

Privacy methods.

Simulazione di Sistemi

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Privacy

Privacy methods.

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Matteo Martelli

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Possible Solutions

Privacy is the right to publish only some informations that we want to publish.

There are a lot of laws and legal issues related to privacy (but some people are just not interested in laws).



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We will talk about anonymity as the property of disconnect the user of a service from some basic properties:

- ▶ Geolocation.
- ▶ Association to a face or a name (or to an IP address).

Sometimes we need to reassociate the user with a communication channel or so.



But...who cares?

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"I have nothing to hide, who cares
about my personal data?"



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- ▶ Some intelligence organizations obviously do anti-terrorist researches and checks (and that's good!).
- ▶ Some intelligence organizations do that in wrong ways, a normal guy searched "Pressure cooking" and "knap sack" on google and FBI knocked at his house.



Figure: the utah NSA data center "Massive Data Repository", 90k-140k m^2



NSA related projects

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According to **Edward Snowden** leaks, the NSA organization has a lot of obscure and top secret projects:

- ▶ PRISM - Software to collect information about every internet communication (US)
 - ▶ Related to some major companies.
- ▶ Tempora - British Intelligence auditing software for internet and phone communications.
- ▶ MonsterMind - **Automated** reaction to attacks.





Other stories

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- ▶ PGP - "munitions export without a license".
- ▶ Lavabit - Request to give the public key of the site to the NSA.
- ▶ IP-sec - Snowden leaks revealed that NSA broke (in collaboration with NIST?) the IP-sec suite and his encryption algorithms.
- ▶ Truecrypt - US intelligence failed to decrypt some disks encrypted with truecrypt and fifth amendment protected a suspect.



Let's talk about numbers...

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
Possible Solutions

U.S. INTELLIGENCE FUNDING

National Intelligence Program leaked by E. Snowden

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US NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
\$52.6 billion



MARTINGRANDJEAN.CH ccavas
Source: FY2013 Congressional Budget Justification Book
Data published by W. Andrews and T. Underman in Washington Post Aug. 29, 2013.



...and leaks!

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TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY

User Activity Leads

- Examine settings of phone as well as service providers for geo-location; specific to a certain region
- Networks connected
- Websites visited
- Buddy Lists
- Documents Downloaded
- Encryption used and supported
- User Agents

TOP SECRET//COMINT//REL TO USA, FVEY



GEO-Obscuration

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Some places are sensitive to geo-obscuration (especially east places like china or japan).

#	Domain	Original URL	Obscured URL	Type	Language	Last Update	Status
1	Omail	google.com	gmail.com	Email	English	2014, September (or earlier) to present [2]	BLOCKED
1	Google	google.com	google.com	Search	English	2014, May (or earlier) to 2015, July [3]	BLOCKED
1	Google Maps	google.com	maps.google.com	Maps	English	2014, May (or earlier) to present [4]	BLOCKED
1	Google Docs	google.com	docs.google.com	Sharing	English	2011, May (or earlier) to present [5]	BLOCKED
1	Pornhub	pornhub.com	www.pornhub.com	Porn	English	2012, May to present [6]	BLOCKED
1	Google Encrypted	google.com	encrypted.google.com	Search	English	2011, March (or earlier) to present [7]	BLOCKED
1	Google APIs	google.com	*googleapis.com	Search	English	2014, September (or earlier) to present [8]	BLOCKED
1	Google+	google.com	plus.google.com	Social	English	2011, July to present [9]	BLOCKED
1	Google Sites	google.com	sites.google.com	Web Hosting	English	2011, March (or earlier) to present [10]	BLOCKED
1	Picasa	google.com	picasaweb.google.com	Sharing	English	2005, July to present [11]	BLOCKED
2	Facebook	facebook.com	www.facebook.com	Social	English	2008, July to present	BLOCKED
3	YouTube	youtube.com	www.youtube.com	Sharing	English	2009, March to present [12] [13][14][15]	BLOCKED



