

An escape from a poverty trap and the role of entrepreneurship: Microfinance lending to the ultra poor in Bangladesh

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ABSTRACT The existing microcredit programs rarely lend to the ultra poor. With a randomised controlled trial in a rural, low income setting of northern Bangladesh, we assess the creditworthiness of the ultra poor and suitability of various debt contract designs to help them escape from poverty through productive investments. We use a stepped-wedge design over the key features of loans, i.e., small-scale sequential disbursement vs. lumpy upfront disbursement, with vs. without a grace period, and cash vs. in-kind loan with a managerial support program. Compared with the traditional microcredit, provision of large, upfront liquidity increases both repayment rates and net asset levels. This is consistent with the existence of an asset-based poverty trap which can be overcome by increasing the loan size. Provision of a grace period does not change the repayment rates or asset levels. We found that managerial supports induce participation of less experienced and poorer households to microfinance, yet resulted in similar repayment rates and asset accumulation as with other participants, indicating a further outreach to the ultra poor. For all households, labour incomes become larger towards the end of loan cycle while consumption stays the same, which we interpret as evidence of repayment discipline. Our main findings, a large, upfront disbursement results in faster asset accumulation that is suggestive of an escape from a poverty trap and managerial support programs induce the participation of the ultra poor, are generalisable to other rural areas with liquidity constraints.

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Revisions

Overall changes:

1. For simplicity, I changed the names: net assets, narrow net assets \Rightarrow broad net assets, net assets. Only the names are changed.
2. Correspondingly, I keep only net assets in main results, and moved other asset concepts to robustness checks and appendices, except where we digress livestock holding and investments.

Title and abstract:

1. No changes.

Introduction:

1. No changes.

Existing studies:

1. No changes.

Theory:

1. No changes.

Experimental design:

1. No changes

Study sample:

1. Added preference related variables to descriptive statistics (p.9). This is necessary as we use these variables in permutation tests.

RiskPrefVal, TimePref1Val, TimePref2Val are the minimum acceptable excess of risky options (vs. certainty), 3 month future options (vs. present), and 15 month future options (vs. 12 months in future), respectively, in monetary values. Smaller values indicate greater risk tolerance and patience. PresentBias is the ratio of respondents who indicate present biasedness, $\text{TimePref1Val} > \text{TimePref2Val}$. All these measures are similar across arms.

- 2.

Results:

1. In all tables, p values are presented in percentage units ($100p\%$).
2. Added time and risk preference estimates in permutation tests (TABLE 3, TABLE 4). In the main text (p.??), added below:

RiskPrefVal indicates that individual rejecters tend to demand higher compensation for risks, and the p value becomes small enough only with entire sample of All arms. This suggests some individual rejecters are more risk averse than non rejecters. TimePrefVal1, TimePrefVal2, PresentBias all do not show statistically recognisable differences.

3. Added that the Cattle arm borrowers are more risk averse but participated, implying a role of managerial supports (p.??):

In addition, cattle arm borrowers show stronger risk intolerance as indicated in TimePrefVal1, TimePrefVal2. These features notwithstanding, the cattle arm, which

provides managerial supports and in-kind lending, induced participation. As we will see in Section VIII.3, the choice of lending instrument (cash or in-kind) does not matter in investments. So it is natural to infer that the managerial support component has induced the members with less experiences and fewer assets to take up loans.

4. Added FIGURE 4: NET ASSETS BY PERIOD as a part of descriptive statistics.
5. For simplicity, keep only impacts on net assets in FIGURE 5. Impacts on cattle holding and broad net assets are shown in the appendix.
6. A subsection called Summary of impacts are added.

In summary, we found that our managerial support programs induce the members of disadvantaged background to participate in microfinance, achieving the further outreach, and achieve the results that are no different with other borrowers. This is consistent with the finding of the previous studies that a certain level of skills is necessary for participation, and our managerial support programs supplemented the lack thereof. We found that the large upfront disbursements allows borrowers to invest in cattle while members with sequential disbursements mostly opted for smaller livestock and small trades. In combination with a greater return to cattle on net asset accumulation and a greater rate of loan repayment, we consider it as evidence of a poverty trap and an effective measure to break it. We also found the impacts and repayment rates are indistinguishable between the moderately poor and the ultra poor.

7. A subsection on Robustness check is added:

- To examine impacts by previous cattle rearing experiences,

FIGURE 12:

CUMULATIVE IMPACTS ON NET ASSETS RELATIVE TO TRADITIONAL ARM BY EXPERIENCE, FIGURE 13: CUMULATIVE IMPACTS ON CATTLE HOLDING RELATIVE TO TRADITIONAL ARM BY EXPERIENCE are added.

The previous literature has shown that returns to lending are higher for the borrowers with business experiences (Banerjee et al., 2015a). To check if the same can be found in our experiment, we divide the subjects into three groups of different cattle rearing experiences at the baseline: Own group, defined by the cattle ownership, Adi group, defined by no cattle ownership but having an experience with cattle lease contracts (called *Adi*) up to 3 years prior to the baseline, and None group who has neither of the two. In FIGURE 12 and FIGURE 13, we plot the group wise impacts by arm on the net assets and cattle holding, respectively. These show that the Own group has the highest returns in both outcomes under the Large/Upfront treatment, followed by the None group, and virtually no impact among the Adi group.

Consistent with the previous literature, we thus find the returns to microfinance are higher among the members with previous cattle rearing experience through ownership. We also find the returns among the members with no previous experience are small yet not statistically zero. In particular, when we choose cattle holding as an outcome, Cattle arm has a statistically meaningful impact even among the None group, which is consistent with our main finding that the managerial support program may have helped them in participating and sustaining the level of returns.

In contrast, the Adi group, who has cattle rearing experiences, does not attain statistically positive returns. As one examines the estimated results in TABLE D5 and TABLE D6, we see that the returns of Adi group becomes negligible once we add baseline household size HHsize0 as a covariate, which has large positive estimates across specifications. This is indicative of Adi group is constrained by the household size, which is consistent with our main finding that a domestic capacity constraint, be it domestic labor or house building size or both, may bind some households to attain positive returns, possibly because they are already engaging in cattle rearing.

- Referred to robustness of results regardless of asset concepts.

We also ran a robustness check over the choice of asset concepts by using various measures of net assets: **Broad net assets** which we include all other household assets that are observed in certain rounds of surveys, **Broad net assets, annual price** which we use annual median price of cattle in computing the livestock values in broad net assets, **Net non livestock assets** which we drop livestock values from net assets, **Land** which is the total of land asset values, and **Cattle** which is the number of cattle holding. In the Appendix [FIGURE E1](#), we show the time paths of various assets by arm. The dynamic patterns of asset accumulation is similar to [FIGURE 4](#).^{||}

All asset measures show similar patterns (see [FIGURE E2](#)). **Broad net assets** show a similar pattern yet the standard error bars cross zero in round 4 for some specifications, possibly because of larger noises in computing the values as some asset items are observed only in certain rounds. **Net non livestock assets** show smaller impacts that are not statistically distinguishable from zero, which is consistent with our findings that borrowers used the funds in productive investments and kept repayment efforts.

Conclusion:

1. No changes.

Appendix:

1. Dropped the word ‘survival’ from table headers of [TABLE ??](#), [TABLE ??](#), [TABLE ??](#).
2. Revised the description of these tables. I made clear that:
 - [TABLE ??](#) compares potential MFI targets (nonattriting borrowers, noted as **Active**) vs. non-targets (attriting borrowers or loan rejecters, noted as **NonActive**), and it is about if screening variables have any predictive power in terms of loan rejection or attrition under our lending.
 - For the other two tables, it is about the managerial support assisted non-attrition of less advantaged borrowers.

Requests for Abu-san

1. Our sample is drawn from the population of river island villages in Northern Bangladesh. Abu-san, please provide the regional characteristics of the area, esp. poverty, using CLP/TUP program data and reports.
 - Please provide a succinct description.
2. A leading proponent is the nobel laureate Professor Mohammad Yunus who claims that “we are all entrepreneurs.” Yunus and Jolis (2003), Cosic (2017) [\[Abu-san: Do you have access to library to get the exact page number\(s\) in his book?](#)
 - Please get the information when everything is settled down.

Contrasts with Balboni et al. (2020)

Balboni et al. (2020) collect data from transfer recipients and control group of BRAC’s TUP.

^{||} Asset values are expressed in BDT. **Net assets**=total assets - debts. Debts include outstanding loaned amount of the experiment. Total assets use items observed in all 4 rounds of household surveys. **Net non livestock assets**=net assets-livestock asset values. Number of cattle is a headcount of cattle holding.

Using the recipient data, they estimate the equation of motion $K_{t+1} = \phi(K_t)$, show the S shape, and compute the threshold asset level \hat{k} that separates the low and high equilibria. They then show that individuals who are above \hat{k} increase the assets while individuals below it decrease them. The variations of initial asset level allows the identification of bifurcation as these variations effectively allocate individuals to below and above the threshold. Anticipating the endogeneity of initial asset levels to asset growths, they show that initial asset levels have no correlation with post intervention asset growths after conditioning on the above-threshold dummy. This is suggestive evidence that the unobservables that correlate with initial asset levels are exogenous to post-transfer asset increases.

In the poverty trap dynamics, the key is the low returns among the low k holders. The returns to high k holders are qualitatively similar in the convex and concave production functions so long as they are above the 45 degree line. Why are they low? Authors show the baseline vehicle ownership is statistically smaller by 4% (but not for other assets, total assets are not tested) for the below threshold households, and the differences relative to the above threshold households grew after the transfer receipt. They conclude that the complementary assets serve as the fixed inputs of production, and the lack thereof withholds households from escaping the poverty trap.

their strength Large sample size, precise asset and labour data, direct estimation of equation of motion, and associated tests of multiple equilibria.

our strength Experimental variations in contract design (Upfront, support programs), use of IGA information that allows the (poverty trap) interpretations without structural estimation, reference to market costs/prices.

Contrasts with Banerjee et al. (2019)

Banerjee et al. (2019) use regionally matched-pair data under staggered branch opening of an urban MFI. They divide the sample into borrowers with a prior business experience (GE) and others (non-GE), and show that impacts are persistently positive for GE borrowers but not for non-GE borrowers. With structural estimation, given a talent distribution, they interpret this as evidence of a poverty trap through a liquidity constraint. They also note the impact heterogeneity is due to MFI selection but not talent heterogeneity, as pre-MFI entry businesses are more profitable than post-MFI entry businesses of the same firm age.

their strength Urban setting, contrast of long-run versus short-run impacts, data on business outcomes, gross substitute/complement with demand for informal loans, explaining the lack of average impacts by finding the subpopulation with superior talents and contrasting with other subpopulation.

our strength Ultra poor population, rural and fragile setting, selection on entrepreneurship without affecting outcomes, Upfront leads to faster asset accumulation and higher repayment rates.

What the three papers agree

- A need for larger lending than regular MF.
- Existence of a poverty trap.
- Evidence of a nonconvex production set as a source of poverty trap.

Contents

I	Introduction	1
II	A brief review of existing studies	3
III	Background	5
IV	Theory	5
V	Study sample	8
VI	Experimental design	9
VII	Empirical strategy	13
VIII	Results	14
	VIII.1 Participation	15
	VIII.2 Attrition	17
	VIII.3 Impacts	17
	VIII.3.1 Assets	17
	VIII.3.2 Labour incomes and consumption	21
	VIII.3.3 Repayments	22
	VIII.3.4 Schooling	23
	VIII.3.5 Summary of impacts	24
	VIII.4 Robustness checks	25
IX	Conclusion	27
A	Randomisation checks	30
B	Rejection	32
C	Attrition	38
D	Impact estimation results	41
E	Correlates of repayment shortfall	64

I Introduction

Since the microcredit became popular in Bangladesh in the late 1980's, the number of borrowers increased rapidly throughout the world. According to over 3700 microfinance institutions (MFIs), there are estimated 204 million borrowers around the world in 2013, of which 110 million are the poor borrowers whose incomes are below the national poverty line (Microcredit Summit Campaign, 2015) [Need to update this.]. The outreach to the extremely poor population or the *ultra poor*, however, is arguably slow in comparison.*¹

There are demand and supply side reasons behind the slow outreach to the ultra poor. On the demand side, the ultra poor borrowers may not be entrepreneurial enough to demand credits for production, or may face an inferior production possibility than the wealthier borrowers. On the supply side, MFIs may perceive the ultra poor as riskier than the moderately poor, or their loan size may be too small to justify the fixed transaction costs while the lender is constrained to keep the interest rate low to avoid adverse selection and moral hazard.

As the rigorous evaluations of microfinance progress, it has become clear that the impacts are not uniformly positive. A group of influential research has shown that only a subgroup of borrowers, those with prior experiences or high ability, have positive returns from borrowing (Banerjee et al., 2015c; McKenzie, 2017; Buera et al., 2017; Banerjee et al., 2019). This is in a stark contrast to the popular belief in microfinance that anyone can become a successful borrower.*² Logically, there must be some minimal level of entrepreneurship to participate and continue as a borrower in any form of finance. Then, the question is, what sort or how much of entrepreneurship is required in microfinance?

