

# Decrypting IPTV

BSides Sofia

Radoslav Gerganov  
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
# whoami

- Infosec @ VMware
  - Confidential Computing
  - Virtual HSMs
  - Fuzzing
- DISCLAIMER: views are my own
- [github.com/rgerganov](https://github.com/rgerganov)
- [twitter.com/rgerganov](https://twitter.com/rgerganov)
- <https://xakcop.com>

# What is IPTV?

- Delivery of television content over Internet Protocol (IP) networks
- Supports both live TV and video-on-demand
- Usually delivered with set-top-boxes
- Protocols: IGMP, RTP, RTSP, UDP, ...

# IPTV deployment



# IPTV Security Model


- The only possible way to consume IPTV is with STB
- STB is operated only with the remote control
- Security through obscurity
- Flaws
  - No need to pay for more channels
  - No need to pay for more STBs
  - No need to pay for IPTV :)

# What is STB?

- Crappy device made in China
- Runs Linux
- Firmware = HTML browser + Video player
- IPTV User Interface = HTML + JS



# Six years ago (2016)



poweron-20160905.pcapng [Wireshark 1.10.6 (v1.10.6 from master-1.10)]

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Tools Internals Help

Filter:  Expression... Clear Apply Save

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
2835	24.970015000	10.199. [REDACTED]	10.3.17.70	RTSP	688	DESCRIBE rtsp://10.3.17.70:554/live/ch1
2837	24.971967000	10.3.17.70	10.199. [REDACTED]	RTSP/SDP	686	Reply: RTSP/1.0 200 OK
2864	25.058425000	10.199. [REDACTED]	10.3.17.70	RTSP	667	SETUP rtsp://10.3.17.70:554/live/ch1203
2866	25.059846000	10.3.17.70	10.199. [REDACTED]	RTSP	451	Reply: RTSP/1.0 200 OK
2873	25.089753000	10.199. [REDACTED]	10.3.17.70	RTSP	633	PLAY rtsp://10.3.17.70:554/live/ch12032
2875	25.091663000	10.3.17.70	10.199. [REDACTED]	RTSP	247	Reply: RTSP/1.0 200 OK

# No server-side authz

- STB MAC addr used for authentication
- PLAY rtsp://10.3.17.70:554/live/**ch12032017033910402807**
- All channel IDs are in the JavaScript

```
...
top.jsSetChannelInfo('Nova Sport','ch11123010550877822586');
top.jsSetChannelInfo('History Channel','ch11123010550858280539');
top.jsSetChannelInfo('Viasat Nature','ch11123010550889166895');
top.jsSetChannelInfo('Viasat Explorer','ch11123010550851794216');
top.jsSetChannelInfo('Viasat History','ch11123010550812809435');
top.jsSetChannelInfo('National Geographic WILD','ch11123010550891597909');
top.jsSetChannelInfo('TV 7','ch11123010550856881207');
top.jsSetChannelInfo('bTV Cinema','ch11123010550841375257');
...
```



# Swap channels with MitM


- Modify network traffic with MitM
- Replace crappy channels with paid channels
- <https://github.com/rgerganov/nfqsed>
- Example configuration:

```
# Fen TV / HBO HD
```

```
/ch13121216533621227255/ch12092914401822894191
```

```
# Folklor TV / HBO Comedy HD
```

```
/ch11123010551095204329/ch12092914413728185379
```




# RaspberryPi in the middle





# Fast forward to 2022

- Live streams delivered on multicast
- IGMP join/leave when switching TV channels
- More efficient for the IPTV provider
- IP range 224.0.0.0 - 239.255.255.255




# Let's try with VLC




# MPEG transport stream

- Multiplex of elementary streams
- Elementary streams are identified by PID
- Program map table (PMT)
- Entitlement control messages (ECM)



# MPEG TS packet




# Conditional Access System (CAS)

- Standard methods for obfuscating digital streams
- Access provided only to authorized users
- DVB Common Scrambling Algorithm (DVB-CSA)


CA ID	Name	Developed by	Introduced (year)
0x4AEB	Abel Quintic	Abel DRM Systems	2009
0x1700 – 0x1701, 0x1703 – 0x1721, 0x1723 – 0x1761, 0x1763 – 0x17ff, 0x5601 – 0x5604	VCAS DVB	Verimatrix Inc.	2010
0x2600	BISS	European Broadcasting Union	2002
0x2610	BISS2		2018
0x5581	Bulcrypt	Bulcrypt	2009
0x0606	Irdeto 1	Irdeto	1995

# Subscription based satellite TV






# Subscription based IPTV




# How to root STB

- Serial UART console
  - RX, TX, GND pins
- JTAG
  - TDI, TDO, TCK, TMS pins
- Power glitch
  - <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dT9y-KQbqi4>



# Arduino as USB to Serial converter



# r00t

```
# whoami  
root
```

```
# cat /proc/cpuinfo  
Processor       : ARMv6-compatible processor rev 7 (v6l)  
BogoMIPS        : 804.86  
Features        : swp half thumb fastmult vfp edsp java  
CPU implementer : 0x41  
CPU architecture: 7  
CPU variant     : 0x0  
CPU part        : 0xb76  
CPU revision    : 7  
Hardware        : mt85xx
```

```
# uname -a  
Linux mtkhost 2.6.35 #1 PREEMPT Wed Feb 13 11:34:46 CST 2019 armv6l GNU/Linux
```

```
# cat /proc/meminfo  
MemTotal:      386556 kB  
MemFree:       115408 kB  
Buffers:       28616 kB  
Cached:        81816 kB
```