SOPA and PIPA

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- ▶ Stop Online Piracy Act
- ▶ Gives the control of the obscuration of a site to the proprietary of the copyright (!) and to the government (!!).
- ▶ In other words...everyone could obscure every site, that use copyrighted contents, from every search engine!
- ▶ Legal penalties and fees to the source of the publication.
- ▶ Incompatible with DMCA, GPL, etc...
- ▶ **Incompatible with VPN, ORs, proxies, etc (!!).**



Focused ADv

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- ▶ Some companies can do some users profilation.
- ▶ What you've searched, what you say or what you do can be a gold information on who you are and what you're going to do.
- ▶ Maybe the company inform you, and you have nothing to hide, but, you really want to say to a company sensible data?
- ▶ Imagine if a data leakage occurs and someone learns about your google searches...
- ▶ Coff, Coff, Windows 10 keylogger...



Not only powerful adversaries

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- ▶ Obviously the companies are not the only person interested in our real identity, someone could gain my IP, and/or my geolocation to break into my house when I'm out.
- ▶ So we must ensure our anonymity, just to have a form of security in addition to the classical ones.
- ▶ On the other hand, there is the identity stealing.



Technologies

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What we can do versus controls?

Can we have some privacy even from the companies/government?

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Confidentiality and authenticity

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Simulazione di Sistemi

We have a lot of programs to protect our data

- ▶ PGP
- ▶ IPsec
- ▶ OTR-based programs
- ▶ Protonmail  **ProtonMail**
- ▶ TrueCrypt 
- ▶ **Perfect Forward Secrecy**

Some tool for steganography can help but not too much.



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Possible Solutions

But for anonymity?

- ▶ Anonymous networks
- ▶ Mix Max networks.
- ▶ Anonymous remailers.
- ▶ Proxy chains.
- ▶ **Onion Routers**



Anonymous network

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Possible Solutions

(mostly) p2p-based networks, no one can identify who put a file on the net.

- ▶ FreeNet



- ▶ OpenNet mode
- ▶ DarkNet mode

- ▶ GNUNet



- ▶ Fully Self Contained (like Usenet).
- ▶ Search?
- ▶ Performance?



Mix Networks

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
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- ▶ Model of the 1981.
- ▶ Multiple layers of encryption.
- ▶ Select different random nodes to deal with controlled nodes.
- ▶ **Timing attack?**





Old times

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Possible Solutions

- ▶ Anonymous remailers: end to end anonymity.
 - ▶ Cypherpunk: remove FROM field and encrypt the mail
 - ▶ Mixmaster: Chain of remailers.
 - ▶ Mixminion: Mixmaster syntax with replies.
 - ▶nym-server: give a pseudonym to the user detached from his IP.

We'll see that this servers recalls the modern idea of OnionRouting.



Onion Routing

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Simulazione di Sistemi

The idea of encapsulate cyphered packets in a chain or an "onion".

- ▶ OpenNet? → Hidden services.
- ▶ New possibility like use a proxy to get to the normal internet.

Problems

- ▶ Performance
- ▶ DoS resistance.
- ▶ Mantain links to the users
- ▶ Thrustness of the routers.
- ▶ Confidentiality and autenticity.



Onion Routing (2)

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Possible Solutions

- ▶ TOR 
 - ▶ We'll come to this later.
- ▶ i2p 
 - ▶ Done for eepsite(s).
 - ▶ Not so much routers/outproxies.
- ▶ And what for the low latency? → **Timing attacks.**



NSA and Tor

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Possible Solutions

Tor was made from the naval research labs:

- ▶ Made for the anonymous control and espionage.
- ▶ Tor need a number of exit nodes (and routers) to lead anonymity to an user.
- ▶ if an organization use only his exit nodes it's like to not use them at all.



The Tor revolution

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Possible Solutions

Apparently Tor slipped from the hands of the US in the 2004.