To shed light on the required level of entrepreneurship, we took this question to the Northern Bangladesh where a flood threat limits the production process to be least complex: livestock rearing. Majority of residents own livestock so its know-how is semi-public knowledge. The required entrepreneurship, then, is to gather all the pieces of relevant information, decide to raise livestock, form a production and a sales plan, and implement. This is the definition of entrepreneurship we use in our paper. In our intervention, we provided a heifer to a selected subgroup of participants as an in-kind loan and bundled it with training and consultation services to make sure the borrower has the right cookbook to follow. Under this treatment, the entrepreneurship to decide what to invest and how to come up with a solid plan is no longer a necessity.

In our study, we compare the borrowers who were provided with such knowledge and the managerial supports against the borrowers who were not. By randomising the offers, we identify the causal impacts of not requiring the entrepreneurship on both the participation and the outcomes. We find that our managerial support program, that helps fill the gap in entrepreneurial skills, induces residents with fewer experiences in livestock production and a lower asset level to participate, while the mean outcomes are the same as in the comparison group.

There is yet another motivation for our study. In bridging these two experimental arms that are different in multiple aspects, we introduced intermediate arms. At the end, we were left with an arm of conventional microcredit that disburses small upfront liquidity for three times, and several arms with large upfront liquidity that disburse the equivalent total amount once under three period maturity. This gives an opportunity to test if the upfront liquidity provision, while keeping the total loan size and maturity equivalent, matters in the future asset levels. If the production technology

*¹ MF is not successful in reaching out to the poorest of the poor, or the ultra poor (Scully, 2004). Empirical evidence in Yaron (1994); Navajas et al. (2000); Rahman and Razaque (2000); Armendáriz-Aghion and Morduch (2007) supports this claim. Some authors discuss the tradeoff between sustainability and outreach for microfinance institutions (MFIs) Hermes and Lensink (2011); Hermes et al. (2011); Cull et al. (2011).

*² A leading proponent is the nobel laureate Professor Mohammad Yunus who claims that “we are all entrepreneurs.” (Yunus and Jolis, 2003), (Cosic, 2017) [Abu-san: Can you get the exact page number(s) in his book?

is nonconvex and if there is a credit constraint, it gives rise to a poverty trap which can result in larger asset accumulation under large upfront liquidity. While we do not directly test for a poverty trap, the investment choices strongly indicate its existence: Only borrowers without a large upfront loan opted for smaller, multiple investments. Our experimental design tests if the upfront liquidity provision breaks a poverty trap, under the assumption that there is one, and found that it results in larger asset accumulation by 48.9 to 52.3 percentage points without affecting the repayment rates.

Our study follows the literature of microfinance debt contract design as hallmarked in Field et al. (2013) who found a grace period induces more risk taking and subsequent loan delinquency. Under our setting of limited production choices, it is irrational to invest in riskier assets, such as goats, when the designed grace period suits the heifer cash flow and a heifer's risk-return profile is considered to be Pareto-dominating. A strategic default is also more difficult in our setting because the number of formal credit suppliers is limited, which is probably zero,^{*3} and relocation is costly, because it requires not just boat rentals with a certain loading capacity during the daytime but also financially reliable mainland contacts to settle in. The repayment rates in our study turned out to be no lower than the comparable microfinance schemes (Banerjee et al., 2015a).

Our study is closely related to a large scale cattle transfer study conducted in the neighbouring area (Bandiera et al., 2017; Balboni et al., 2020). The targeted population of their study is similar to ours, yet our study population resides on less stable terrain, are more exposed to flood and water logging, are considered to be less well connected to the market, are equally less trained, and are probably poorer. The chance of survival for each investment project is expected to be no higher. More prominently, our study is commercially oriented: It uses a loan than a transfer, and charge market level fees to all the services provided.

We find that borrowers of the arm with managerial supports have, on average per household, lower [baseline?] cattle holding 0.22 (while borrowers from other arms have .308, p value = .156), and smaller net asset values BDT 5603 (in contrast to BDT 8204 in other arms, p value = .058). The outcomes and repayment rates are no lower than the other arms, implying the managerial supports had a further outreach without compromising the outcomes and loan repayments. We also find that, relative to the traditional microfinance lending, the upfront liquidity provision increases the net assets by 0.86 times the baseline standard deviation (denoted hereafter with σ) in the second year, 1.35σ by the end of fourth year, and the number of cattle holding by 0.6σ in the second year, and 0.58σ by the end of fourth year. These results hold broadly regardless of different cattle rearing experiences prior to the intervention.

We consider our finding is generalisable to rural areas where small scale livestock production is prevalent. While there is a caveat that the domain of our results is a low level herd size and the entrepreneurial capacity to hold a larger herd size can be different from what our study suggests,^{*4} the successful livestock transfer program in the neighbouring areas (Bandiera et al., 2017; Balboni et al., 2020) and our results indicate that supporting asset accumulation through large livestock has wide applicability in assisting the rural ultra poor to escape from poverty.

In the following section, we summarise the existing literature. Section II gives the link to the previous literature. Section III gives the brief account of background of study site. Section VI lays out the details of experimental design. Section VII explains the estimation strategy. In section VIII, we provide the experimental results and contents of income generating activities (IGAs). Section IV shows a possible mechanism of poverty trap that our target population is under. Section IX discusses the interpretation of results.

^{*3} As we surveyed the area before the study, we note several NGOs provide a relief credit to flood victims, but not regular finance. In selecting the study site, we purposefully chose the population without access to any financial institution.[Abu-san: A better description for this?]

^{*4} Our study matches the scale of lower equilibrium of Lybbert et al. (2004) which is much smaller than the scale of the high equilibrium of around 50 herd size.

II A brief review of existing studies

There are four aspects in our study that relate to the existing literature: The role of entrepreneurship in microfinance impacts, variations in debt contract design, empirical assessment of a poverty trap, and targeting the ultra poor. We will discuss these in turn.

Much has been discussed about the poverty reduction impacts of microfinance in the early days of microfinance studies (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Morduch, 1999). Recently, doubts are cast on the magnitude of microfinance impacts (Banerjee et al., 2015a; Duvendack and Mader, 2019; Meager, 2019) while asset grants (capital injection) remain to show high returns (de Mel et al., 2008; de Mel et al., 2014; Fafchamps et al., 2014; Bandiera et al., 2017).^{*5} Lack of mean impacts in microcredit led researchers to look for a particular subgroup which shows impacts, or impact heterogeneity (Banerjee et al., 2017): Borrowers with prior experiences or high ability are shown to have higher returns (Banerjee et al., 2015c; McKenzie, 2017; Buera et al., 2017; Banerjee et al., 2019). The studies with a focus on experienced members or existing firms can be considered as looking at impacts on the intensive margins. In contrast, our study is focused on an isolated greenfield population, or poverty impacts on the extensive margins, which are relatively less studied.

The fact that experienced members gain larger benefits from microcredit is consistent with the positive impacts of capital grant programs on existing firm owners. Whether such experience is trainable for novice entrepreneurs remains unsettled. A recent microfinance study indicates that there is an advantageous selection through talents in the existing firm owners, so trainability is called into a question (Banerjee et al., 2019). A growing body of management capital literature in developing countries is insightful yet most of the research is necessarily geared to existing firms, so it does not inform much on how one can assist novice entrepreneurs.^{*6} Karlan and Valdivia (2011); Bruhn and Zia (2011); Argent et al. (2014) are the exceptions, but results and quality of evidence are mixed and inconclusive. The current study explicitly tests if the entrepreneurship matters in microfinance by using a heifer lending with a managerial support program. We also examine the self-selection on entrepreneurship into microcredit, which we find to exist.

The corporate finance devotes a substantial part of its field in understanding the consequences of contract designs on entrepreneur's incentives. Field et al. (2013) was the first to examine if the traditional lending style of microfinance inhibits the spawning of entrepreneurship by experimentally allocating different types of debt contracts. As we will discuss in the Section VI, our study follows the similar strategy. In an attempt to tease out the impacts of entrepreneurship, we introduced longer maturity and a grace period in other arms. While there was a strong concern among practitioners that a grace period induces untruthful borrowing, there was no alternative in borrowing other than relatives and money lenders due to ruralness and isolation. This gave us flexibility in designing the debt contracts. Similar to Beaman et al. (2015) who redesigned the repayment schedule to adapt the borrower's cash flow profile (repay after harvest), we designed the debt contract to best suit the cash flow profile of the most popular investment project in the area, rearing a heifer. Our study exemplifies the economic gains from designing the debt contract to match the presumed investment

^{*5} This is due partly to insufficient statistical power (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2013). Banerjee et al. (2015a) collects six studies of microfinance lending impacts. They also point the lack of statistical power due to low take up while noting more able and experienced borrowers saw larger "transformative effects." In the current study, in contrast, the take up rate is relatively high at 74.42%, of which 5.19% is lost to the flood.

^{*6} Bruhn et al. (2018) shows intensive management consulting services to the small scale firms in Mexico resulted in sustained improvements in management practices which led to higher TFP and larger employment. Others also show effectiveness (Calderon et al., 2011; Berge et al., 2012; Bloom et al., 2013) while others do not (Bruhn et al., 2012; Karlan et al., 2015). McKenzie and Woodruff (2013) put them as: These managerial impacts studies are too different to compare, in terms of population, interventions, measurement (variables, timing), and most importantly, implied statistical power in the design.

choices in microfinance.

Another strand of the literature related to our study links capital grant effectiveness with the production set nonconvexity. Theories base lumpiness and credit market imperfection as keys to a poverty trap (e.g., Galor and Zeira, 1993). When the production set is nonconvex, a small scale transfer may not lead to a sustained increase in income, as it can be either consumed or invested to a technology with decreasing marginal returns that brings back to the original income level (i.e., the lower equilibrium of a poverty trap).

Despite its popularity as a theory, the empirical evidence of a poverty trap is mixed. Kraay and McKenzie (2014) note that a poverty trap finding is rare, while Barrett et al. (2016) state the otherwise and there is overwhelming evidence.^{*7} Interestingly, however, they both agree that, when there is a range of assets and production opportunities, it is inherently difficult to empirically single out a particular poverty trap. The latter authors note that existing evidence comes mostly from remote and isolated areas with a single primary production opportunity and an associated asset. Our study is no exception. It comes from a remote and isolated area of northern Bangladesh where the single most important production opportunity to increase income in otherwise subsistence-oriented paddy producing villages is livestock production.

An earlier finding of a poverty trap includes the cattle herd size dynamics of Southern Ethiopian pastoralists that indicates existence of a poverty trap over a 17 year recall period (Lybbert et al., 2004). More recently, Balboni et al. (2020) estimate the equation of motion for assets and show the direct evidence of a poverty trap among the recipients of a large scale transfer program targeted in the neighbouring areas of our study site. The source of nonconvexity is cattle and the complementary assets (vehicles) at the baseline which serve as a fixed input that the ultra poor cannot afford. Similar to these studies, our study examines the nonconvexity of a higher-return production set. Our study regresses the future asset values on the current asset values and intervention dummies, thereby adding evidence, in the Barrett et al. (2016)'s terminology, using the *direct method*. By complementing this estimated result with the fact that borrowers purchase cattle only when large upfront liquidity is provided, we conclude that there is a poverty trap. In our study, the source of nonconvexity is the price of a heifer that is about three times the price of a goat. We also show that frontloading the liquidity in lending is effective in escaping the poverty trap.

Lastly, selecting the ultra poor as the population to provide supports have often involved free consultation/training and transfers in the past. A handful of studies on ultra poor transfer programs report sustained increase in assets and incomes (Blattman et al., 2014; Banerjee et al., 2015b; Blattman et al., 2016; Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016). A transfer program in the Northern Bangladesh shows an occupational change and an income increase (Bandiera et al., 2017) and long-run asset accumulation (Balboni et al., 2020). In an attempt to test commercial viability, our experimental design makes a reference to markets. It uses loans rather than transfers, and any training and consulting components charge a fee for services. The resulting repayment rates are not lower than the majority of representative microfinance programs, and we also find significant accumulation of assets. These results show that the costs of microfinance programs targeted to the ultra poor can be reduced by using loans and charging fees. Use of loans and fees can increase the likelihood of long run viability often overlooked in transfer programs. Our study can be considered as an example of market based interventions that can play a role in ultra poor graduation programs.

^{*7} Kraay and McKenzie (2014) also note that upward transition from one poverty trap to another may negate the notion of a trap, while Barrett et al. (2016) base their affirmation by counting both the direct asset dynamics and the indirect inference that tests the behavioral responses that are consistent with poverty traps. See also Carter and Barrett (2006); Barrett and Carter (2013) for earlier evidence and discussions.

III Background

The study area is in the river island, known as *chars* in Bengali, of northern Bangladesh in Gaibandha and Kurigram districts. Chars are formed by sediments and silt depositions and are prone to cyclical river erosions and floods. Chars are not stable in size and even in existence, and episodes of their partial or complete erosion or submerging are common. Chars accommodate ultra-poor inhabitants who are forced, as a desperate attempt for survival, to relocate across islands due to river erosion and floods.

