



# Securing Open Source Software -End-to-end, At massive scale, Together

Jennifer Fernick - SVP & Global Head of Research, NCC Group Christopher Robinson (aka CRob) - Director of Security Communications, Intel

August 5 2021





#### In this talk:

- About us
- Lessons learned from the last 20 years of coordinating OSS vulnerability disclosure
- Why securing the open source ecosystem matters
- Securing OSS at scale has several unique challenges
- Threat modelling the open source ecosystem
- Why the insecurity of the open source ecosystem is accelerating
- Reducing vulns at scale / what actually helps / coordinated approach / OpenSSF
- Q&A







# [us@bh.usa ~]\$ ./HelloWorld.sh





#### **Jennifer Fernick**

- SVP & Global Head of Research at NCC Group
- Co-founding Governing Board/TAC member for the Open Source Security Foundation
- Prev: Cryptographer (quantum cryptanalysis, postquantum cryptography, cryptographic standards development, cryptographic architecture)
- Prev: Director of Information Security at a major FI
- Grad school: CS; Engineering (Waterloo); undergrad: Artificial Intelligence (Toronto)

#### CRob, n, adj, and v

- Pronunciation: U.S. (K-robe)
- Over 25 years of Enterprise-class Architecture,
   Engineering, Operations, and Security experience
- Ambassador For Intel Product Assurance and Security
- Working Group lead for the OpenSSF Dev Best Practices & Vuln Coordination WGs, FIRST PSIRT TPC WG, and others
- Co-Author FIRST PSIRT Services Framework & others
- Pirate-enthusiast & hat-owner



#### General Members

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Associate Members

















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Imagine a World....




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#BHUSA @BlackHatEvents



#### CVE-2014-0160



- (7) Heartbleed
- (8) 300k vulnerable to Heartbleed two months later
- (9) <u>Heartbleed's Heartburn: Why a 5 year Old</u> Vulnerability Continues to Bite
- (10) Heartbleed Report

#### https://heartbleed.com/

Vulnerability in **popular** open source library OpenSSL that could leak sensitive information otherwise thought protected by SSL/TLS encryption

This is a widely-used method to protect communications over TCP-IP-based networks (example - The Internet)

"At the time of disclosure, some 17% (around half a million) of the Internet's secure web servers certified by trusted authorities were believed to be vulnerable to the attack, allowing theft of the servers' private keys and users' session cookies and passwords" (7)

#### Public disclosure - 7 April 2014 Exposure -

- 21 June 2014 309,197 public web servers remained vulnerable (8)
- 6 July 2017, the number had dropped to 144,000 (9)
- 11 July 2019, 91,063 devices were vulnerable (10)

At the time, OpenSSL had **TWO** full-time developers to develop, maintain, test, and review 500,000 lines of code (7)



@BlackHatEven




Why does securing the open source ecosystem matter?

# The Security of OSS = The Security of EVERYTHING



### **Problem Overview - Securing the open source ecosystem**

- It has been estimated that FOSS constitutes 80-90% of any given piece of modern software (1)
- One report found that 84% of these codebases had at least one vulnerability, with the average having 158 per codebase
- Other reports discover that average applications contain 118 libraries with roughly ⅓ being active; The average library age was 2.6 years old <sup>(3)</sup>
- Over a 10 year period the volume of vulns has increased over 4 times [as measured with CVE] (4)
- Most OSS vulns are discovered in indirect dependencies (5)
- A typical vuln can go undetected for 218 weeks, and typically takes 4 weeks to get resolved once the project is alerted to it <sup>(6)</sup>
  - (1) State of the Software Supply Chain
  - (2) 2021 Open Source Security and Risk Analysis Report
  - (3) 2021 State of Open Source Security Report
  - (4) 2020 Red Hat Risk Report
  - (5) 2020 State of Open Source Security Report
  - (6) 2020 State of the Octoverse





## **Challenges of Securing Open Source Software at Scale**



## What makes OSS a unique target for adversaries?


Many of the best things about open source development invite unique security challenges:

- Deobfuscated and public-facing source code lowers attacker barrier to entry
- Distributed community-driven development with contributions from unknown third-parties
- Tragedy of the commons regarding security analysis
- Lack of consistently-deployed security standards, reviews and tooling
- (Often) decreased capacity for vulnerability remediation
- Lack of resources for monitoring & typical underpreparedness for incident response
- **Different economic incentives & feedback loops** than: enterprise devs; threat actors
- In spite of this: many high-value targets, foundational to enterprises and the internet itself



Supply Chain Attacks (2020)

### OSS security is about more than just vulnerabilities in source code





Threats, Risks, and Mitigations in the Open Source Ecosystem

<u>Michael Scovetta</u>, Microsoft in collaboration with the Open Source Security Coalition