# Reversing the firmware

- How channel keys are obtained?
- How channel keys are used?
- `libvmclient.so`
- Ghidra for static analysis (disassembler, decompiler)
- GDB for runtime analysis

```
stb# gdbserver --attach :9090 <vplayer_pid>  
local$ gdb-multiarch  
(gdb) target remote stb:9090
```

# OpenSSL version

```
# strings libvmclient.so | grep -i openssl
```

```
MD5 part of OpenSSL 1.0.0d 8 Feb 2011
```

```
SHA part of OpenSSL 1.0.0d 8 Feb 2011
```

```
SHA1 part of OpenSSL 1.0.0d 8 Feb 2011
```

```
...
```

# Decompiled function (part1)

```
2 | code * Yn_07xvZrdrMv(undefined4 *param_1,undefined4 param_2,undefined4 *param_3,int *param_4)
3 |
4 | {
5 |     code *pcVar1;
6 |     int iVar2;
7 |     undefined4 *puVar3;
8 |     code *pcVar4;
9 |     code *pcVar5;
10 |    undefined auStack128 [64];
11 |    undefined auStack64 [24];
12 |    undefined4 local_28;
13 |    undefined4 local_24;
14 |
15 |    pcVar4 = (code *)0x0;
16 |    *param_3 = 0;
17 |    RkVPYGdkwnhvhh0(auStack64);
18 |    Dd1CcRTdbYVlkGAQSF(auStack64,param_1);
19 |    p6mfT0ASCxegv6w7Fu(auStack64,auStack128,&local_24);
20 |    raAAimqDF6A4IKZohv(auStack64);
```

## Decompiled function (part2)

```
21 puVar3 = (undefined4 *)*param_1;
22 if ((puVar3[3] & 4) == 0) {
23     if ((puVar3[0xb] == 0) ||
24         ((iVar2 = *param_4, iVar2 != puVar3[0xb] &&
25          ((puVar3[0xc] == 0 ||
26           ((iVar2 != puVar3[0xc] &&
27            ((puVar3[0xd] == 0 ||
28             ((iVar2 != puVar3[0xd] && ((puVar3[0xe] == 0 || (iVar2 != puVar3[0xe]))))))))))))))) {
29         AZJwpqvTswDQA(6,0x6b,0x6e,"p_sign.c",0x7d);
30         pcVar5 = (code *)0x0;
31     }
32     else {
33         pcVar5 = (code *)puVar3[9];
34         if (pcVar5 == (code *)0x0) {
35             AZJwpqvTswDQA(6,0x6b,0x68,"p_sign.c",0x83);
36         }
```



# EVP\_SignFinal (part1)

→ ↻ 🔒 github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/OpenSSL\_1\_0\_0d/crypto/evp/p\_sign.c ➤ ☆

```
78  int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen,  
79                  EVP_PKEY *pkey)  
80  {  
81      unsigned char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];  
82      unsigned int m_len;  
83      int i, ok=0, v;  
84      EVP_MD_CTX tmp_ctx;  
85  
86      *siglen=0;  
87      EVP_MD_CTX_init(&tmp_ctx);  
88      EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&tmp_ctx, ctx);  
89      EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&tmp_ctx, &(m[0]), &m_len);  
90      EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&tmp_ctx);
```

## EVP\_SignFinal (part2)

```
123         if (!ok)
124             {
125                 EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_SIGNFINAL, EVP_R_WRONG_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE);
126                 return(0);
127             }
128
129         if (ctx->digest->sign == NULL)
130             {
131                 EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_SIGNFINAL, EVP_R_NO_SIGN_FUNCTION_CONFIGURED);
132                 return(0);
133             }
```




# Signing with OpenSSL


```
void EVP_SignInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type);  
  
int EVP_SignUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt);  
  
int EVP_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey);
```

# Obtain channel keys

- Key server (VCAS)
- 2 things needed for auth
  - STB MAC
  - RSA key
- Channel key = 128bit AES key



# Using the STB as jump host



- STB MAC used for authentication
- Enable SSH on the STB (dropbear)
- SSH port forwarding to the rescue
  - `ssh -L 12697:vcas:12697 root@stb`
  - `ssh -L 12700:vcas:12700 root@stb`
  - `get-keys.py localhost:12697 localhost:12700`

# Using channel keys



- Channel keys are rotated every 24h
- Even/odd keys are rotated every 10sec
- <https://github.com/rgerganov/vmdecrypt>

# Key sharing

- Channel keys can be easily shared
- Similar to card sharing for SAT TV
- You just need multicast IPTV streams
- ISP send multicast to all customers
  - Even those not paying for IPTV :)



# Summary

- Security through obscurity never works
- Both authn and authz are needed
- Multicast encryption is a hard problem
- Confidential Computing may solve this

**Q&A**