In the study area, heifers are the prime investment choice. Female goats are considered to be a secondary choice by residents. A heifer needs to be at least two years old to start lactation.^{*8} Rearing costs are higher for cattle as it requires fodder while a goat will eat the bushes. Cattle requires vaccination shots when a goat is usually left unvaccinated. Reproductive capacity of goats are high.^{*9} However, in comparison with cattle, their higher reproductive capacity and lower rearing costs are more than offset by the elevated morbidity and mortality risks,^{*10} and a less frequent cash flow.^{*11} Residents also report that a goat herd is less mobile than single cattle when they are forced to evacuate during the flood. All of these considerations prompt residents to opt for cattle when they can afford it, and do not expand the herd size of goats, which are both confirmed in our data.

IV Theory

In this section, we use a simplified version of Galor and Zeira (1993) to illustrate a theoretical framework to aid the interpretation of the empirical finding that asset accumulation is faster while the repayment rate is higher for upfront lending. Let us consider that there are two production sets called ‘goats’ and ‘cattle.’ Both sets are nonconvex with fixed inputs as shown in FIGURE 1 (TOP PANEL). In the top panel, the current period per capita asset size in monetary units k_t is shown on the horizontal axis, the current period production in monetary units y_t is shown on the vertical axis. For production set $j = \{\text{goats, cattle}\}$, the production becomes positive only after k_t becomes greater than its fixed input portion $\underline{k}_j \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$. The production after \underline{k}_j follows a decreasing return to scale technology.

In the two bottom panels, period t per capita asset size in monetary units k_t is given on the horizontal axis and the period $t + 1$ per capita asset size in monetary units k_{t+1} is given on the vertical axis. We take cattle production as an example. In the bottom left panel, saving out of production is given by the dotted line $sf(k_t)$ with a fixed saving rate $s \in (0, 1)$. Saving is zero for the flat segment, and becomes positive once the production becomes positive. For $k_t > \underline{k}_{\text{cattle}}$, the saving traces the


^{*8} They typically need to be about 15 months old to be ready for insemination and takes about 9.5 months to deliver a calf as it starts lactation, or the total of about 2 years.

^{*9} Parity size approaches to 2 at the third birth, and the birth interval is about 200 days (Hasan et al., 2014). An indigenous cow has a birth interval of 375 to 458 days (Hasan et al., 2018), resulting in about 2 years for gestation and calving interval (Habib et al., 2012) with the mean lifetime births of 4 (Hasan et al., 2018, Table 1).

^{*10} Indeed, morbidity of goat kids ranges from 12% (Mahmud et al., 2015) to more than 50% in some diseases (Nandi et al., 2011, Table 5), while cattle morbidity is around 22% (Bangar et al., 2013). Goat kid mortality ranges from 6% (Mahmud et al., 2015) to 30% (Paul et al., 2014, Table 5) (Ershaduzzaman et al., 2007). Heifer mortality is between 5% (Hossain et al., 2014, p.332R) to 10% (Alauddin et al., 2018). Higher morbidity of goat kids partly reflects their eating style that uses lips rather than tongues (as cattles do) and vulnerability to logging water.

^{*11} The produce of goats is mostly meat and their milk is seldom marketed. A meat market requires a cluster of relatively high income earners, usually located far from river islands, and the demand is highly seasonal. In contrast, cow milk can be marketed locally with stable demand, the lactation length is 227 days, and milk yield is 2.2 kg per day (Rokonuzzaman et al., 2009).

FIGURE 1: A POVERTY TRAP WITH GOATS AND CATTLE



Note: In the top panel, the current period per capita asset size k_t is on the horizontal axis, the current period production y_t is on the vertical axis. For production set $j = \{\text{goats, cattle}\}$, the production becomes positive only after k_t becomes greater than its fixed input portion $\underline{k}_j \in \mathbb{R}_{++}$. The positive production portion follows a decreasing return to scale production function for each j . In two bottom panels, period t per capita asset size in monetary units k_t is given on the horizontal axis and the period $t+1$ per capita asset size in monetary units k_{t+1} on the vertical axis. In the bottom left panel, the production function for cattle $f(k)$ is multiplied with a fixed saving rate s and is added current herd size net of mortality $(1-\delta)k_t$ that is passed on to the next period. The depreciation rate δ is applied in the fixed cost segment. Similar description applies to the goat production function $g(k_t)$. Saving rate and depreciation rate are assumed to be common with the cattle production. The bottom left panel shows each production sets, the bottom right panel shows the contour of two production sets. The point M exists if for some $k \in (\underline{k}_{\text{cattle}}, \infty)$, $sf(k) + (1-\delta)k > k$ holds. The point C exists as long as the point M exists and the Inada condition $\lim_{k_t \rightarrow \infty} f'(k_t) = 0$ is met. Red points are stable equilibria, blue points are unstable equilibria.

cattle production set after rescaling with the saving rate s , or $sf(k)$.

The next period net per capita asset size is given by the sum of saving and carry over asset net of depreciation (including mortality) $(1-\delta)k_t$. The depreciation rate $\delta \in (0, 1)$ is assumed to be constant. To keep the figure being overly complicated, the depreciation rate is assumed to be common between the cattle and goat production. Carry over asset net of depreciation is given as the linear slope segment next to the origin. Once the production becomes positive, saving out of production is added to the linear carry over asset line, which forms an S-shaped line as depicted with a thick green line for goat and a thick blue line for cattle.

When cattle production is feasible in the long run, which we assume to be so, or when the thick blue line gets to pass the steady state line $k_{t+1} = k_t$, it will have two intersections, C, M . As shown in the bottom left figure, when the current asset level is greater than k_M , the asset level corresponding to the intersection D , the production eventually reaches C , a steady state where the per capita asset size is constant, or $k_{t+1} = k_t$. If the current asset level is smaller than k_M , the producer will not choose to invest in cattle.

Similarly for the goat production, there is much smaller fixed inputs and production, hence smaller saving $sg(k_t)$. The shape of next period net per capita asset size is similar with the cattle, only smaller. We note from the previous section that the returns to goats net of mortality and the steady state goat asset size are smaller than the cattle in the region depicted in FIGURE 1. We also note that a goat investment, when compared to a cattle investment, requires smaller upfront costs but has an infrequent income stream, faces a more limited local demand, shows vulnerability to logging water, all pointing to smaller investments and their returns. We will use these points, and by neglecting risk implications, to assume that the fixed costs and steady state production level are smaller for goats than cattle.

For simplicity, we assume that all individual has an asset no smaller than k_B . Then, when there is only a goat production technology, individuals eventually reaches the point G . When the cattle production technology is added to the picture, there is no change in the equilibrium for individuals whose initial assets are in $[k_B, k_M)$. For individuals with initial assets in $[k_M, \infty)$, one chooses cattle, because the resulting income level is higher, and eventually arrive at the steady state C .^{*12}

Over the domain of $k_t \in [0, \infty)$, the production possibility frontier, or the contour of the union of two production sets, becomes M-shaped (BOTTOM RIGHT PANEL). Under the configuration depicted in the figure, there will be five equilibria of which three are stable. Ruling out the zero equilibrium as irrelevant, one is left with two stable equilibria, named as goats and cattle in the figure.^{*13}

Formally, one requires the production set $j = \{\text{goat, cattle}\}$ to satisfy: there exists $\underline{k}_j > 0$ that the production is zero for input $k < \underline{k}_j$ and is strictly positive for $k \geq \underline{k}_j$. We assume the production set exhibits decreasing returns to scale for $k \geq \underline{k}_j$. Let the contour of the production set be $f_j(k)$. Assume for expositional simplicity that the saving rate s and depreciation rate δ are fixed. Further assume that there exists $k_M > \underline{k}_j$ such that $sf_j(k) + (1-\delta)k > k$ for $k \in (k_M, k^*)$, with $k^* > k_M$ is a fixed point $k^* = sf_j(k^*) + (1-\delta)k^*$. For k^* to be finite, under the assumption that cattle rearing is feasible so the intersection C exists, we need $sf'_j(k^*) + (1-\delta) < 1$ which holds for any $s > 0$ as long as the Inada condition $\lim_{k_t \rightarrow \infty} f'(k_t) = 0$ is met. Under these assumptions, for j , there exists two intersections between the steady state line, one unstable and the other stable equilibria.^{*14}

In light of this argument, a loan that is larger than k_M allows individuals in the goat equilibrium to transition to cattle production and arrive at the cattle equilibrium. The entire region depicted in the diagram is considered as in the realm of poverty, so it shows a poverty trap within poverty (i.e., goat as ultra poor and cattle as moderately poor).

^{*12} M is an unstable equilibrium that all individuals would deviate from, but we include this point to the region of attraction of C for the sake of simplicity.

^{*13} A similar diagram is found in Kraay and McKenzie (2014, Figure 3, with $k - y$ space).

^{*14} In FIGURE 1, depreciation below \underline{k} is not accounted, because capital cannot be negative. Once the production starts for $k > \underline{k}$, the contour shows net of depreciation so $sf(k) + (1-\delta)k$.

[Need math.] A government or not-for-profit lender can support the productive investments of borrowers without incurring an efficiency loss through lending. If the lender charges according to marginal costs, the interest rate is the same as the marginal return on capital. The slope of such interest rate is smaller than the 45 degree line, and a line with this slope passing through M will stay below C , so the return on investment is strictly greater than the loan interest rate. Therefore, a lending, not a transfer, suffices for the transition, so long as the upperbound of the loan size is no smaller than k_M and if there is a way to reduce the costs of information asymmetry and transactions, for example, by group lending and an overhead cost subsidy.

In the empirical section, we follow Bandiera et al. (2017) in interpreting the lower repayment rates and smaller cattle holding for a smaller upfront loan size as evidence consistent with a poverty trap with a nonconvex production technology.

V Study sample

Our sample is drawn from the population of river island villages in Northern Bangladesh. [Abusan will provide the regional characteristics of the area, esp. poverty, using CLP/TUP program data and reports.]

In the *char* region, the majority of *chars* have only one village. The majority of *chars* have no MFI activity, and we delisted the *chars* if an MFI or an NGO is engaging in microfinance activities, or if *Char Livelihood Program (CLP)* is active.^{*15} Using Landsat imagery, we identified 128 *chars* within a day's boat ride from the Gaibandha peer and collected information by field visits. From this list of *chars*, we randomly selected 80 *chars*. In each village, we conducted a census of households with their wealth ranking made through a participatory ranking process. Following a process similar to the paired ranking as in Alatas et al. (2012, p.1212) and the Peruvian ultra poor case of Karlan and Thuysbaert (2019, p.66), we asked the least wealthy households in terms of asset ownership. We then asked to form a member committee of 20 households, of which 14 are ultra poor and six are moderately poor. The ultra poor are the poorest in the ranking, while the moderately poor are all other households. As we admitted households on a first come, first served basis, these 20 households are the first to join the membership of microfinance in respective poverty classes. After receiving acceptance for study participation ('pre-acceptance' in FIGURE 3) from 80 groups comprising 1,600 members, baseline data was collected in 2012 prior to the debt contract type randomization. In each group, 10 out of 20 members were randomly offered the credit and the remaining members were kept as pure control groups who did not receive a loan until 1 or 2 years into the program. Due to a concern for within group spill overs, we do not use the subsample of these control members in this paper. We thus have 800 members for the impact evaluation of this paper whom we surveyed in the baseline and offered one of the four credit products. From these 800 members, we exclude 24 members whose intervention did not strictly follow the experimental design explained below.

After the baseline data was collected in 2012, we offered the debt contracts to each group. There are four debt contract types that are randomised at the group level. After offering the each type of debt contract, three groups opted out as a group, resulting in 77 groups participating the intervention. In addition to the group level rejection, we had 89 individual loan rejectors before loan disbursements. This happened despite we had explained about the debt contract types, random assignment process, various other group based obligations, and had obtained everyone's consent to participate before randomisation. Although both types of rejectors refused to receive a loan, they gave a consent to be surveyed so we tracked them in subsequent survey rounds.

In 2013, we lost four groups to floods. As they relocated, we had no choice but to drop them from the study. This resulted in 76 groups remaining in our data, including 4 groups who group-rejected the loans. In our study, attrition refers to dropouts from our household survey. Rejection

^{*15} The *Char Livelihood Program (CLP)* is run by DFID of the United Kingdom and transfers assets to the poor.

refers to loan rejecters in our intervention, and majority of rejecters (81.25%) did not attrit from our household survey. Counting all individual attriters, we have a total of 91 subjects (11.7%) out of 776 subjects who attrited by the final round of the household survey.

As a result, among the baseline survey sample, there are flood victims whom we do not track, as well as group rejecters, individual rejecters and borrowers that we track. See Takahashi et al. (2017) for more details on the randomisation and acceptance process. We track all — barring the flood victims whose villages were washed away and other attriters — the potential borrowers in the data, including who eventually opted out the borrowing. This enables us to estimate the intention-to-treat effects of offering various debt contracts on the population who showed interests in joining microfinance membership.

