, Informational. For each of the findings, the report has included recommendations of fix or mitigation for security and best practices.



Overview

Project Detail

Project Name	Star Name Service
Platform & Language	Aptos Move
Codebase	Code Provided offline
Audit Methodology	 Audit Contest Business Logic and Code Review Privileged Roles Review Static Analysis

Code Vulnerability Review Summary

Vulnerability Level	Total	Reported	Acknowledged	Fixed	Mitigated	Declined
Critical	3	0	0	3	0	0
Medium	4	0	1	3	0	0
Low	2	0	1	1	0	0
Informational	10	0	1	9	0	0

4




Audit Scope

File	Commit Hash
sns_nameservice/sources/Airdrop.move	2afba22ffd0d5c62b4d00e7609e6711a8da2d1cbea0e1d1 865abbc14be985837
sns_nameservice/sources/Resovler.move	8b897b183e14dd17f873cbb279d8b61f5ace0a9de8884b 1421e275acd20ed6c9
sns_nameservice/sources/StarNameService.move	6cc2d4d08c892cf1ed7da7290146f6ad2ca0e56ca321ab b42dbe5136bb49fcfb

5



Code Assessment Findings



ID	Name	Category	Severity	Status	Contributor
STA-1	Code Style in Airdrop contract consume function	Code Style	Informational	Fixed	yekong
STA-2	Design flaw of StarNameService NFT and NameServices resource	Logical	Critical	Fixed	Kong7ych3
STA-3	Expired SNS NFTs are not processed	Logical	Medium	Fixed	Kong7ych3
STA-4	Index out of bound.	Logical	Critical	Fixed	jayphbee
STA-5	Input parameter to has not been used by the function airdrop_mint	Logical	Medium	Fixed	0xac, Kong7ych3



STA-6	Lack of limiting the length of prefix in function check_prefix_length_isLegal	Logical	Low	Fixed	0xac, alansh, BradMoonU ESTC, Hupixiong3
STA-7	No need for ex_expire_time in StarNameService contract renew_name_script function	Gas Optimization	Informational	Fixed	alansh
STA-8	Redundant codes in multiple functions of StarNameService contract	Gas Optimization	Informational	Fixed	yekong, alansh
STA-9	Redundant initialize_token_store operation	Gas Optimization	Informational	Fixed	Kong7ych3
STA-10	Resource operation type usage error	Code Style	Informational	Fixed	Kong7ych3
STA-11	Risk of registered domain being front- run	Race condition	Informational	Acknowled ged	Kong7ych3
STA-12	The relationship of two parameters has not been checked	Logical	Medium	Acknowled ged	0xac
STA-13	Typographical errors in multiple contracts	Code Style	Informational	Fixed	Hupixiong3, alansh
STA-14	User can free from fee by registering a very short time domain	Logical	Low	Acknowled ged	jayphbee, 0xac
STA-15	Wrong main_uri append	Logical	Medium	Fixed	Kong7ych3
STA-16	Airdrop.airdrop() incorrect amount logic	Logic	Critical	Fixed	jayphbee, yekong, 0xac, Kong7ych3, BradMoonU ESTC, Hupixiong3
STA-17	StarNameService.LengthRange is empty and not used	Code Style	Informational	Fixed	BradMoonU ESTC
STA-18	resource_account variable is unused in StarNameService.move contract initialize_name_services function	Code Style	Informational	Fixed	alansh



STA-19	uri parameter is not used in	Code Style	Informational	Fixed	alansh
	StarNameService.move contract				
	<pre>create_name_script function</pre>				



STA-1:Code Style in Airdrop contract consume function

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Code Style	Informational	code/sources/Airdrop.move#L61	Fixed	yekong

Code

61: assert(balance - amount >= 0,N0_SUFFICIENT_FNUDS);

Description

yekong: The usage of assert is not standardized

Recommendation

yekong: Assert is a builtin, macro-like operation provided by the Move compiler. Since the operation is a macro, it must be invoked with the !. reference link:https://move-language.github.io/move/abort-and-assert.html

Client Response



STA-2:Design flaw of StarNameService NFT and NameServices resource

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Logical	Critical	code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L227-L241	Fixed	Kong7ych3