The purpose of this document is to build a mutual understanding of the high-level threats, security risks, and potential mitigations associated with the open source ecosystem. There is a natural overlap between these threats and risks, and those that affect the more general software development process. The primary intended audience consists of members of the <a href="Open Source Security Coalition">Open Source Security Coalition</a> (the "Coalition", herein) and similar organizations interested in promoting and advancing improvements to the security of the open source ecosystem, but should not be



# **Vulnerabilities in the Open Source Ecosystem**








# Open source security keeps getting worse & it's no one's fault, but it's everyone's problem

- Years to detect:
   A typical vulnerability on GitHub goes undetected for over 4 years (>2.5y for critical)
- Mere days to exploit:
   Days between vulnerability disclosure and exploit creation has gone from 45 days to 3
- Devs are not getting better at secure coding:
   "A line of code written in 2020 is just as likely to introduce a security vulnerability as one written in 2016" GitHub
- Applications are increasing in complexity
   & transitive dependency risk seems to be growing





Top 50 packages (for each package manager)	Avg. dependent projects	Avg. direct contributors
Maven packages	167k	99
pip packages	78k	204
npm packages	3.5m	35
NuGet packages	94k	109
RubyGems packages	737k	146

Source: Github State of the Octoverse 2019





Open source projects have an average of 180 package dependencies


The top 50 OSS projects with the most downstream dependencies had an average of 3.6 million projects dependent upon them

Vulns in OSS have been central to major breaches and some of these vulns were **not found until decades** after their creation



#### The number of vulnerabilities "in the wild" outpaces the speed at which the security community can patch or even identify them.


#### And each day, the world contains more lines of source code than it ever has before



Every year, more lines of OSS are written than ever before, but vuln detection

lags years behind


Potential vulnerabilities found in source code scale with lines of code written



Source: Github State of the Octoverse 2020

Vulnerabilities seem to scale with lines of code - but other metrics besides LOC show similar patterns

Open Source Vulnerabilities per Year: 2009-2020



Source: Whitesource State of Open Source Security 2021

The number of reported vulnerabilities in open source codebases is growing each year

vents

The creation of potentially exploitable vulnerabilities increasingly outpaces the rate at which we can search for and remediate them, and this problem is one that only gets worse with time.

Security as it is practiced now does not scale. And we have reasons to believe this will only get worse for defenders.



#### Uncomfortable truth: Scalable vuln-finding helps adversaries, too

Innovations in

Economics of patching vs exploitation benefit threat actors over defenders

Threat actors don't care about CFAA

Decreasing time to exploitation of vulns in the wild

Increased transitive dependencies over time in OSS projects Threat actors don't need multi stakeholder

coordination

Large-scale fuzzing projects; vuln discovery query languages

Advancements in automated exploit generation

Machine learning advancements in generative language, including code

Dual use nature of scalable bug hunting methods can benefit defenders - or attackers





So how do we reduce vulnerabilities at scale?



#### How do we reduce vulnerabilities at scale?

#### **PREVENT DETECT** FIND Prevent classes of bugs Integrate security tooling Improve coordinated from being possible at all into your build pipeline vulnerability disclosure Threat model to (Static analysis, Fuzzing, Software Bill of Materials. understand systemic etc) security advisories, and architectural security risks **CVE** improvements Perform enhanced testing & design with security in (manual code review, thirdparty security audit, formal mind verification) for priority Concentrate resources on securing the most critical codebases libraries, components, and projects



# What ACTUALLY helps secure OSS



## "Groundbreaking" idea

"If you use software from a project, maybe you could contribute back to that project?"

- A very wise person









### What is needed to make open source more secure?

- Threat model to understand the many places & times at which a project can be compromised.
- Data-driven identification of the world's most critical open source projects
- Interventions to prevent vulnerabilities in the first place, introduced at various parts of SDLC
- Preventing inherited security debt through tools that can help developers obtain and users assess the security of a project (such as the CII Best Practices badge)
- Continued research and open source tool development for scalable bug-hunting & remediation
- Investments in technical security reviews of critical open source projects,
- Coordinated patching and incident response support to respond to high-impact vulnerabilities in OSS
- Better vulnerability disclosure processes, response, and workflows.
- Coordinated, impact-prioritized funding for security improvements, audits, and research




## Timeline: Historical coordination toward securing OSS








#### COORDINATED APPROACH - WHY AND HOW









#### **OPENSSF\*** Reference Architecture


(\* The Open Source Security Foundation if you're *nasty*)











# openssf.org/getinvolved github.com/ossf







# Thank you!

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# OpenSSF

OPEN SOURCE SECURITY FOUNDATION