TABLE 1 shows descriptive statistics of sample households. As we randomly allocate them into four different arms named as traditional, large, large grace, and cattle, summary is shown by the arms and the overall. As shown in the Appendix A TABLE A1, these baseline household characteristics do not differ statistically between the arms. Our sample is characterised by relatively low literacy rate (HeadLiteracy) and relatively young age (HeadAge) of the household heads. Literacy rate is lower than the national average of adult males at 61.54% in 2012 (UNESCO). Household size (HHsize) is not large, 4.189 members overall, due probably to the constant flood threats, as indicated by above 49% exposure overall at the baseline (FloodInRd1), that do not easily allow a large household formation. Cattle holding per household (NumCows) shows cattle rearing is not common and the mean herd size is between .2 to .4.^{*16} Net asset value of household (NetValue) is a sum of the monetary value of livestock, household asset values per household (HAssetAmount), and productive asset values per household (PAssetAmount). [No deduction of debts?] The latter two differ to some extent by arms, but they mostly reflect sampling errors as indicated in the large standard deviations.^{*17} Attrited indicates attrition rates in the household survey, and GRejected and IRejected show group rejection rates and individual rejection rates to the lending program. We will analyse attrition and rejection later in Section VIII.1, VIII.2, but at this point, we just note that the attrition rates are not statistically different between the arms at the group level. Non-attriting borrowers indicates the ratio of non-attriting borrowers to all borrowers. Because there are more rejecters in the traditional arm, this ratio is smaller than other arms. RiskPrefVal, TimePref1Val, TimePref2Val are the minimum acceptable excess of risky options (vs. certainty), 3 month future options (vs. present), and 15 month future options (vs. 12 months in future), respectively, in monetary values. Smaller values indicate greater risk tolerance and patience. PresentBias is the ratio of respondents who indicate present biasedness, TimePref1Val > TimePref2Val. All these measures are statistically similar across arms.

VI Experimental design

To investigate the detailed demand-side constraints and suitable credit scheme for the ultra poor, we implemented the village-level clustered randomization across the four treatment arms as follows (see FIGURE 2):

- T1 Traditional microcredit. Members of the group receive 5600 BDT (approximately USD 50) credit, and the loan repayment begins two weeks after the disbursement. Members repay with weekly installments and are required to attend weekly meetings as well as to regularly save an amount decided jointly by the group members. The loan maturity is one year, and borrowers are allowed to take another two loan contracts of equivalent amounts over the next

^{*16} TABLE A2 in Appendix A shows the test results that NumCows do not differ across arms at the baseline.

^{*17} There is an alternative measure for net assets, which we call broad net assets: Broad net assets = Broad assets + net saving - debt to GUK - debts to relatives and money lenders. While regular assets use only items observed for all 4 rounds for household assets, broad assets use all asset items. All estimation results hold with broad net assets with wider confidence intervals due to greater noises across time. See FIGURE ?? for details.

TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY RCT ARM FOR ALL HOUSEHOLDS INCLUDING NONPARTICIPANTS

Variable	Traditional	Large	Large grace	Cattle	Overall
HeadLiteracy	0.097 (0.297)	0.111 (0.314)	0.106 (0.308)	0.151 (0.359)	0.117 (0.321)
HeadAge	38.477 (10.124)	37.452 (10.189)	38.376 (9.283)	38.015 (10.746)	38.066 (10.087)
HHsize	4.097 (1.449)	4.302 (1.507)	4.241 (1.495)	4.121 (1.369)	4.193 (1.456)
FloodInRd1	0.463 (0.500)	0.618 (0.487)	0.407 (0.493)	0.497 (0.501)	0.497 (0.500)
NLHAssetAmount	1428 (922)	1244 (714)	1308 (692)	1546 (1170)	1378 (898)
PAssetAmount	1020 (1724)	1232 (2335)	2031 (9387)	1032 (2577)	1335 (5127)
TotalImputedValue	4343 (11116)	6131 (13802)	5319 (13139)	4121 (10304)	4993 (12195)
NumCows	0.217 (0.556)	0.307 (0.690)	0.266 (0.657)	0.206 (0.515)	0.250 (0.610)
NetValue	8011 (14877)	9550 (15314)	9677 (21603)	5811 (11658)	8273 (16255)
BroadNetValue	9012 (15030)	10312 (15556)	9894 (21460)	7115 (12817)	9093 (16498)
Attrited	0.177 (0.383)	0.040 (0.197)	0.146 (0.354)	0.116 (0.321)	0.118 (0.323)
IRejected	0.171 (0.378)	0.045 (0.208)	0.065 (0.248)	0.186 (0.390)	0.115 (0.320)
GRejected	0.229 (0.421)	0.101 (0.301)	0.050 (0.219)	0.000 (0.000)	0.091 (0.287)
Non-attributing borrowers	0.474 (0.501)	0.819 (0.386)	0.799 (0.402)	0.734 (0.443)	0.714 (0.452)
RiskPrefVal	115 (31)	108 (32)	114 (36)	110 (32)	111 (33)
TimePref1Val	374 (132)	374 (152)	377 (147)	409 (141)	384 (144)
TimePref2Val	483 (127)	486 (137)	477 (156)	512 (121)	490 (136)
PresentBias	0.470 (0.501)	0.453 (0.499)	0.482 (0.501)	0.455 (0.499)	0.464 (0.499)
N	175	199	199	199	772

Source: Information of 776 households in GUK administrative data and household survey data at the baseline. Survey respondents include nonparticipants to the experiments.

Notes: 1. Mean values at the baseline. Values in brackets are standard deviations.

2. Head literate is an indicator variable of household head literacy. Head age is age of household head. Household size is total number of household members. Flood at baseline is an indicator variable of flood exposure. Household asset amount and Productive asset amount are amount of non-livestock household and productive assets, respectively, in BDT. Livestock value is BDT value of all livestock holding beyond cattle. Number of cattle holding is number of cattle holding. Net asset value is net asset values in BDT using asset items observed in all 4 rounds. Broad net asset value is net asset values in BDT for all asset items. Attrited indicates attrition rates in the household survey, and GRejected and IRejected show group rejection rates and individual rejection rates to the lending program. Non-attributing borrowers indicates the ratio of non-attributing borrowers to all borrowers. Because attrition and rejection are separate events, a household can reject and attrit, so non-attributed borrowers \geq total - (rejected members + attrited members). USD 1 is about BDT 80. Risk preference is the respondent's choice of the acceptable minimum excess monetary value of the risky option over a certainty option. Lower values indicate a greater risk tolerance. Time preference 1 is the respondent's choice of the acceptable minimum excess monetary value in 3 months that is no smaller than present monetary benefit, and Time preference 2 is the minimum excess value in 1 year and 3 months that is no smaller than monetary benefits of 1 year from now. Lower values indicate a greater patience. If a respondent's Time preference 1 is greater than Time preference 2, the respondent is considered to be present-biased. Present bias is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is considered to be present-biased, 0 otherwise.

consecutive years. The weekly repayment is 125 BDT (approximately USD 1.1) payable in 50 installments.

- T2 Upfront lumpy credit. Members receive 16,800 BDT (approximately USD 150) credit with a longer loan maturity, and the loan repayments begin two weeks after the disbursement. The weekly repayment and the design of compulsory saving are exactly the same as in T1 arm. The loan maturity is three years. The required weekly repayment is 125 BDT payable in 150 weekly instalments (for three years).
- T3 Upfront lumpy credit with a grace period. Members receive 16,800 BDT credit with loan re-

FIGURE 2: DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIMENTAL ARMS

T1	<p>Traditional microcredit.</p> <p>Credit 5600 BDT (approximately USD 50).</p> <p>Repayment start Two weeks after the disbursement.</p> <p>Installments Repay with weekly installments of 125 BDT (approximately USD 1.1) which amounts to a simple interest rate of 11.61%.</p> <p>Maturity Total installments of 50 or a loan maturity of one year. Take another two loan contracts of equivalent amounts over the next consecutive years.</p> <p>Weekly obligations Attend a meeting and deposit an amount decided jointly with group members.</p>
T2	<p>Upfront lumpy credit. Following conditions in black colours differ from T1:</p> <p>Credit 16,800 BDT (approximately USD 150).</p> <p>Repayment start Two weeks after the disbursement.</p> <p>Installments Repay with weekly installments of 125 BDT (approximately USD 1.1) which amounts to a simple interest rate of 11.61%.</p> <p>Maturity Total installments of 150 or a loan maturity of three years.</p> <p>Weekly obligations Attend a meeting and deposit an amount decided jointly with group members.</p>
T3	<p>Upfront lumpy credit with a grace period. Following conditions in black colour differ from T2:</p> <p>Credit 16,800 BDT (approximately USD 150).</p> <p>Repayment start One year after the disbursement.</p> <p>Installments Repay with weekly installments of 190 BDT (approximately USD 1.7) which amounts to a simple interest rate of 13.1% when repaying.</p> <p>Maturity Total installments of 100 or two years.</p> <p>Weekly obligations Attend a meeting and deposit an amount decided jointly with group members.</p>
T4	<p>In-kind credit with a one-year grace period and managerial support programs. Following conditions in black colours differ from T3:</p> <p>Credit Receive a credit in the form of a one-year old heifer with the price of 16,000 BDT (approximately USD 143).</p> <p>Repayment start One year after the disbursement.</p> <p>Installments Repay with weekly installments of 190 BDT (approximately USD 1.7) which amounts to a simple interest rate of 18.75% when repaying. After adding the support program costs 800 BDT to the principal, the interest rate will be the same as T3.</p> <p>Maturity Total installments of 100 or two years.</p> <p>Weekly obligations Attend a meeting and deposit an amount decided jointly with group members.</p> <p>Support program Provide input support (fodder, veterinary and vaccination services), marketing consultancy (milk sales), and basic training on cattle rearing with the local NGO, at the total fee of 800 BDT (approximately USD 7.2) charged for the three years. With 800 BDT for the support program, the total cost sums to BDT 16,800 which is the same as in all other arms.</p>

Note: Grayed texts in T2-T4 arms are unchanged conditions from the respective previous arms.

payments begin one year after the disbursement. During the first year grace period, members are required to meet weekly and follow group activities such as compulsory savings just as in other arms. The design of compulsory saving is the same as in the T1, T2 arms. The loan maturity is three years. The required weekly repayment is 190 BDT (approximately USD 1.7) payable in 100 weekly installments, starting after one year.

- T4 In-kind credit with a one-year grace period and managerial support programs.^{*18} Members receive in-kind credit in the form of a one-year old heifer with the price of 16,000 BDT (approximately USD 142), and the loan repayments begin one year after the disbursement.

^{*18} Heifer ownership was never explicitly agreed upon, but it was generally understood by the borrowers that they owned the heifer. T4 is thus more similar to a debt contract with the purchased asset as collateral than to a finance lease under which the asset ownership belongs to the lessor.

The grace period length is equal to the one provided under T3 and T4 arms. In addition, the members receive input (fodder, veterinary and vaccination services) procurement supports, marketing consultancy (milk sales), and basic training on cattle rearing with the local NGO, at the total fee of 800 BDT (approximately USD 7.2) charged for the subscription period of three years. With 800 BDT for the support program, the total cost sums to BDT 16,800 which is the same as in all other arms.

One of the aims of the study is to assess if the entrepreneurship matters in microfinance lending outcomes. Assuming, below 17000 Taka, that the productive asset with the highest return is a heifer, we bundle training and consultation with a heifer lending. At the start of a loan, the NGO's procurement officer buys a heifer from the local market, so the borrower does not have to have the knowledge required for the quality purchase. By providing the knowledge to a group of borrowers through training and disallowing an investment choice with in-kind, heifer lending, some aspects of entrepreneurship will no longer be a prerequisite. It can be seen that we are offering a capacity to use the best practice or the *cristalised intelligence* related to cattle production (Cattell, 1963). This is only a part of entrepreneurial skills. The remainder, a capacity to apply a suitable action to unforeseen events or the *fluid intelligence* related to cattle production, and other inter-personal skills, are left unchanged. If the entrepreneurship raises productivity, borrowers of other arms who are not provided the knowledge are expected to opt out the loan more frequently or perform worse. One can measure effects of the entrepreneurship on participation and outcomes by comparing these two groups, in-kind credit with training vs. cash credit.

As a natural reference, we want to compare the training cum in-kind loan T4 with the traditional regular microcredit T1, a classic Grameen style loan that is about a third in loan size and maturity with no grace period. In order to make comparison feasible, we added two intermediate treatment arms to bridge them: Two arms with upfront lumpy lending that is equivalent of a heifer price, one with a grace period T3 and another without a grace period T2. With the loan sizes that are three times the traditional microfinance loans, we extended the maturity to three years to even out the repayment burden. The comparison arm, the traditional regular microcredit, has only one year maturity. We therefore provided the total of three loans in three loan cycles in T1 which are unconditionally disbursed annually, so the total loaned amount will be aligned and there is no exit-selection due to delinquency before three cycles are complete.

Under this setting, frontloading liquidity without changing the total loan size eases a liquidity constraint, attaching a grace period under the same loan size and disbursement timing eases a saving constraint prior to a loan receipt, and offering an in-kind loan with a managerial support without changing other features eases an entrepreneurship constraint. In effect, we constructed a stepped-wedge design over these key features of loans, namely, upfront liquidity (Upfront), a grace period (WithGrace), and in-kind with managerial supports (InKind), to assess the impacts of respective constraints on participation and outcomes as indicated in TABLE 2.

An in-kind offer in treatment T4 is generally thought to be less efficient than a cash offer as it takes away an investment choice from the borrower. However, the local microfinance practitioners widely agree that other production opportunities are limited, so not much is lost in terms of the choice set, under our setting of island location and occasional floods.^{*19} Given the small set of the productive investment choices, our experiment gives a unique chance to compare cash lending against in-kind lending, even without controlling for a potentially wider choice set of cash lending. Indeed, we found in our data that most of T2 and T3 cash borrowers started to invest in cattle after receiving a loan. Consequently, in our study, the cash-grace-period and in-kind-grace-period lending differ effectively only in the managerial support services bundled in the latter.