Code

```
if (table::contains(&name_services.expire_data, name)) {
227:
                let expire_time = table::borrow(&name_services.expire_data, name);
229:
                assert!(*expire_time + BUFFER_DURATION < timestamp::now_seconds() ,</pre>
NAME_NOT_AVAILABLE);
232:
                table::remove(&mut name_services.expire_data, name);
                let ex owner = table::borrow(&name services.name owner, name);
234:
                let nft_vec = table::borrow_mut(&mut name_services.temp_nft_vec, *ex_owner);
                token::burn_by_creator(&resource_account_signer, *ex_owner, domain_name, name, 0,
1):
                table::remove(&mut name_services.name_owner, name);
                let (exist, index): (bool, u64) = vector::index_of(nft_vec, &name);
                if (exist) {
239:
                    vector::remove(nft vec, index);
241:
            };
```

Description

Kong7ych3: In the StarNameService module, when we register a new SNS name through the create_name_script function, it will cast a corresponding SNS NFT to the registrant, and update the resolver_contract, expire_data, name_owner, nft_controller and other tables in the NameServices resource. However, SNS NFT resources and NameServices resources are independent of each other. Users can transfer SNS NFT at will, but the table records in NameServices resources will not change during the NFT transfer process. So this will lead to a situation where the SNS NFT resource data does not match the NameServices resource data.

E.g. The user transfers his SNS NFT to other users, and when the SNS NFT expires, other users will not be able to use burn_by_creator to burn the user's NFT when they re-register through the create_name_script function,



because the NFT has already been transferred.

Recommendation

Kong7ych3: It is recommended that protocol data should be checked with the actual owner of the SNS NFT as the subject. For example: check the actual owner of the expired SNS NFT when performing the create_name_script operation; the read_name_owner operation should also obtain the actual owner of the SNS NFT. You should not rely on the data recorded in NameServices.

Perhaps it is a good solution to customize an SNS-compatible NFT module based on the Token module in the Aptos framework.

Client Response

We add an 'owner_of' function to replace the name_owner, it will query the data from Aptos Token module, which may solved the issue. And we think the expire_data can still work when user transfer his SNS NFT.



STA-3: Expired SNS NFTs are not processed

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Logical	Medium	code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L482-L499	Fixed	Kong7ych3

Code

```
482:
        public fun read_name_owner(name: string::String): address acquires NameServices{
            let name_services = borrow_global_mut(@SNS_address);
            assert!(table::contains(&name_services.name_owner, name), DATA_NOT_EXIST);
484:
            return *table::borrow(&name_services.name_owner, name)
        }
487:
489:
        public fun read_name_controller(name: string::String): address acquires NameServices{
490:
            let name services = borrow global mut(@SNS address);
            assert!(table::contains(&name_services.nft_controller, name), DATA_NOT_EXIST);
491:
492:
            return *table::borrow(&name_services.nft_controller, name)
        }
        public fun read_name_resolver_contract(name: string::String): address acquires NameServices{
            let name_services = borrow_global_mut(@SNS_address);
497:
            assert!(table::contains(&name_services.resolver_contract, name), DATA_NOT_EXIST);
            return *table::borrow(&name_services.resolver_contract, name)
```

Description

Kong7ych3: The SNS domain name has an expiration time, which is stored under the user's account in the form of SNS NFT resources. But SNS NFT does not have the concept of expiration time, and the expiration time is only stored in the NameServices.expire_data table. Therefore, when a domain name expires and no other users re-register, the expired domain name NFT can still be used normally. The owner of this domain name can still be read through the read name owner function. This not only allows users to maliciously register a large number of remote domain names,



but also specifies a short duration, so as long as these domain names are not re-registered, they can be used for a long time. This will also lead to unexpected risks for other protocols connected to the SNS domain name service.

Recommendation

Kong7ych3: The short-term deferred construction solution is to specify the domain name reading interface in the SNS protocol, and check whether the domain name has expired when reading. But this still does not prevent other protocols from doing domain name checks through the SNS NFT TokenStore resource under the user account. Therefore, in the long run, building your own NFT Token to replace Aptos framework Token is a better solution.

Client Response

We add an 'owner_of' function to replace the name_owner, it will query the data from Aptos Token module, which may solved the issue. And we think the expire_data can still work when user transfer his SNS NFT.



STA-4:Index out of bound.