- ▶ Russia offered \$114.000 to identify and deface Tor anonymity.
- ▶ NSA now classify TOR as a menace of level *catastrophic*.

(U) What is TOR?

- (U) “The Onion Router”
- (U) Enables anonymous internet activity
 - General privacy
 - Non-attribution
 - Circumvention of nation state internet policies
- (U) Hundreds of thousands of users
 - Dissidents (Iran, China, etc)
 - (S//SI//REL) **Terrorists!**
 - (S//SI//REL) Other targets too!

But...nobody knows who and what is hidden under the layer of the onion.

Part 2 – Onion routers and attacks





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
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
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
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Tor encryption

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
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Tor Hidden Service

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
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
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
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
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Possible Solutions

- ▶ Base: anonymity of clients
- ▶ Hidden services: anonymity of client + anonymity of servers

But ... is it enough?"



Time analysis based attacks

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Simulazione di Sistemi

"Tor does not provide protection against end-to-end timing attacks[...]"

We can place a tracker after the client node and another before the server node and check for the connection time to profile users and nodes (and later associate IP to users.)



Timing analysis based attacks

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
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Simulazione di Sistemi





Why simulation?

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Possible Solutions

Simulation help us in a lot of aspects:

- ▶ Compare the performances of two onion routers (p.e. i2p vs Tor).
- ▶ To compare effects of changes in the node choice algorithms.
- ▶ **Get an idea about the timing attack feasibility and estimate the number of resources needed by an attacker.**



Simulation results

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
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Possible Solutions



Tracing **half** of the Tor network, an attacker may be able to understand the relationships between the nodes of a **quarter** of the Tor network.



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
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Timing Attack

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Possible Solutions



- ▶ Timing attack is **feasible**.
- ▶ It requires a **LOT** of resources.



Too much?

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Who can face such big amount of resources?





NSA timing attack on clients

NSA slides leak

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Simulazione di Sistemi

TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY

(TS//SI)

Technical Analysis: Timing Pattern

Send packets back to the client that are detectable by passive accesses to find client IPs for Tor users.

- Current: GCHQ has research paper and demonstrated capability in the lab.
- Goal: Can we expand to other owned nodes?



NSA timing attack on servers

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TOP SECRET//COMINT// REL FVEY

Exploitation: Web Server Enabling

(TS//SI)

Given CNE access to web server modify the server to enable a “timing/counting” attack similar to timing pattern idea.

- Current: GCHQ has a research paper and demonstrated the technique in the lab.



Measuring AS-level adversaries against Tor

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Possible Solutions

- ▶ Multiple Autonomous Systems (AS) collude with each other performing time based attacks and collecting asymmetric data.
- ▶ Up to 40% of circuits constructed by the current Tor client are vulnerable to AS-level attackers.
- ▶ Connections from China were found to be most vulnerable to AS-level attackers with up to 86% of all Tor circuits.



Mitigating AS-level adversaries against Tor

ASes correlations

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Connections between ASes are negotiated as business arrangements.




Fig. 3. Hierarchical AS interconnection.

The idea

Building a graph of ASes correlations to identify vulnerable paths.



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Simulazione di Sistemi

- ▶ Use of path prediction to avoid Tor vulnerable paths.
i.e. The entry node and the exit node may be selected together if their ASes are unrelated to each others.
- ▶ Able to perform load-balancing at least as well as the vanilla Tor client.



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"I deplore the lack of internet privacy
and so do my 5,000 Facebook friends!"





Possible Solutions

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- ▶ Need of privacy rules enforcement and more investments on network security solutions
 - (i.e. In April 2014, the European Court of Justice declared invalid the EU Data Retention Directive.)¹
- ▶ Academic researches
- ▶ FOSS

¹According to the directive, member states will have to store citizens' telecommunications data for a minimum of 6 months and at most 24 months. Under the directive the police and security agencies will be able to request access to details such as IP address and time of use of every email, phone call and text message sent or received.

Thank you for your attention.





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