All loan products are of individual liability and the committee was intended to serve as an activity platform for microfinance operations. Among the traditional members, there were 24 members who

^{*19} A closely related project in the neighbouring areas transfers an asset in the form of a cow (Bandiera et al., 2017).

TABLE 2: A 4×4 FACTORIAL, STEPPED WEDGE DESIGN

	Large, grace	Large	Traditional
Cattle	entrepreneurship	saving	liquidity
	constraint	constraint	constraint
	(InKind)	(WithGrace)	(Upfront)
Large, grace		saving	liquidity
		constraint	constraint
		(WithGrace)	(Upfront)
Large			liquidity
			constraint
			(Upfront)

Note: Cell contents are hypothesised constraints on investments that exists in the column arm but are eased in the row arm. Contents in brackets are variable names of respective attributes.

received disbursements twice, not three times, due to logistical limitations. We drop them from the analysis and use 776 members in the below.

Lastly, because of the severe flood damages caused on borrowers and the associated administrative delays in 2013, the repayment was halted in 2013 and resumed after one year in 2014. This resulted in an extension of loan maturity from 36 months to 48 months for all arms. This gave substantial leniency to the borrowers in terms of loan repayment burden.

VII Empirical strategy

We collected data at one baseline survey and three annual follow up surveys. With successful randomisation (see Section VIII.1 and Appendix A), we use ANCOVA estimators to measure impacts of each experimental arms and loan attributes. ANCOVA estimators are more efficient than DID estimators (Frison and Pocock, 1992; McKenzie, 2012). As we include loan rejecters, what we are estimating is intention-to-treat effects. For an ease of interpretation, we sometimes use indicator variables of each attributes, Upfront, WithGrace, InKind in place of arms in several estimating equations. Numerically, both are equivalent. In what follows, we will refer to these attributes as *functional attributes*.

The estimating equation for our intention-to-treat effects is:


$$y_{it} = b_{a_0} + b_1 y_{i1} + \mathbf{b}' \mathbf{d}_i + e_{it}, \quad t = 2, 3, 4, \quad (1)$$

where, for member i in survey round t ($t = 1$ is the baseline), y_{it} is an outcome measure, \mathbf{d}_i is a vector of three indicator variables in nontraditional arms or functional attributes that i receives, $\mathbf{b}' = (b_{a_1} \ b_{a_2} \ b_{a_3})$ is associated impacts relative to traditional arm, e_{it} is an error term. For the traditional arm, the conditional mean of outcome given covariates and baseline outcome variable is given by b_{a_0} . For an arm or a functional attribute a_k , the impact relative to the traditional arm is measured with b_{a_k} . As we are interested in the time course of relative impacts, we extend equation (1) as:

$$y_{it} = b_1 y_{i1} + b_{2a_0} + \mathbf{b}'_2 \mathbf{d}_i + b_{3a_0} c_3 + \mathbf{b}'_3 \mathbf{d}_i c_3 + b_{4a_0} c_4 + \mathbf{b}'_4 \mathbf{d}_i c_4 + e_{it}, \quad t = 2, 3, 4, \quad (2)$$

where $\mathbf{b}'_t = (b_{ta_1} \ b_{ta_2} \ b_{ta_3})$ is a vector of time-varying impacts relative to concurrent traditional arm, c_3 is a dummy variable for $t = 3$ and c_4 is a dummy variable for $t = 4$. Our main interest is on the cumulative deviation of impacts of a non-traditional arm from impacts of the traditional arm. In equation (2), this is captured by b_{2a_k} for period 2, $b_{2a_k} + b_{3a_k}$ for period 3, and $b_{2a_k} + b_{4a_k}$ for period 4. We thus plot these estimates for cumulative impacts in main figures in the next section. In some specifications, equation (2) is further extended to include controls of other baseline characteristics and their interactions with treatment dummies to allow heterogeneous impacts. All the standard errors are clustered at the group (char) level as suggested by ?.

FIGURE 3: SAMPLING FRAMEWORK, REJECTION, AND ATTRITION



Note: Each 20 subjects (14 ultra poor, 6 moderately poor) in 80 groups agreed to participate in the lending program. Each 10 subjects (7 ultra poor, 3 moderately poor) in 80 groups were randomly assigned to the experiment. 80 groups were randomly assigned to 4 arms after the baseline household survey. After the arm assignment is revealed, 7 groups (70 subjects) group-rejected and 90 subjects individually-rejected to participate in the lending program. 24 subjects in the traditional arm were given the same loan amount but in 2 disbursements for logistical errors, and they were dropped from the analysis sample. Total of 706 subjects participated in the lending program while all 776 subjects were tracked in the subsequent household surveys. The household survey sample size was reduced to 684 by attrition at the round 4 survey (attrition rate 0.119). See FIGURE 2 for description of each arms.

VIII Results

The reasons behind nonparticipation are fundamental in understanding the outreach. We analyse nonparticipation in relation to the debt contract design that they were randomly allocated to. Given our interests on the cattle arm, we further compare the participant characteristics of cattle arm members and of all other arms. In addition, selective attrition from the household surveys, if any, biases the estimates so we need to compare the attriter's characteristics with the nonattriters. In this section, we examine the difference in characteristics of participants and rejecters, attriters and non-attriters. After these exercises, we assess the impacts of debt contract design on assets, labour incomes, consumption, and schooling.

VIII.1 Participation

As noted in Section VI, there are two kinds of rejecters in participation. One is group rejecters who turned down the offer jointly as a group, and another is individual rejecters who decided not to participate while fellow members of the group participated. To see if the differences are statistically meaningful, we use permutation tests of R's coin package with 100000 random draws from all admissible permutations.

Group rejecters of traditional and non-traditional arms differ in household characteristics. In the Appendix B, it is shown that the asset-poor households group-rejected in the traditional arm (TABLE B6), while it is younger, recent flood victims who group-rejected in the non-traditional arms (TABLE B7). We conjecture that it is lack of Upfront liquidity that prevented asset-poor households of traditional arm from participating because they cannot purchase cattle due to insufficient net asset values or an insufficient resale value of owned livestock, when members of similar characteristics participated in non-traditional arms. Group rejecters of non-traditional arms did not participate mostly because of negative asset shocks.

TABLE 3 contrasts individual rejecters and individual non-rejecters for traditional arm, non-traditional arms, and all arms combined.^{*20} As seen in livestock values, cattle holding, net assets, individual rejecters in both subsamples tend to have less assets. The differences between individual rejecters and non individual rejecters are not statistically meaningful due to small sample sizes in both subsamples, but they become statistically unignorable when both subsamples are combined^{*21}. In the All arms panel comparing individual rejecters and non individual rejecters in all arms, the common factors associated with nonparticipation are a smaller household size ($p = 1.0\%$), smaller livestock holding ($p = 8.3\%$), and smaller net asset values ($p = 6.9\%$).^{*22}

Smaller household size of rejecters hints that cattle rearing may require a certain household size. It is possible that smaller households may be facing a domestic labour constraint or a space limitation to accommodate cattle under the roof. These constraints are expected to be absent in asset transfer programs where targeted residents can sell the asset if either of constraints binds. We conjecture that the households under a binding domestic capacity constraint did not meet the conditions to raise cattle, and have withheld themselves from the program with an individual rejection. This self-selection may have caused the repayment rates to be higher than when everyone participated.

One of the few differences between subsamples is flood exposure: It is related to individual rejection only among the non-traditional arm members. A strong correlation between baseline flood exposure and individual rejection among the non-traditional arm members suggests that a population prone to natural calamity and associated asset shocks have voluntarily opted out the borrowing. This partly explains the lack of commercial and even noncommercial/NGO lenders in the flood prone areas.

RiskPrefVal indicates that individual rejecters tend to demand higher compensation for risks, and the p value becomes small enough only with entire sample of All arms. This suggests some individual rejecters are more risk averse than non rejecters. TimePrefVal1, TimePrefVal2, PresentBias all do not show statistically recognisable differences.

In TABLE 4, we compare if the cattle arm participants (borrowers) differ from participants in other arms at the baseline. In the left panel, we compare all participants including atteriters. Interestingly, participants of cattle arm differ from other arms in having less cattle rearing experience as observed in smaller initial cattle holding (p value = 15.6%) and in having lower net asset values (p value = 6.2%). Despite these disadvantageous features in rearing a heifer, the cattle arm, which provides

^{*20} As shown in TABLE B12, characteristics of individual rejecters are similar between traditional and non-traditional arms.

^{*21} For example, net asset values have p values of 29.9% and 13.1% for both subsamples, which is reduced to 6.8% in the all arms sample.

^{*22} NetValue also shows a difference but this is due mostly to a difference in livestock holding.

TABLE 3: INDIVIDUAL REJECTERS VS. NON-REJECTERS


variables	Traditional arm			non-Traditional arms			All arms		
	Not rejected	Rejected	<i>p</i> value	Not rejected	Rejected	<i>p</i> value	Not rejected	Rejected	<i>p</i> value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
<i>I</i>	0.095	0.167	(25.3)	0.132	0.068	(17.8)	0.126	0.101	(54.9)
Head age	38.848	36.467	(25.8)	37.982	39.732	(22.0)	38.131	38.593	(69.3)
<i>Ho</i>	4.181	3.667	(8.2)	4.274	3.932	(8.9)	4.258	3.843	(1.3)
Prop. of non-textsfTraditional arms							0.829	0.663	(0.1)
Flood	0.514	0.533	(92.1)	0.467	0.627	(2.3)	0.475	0.596	(3.6)
Household asset amount	1538	1360	(56.6)	1392	1174	(14.7)	1413	1226	(16.1)
Productive asset amount	1016	869	(71.7)	1526	804	(15.9)	1438	826	(16.7)
Livestock value	6095	3333	(28.1)	5444	3051	(17.0)	5556	3146	(9.3)
Number of cattle	0.305	0.167	(28.1)	0.272	0.153	(17.0)	0.278	0.157	(9.3)
Net asset value	11103	7761	(50.7)	8627	6580	(47.9)	8993	6921	(40.8)
Broad net asset value	12547	9001	(47.4)	9494	6634	(32.8)	9945	7317	(29.3)
Risk preference	115	123	(21.6)	109	118	(7.5)	110	120	(2.2)
Time preference	376	342	(25.1)	386	393	(73.9)	384	375	(62.6)
Time preference 2	485	492	(78.8)	495	489	(78.1)	494	490	(81.8)
	0.465	0.385	(44.4)	0.449	0.478	(70.0)	0.452	0.444	(95.0)
<i>n</i>	105	30	(rate 0.222)	508	59	(rate 0.104)	613	89	(rate 0.127)

Note: Individual rejecters are the members who did not accept a loan based on an individual decision after the period when group rejection was decided. After 70 people group-rejected, the total number of individuals who was in a position to individually reject the loan was 706 people, of which 90 individually rejected. Traditional arm panel compares individual rejecters against non rejecters in the traditional arm, non-Traditional arm panel shows the comparison in the non-traditional arms, All arms panel shows the comparison in the all arms. Non-traditional arms are large, large grace and cattle arms. The variable Arm is the ratio of traditional arm members in individual nonrejecters and individual rejecters. Respective rejection rates are given in the brackets in the row *n*. HeadLiteracy is an indicator variable of household head literacy. HeadAge is age of household head. HHsize is total number of household members. FloodInRd1 is an indicator variable of flood exposure. HAssetAmount and PAssetAmount are amount of household and productive assets, respectively, in BDT, NumCows is cattle holding per household. NetValue is net asset values in BDT per household. Attrited indicates attrition rates in the household survey, and GRejected and IRejected show group rejection rates and individual rejection rates to the lending program. USD 1 is about BDT 80.

TABLE 4: CONTRASTING CATTLE ARM AND OTHER ARMS, BORROWERS AND NON-ATTRITING BORROWERS

variables	Borrowers			Non-attributing borrowers		
	Cattle arm	Other arms	<i>p</i> value	Cattle arm	Other arms	<i>p</i> value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>I</i>	0.167	0.111	(6.3)	0.144	0.114	(33.7)
Head age	37.642	38.306	(45.8)	37.973	38.205	(80.5)
<i>Ho</i>	4.173	4.288	(37.2)	4.110	4.286	(19.4)
Flood at baseline	0.463	0.479	(74.8)	0.459	0.484	(59.8)
Household asset amount	1639	1334	(0.5)	1676	1313	(0.1)
Productive asset amount	1089	1563	(40.5)	1112	1336	(47.2)
Livestock value	4444	5956	(20.0)	3425	6222	(2.0)
Number of cattle holding	0.222	0.298	(20.1)	0.171	0.311	(2.0)
Net asset value	5968	10048	(4.4)	5457	9888	(2.4)
Broad net asset value	7597	10764	(12.7)	7251	10410	(11.5)
	109	110	(69.3)	108	109	(67.9)

FIGURE 4: NET ASSETS BY PERIOD



Source: Tabulated with survey data.

Note: Red squares are means of respective data. Vertical axis is logarithmic scaled. Horizontal green lines indicate zero.

managerial supports and in-kind lending, induced participation.^{*23} As we will see in Section VIII.3, the choice of lending instrument (cash or in-kind) does not matter in the investment choice. So it is natural to infer that the managerial support component has induced the members with less experiences and fewer assets to take up loans.