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Logical	Critical	 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L246-L252 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L256-L262 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L404-L410 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L414-L420 	Fixed	jayphbee

Code



```
if ( name length > vector::length(fee vector)) {
247:
                        let fee = *vector::borrow(fee_vector, 0);
248:
                        Airdrop::consume(account, fee * duration / 31536000);
249:
                     }else {
                        let fee = *vector::borrow(fee vector, name length);
250:
251:
                        Airdrop::consume(account, fee * duration / 31536000);
252:
                    if ( name_length > vector::length(fee_vector)) {
257:
                        let fee = *vector::borrow(fee vector, 0);
                        coin::transfer(account, @SNS_address, fee * duration / 31536000);
259:
                     } else {
260:
                        let fee = *vector::borrow(fee_vector, name_length);
261:
                        coin::transfer(account, @SNS_address, fee * duration / 31536000);
262:
404:
                    if ( name_length > vector::length(fee_vector)) {
                        let fee = *vector::borrow(fee_vector, 0);
                        Airdrop::consume(owner,fee * duration / 31536000);
                     }else {
407:
                        let fee = *vector::borrow(fee_vector, name_length);
                        Airdrop::consume(owner,fee * duration / 31536000);
409:
                    if ( name_length > vector::length(fee_vector)) {
                        let fee = *vector::borrow(fee_vector, 0);
                        coin::transfer(owner, @SNS_address, fee * duration / 31536000);
417:
                    } else {
                        let fee = *vector::borrow(fee_vector, name_length);
419:
                        coin::transfer(owner, @SNS_address, fee * duration / 31536000);
420:
```

Description

jayphbee: If name_length == vector::length(fee_vector), it will cause execution abort due to index out of bound.

```
let fee = *vector::borrow(fee_vector, name_length);
```

The impact is that all the name whose length is equal to the fee_vector length when call to renew_name_script and create name script will abort due to index out of bound.



Recommendation

jayphbee : change

```
if ( name_length > vector::length(fee_vector)) {
```

to

```
if ( name_length >= vector::length(fee_vector)) {
```

This can avoid index out of bound abort.

Client Response



STA-5:Input parameter to has not been used by the function airdrop_mint

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Logical	Medium	 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L272-L280 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L326 	Fixed	0xac, Kong7ych3

Code

Description

Oxac: The airdrop_mint get a parameter to, but not use inside the function. It cause that the to address could not receive the token minted by the contract.



```
public entry fun airdrop_mint(
    account: &signer,
    to: address,
    name: string::String,
    domain_name: string::String,
    description: string::String,
    uri: string::String,
    duration: u64
    )
```

Kong7ych3: In the StarNameService module, the airdrop_mint function is used to airdrop SNS NFT to the specified to address. However, the wrong receiving address was passed in during the create_name_script_nft operation. It incorrectly filled in the signer address for the to address that should have obtained the SNS NFT.

Recommendation

Oxac : It is recommended to modify the code(Line 326) to
 create_name_script_nft(&resource_account_signer, to, name, domain_name, description,
 main_uri, duration); . Then it can mint the token to the to address in function
 create_name_script_nft (Line 360-365).

```
token::mint_token_to(
    resource_account,
    owner,
    tokendata_id,
    1,
    );
```

Kong7ych3: It is recommended to replace the address of signer with the address of to, the following is the repair reference:

```
create_name_script_nft(&resource_account_signer, to, name, domain_name, description, main_uri,
duration);
```

Client Response



STA-6:Lack of limiting the length of prefix in function check_prefix_length_isLegal

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Logical	Low	code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L108-L118	Fixed	0xac, alansh, BradMoonUES TC, Hupixiong3

Code

```
108:    public fun check_prefix_length_isLegal(collection: string::String,prefix: string::String):
    bool acquires NameServicesFeeManager{
109:        let name_service_extension = borrow_global_mut(@SNS_address);
110:        let tmp_table = &mut name_service_extension.domain_to_shortestlength;
111:        let shortest_length = *table::borrow(tmp_table,collection);
112:
113:        if (string::length(&prefix) > shortest_length) {
114:            return true
115:        } else{
116:             return false
117:        }
118:    }
```

Description

Oxac: In function check_prefix_length_isLegal, the code only ensure that the length of prefix is greater than shortest_length, but not less than longest_length.

```
if (string::length(&prefix) > shortest_length) {
    return true
} else{
    return false
}
```

alansh: check_prefix_length_isLegal only checks against shortest length, it should also check against longest length to be complete.

BradMoonUESTC: Function check_prefix_length_isLegal not used, also need to concern the length of input param



Hupixiong3: Incomplete function, check_prefix_length_isLegal function is not referenced by other functions, and the check condition is missing, Missing longst Length Check

Recommendation

0xac: Suggest that modifying the function as following:

```
public fun check_prefix_length_isLegal(collection: string::String,prefix: string::String) : bool
acquires NameServicesFeeManager{
    assert!(exists<NameServicesFeeManager>(@SNS_address),ERROR);
    let name_service_extension = borrow_global_mut<NameServicesFeeManager>(@SNS_address);

let shortest_length_table = &mut name_service_extension.domain_to_shortestlength;
    assert!(table::contains(&shortest_length_table, collection), NOT_EXIST);
    let shortest_length = *table::borrow(shortest_length_table,collection);

let longest_length_table = &mut name_service_extension.domain_to_longestlength;
    assert!(table::contains(&longest_length_table, collection), NOT_EXIST);
    let longest_length = *table::borrow(longest_length_table,collection);

if (string::length(&prefix) > shortest_length && string::length(&prefix) < longest_length) {
        return true
    } else{
        return false
    }
}</pre>
```

alansh : Also check against domain_to_longestlength.

