


# A Moving Target - Overview of Current Threat Landscape

BSides Sofia

23<sup>rd</sup> March 2024 , Sofia, Bulgaria




# Who am I?



**Gergana Karadzhova-Dangela**

LinkedIn | B.Sc. in IT-Forensics, CISSP, GCFA



Senior Incident Response Consultant



Supporting Cisco customers with emergency response and proactive activities, ranging from analysis of data of infected systems to creation of incident response documentation and simulation exercises.



Part of Cisco Switzerland



# Agenda

1

Meet Cisco Talos

2

Threat landscape ↔ Threat Intelligence

3

APT Groups

4

Ransomware

5

Top targeted vulnerabilities


6

Defense landscape



# Talos powers the Cisco portfolio with comprehensive intelligence

Every customer environment,  
every event, every single day,  
all around the world



# Unmatched visibility across the threat landscape



550B security events/**day**



~9M emails blocked/**hour**



~2,000 new samples/**minute**



~2,000 domains blocked/**second**



# Intelligence Collection

Primary and secondary sources of threat intel



Product telemetry



Intelligence partnerships



Talos IR engagements



Cutting-edge threat research



Vulnerability research



Honeypots and spam traps

**200+**

*Vulnerabilities discovered  
per year*

**60+**

*Government and law  
enforcement partnerships*

**45k**

*critical infrastructure  
endpoints monitored  
in Ukraine*

# (Cybersecurity) Threat Landscape



Dangers

Risks

Attacks

Potential

Ongoing

Threat actors

Vulnerabilities

Malware



*Goals may be different,  
but methodologies  
are similar*



## Cyber crime

- Financially motivated
- Phishing
- Big-game hunting
- Social engineering

Different  
motivations



## State-sponsored

- Data and espionage
- Havoc and chaos
- Supply chain attacks
- Partner abuse



# Threat Actors

Motivations across the spectrum

## Cyber Criminal



Financially motivated

Access to  
valuable data  
Ransom -> Extortion

## Nation State



Gain intelligence

Nuclear, Fin or Tech  
Strategic Sabotage  
Critical Infrastructure  
Disruption

## Ideologues



Spread message

Hackers, Terrorists  
Anti-Capitalism  
Anti-Corporate  
Inspired by political  
and/or social issues

## Thrill Seekers



Fame and glory

Experiments,  
learning  
(don't aim to cause  
damage)  
Some become trolls -  
misinformation

## Insiders



By Intent

Disgruntled  
employee  
Unfair treatment  
Different "goals"

By accident

# Advanced Persistent Threats



# APTs: China Summary

APTs operated at a rapid pace this year, conducting sophisticated and stealthy intrusions into numerous high-value targets.

## Geopolitical gains

APTs occurred at a rigorous pace, likely in response to **geopolitical** events that strained the country's relationships with the West and Asia Pacific.

## Preparing for future

Based on analysis of many malicious campaigns, **Beijing** may be directing more aggressive intelligence collection and prepositioning for future targeted attacks in these regions.

## Ransomware persists

Talos observed several instances of ransomware actors compromising a target closely following a long-term, covert APT intrusion by using similar methods of initial access and deploying ransomware.

## Telecommunications

We responded to several intrusions into telecommunications providers by China-affiliated APTs this year, particularly in areas that are of strategic interest to Beijing.

## Regional tensions

Rising tensions between China and Taiwan, China has also become increasingly aggressive in the South China Sea and relationship with Japan has also seen challenges in the past year.

## Evasion techniques

Threat actors are deeply entrenching themselves in targeted networks and dodging detection.



# Threat actor highlight: Volt Typhoon



A China-affiliated threat group that made headlines this past year for their long-term operation targeting U.S. critical infrastructure organizations and military bases.



Talos investigated a sustained Volt Typhoon intrusion targeting the telecommunications sector in Guam, which is notably the site of a U.S. military base significant for the defense of Taiwan.



Our research revealed the actors maintained persistent access to and exfiltrated data from networks of a service provider and certain high-value customers for at least a year and a half.