In the right panel, we compare the borrowers who did not attrit by the end of final survey round between cattle arm with other arms. These borrowers can be seen as successful borrowers. At the baseline, these successful borrowers of cattle arm have smaller baseline livestock holding (p value = 1.6%) and smaller baseline net asset holding (p value = 0.7%) than other arms' successful borrowers. This hints that asset poor borrowers participated and managed to stay on the survey until the end of the study in the cattle arm with a help of managerial supports.

VIII.2 Attrition

The survey resulted in the attrition (including the flood victims) of a moderate rate, 11.9%. We checked for systematic differences between attriters and nonattriters and found the attrition is not correlated with any household level characteristics (see more detailed attrition examination in Appendix C). We also found that traditional arm attriters have a lower rate of head literacy while non-traditional arm attriters are more exposed to the flood and have a larger household size. One can argue that, with attrition, the estimated impacts of borrowing could have increased for the traditional arm while not for the non-traditional arms. Such a conjecture hints there may be underestimation, if any, but it is unlikely to inflate the impact estimates.

VIII.3 Impacts


VIII.3.1 Assets

In FIGURE 4, we show the time paths of net assets by arm in logarithms. Overall, we see increased levels of asset holding in all arms. The difference between Traditional arm and non-Traditional arms are visually subtle that one must use statistical tests.^{*24}

^{*23} In addition, cattle arm borrowers show relative impatience as indicated in TimePrefVal1 (p value = 0.6%), TimePrefVal2 (p value = 4.4%).

^{*24} In all regressions, specification (1) is an OLS on arms/functional attributes, (2) is ANCOVA only with arms/functional attributes, (3) adds flood exposure, household head characteristics, household size to (2), (4) adds baseline cattle ownership and interactions to (3), (5) adds baseline cattle holding to (3), (6) adds adds baseline cattle ownership and interactions and baseline cattle holding to (3).

FIGURE 5: CUMULATIVE EFFECTS ON NET ASSETS



Source: Estimated with survey data. Constructed from ANCOVA estimation results TABLE D2, TABLE D4.

Note: Cumulative impacts on net assets. Large/Upfront, Large grace, Cattle are impacts relative to Traditional arm. WithGrace and InKind are the impacts of respective marginal functional attributes. Panels show cumulative impacts of respective arm or attributes k relative to traditional arm which are obtained by 2nd period = b_{2k} , 3rd period = $b_{2k} + b_{3k}$, 4th period = $b_{2k} + b_{4k}$ in the estimating equation $y_{it} = b_1 y_{i1} + b_2 + \mathbf{b}_2' \mathbf{d}_i + b_3 c_{3t} + \mathbf{b}_3' \mathbf{d}_i c_{3t} + b_4 c_{4t} + \mathbf{b}_4' \mathbf{d}_i c_{4t} + e_{it}$, $t = 2, 3, 4$, where y_{it} is the outcome measure of member i in period t , \mathbf{d}_i is a vector of arms or functional attributes, c_{3t} , c_{4t} are indicator variables of period 3 and 4. Bars show 95% confidence intervals using cluster robust standard errors.

We see bifercation of net asset holding into large and small values in all arms. What are the characteristics of large holders and small holders?

FIGURE 5 summarises the cumulative impacts on net assets in time-varying specification of (2). See Appendix D for full estimation results. There are five panels of arms and functional attributes. Since large arm and Upfront functional attribute are numerically same in (2), they are put in one panel column. In all panels, points show the estimates of cumulative deviation from concurrent traditional arm values, or how much the impacts relative to traditional arm have evolved. Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. For all panels, in each period, there are several estimation specifications bunched side-by-side.^{*25} This is intended to show robustness to specification changes at a glance.^{*26} One sees that there is little variation across specifications.

There are notable tendencies in the figure. First, point estimates show there is a one time increase at period 2 in the Large/Upfront arm/attribute. All the non-traditional arms, which have the Upfront functional attribute in common, have increased net assets once and stayed increased relative to the traditional arm. We interpret the impacts as once-off, given that the point estimates change only marginally and standard error bars grow longer in time. As time passes, standard errors get necessarily magnified because borrowers get exposed to more random variations, and in the absence of further impacts that lift the point estimates away from zero, the error bars eventually cross the zero line at round 4 in two regresion specifications.

Secondly, it is the Upfront functinal attribute that shows positive impacts on net assets. This is consistent with the nonconvex production technology of a larger investment under a liquidity constraint, coupled with an inferior, smaller investment technology. TABLE D2 [specification (2)] in the Appendix shows that, relative to the traditional microfinance lending, the upfront liquidity provision increases the net assets by BDT 13772 (CI 5826, 21719) or 0.86σ (of the baseline standard deviation) in the second year, BDT 21601 (CI 5330, 37872) or 1.35σ by the end of fourth year. As we discuss in the robustness checks, these results hold when other various definitions of assets are adopted or other covariates, including cattle rearing experiences, are controlled.

Thirdly, comparing the impacts of the InKind and WithGrace functional attributes, we see sta-

^{*25} Specification 1 is omitted from the plot, because it is an OLS regression without the baseline outcome that is intended to provide a reference for ANCOVA estimates.

^{*26} As multiple specifications are estimated to show uniformity of results, not to pick one specific estimate, inference corrections for multiple testing are unnecessary.

tistically zero differences while Large/Upfront shows statistically positive impacts. The marginal contributions of the former functional attributes are zero. Accordingly, the Cattle arm, a combination of InKind and WithGrace functional attributes in addition to Upfront, has the impacts that are statistically zero beyond the Large arm. The finding that the Cattle arm outcomes are statistically indistinguishable from other non-traditional arms implies that it facilitated the returns to cattle rearing at a no lower level. In light of the fact that individuals with less cattle rearing experiences and lower asset values participated and continued in the Cattle arm, the returns at a no lower level by themselves are an achievement. The reason can either be the managerial support program complemented the necessary codifiable knowledge, or these participants had the same level of knowledge as other participants but noticed the managerial support program as useful. Either possibility is consistent with the finding by previous studies that only the experienced or skilled members could reap the benefits of traditional microfinance. Previous studies cited in the Section I have targeted the population with a richer set of investment possibilities in a more urbanised setting under which the experience may have a positive return. In the current study, the population resides in a remote, rural area. Even the simpler production process of cattle rearing that consists of procuring feeding, grazing, insemination and calving turns out to demand unignorable codifiable skills, or the crystallised intelligence, to participate and sustain in traditional microfinance. We examine how the returns to experience may have affected the outcomes in more details in VIII.4.


One of the reasons behind the difference in net asset impacts is number of cattle holding. In the appendix, we examine the impacts on the subcomponents of net assets. The Cattle holding row in FIGURE E2 shows the impacts on number of cattle owned and it also serves as a check that non-traditional members actually own cattle once the loan is made. The ANCOVA estimates plotted in the figure are net of baseline cattle holding, so even the non-traditional holding estimates sometimes add up to less than 1. The figure shows that, on average, the non-traditional arms continue to own about .4 more cattle than the traditional arm members conditional on the initial cattle holding, although estimates are indistinguishable from zero for some arms and regression specifications.

To gain insights on larger cattle holding among the non-traditional members, we decompose the cattle ownership of each arms in FIGURE 6. Holder rates (HolderRates) are the number of cattle owners per arm size, holding size (HoldingSize) is average holding per owner, initial owners' holding (InitialOwnerHolding) are herd size for owners who held cattle at baseline, and per capita holding (PerCapitaHolding) is mean cattle holding in each arm. Initial owner holding and holder rates reflect impacts on the intensive and extensive margins, respectively. Per capita holding tracks impacts on both the intensive margins (growth of initial owners) and the extensive margins (growth of new owners). All the indicators are similar across arms at the baseline.

We see that the holder rates increased in all arms, although the increase was smallest for the traditional. This shows that, even the small upfront lending of traditional arm helped increase cattle ownership but to a lesser degree. With no large upfront liquidity provision and the repayment pressure that begins immediately after the disbursement, a smaller fraction of borrowers could purchase their first cattle. HoldingSize increased in all non-traditional arms, while the traditional arm remained stagnant. In InitialOwnerHolding, it is also the traditional arm that has the smallest, or negligible, changes between round 1 and 4. For the non-traditional arm, InitialOwnerHolding size is larger than the average holding size per owner, hinting the higher returns to members with experiences, or on the intensive margins. The per capita holding growth was smallest in the traditional arm. This is due to smaller changes on the extensive margins (fewer new ownership, smaller growth by new owners) and little change on the intensive margins (negligible growth by initial owners).

To understand the reasons behind the slower pace of asset accumulation of traditional arm, in FIGURE 7, we plot the contents of first IGAs of members. The first IGA is defined as the oldest IGA for the household. For most of the households, the oldest IGA had started after the baseline, and it is the IGA with the largest cash flow. Of course, there are a small percentage of households with an existing IGA before the baseline, but, with randomisation, the fraction of such households are similar across arms. Therefore, the between arm comparison of the first IGA gives us an idea about


FIGURE 6: CATTLE HOLDING BY ARM



Source: Household survey data.

Note: HolderRate is the ratio of cattle owners in each arm, HoldingSize is average holding per owner, InitialOwnerHolding are average holding per owner who held cattle at baseline, and PerCapitaHolding is cattle owned per arm member. InitialOwnerHolding and HolderRates show impacts on the intensive and extensive margins, respectively. PerCapitaHolding shows the time trend in mean cattle holding.

FIGURE 7: CONTENTS OF FIRST IGA



Source: Administrative data, based on the information reported at the weekly meeting. Only borrowing member data are shown.


Note: Contents of IGAs are cattle, goat/sheep, growing cereals (paddy, corn) and nuts, small trades, and house and land leasing. The first IGA is defined as the oldest IGA for the household. Colour-filled bars are the cattle rearing, white bars are the sum of all other projects.

how the households had chosen the initial investments. In the traditional arm, there are 33 borrowing members who report cattle as their first IGA, and 76 borrowing members (69.72%) who report other than cattle as their first IGA. This contrasts with the non-traditional arms that 466 borrowing members who report cattle as their first IGA and 25 borrowing members (5.09%) other than cattle as their first IGA. Correspondingly, the data confirms that the traditional arm borrowers hold a diversified IGA portfolio while only a small minority of non-traditional arm borrowers have a diversified portfolio. ^{*27, *28}

^{*27} Results are available from the authors upon a request.

^{*28} As observed earlier, a stagnant growth of InitialOwnerHolding indicates the traditional arm initial owners diversified

FIGURE 8: CUMULATIVE EFFECTS ON LABOUR INCOME AND PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION



Source: Constructed from ANCOVA estimation results TABLE D10, TABLE D11, TABLE D12, TABLE D13.


Note: Style and placement of panels follow the FIGURE 5. Large/Upfront, Large grace, Cattle are impacts relative to Traditional arm. WithGrace and InKind are the impacts of respective marginal functional attributes. Panels show cumulative impacts of respective arm or attributes k relative to traditional arm which are obtained by 2nd period = b_{2k} , 3rd period = $b_{2k} + b_{3k}$, 4th period = $b_{2k} + b_{4k}$ in the estimating equation $y_{it} = b_1 y_{i1} + b_2 + \mathbf{b}'_2 \mathbf{d}_i + b_3 c_{3t} + \mathbf{b}'_3 \mathbf{d}_i c_{3t} + b_4 c_{4t} + \mathbf{b}'_4 \mathbf{d}_i c_{4t} + e_{it}$, $t = 2, 3, 4$, where y_{it} is the outcome measure of member i in period t , \mathbf{d}_i is a vector of arms or functional attributes, c_{3t} , c_{4t} are indicator variables of period 3 and 4. Bars show 95% confidence intervals using cluster robust standard errors. Per capita consumption is a total of food, hygiene, social, and energy expenditure divided by the number of household members, expressed as the annualised values in BDT. In-kind consumption of home made products is imputed at median prices. Labour income is labour incomes of household in 1000 BDT units.

VIII.3.2 Labour incomes and consumption

FIGURE 8 shows impacts on consumption and labour incomes. Style and placement of panels follow the FIGURE 5. Consumption is not measured at the baseline, so we do not use it to understand the welfare impacts. Instead, using period 2 consumption as a reference point, we can understand how the members have dealt with the loan repayment through consumption choices. Given randomisation, one can still identify impacts on repayment efforts in terms of consumption suppression relative to the traditional arm. The upper row of FIGURE 8 plots ANCOVA estimates, conditional on period 2 consumption. In theory, this can be problematic as period 2 consumption can be correlated with arm assignment. But the results do not change if we estimate without period 2 consumption as a covariate in specification 1. Consumption is per capita expenditure of the household. Labour income is a household level variable and measures earnings from casual jobs. Both consumption and labour incomes do not show any impact by the arms or functional attributes.

In FIGURE 9, we see that, in all arms, the labour income is increasing from period 3, and per capita

FIGURE 9: MEAN PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION AND LABOUR INCOMES BY ARM AND PERIOD



Source: Survey data.