BradMoonUESTC: add Upper limit of input param of prefix collection, use this function or delete it.

Hupixiong3: Improve function functions

Consider below fix in the StarNameService.check_ prefix_ length_ isLegal function

if (string::length(&prefix) < longest_length) {
 return true</pre>

Client Response

The check_prefix_length_isLegal function is not needed in the short term and we remove the function.



STA-7:No need for ex_expire_time in StarNameService contract renew_name_script function

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Gas Optimization	Informational	code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L422-L423	Fixed	alansh

Code

```
422: let ex_expire_time = *table::borrow(&name_services.expire_data, name);
423: table::upsert(&mut name_services.expire_data, name, ex_expire_time + duration);
```

Description

alansh: ex_expire_time is the same as expire_time, just use expire_time to save some gas.

Recommendation

alansh: Use expire_time instead.

Client Response



STA-8:Redundant codes in multiple functions of StarNameService contract

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Gas Optimization	Informational	 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L244-L245 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L254-L255 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L396-L397 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L403-L404 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L412-L413 	Fixed	yekong, alansh

Code



```
assert!(table::contains(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
domain_name), GRADIENT_FEE_NOT_EXIST);
                let fee vector = table::borrow(&name service extension.gradient fee in domainname,
domain_name);
                assert!(table::contains(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
domain_name), GRADIENT_FEE_NOT_EXIST);
                let fee_vector = table::borrow(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
domain_name);
            assert!(table::contains(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
domain_name), GRADIENT_FEE_NOT_EXIST);
397:
            let fee_vector = table::borrow(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
domain_name);
                let fee_vector = table::borrow(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
domain_name);
404:
                    if ( name_length > vector::length(fee_vector)) {
                assert!(table::contains(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
412:
domain_name), GRADIENT_FEE_NOT_EXIST);
413:
                let fee_vector = table::borrow(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
domain_name);
```

Description

yekong: Redundant code

```
assert!(table::contains(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname, domain_name),
GRADIENT_FEE_NOT_EXIST);
let fee_vector = table::borrow(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname, domain_name);
```

in



```
if (pay_option == 1){
            assert!(table::contains(&name service extension.gradient fee in domainname,
domain_name), GRADIENT_FEE_NOT_EXIST);
            let fee vector = table::borrow(&name service extension.gradient fee in domainname,
domain_name);
                if ( name length > vector::length(fee vector)) {
                    let fee = *vector::borrow(fee_vector, 0);
                    Airdrop::consume(account, fee * duration / 31536000);
                 }else {
                    let fee = *vector::borrow(fee_vector, name_length);
                    Airdrop::consume(account, fee * duration / 31536000);
        } else {
            assert!(table::contains(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
domain_name), GRADIENT_FEE_NOT_EXIST);
            let fee_vector = table::borrow(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
domain_name);
                if ( name length > vector::length(fee vector)) {
                    let fee = *vector::borrow(fee_vector, 0);
                    coin::transfer<AptosCoin>(account, @SNS_address, fee * duration / 31536000);
                 } else {
                    let fee = *vector::borrow(fee_vector, name_length);
                    coin::transfer<AptosCoin>(account, @SNS_address, fee * duration / 31536000);
                }
        };
```

yekong : Duplicate code. The following code has already appeared before the if judgment, and there is no need to repeat the judgment and assignment

```
assert!(table::contains(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname, domain_name),
GRADIENT_FEE_NOT_EXIST);
let fee_vector = table::borrow(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname, domain_name);
```

alansh:

```
assert!(table::contains(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname, domain_name),
GRADIENT_FEE_NOT_EXIST);
let fee_vector = table::borrow(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname, domain_name);
```

These 2 lines are always needed in both branches, no need to write the same code twice.



Recommendation

yekong: Put these two pieces of code before the if judgment

yekong: It is recommended to delete the two codes of the if branch and the else branch

alansh: Put the common code before the branch.