# Volt Typhoon (January 2024)



Australian Government  
Australian Signals Directorate

TLP:CLEAR

ACSC Australian  
Cyber Security  
Centre



Communications  
Security Establishment  
Canadian Centre  
for Cyber Security

Centre de la sécurité  
des télécommunications  
Centre canadien  
pour la cybersécurité



National Cyber  
Security Centre  
PART OF THE GCSB



National Cyber  
Security Centre  
a part of GCHQ

## People's Republic of China State-Sponsored Cyber Actor Living off the Land to Evade Detection

### Summary

The United States and international cybersecurity authorities are issuing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) to highlight a recently discovered cluster of activity of interest associated with a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored cyber actor, also known as [Volt Typhoon](#). Private sector partners have identified that this activity affects networks across U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, and the authoring

Source: <https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-144a>



# APTs: Russia Summary

Threats from Russian state-sponsored or state-aligned advanced persistent threats (APTs) remain a mainstay in our threat tracking and research efforts this year.

## Gamaredon

Broadly suspected to be a team of Russian government-supported actors based in Crimea, the group in recent months has concentrated their efforts on cyberespionage against Ukrainian entities.

## Internal Task Unit

We've continued monitoring suspicious activity in endpoint telemetry for nearly three dozen Ukrainian partners across critical infrastructure sectors, including government, utilities, financial services, health care, and transportation.

## Turla

Conducts long-term espionage and data exfiltration operations that are in line with Russian intelligence priorities that the U.S. government attributes to a unit within the FSB.

## Russia-Ukraine war

The task unit has continuously responded to a myriad of cyber threats since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, the observed activity in 2023 was far less sophisticated than what is typically associated with the sophisticated adversaries.

## Turla's Snake

For nearly 20 years, APT Turla deployed Snake to steal and exfiltrate data from targeted systems through numerous relay nodes scattered around the world.

## SmokeLoader Malware

We observed a spike in SmokeLoader activity in late April and early May, aligning with CERT-UA's reporting of mass distribution of SmokeLoader targeting Ukrainian entities.




## Turla instrumenting TTNG for various tasks

Russian espionage group Turla deploys new implant TinyTurla-NG (TTNG)

[Deep dive: TTNG tooling and C2 analysis](#) (Feb 2024)

[Deep dive: TTNG post-compromise activity](#) (March 2024)





CISCO  
Talos

# 2023 YEAR IN REVIEW

Read the full report on the Talos Blog  
<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2023-year-in-review/>



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




# Ransomware and Extortion



# Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS)



Source: <https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/#ransomware-as-a-sevice-incidents>



# Ransomware and extortion summary

2023 Talos Year in Review

**Ransomware** global prevalence continues as new affiliate groups and techniques emerge. Groups increasingly shifting toward pure **data theft extortion** as defender community detection increases.

20%

Of incidents seen by  
Talos IR in 2023  
involved ransomware

33%

Of incidents seen by  
Talos IR in Q2 2023\*  
were data extortion.

25%

LockBit accounted for  
1/4 of victim posts on  
data leak sites

1

LockBit again most  
prolific RaaS gang

2

Healthcare most  
targeted vertical  
Talos IR observed

3

Leaked source code  
enables less skilled  
actors into space

4

Exploitation of  
zero-day vulns  
rampant as Clop  
expertise broadens

# LockBit takedown - February 2024

## LockBit Background:

### Interview with a LockBit Ransomware Operator (2021)

## LockBit takedown:

- **20<sup>th</sup> Feb 2024** – The US Department of Justice joined the United Kingdom and international law enforcement partners in London today to announce the disruption of the LockBit ransomware group...
- **22<sup>nd</sup> February 2024** – LockBit relaunches its services

#### Interview with a LockBit ransomware operator



#### INTRODUCTION

In September 2020, Cisco Talos established contact with a self-described LockBit operator and experienced threat actor. Over the course of several weeks, we conducted multiple interviews that gave us a rare, first-hand account of a ransomware operator's cybercriminal activities. Through these exchanges, we gleaned several valuable takeaways for executives and the broader cybersecurity community.



# LockBit comeback – March 2024



Why the LockBit takedown is emblematic of the problems law enforcement face when stopping ransomware groups


Read the full Talos blog here: <https://blog.talosintelligence.com/p/48f2b2fd-723d-4fba-a634-bce5e764584a/>



# Phishing via digital document publishing sites

A new way to lure users into sharing  
their credentials

What is a digital document publishing site?



Talos IR observed legitimate digital document publishing (DDP) sites being used for phishing, credential theft and session token theft.


Image source: <https://publuu.com/knowledge-base/how-to-make-an-ebook-with-publuu/>



# Malicious link detection in DDP

DDP productivity features may inhibit malicious link detection.