Note: Points indicate means, vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. Per capita consumption is an annualised total of food, hygiene, social, and energy expenditure divided by the number of household members in BDT. In-kind consumption of home made products is imputed at median prices. Household labour income is annual labour income of household in BDT.

consumption did not change between periods 3 and 4 despite the growths in labour incomes.^{*29, *30} The households seem to have put asset accumulation and repayment a priority before consumption growths. It indicates that the borrowers did not choose to strategically default but tried to repay.


VIII.3.3 Repayments

FIGURE 10 shows the repayment results. Top panel shows the ratios of cumulative repayment to cumulative planned installment, the bottom panel shows the ratios of sum of cumulative repayment and cumulative net saving (saving - withdrawal) to cumulative planned installment. Both are plotted against weeks after first disbursement. Each dot represents a member at each time point. Value of 1, which is given by a horizontal line, indicates the member is at per with repayment schedule. Some members saved more than the required repayment at each time points that go beyond 1 in the figure. One sees that repayment rates are above 1 at the beginning but stay below 1 for most of the time. The majority of borrowing members did not repay the loan by the 48th month with prespecified installments. One notes the traditional arm has more of lower repayment rates among all arms. When a member does not reach the due amount with installments, they had to repay from the (net) saving, an arrangement to which the lender and the borrowers made at the loan contract signment. Repayment rates after using net saving are 44.71, 93.57, 97.01, 95.42%, respectively, for traditional, large, large grace, cow arms, 87.85% for overall, and 95.32% for the average of non-traditional lending arms. The overall repayment rate is comparable to the two microfinance programs with repayment rate information 74% and 99% examined in Banerjee et al. (2015a), and the non-traditional lending

^{*29} One notes that the labour income is lowest in period 2 for all non-traditional arms, second lowest for the traditional arm, and start increasing from period 3. The fall in period 2 is due to the floods. Period 2 consumption is reportedly lower than period 3 and 4 because of flood damages.

^{*30} Consumption is based on the annualised expenditure on following items: rice, wheat, maize, potato, lentil, other pulses, other staples, chicken, other meat, fish, milk, egg, chili, stem, carrot, leafy vegetable, other vegetable, banana, seasonal fruits, other fruit, puffed rice, onion, pgarlic, ginger, oil, sugar, salt, hard spices, soft spices, tea, bettle, other drinks, biscuit, cigarette, chew tobacco, transport, fuel wood, cloth, soap, haircut, cosmetic, communication, festivities, mosque related, contraceptive, wedding/funeral, other. It focuses on daily consumption, while education, health, housing, maintainance and other productive (livestock, farming) expenditures are not included.

FIGURE 10: CUMULATIVE WEEKLY NET REPAYMENT RATES



Note: Each dot represents weekly observations. Only members who received loans are shown. Each panel shows ratios of cumulative repayment against cumulative due amount, sum of cumulative repayment and cumulative net saving (saving - withdrawal) against cumulative due amount, against weeks after first disbursement. Lines are smoothed lines with a penalized cubic regression spline in `ggplot2::geom_smooth` function, originally from `mgcv::gam` with `bs='cs'`.

has exceptionally high repayment rates. The low repayment rates among traditional arm borrowers may be due to our experimental design that a new loan is disbursed unconditionally up to three cycles, lacking the dynamic incentives to repay, or due to the fact that they had lower returns on their investments. Our finding of growing labour incomes and the steady consumption levels indicates the latter possibility is more likely.

There is little difference in repayment rates by poverty classes. FIGURE 10 depicts both moderately poor and ultra poor in different colours. It is impossible to distinguish between them with eyeballs, and ANCOVA estimates also confirms this (see Appendix E, TABLE E16 for details). We also observe that impacts on all outcome measures are not statistically different between the poverty classes (see Appendix D). All of these are in contrast to a popular belief that the ultra poor are the riskiest among all income classes.


Smaller cumulative impacts and lower repayment rates of traditional arm members stand out once we acknowledge that they are receiving an equivalent amount and their contract differs with other arms only in the attributes we focus. These differences arose partly from the different investment choices observed in FIGURE 7, which were induced by the lack of Upfront functional attribute in lending.

VIII.3.4 Schooling

In Section VIII.1, we observed that nonparticipation is correlated with smaller household size. If the household size limits the participation to microfinance, we may observe adverse impacts of borrowing on the children's school enrollment. In FIGURE 11, the effects on child school enrollment are displayed. Unlike the previous figures, we show per period impacts relative to the concurrent traditional arm values. Using estimated parameters of (2), what we display in FIGURE 11 are the per period impacts (b_{3k} for period 3 and b_{4k} for period 4), not the cumulative impacts ($b_{2k} + b_{3k}$ for period 3 and $b_{2k} + b_{4k}$ for period 4). We chose to show per period impacts because annual enrollment status matters in schooling.

In general, there is no detectable impact of the intervention, except for a negative impact for women at the college level for Large/Upfront in period 4 and a positive impact for women at the college level for WithGrace in period 4. The positive impacts of WithGrace reflects the negative impacts among Large/Upfront and neutral impacts on Large grace and Cattle arms. Women at the college level were found from about 5.9% of the whole sample, so the effective sample size of each

FIGURE 11: PERIOD WISE EFFECTS ON SCHOOLING



Source: Constructed from ANCOVA estimation results TABLE D14, TABLE D15.

Note: Left most column panel shows the conditional means of traditional arm which serves as a benchmark in estimating impacts. In other column panels, all points show the relative difference from concurrent traditional levels depicted in the left most column. Large and Upfront are the same values. Other column panels are grouped either by arm or by attribute. Row panels show different outcomes. Bars show 95% confidence intervals using cluster robust standard errors.

cell is about 11-12 ($=776 \cdot .059/4$), and it is difficult to interpret the results on these small samples. If anything, negative impacts of elder girl's schooling may be due to a stronger demand for cattle production in a household. This is in line with the finding in rejection that the limited household size can be a constraint on participation, especially when there is no grace period. Cattle ownership naturally shifts the relative shadow prices in a household against child schooling, especially for the elder girls as their returns on human capital are considered to be lower than younger girls, and the task contents of cattle rearing labour are less brawn intensive yet requires to be above the primary school ages. This may be a potential downside of having greater cattle production in a household.

VIII.3.5 Summary of impacts

In summary, we found that our managerial support programs induce the members of disadvantaged background to participate in microfinance, achieving the further outreach, and achieve the

results that are no different with other borrowers. This is consistent with the finding of the previous studies that a certain level of skills is necessary for participation, and our managerial support programs supplemented the lack thereof. We found that the large upfront disbursements allows borrowers to invest in cattle while members with sequential disbursements mostly opted for smaller livestock and small trades. In combination with a greater return to cattle on net asset accumulation and a greater rate of loan repayment, we consider it as evidence of a poverty trap and an effective measure to break it. We also found the impacts and repayment rates are indistinguishable between the moderately poor and the ultra poor.

VIII.4 Robustness checks

The previous literature has shown that returns to lending are higher for the borrowers with business experiences (Banerjee et al., 2015a). To check if the same can be found in our experiment, we divide the subjects into three groups of different cattle rearing experiences at the baseline: **Own** group, defined by the cattle ownership, **Adi** group, defined by no cattle ownership but having an experience with cattle lease contracts (called *Adi*) up to 3 years prior to the baseline, and **None** group who has neither of the two. In FIGURE 12 and FIGURE 13, we plot the group wise impacts by arm on the net assets and cattle holding, respectively. These show that the **Own** group has the highest returns in both outcomes under the **Large/Upfront** treatment, followed by the **None** group, and virtually no impact among the **Adi** group.

Consistent with the previous literature, we thus find the returns to microfinance are higher among the members with previous cattle rearing experience through ownership. We also find the returns among the members with no previous experience are small yet not statistically zero. In particular, when we choose cattle holding as an outcome, **Cattle** arm has a statistically meaningful impact even among the **None** group, which is consistent with our main finding that the managerial support program may have helped them in participating and sustaining the level of returns.


In contrast, the **Adi** group, who has cattle rearing experiences, does not attain statistically positive returns. As one examines the estimated results in TABLE D5 and TABLE D6, we see that the returns of **Adi** group becomes negligible once we add baseline household size **HHsize0** as a covariate, which has large positive estimates across specifications. This is indicative of **Adi** group is constrained by the household size, which is consistent with our main finding that a domestic capacity constraint, be it domestic labor or house building size or both, may bind some households to attain positive returns, possibly because they are already engaging in cattle rearing.

We also ran a robustness check over the choice of asset concepts by using various measures of net assets: **Broad net assets** which we include all other household assets that are observed in certain rounds of surveys, **Broad net assets**, annual price which we use annual median price of cattle in computing the livestock values in broad net assets, **Net non livestock assets** which we drop livestock values from net assets, **Land** which is the total of land asset values, and **Cattle** which is the number of cattle holding. In the Appendix FIGURE E1, we show the time paths of various assets by arm. The dynamic patterns of asset accumulation is similar to FIGURE 4.^{*31}

All asset measures show similar patterns (see FIGURE E2). **Broad net assets** show a similar pattern yet the standard error bars cross zero in round 4 for some specifications, possibly because of larger noises in computing the values as some asset items are observed only in certain rounds. **Net non livestock assets** show smaller impacts that are not statistically distinguishable from zero, which is consistent with our findings that borrowers used the funds in productive investments and kept repayment efforts.

^{*31} Asset values are expressed in BDT. **Net assets**=total assets - debts. Debts include outstanding loaned amount of the experiment. Total assets use items observed in all 4 rounds of household surveys. **Net non livestock assets**=net assets-livestock asset values. Number of cattle is a headcount of cattle holding.


FIGURE 12: CUMULATIVE IMPACTS ON NET ASSETS RELATIVE TO TRADITIONAL ARM BY EXPERIENCE



Source: Estimated with survey data.

Note: Adi is a group who has an experience of lease-in cattle contract at the baseline, Own is a group who holds cattle at the baseline, and None are all other individuals. There are 141 members who owned cattle at the baseline, 112 members who ever practiced Adi at the baseline, and 523 members who have no experience in cattle rearing.

FIGURE 13: CUMULATIVE IMPACTS ON CATTLE HOLDING RELATIVE TO TRADITIONAL ARM BY EXPERIENCE



Source: Estimated with survey data.

Note: See the footnote of FIGURE 12.

IX Conclusion

Conclusion

- Entrepreneurship is necessary for project success, even with a simpler production process.
- Upfront liquidity increases asset holding and repayment rates.
- Cattle has higher returns and lower risks, resulting in higher repayment rates, but also has larger initial fixed costs, possibly generating a poverty trap.
- Lending uptake is impeded by small household size, asset shocks, and a lack of supports for managerial capacity.
- If these are relaxed, a poverty trap may be overcome.
- In the remote rural setting, larger upfront loan suited to the project cash flow is shown to be Pareto improving, despite widely believed fears of inefficiency due to information asymmetry.
- Consumption and labour incomes were not affected in non-traditional arms. Labour incomes increased toward the end of repayment for all arms which can be a repayment effort.
- Schooling was not affected in general. It finds a sign of a loss to higher secondary level women, hinting a domestic labour constraint in cattle production. But there was also a positive impact for women at the higher secondary level in WithGrace arm. While these are possibilities, cell sample sizes are too small to draw anything conclusive.

The poverty reduction impacts of microfinance was a firm belief in the early days of microfinance. Yet it suffered from a puzzling weak spot that microfinance is slow to reach the ultra poor, which is still debated today. Recently, even the poverty reduction impacts are subject to doubts, and it has been shown that the only borrowers with experience or skills are able to leap benefits. In this study, we examined the role of entrepreneurship in leaping benefits. We showed, under the rural setting, experiences or entrepreneurship seem to matter for participation. We note the usefulness of having managerial supports available for the prospective clients of MFIs when expanding the credit to the ultra poor.

This study employs a stepped-wedge design of multiple arms to isolate different functional attributes of loan contracts: Frontloading, a grace period, and in-kind loan with management supports. These functional attributes are intended to relax various constraints in productive investments by the poor: A liquidity constraint, a saving constraint, and an entrepreneurship constraint. Only frontloading the disbursement matters in all outcomes, which signifies the importance of a liquidity constraint. With evidence that borrowers with frontloaded arms invested in cattle while the borrowers under incremental lending invested in multiple, smaller projects, and the repayment rates are higher for the frontloaded arms, we conclude that there is a poverty trap which cannot be overcome by the traditional approach of microfinance. Under the study's setting, escaping from the poverty trap requires frontloading the lending, not lending incrementally as practiced by the majority of microfinance institutions. In addition, lending rather than a transfer may suffice to support the transition.

While we did not observe additional impacts of managerial supports, we found that more members with disadvantaged background participated. This implies that managerial supports can invite more disadvantaged prospective borrowers without adversely affecting the outcomes. To expand the coverage to the ultra poor, it may be useful to have managerial support services.

We have witnessed that a binding domestic capacity constraint may impede potential borrowers from participation. This limits the potential benefit of lending a larger amount from the start of the program. While it is unclear why the outsourced labour cannot substitute the domestic labour, one can consider organising an arrangement in each group, tended by the group members, to collectively graze the cattle during the daytime. This partly eases the domestic labour and/or space constraints faced by small households.