Client Response



STA-9:Redundant initialize_token_store operation

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Gas Optimization	Informational	code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L213	Fixed	Kong7ych3

Code

```
213: token::initialize_token_store(account);
```

Description

Kong7ych3: In the StarNameService module, users can register domain names through the create_name_script function. It will first create a Token resource for the user through the initialize_token_store function, and then set its direct_transfer to true through the opt_in_direct_transfer function. But in fact, the initialize_token_store function is also called in the opt_in_direct_transfer function to create resources for the user. So the initialize_token_store operation in the create_name_script function is redundant.

Below is the implementation of Token::opt_in_direct_transfer function.

```
public entry fun opt_in_direct_transfer(account: &signer, opt_in: bool) acquires TokenStore {
    let addr = signer::address_of(account);
    initialize_token_store(account);
    let opt_in_flag = &mut borrow_global_mut<TokenStore>(addr).direct_transfer;
    *opt_in_flag = opt_in;
}
```

Recommendation

Kong7ych3: It is recommended to remove the initialize_token_store operation in the create_name_script function.

Client Response



STA-10:Resource operation type usage error

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Code Style	Informational	 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L109 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L476 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L483 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L490 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L496 	Fixed	Kong7ych3

Code

```
109: let name_service_extension = borrow_global_mut(@SNS_address);
476: let name_services = borrow_global_mut(@SNS_address);
483: let name_services = borrow_global_mut(@SNS_address);
490: let name_services = borrow_global_mut(@SNS_address);
496: let name_services = borrow_global_mut(@SNS_address);
```

Description

Kong7ych3: In the Move language, there are two ways to reference resources: borrow_global_mut and borrow_global. The borrow_global_mut operation is generally used to modify resource references, and borrow_global is generally used to read resources. So you only need to use the borrow_global operator when reading resources. However, in the check_prefix_length_isLegal, read_name_expire, read_name_owner, read_name_controller and read_name_resolver_contract functions of the StarNameService module, only the resource is read, but borrow_global_mut is used for the operation.

Recommendation

Kong7ych3: It is recommended to use borrow_global when doing read operations on resources.



Client Response



STA-11:Risk of registered domain being front-run

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Race condition	Informational	code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L195-L270	Acknowledged	Kong7ych3

Code



```
public entry fun create name script(
            account: &signer,
197:
            name: string::String,
            domain_name: string::String,
            description: string::String,
200:
            uri: string::String,
201:
            duration: u64,
202:
            pay_option: u64
        )acquires NameServices, ResourceAccount, ForbiddenStrings, NameServicesFeeManager{
            let name service extension = borrow global mut(@SNS address);
204:
            let shortest_length_table =&mut name_service_extension.domain_to_shortestlength;
            let shortest_length = *table::borrow(shortest_length_table, domain_name);
207:
            let longest_length_table = &mut name_service_extension.domain_to_longestlength;
            let longest_length = *table::borrow(longest_length_table,domain_name);
209:
210:
            let name_length = string::length(&name);
211:
            assert!(name length >= shortest length, ILEGAL NAME LENGTH);
212:
            assert!(name_length <= longest_length,ILEGAL_NAME_LENGTH);</pre>
            token::initialize token store(account);
            token::opt_in_direct_transfer(account, true);
            assert!(check_forbidden_string(name), ILLEGAL_STRING_EXIST);
215:
216:
217:
            let name_services = borrow_global_mut(@SNS_address);
            assert!(table::contains(&name_services.nameservice_collections, domain_name),
DOMAINNAME NOT EXISTS);
            string::append_utf8(&mut name, b".");
220:
            string::append(&mut name, domain name);
221:
222:
            let resource_account_capability = borrow_global(@SNS_address);
            let resource account signer =
account::create_signer_with_capability(&resource_account_capability.account_capability);
225:
227:
            if (table::contains(&name_services.expire_data, name)) {
                let expire_time = table::borrow(&name_services.expire_data, name);
229:
230:
                assert!(*expire_time + BUFFER_DURATION < timestamp::now_seconds() ,</pre>
NAME NOT AVAILABLE);
```



```
231:
232:
                table::remove(&mut name services.expire data, name);
                let ex_owner = table::borrow(&name_services.name_owner, name);
234:
                let nft_vec = table::borrow_mut(&mut name_services.temp_nft_vec, *ex_owner);
                token::burn_by_creator(&resource_account_signer, *ex_owner, domain_name, name, 0,
1);
                table::remove(&mut name_services.name_owner, name);
237:
                let (exist, index): (bool, u64) = vector::index_of(nft_vec, &name);
                if (exist) {
239:
                    vector::remove(nft vec, index);
                }
240:
241:
            };
242:
            if (pay option == 1){
243:
                assert!(table::contains(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
domain_name), GRADIENT_FEE_NOT_EXIST);
245:
                let fee_vector = table::borrow(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
domain_name);
                    if ( name length > vector::length(fee vector)) {
247:
                        let fee = *vector::borrow(fee_vector, 0);
                        Airdrop::consume(account, fee * duration / 31536000);
                     }else {
                        let fee = *vector::borrow(fee_vector, name_length);
                        Airdrop::consume(account, fee * duration / 31536000);
251:
252:
            } else {
                assert!(table::contains(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
254:
domain name), GRADIENT FEE NOT EXIST);
255:
                let fee_vector = table::borrow(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
domain_name);
                    if ( name length > vector::length(fee vector)) {
257:
                        let fee = *vector::borrow(fee_vector, 0);
                        coin::transfer(account, @SNS_address, fee * duration / 31536000);
259:
                     } else {
260:
                        let fee = *vector::borrow(fee_vector, name_length);
261:
                        coin::transfer(account, @SNS_address, fee * duration / 31536000);
262:
                    }
            };
264:
```



```
265: let main_uri = string::utf8(b"https://api.sns.so/v1/image/");
266: string::append(&mut main_uri, name);
267: string::append_utf8(&mut main_uri, b".");
268: string::append(&mut name, domain_name);
269: create_name_script_nft(&resource_account_signer, signer::address_of(account), name,
domain_name, description, main_uri, duration);
270: }
```