Read the full Talos blog here:  
<https://blog.talosintelligence.com/threat-actors-leveraging-document-publishing-sites/> (March 2024)



# Impact of leaked ransomware source code

Multiple leaks of ransomware source code and builders have had a significant effect on the ransomware threat landscape.

## Rise of novice actors

Multiple leaks of ransomware source code and builders — components essential to creating and modifying ransomware — allowed ransomware operators to rebrand or give unsophisticated actors the ability to generate their own ransomware more easily with little effort or knowledge.

## New ransomware strains

Talos observed a surge in new ransomware strains emerging from the [Yashma ransomware builder](#).

In April, we discovered a new ransomware actor, [RA Group](#), deploying their ransomware variant based on the leaked Babuk source code.





# Chaos ransomware builder

## Chaos Ransomware Builder v5

—> Chaos is multi language ransomware. Translate your note to any language <—

All of your files have been encrypted

Your computer was infected with a ransomware virus. Your files have been encrypted and you won't be able to decrypt them without our help. What can I do to get my files back? You can buy our special decryption software, this software will allow you to recover all of your data and remove the ransomware from your computer. The price for the software is [REDACTED] Payment can be made in Bitcoin only.

How do I pay, where do I get Bitcoin?

Purchasing Bitcoin varies from country to country, you are best advised to do a quick google search yourself to find out how to buy Bitcoin.

Many of our customers have reported these sites to be fast and reliable:

Coinmama - [hxxps://www.coinmama.com](https://www.coinmama.com) Bitpanda - [hxxps://www.bitpanda.com](https://www.bitpanda.com)

Payment information Amount: [REDACTED]

Bitcoin Address: [REDACTED]

☒ Randomize file extension:

encrypted

☒ Usb and network spread:

surprise

☒ Process Name:

svchost.exe

Dropped File Name

read\_it.txt

About

FileExtensions

Advanced Options

☐ Delay second

10

☒ Add to startup


Select Icon

Build




# Ransom demands - comparison of leaked code-based variants vs. prominent groups

Leaked code-based ransomware variants



Prominent ransomware groups



Read the full Talos blog here: <https://blog.talosintelligence.com/code-leaks-new-ransomware-actors/>

# Top targeted vulnerabilities



# Top targeted vulnerabilities

Ranking	CVE	Vendor	Product	CISA findings	CISA KEV catalog	Kenna/CVSS
1	CVE-2017-0199	Microsoft	Office and WordPad	Routinely exploited in 2022	Yes	100/9.3
2	CVE-2017-11882	Microsoft	Exchange server	Routinely exploited in 2022	Yes	100/9.3
3	CVE-2020-1472	Microsoft	Netlogon	Routinely exploited in 2022	Yes	100/9.3
4	CVE-2012-1461	Gzip file parser utility	Multiple antivirus products			58/4.3
5	CVE-2012-0158	Microsoft	Office	Commonly exploited by state-sponsored actors from China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia (2016-2019)	Yes	100/9.3

**Source:** Cisco Secure Endpoint

**CISA sources:** Top Routinely Exploited Vulnerabilities, 2022 and 2016 - 2019.

- Exploitation of older software vulnerabilities in commonly used applications
- Low cost/high impact target for threat actors

## Key takeaway

*Prioritize security patching of all systems in your enterprise*



# Defense Landscape

## Sophistication and Persistence

Adversaries are more determined and persistent than ever

**Adversaries**

**Threat  
landscape**

**Defenders**

## Inventiveness and Collaboration

The defender community's diligence, inventiveness and collaborative efforts are helping to push adversaries back

# Evolving defender landscape

## AI Support

Configuration of  
security tools

## Threat Intel Alliances

Private and public  
threat intel  
exchange

Information  
Sharing and  
Analysis Center  
(ISAC)

## Regulations

Higher  
cybersecurity  
requirements for  
non-critical  
infrastructure  
organizations

NIS2  
SEC

## Increased awareness

Digitalization of  
public services

# Recommended Talos community resources

Sign up - [Weekly Talos Threat Source](#) newsletter

Read - [Quarterly Threat Overview](#) reports

Tune in - [Talos Takes Podcast](#) episodes



[Sign up here](#)



[Once per quarter, the key facts](#)



[Listen to our episode on  
malicious Windows drivers](#)





# Stay Connected and Up To Date