Description

Kong7ych3: In the StarNameService module, users can register a domain name through the create_name_script function. But in Aptos, verifiers can also sort the transactions submitted by users (refer to the transaction life cycle in Aptos official documentation). Therefore, when a user registers for SNS, other users or nodes can pre-empt it to register and sell this SNS at a higher price.

Recommendation

Kong7ych3: It is recommended to refer to the registration logic in ENS. Users need to commitment hash first to determine that they need to register a domain name, and then check whether the registrant is consistent with the commitment hash during the registration process to avoid this risk.

Ref: https://docs.ens.domains/contract-api-reference/.eth-permanent-registrar/controller

Client Response

TBD



STA-12:The relationship of two parameters has not been checked

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Logical	Medium	code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L387-L399	Acknowledged	0xac

Code

```
assert!(exists(@SNS_address),NAMESERVICES_NOT_PUBLISH);
387:
            let name_services = borrow_global_mut(@SNS_address);
389:
            assert!(table::contains(&name_services.expire_data, name), NAME_NOT_EXIST);
            let expire_time = *table::borrow(&name_services.expire_data, name);
391:
            assert!(expire_time + BUFFER_DURATION > timestamp::now_seconds(),
NAME_HAS_BEEN_EXPIRED);
392:
            let storaged_owner = table::borrow(&name_services.name_owner, name);
            assert!( *storaged_owner == signer::address_of(owner), IS_NOT_YOUR_NAME);
394:
            let name_service_extension = borrow_global_mut(@SNS_address);
            assert!(table::contains(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
domain_name), GRADIENT_FEE_NOT_EXIST);
            let fee_vector = table::borrow(&name_service_extension.gradient_fee_in_domainname,
domain name);
399:
            let name_length = string::length(&name);
```

Description

Oxac: The relationship of name and domain_name has not been checked in function renew_name_script. It means that the owner of name can input a domain_name which is not related to name. For example the value of name is abc.com, but the value of domain_name is xyz. This can further affect the calculation of fees(Line 410-421).



```
public entry fun renew_name_script(
    owner: &signer,
    name: string::String,
    domain_name: string::String,
    duration: u64,
    pay_option: u64
)
```

Recommendation

0xac: It is suggest that to check the relationship of name and domain_name. To make sure domain_name is the domain of name.

Client Response

TBD



STA-13:Typographical errors in multiple contracts

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Code Style	Informational	 code/sources/Airdrop.move#L19 code/sources/Resovler.move#L23- L24 code/sources/Resovler.move#L35- L36 code/sources/Resovler.move#L71 code/sources/Resovler.move#L83 	Fixed	Hupixiong3, alansh

Code

Description

Hupixiong3: Spelling mistakes

alansh : defualt_reverse_resolver should be default_reverse_resolver, the file Resovler.move
should be renamed to Resolver.move

Recommendation

Hupixiong3 : Correct Spelling
Consider below fix in the Airdrop



```
struct CreditService has key{
    credit_table: table::Table<address,u64>,
    supplied: u64,
    maximum_supply: u64
}
```

alansh : n: defualt_reverse_resolver should be default_reverse_resolver, the file Resovler.move
should be renamed to Resolver.move

Client Response

TBD



STA-14:User can free from fee by registering a very short time domain

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Logical	Low	 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L248 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L251 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L258 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L261 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L406 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L409 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L416 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L419 	Acknowledged	jayphbee, 0xac

Code



```
Airdrop::consume(account, fee * duration / 31536000);

Airdrop::consume(account, fee * duration / 31536000);

coin::transfer(account, @SNS_address, fee * duration / 31536000);

coin::transfer(account, @SNS_address, fee * duration / 31536000);

Airdrop::consume(owner, fee * duration / 31536000);

Airdrop::consume(owner, fee * duration / 31536000);

Airdrop::consume(owner, gSNS_address, fee * duration / 31536000);

coin::transfer(owner, gSNS_address, fee * duration / 31536000);

coin::transfer(owner, gSNS_address, fee * duration / 31536000);
```

Description

jayphbee: There are some fees paid to SNS_address by AptosCoin or by consume some airdropped amount with different pay_option when calling StarNameService::create_name_script or StarNameService::renew_name_script functions.

Due to the pricision loss, fee * duration / 31536000 can be zero, that is to say user can free from fee by calling create_name_script and renew_name_script periodically as long as he ensures fee * duration less than 31536000.

Oxac: Based on the fee * duration / 31536000 formula, the result of calculation is 0 if fee * duration less then 31536000. This formula would influent two functions as following. While the value of fee is set less than 31536000, owner of name can input a small duration (such as 1) to avoid paying.

```
// pay_option == 1
Airdrop::consume(account, fee * duration / 31536000);

// else
coin::transfer<AptosCoin>(account, @SNS_address, fee * duration / 31536000);
```

Recommendation

jayphbee: To prevent user free from fee there should be a minimum fee to pay when fee * duration / 31536000 is zero. Or add MIN_REGISTRATION_DURATION.

0xac: It suggests that to ensure the calculating result of fee * duration / 31536000 is greater than 0.

```
assert!(fee * duration / 31536000 > 0);
```



Client Response

We will set the fee to be greater than or equal to 1 APT, which represents 1 followed by eight zeros in program. Therefore, users will have to pay even if they register a name for a short time because the value of fee is greater than 31536000.



STA-15:Wrong main_uri append

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Logical	Medium	 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L268 code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L325 	Fixed	Kong7ych3

Code

```
268: string::append(&mut name, domain_name);
325: string::append(&mut name, domain_name);
```

Description

Kong7ych3: In the StarNameService module, the main_uri will be spliced in the create_name_script function to complete the casting of SNS NFT. But it mistakenly spliced domain_name to name repeatedly, resulting in the lack of domain_name in the link of main_uri. And the token_mutate_config parameter of SNS is set to be unchangeable. So once the casting of SNS NFT is completed, the wrong main_uri will not be able to be modified.

The main_uri in the airdrop_mint function also has this issue.

The following is the setting of the token_mutate_config parameter in the

StarNameService::create_name_script_nft function:

let mutate_setting = vector<bool>[false, false, false, false, false];

Recommendation

Kong7ych3: The following code is recommended for fix.

string::append(&mut main_uri, domain_name);

Client Response



STA-16: Airdrop.airdrop() incorrect amount logic

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Logic	Critical	 code/sources/Airdrop.move#L37- L43 code/sources/Airdrop.move#L40 	Fixed	jayphbee, yekong, 0xac, Kong7ych3, BradMoonUES TC, Hupixiong3

Code

```
37:    public entry fun airdrop(account: &signer, to: address, amount: u64) acquires CreditService{
38:        let credit_service = borrow_global_mut(@SNS_address);
39:        assert!(signer::address_of(account) == @SNS_address, ONLY_OWNER);
40:        assert!(amount + credit_service.supplied >=
        credit_service.maxmium_supply,SUPPLY_OVERFLOW);
41:        let tmp_table = &mut credit_service.credit_table;
42:        table::upsert(tmp_table,to,amount);
43:    }
40:        assert!(amount + credit_service.supplied >=
        credit_service.maxmium_supply,SUPPLY_OVERFLOW);
```

Description

jayphbee: There is an invariant that the to be airdropped amount plus the supplied should less than or equal to maxmium_supply, but this line of code have the reverse logic.

```
assert!(amount + credit_service.supplied >= credit_service.maxmium_supply,SUPPLY_OVERFLOW);
```

The impact is that Airdop::airdrop can airdrop unlimitted amount that greater than the maxmium_supple.

jayphbee: When Airdriop::airdrop finished, credit_service.supplied should updated accordingly to indicate how much have been airdropped.

The impact is that more than the maxmium_supply amount can be airdropped if credit_service.supplied not being updated accordingly.

yekong: The variable 'supplied' is not updated after calling the 'airdrop' function, and the assert judgment is wrong. Therefore, it can cause additional issuance, exceeding the maximum limit



```
public entry fun airdrop(account: &signer, to: address, amount: u64) acquires CreditService{
    let credit_service = borrow_global_mut<CreditService>(@SNS_address);
    assert!(signer::address_of(account) == @SNS_address, ONLY_OWNER);
    assert!(amount + credit_service.supplied >= credit_service.maxmium_supply,SUPPLY_OVERFLOW);
    let tmp_table = &mut credit_service.credit_table;
    table::upsert(tmp_table,to,amount);
}
```

0xac: The logic of assert!(amount + credit_service.supplied >=

credit_service.maxmium_supply, SUPPLY_OVERFLOW); is wrong. This assert cause the amount of airdrops exceeds the set maximum maxmium_supply. For example, the value of maxmium_supply is 100, and supplied is 0. The amount must be no less than 100.

Kong7ych3: In the Airdrop module, the airdrop function is used to airdrop Credits to users. It will check that the sum of the required airdrop Credit amount and the current total supply must be less than or equal to maxmium_supply. However, in the actual inspection, the >= operation symbol is used incorrectly, which will cause airdrop to not work as expected.

BradMoonUESTC: The supplied data is not updated in time after initial executed, so the actual number of supplied may exceed the maxmium_supply

Hupixiong3: Condition judgment error, amount + credit_service.supplied >=
credit_service.maxmium_supply It should be <=.</pre>

Hupixiong3: credit_service.supplied not updated

Recommendation

jayphbee: change the implementation to:

```
assert!(amount + credit_service.supplied <= credit_service.maxmium_supply,SUPPLY_OVERFLOW);</pre>
```

jayphbee: update the credit_service.supplied in Airdriop::airdrop function.

credit_service.supplied += amount

yekong: Update the variable 'supplied' at the end of the function, and modify the assert to be '<='

Oxac : It is recommended to modify the code(Line 40) to assert!(amount + credit_service.supplied <=
credit_service.maxmium_supply,SUPPLY_OVERFLOW);</pre>

Kong7ych3: It is recommended to change >= to <=.

Consider below fix in the Airdrop::airdrop function

assert!(amount + credit_service.supplied <=
credit_service.maxmium_supply,SUPPLY_OVERFLOW);</pre>

BradMoonUESTC: update the supplied data in initial function



```
Hupixiong3: Revise judgment
```

```
Consider below fix in the Airdrop.airdrop function
```

```
public entry fun airdrop(account: &signer, to: address, amount: u64) acquires
CreditService{
    let credit_service = borrow_global_mut<CreditService>(@SNS_address);
    assert!(signer::address_of(account) == @SNS_address, ONLY_OWNER);
    assert!(amount + credit_service.supplied <=
credit_service.maxmium_supply,SUPPLY_OVERFLOW);
    let tmp_table = &mut credit_service.credit_table;
    table::upsert(tmp_table,to,amount);
}</pre>
```

Hupixiong3: credit_service.supplied should be updated
Consider the below fix in the Airdrop.airdrop function
credit_service.supplied += amount;

Client Response

TBD



STA-17: StarNameService.LengthRange is empty and not used

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Code Style	Informational	code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L38-L41	Fixed	BradMoonUES TC

Code

```
38:// todo
39: struct LengthRange{
40:
41: }
```

Description

BradMoonUESTC: The struct LengthRange is empty and not used.

Recommendation

BradMoonUESTC: Delete it or use it.

Client Response



STA-18:resource_account variable is unused in StarNameService.move contract initialize_name_services function

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Code Style	Informational	code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L156	Fixed	alansh

Code

156: let (resource_account, cap) = account::create_resource_account(creator, seed);

Description

alansh: resource_account is unused.

Recommendation

alansh: Unused variables should be replaced with instead.

Client Response



STA-19:uri parameter is not used in StarNameService.move contract create_name_script function

Category	Severity	Code Reference	Status	Contributor
Code Style	Informational	code/sources/StarNameService.m ove#L200	Fixed	alansh

Code

200: uri: string::String,

Description

alansh: The parameter uri is not used.

Recommendation

alansh: Check the usage of uri. Delete it or implement it.

Client Response



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