We note that our study site is rich in rainfall, giving more advantages to cattle production over sheep/goat production. In contrast, if the climate is more arid, sheep and goats are better suited because of less water logging and their greater viability in relying on natural grass. This raises a concern that our results may not directly be transferrable to more arid areas. However, the key lesson from the study is the presence of fixed inputs in scaling the herd size. While sheep/goats are easier to scale than cattle, it will require larger land and roofed facilities at some point as one increases the herd size. This can effectively form nonconvexity in the production set, and large enough finance may allow herders to go past the threshold.

We have seen that borrowers accumulated assets, increased labour supplies, but not increasing the consumption. This is consistent with a high morale of repayment, which can partly be explained by the lack of alternative lenders in the study area. With stronger incentives to repay, the evidence on stronger repayment discipline of large sized arm members need not generalise in the areas outside the study site. On the other hand, the necessity of codifiable knowledge in participation even for a simple production process and the scope for escaping the poverty trap with large, frontloaded lending may be generalisable to other rural areas with liquidity constraints.

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A Randomisation checks

TABLE A1: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS

Variables	P values (%)			
	Traditional	Large	LargeGrace	Cattle
HeadLiteracy	30.0	56.1	92.0	92.0
HeadAge	98.8	98.8	94.2	89.7
HHsize	75.3	53.2	75.3	58.2
FloodInRd1	99.1	99.1	35.6	31.2
HAssetAmount	97.6	87.8	97.6	97.6
PAssetAmount	39.9	68.2	5.8	97.8
NumCows	75.7	75.7	76.9	47.8
NetValue	57.0	61.2	61.2	48.7
BroadNetValue	57.9	58.8	58.8	48.7
RiskPrefVal	89.8	73.7	89.8	78.2
TimePref1Val	21.5	51.7	86.4	85.3
TimePref2Val	18.3	72.6	71.6	73.4
PresentBias	97.9	97.9	93.6	97.9
Attrition	93.8	33.8	93.8	30.3
N	176	200	200	200

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R’s package coin is used for baseline group mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000. Number of groups is 72. Holm’s step-down method is used to adjust for multiple testing of a multi-factor grouping variable.

2. See the footnote of TABLE 3 for description of variables.

TABLE A2: ANOVA RESULTS FOR CATTLE HOLDING EQUALITY BY ARM

Tests	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
a	rd4	rd4 edited	rd3	rd2	rd1
b	c	d	e	f	
ANOVA	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.13)	(0.02)	(34.90)
Kruskal-Wallis	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.39)	(0.14)	(42.63)
<i>Tukey HST</i>					
Large-Traditional	0.4890 (0.03)	0.4890 (0.03)	0.4252 (0.05)	0.5243 (0.01)	0.0894 (48.58)
Large grace-Traditional	0.3592 (2.16)	0.3592 (1.88)	0.2113 (22.47)	0.2295 (24.50)	0.0391 (92.48)
Cattle-Traditional	0.3031 (6.80)	0.3737 (1.16)	0.1713 (39.54)	0.2044 (31.63)	-0.0111 (99.80)
Large grace-Large	-0.1299 (66.68)	-0.1299 (65.50)	-0.2139 (18.17)	-0.2948 (5.85)	-0.0503 (84.19)
Cattle-Large	-0.1859 (35.07)	-0.1153 (72.52)	-0.2539 (7.14)	-0.3200 (2.45)	-0.1005 (34.97)
Cattle-Large grace	-0.0560 (96.37)	0.0145 (99.93)	-0.0400 (98.21)	-0.0251 (99.64)	-0.0503 (84.19)

Source: Survey data.

Note: Each column uses respective year cattle ownership information. Columns (1) to (5) tests cattle holding equality for each survey rounds. In column (2), we edited the data by assigning 1 to members of Cattle arm who report holding is NA or zero. For ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis, each entry indicates p values. ANOVA tests for the null of equality of all means under normality. Kruskal-Wallis tests for the null of no stochastic dominance among samples without using the normality assumption. Tukey's honest significant tests show difference in means and p values in parenthesis that account for multiple testing under the normality assumption.

In TABLE A1, we use `independence_test` of R's `coin` package: Approximate permutation tests by randomly resampling 100000 times. The test examines if the arm a 's mean is different from all other arms' means. This is done by randomly reassigning group labels to get the permuted distribution of arm a means. If the arm a does not differ from non- a arms, then the p value becomes large (non small). All the values are relatively large, except for Time preference 1, Time preference 2 of Traditional arm are around 20%.

In TABLE A2, we show the cattle ownership ratios by each arm at various points in time and examine their equality with ANOVA, Kruskal-Wallis, and Tukey Honest Significant Test. For ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis, each entry indicates p values. ANOVA tests for the null of equality of all means under normality. Kruskal-Wallis tests for the null of no stochastic dominance among samples without using the normality assumption. Tukey's honest significant tests show difference in means and p values in parenthesis that account for multiple testing under the normality assumption.

In column (1), for example, the final round cattle holding is tested. ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis give .06% and .07%, respectively. Tukey HST is tested for each pair wise differences in ownship ratios. Large-Traditional shows .5016 percentage points larger for Large arm relative to Traditional, and the null p value of equality is .02%. Likewise, Large grace-Traditional, Cattle-Traditional give p values of 2.35% and 6.90%, respectively. Differences between arms with large loan size, Large, Large grace, Cattle show relatively large p values. It shows the results are statistically different between Traditional and the other arms.

Similarly, columns (2) to (5) show test results at each different points of time. In column (2), we edited the data by assigning 1 to members of Cattle arm who report holding is NA or zero at round 4. We did so because there is a possibility of misreporting and decided to check the sensitivity of permutation test results if we correct them. We see effectively no difference between (1) and (2) except the difference Cattle-Traditional becomes larger and associated p value becomes smaller. Looking at (5), all the p values are large and do not indicate statistically meaningful differences between arms.

B Rejection

We use R's coin package `independence_test`: Approximate permutation tests by randomly re-sampling 100000 times.

Among 776 observations, there are 40 whose villages are washed away by a flood and 70 who, by group decisions, rejected the assigned arms (traditional, large, large grace with 40, 20, 10 individuals, respectively). There are 30, 9, 13, 37 individuals who individually rejected traditional, large, large grace, cattle, respectively.

For risks preference values, the larger the more risk averse. For time preferences values 1 and 2, larger the more impatient. If time preference value 1 (3 months) is larger than value 2 (1 year 3 months), time inconsistent, if 3 months < 1 year 3 months, a future bias.^{*32}

TABLE B1: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF REJECTION

variables	NonRejected	Rejected	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.126	0.082	(9.6)	(11.3)	(13.0)
Head age	38.131	37.813	(72.7)	(72.9)	(73.1)
Household size	4.258	3.943	(1.5)	(1.5)	(1.6)
Prop. of non-textsfTraditional arms	0.829	0.560	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Flood at baseline	0.475	0.585	(1.2)	(1.4)	(1.6)
Household asset amount	1413	1235	(8.2)	(8.2)	(8.2)
Productive asset amount	1438	932	(24.5)	(24.5)	(24.5)
Livestock value	5556	2685	(0.9)	(1.0)	(1.0)
Number of cattle holding	0.278	0.134	(0.8)	(0.9)	(1.0)
Net asset value	8993	5339	(5.1)	(5.1)	(5.1)
Broad net asset value	9945	5618	(2.4)	(2.4)	(2.4)
Risk preference	110	117	(2.7)	(3.0)	(3.3)
Time preference 1	384	383	(89.1)	(90.4)	(91.8)
Time preference 2	494	474	(13.6)	(14.5)	(15.5)
Present bias	0.452	0.519	(14.4)	(15.9)	(17.4)
n	613	159	(rate: 0.206)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

- Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000. Step-down method is used to adjust for multiple testing of a multi-factor grouping variable. The second and third columns show means of each group. For Arm, proportions of non-traditional arm between two groups are tested.
2. p-value.lower, p-value.mid, p-value.upper indicate lower-bound, mid point value, and upper-bound of the p values for observed test statistic and the null distribution, expressed in per centage units.
3. Head literate is an indicator variable of household head literacy. Head age is age of household head. Household size is total number of household members. Flood at baseline is an indicator variable of flood exposure. Household asset amount and Productive asset amount are amount of non-livestock household and productive assets, respectively, in BDT. Livestock value is BDT value of all livestock holding beyond cattle. Number of cattle holding is number of cattle holding. Net asset value is net asset values in BDT using asset items observed in all 4 rounds. Broad net asset value is net asset values in BDT for all asset items. Attrited indicates attrition rates in the household survey, and GRejected and IRejected show group rejection rates and individual rejection rates to the lending program. Non-attriting borrowers indicates the ratio of non-attriting borrowers to all borrowers. Because attrition and rejection are separate events, a household can reject and attrit, so non-attrited borrowers \geq total - (rejected members + attrited members). USD 1 is about BDT 80. Risk preference is the respondent's choice of the acceptable minimum excess monetary value of the risky option over a certainty option. Lower values indicate a greater risk tolerance. Time preference 1 is the respondent's choice of the acceptable minimum excess monetary value in 3 months that is no smaller than present monetary benefit, and Time preference 2 is the the minimum excess value in 1 year and 3 months that is no smaller than monetary benefits of 1 year from now. Lower values indicate a greater patience. If a respondent's Time preference 1 is greater than Time preference 2, the respondent is considered to be present-biased. Present bias is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is considered to be present-biased, 0 otherwise.

^{*32} Risk preference is the respondent's choice of the acceptable minimum excess monetary value of the risky option over a certainty option. Lower values indicate a greater risk tolerance. Time preference 1 is the respondent's choice of the acceptable minimum excess monetary value in 3 months that is no smaller than present monetary benefit, and Time preference 2 is the the minimum excess value in 1 year and 3 months that is no smaller than monetary benefits of 1 year from now. Lower values indicate a greater patience. If a respondent's Time preference 1 is greater than Time preference 2, the respondent is considered to be present-biased. Present bias is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is considered to be present-biased, 0 otherwise.

TABLE B2: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF REJECTION AMONG TRADITIONAL ARM

variables	NonRejected	Rejected	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.095	0.100	(79.5)	(89.8)	(100.0)
Head age	38.848	37.913	(55.2)	(55.5)	(55.7)
Household size	4.181	3.971	(34.3)	(35.7)	(37.1)
Flood at baseline	0.514	0.386	(9.2)	(10.7)	(12.2)
Household asset amount	1538	1291	(18.5)	(18.6)	(18.6)
Productive asset amount	1016	1024	(99.0)	(99.1)	(99.1)
Livestock value	6095	1714	(0.7)	(0.9)	(1.1)
Number of cattle holding	0.305	0.086	(0.7)	(0.9)	(1.1)
Net asset value	11103	4076	(1.6)	(1.6)	(1.6)
Broad net asset value	12547	4513	(0.6)	(0.6)	(0.6)
Risk preference	115	116	(74.6)	(80.9)	(87.1)
Time preference 1	376	370	(77.3)	(79.2)	(81.1)
Time preference 2	485	480	(70.9)	(75.8)	(80.6)
Present bias	0.465	0.477	(87.5)	(93.8)	(100.0)
n	105	70	(rate: 0.400)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B1.

TABLE B3: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF REJECTION AMONG NON-TRADITIONAL ARM

variables	NonRejected	Rejected	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.132	0.067	(8.0)	(9.6)	(11.2)
Head age	37.982	37.733	(83.0)	(83.2)	(83.4)
Household size	4.274	3.921	(3.3)	(3.5)	(3.7)
Flood at baseline	0.467	0.742	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Household asset amount	1392	1185	(12.5)	(12.5)	(12.5)
Productive asset amount	1526	859	(19.1)	(19.1)	(19.1)
Livestock value	5444	3544	(20.6)	(22.6)	(24.6)
Number of cattle holding	0.272	0.177	(20.4)	(22.3)	(24.3)
Net asset value	8627	6473	(39.9)	(39.9)	(39.9)
Broad net asset value	9494	6612	(26.4)	(26.4)	(26.4)
Risk preference	109	118	(2.6)	(3.7)	(4.8)
Time preference 1	386	395	(61.8)	(63.4)	(65.0)
Time preference 2	495	468	(12.9)	(14.1)	(15.3)
Present bias	0.449	0.561	(8.9)	(10.1)	(11.3)
n	508	89	(rate: 0.149)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B2.

TABLE B4: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF REJECTERS, TRADITIONAL VS. NON-TRADITIONAL ARM

variables	NonTradArm	TradArm	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.067	0.100	(39.2)	(47.9)	(56.7)
Head age	37.733	37.913	(92.1)	(92.4)	(92.7)
Household size	3.921	3.971	(84.1)	(86.1)	(88.1)
Prop. of non-textsfTraditional arms	1.000	0.000	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Flood at baseline	0.742	0.386	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Household asset amount	1185	1291	(47.1)	(47.3)	(47.6)
Productive asset amount	859	1024	(24.6)	(24.6)	(24.6)
Livestock value	3544	1714	(16.9)	(20.3)	(23.6)
Number of cattle holding	0.177	0.086	(17.0)	(20.3)	(23.7)
Net asset value	6473	4076	(25.4)	(25.4)	(25.4)
Broad net asset value	6612	4513	(32.0)	(32.0)	(32.0)
Risk preference	118	116	(55.9)	(62.8)	(69.8)
Time preference 1	395	370	(25.5)	(27.0)	(28.5)
Time preference 2	468	480	(51.6)	(60.6)	(69.5)
Present bias	0.561	0.477	(29.5)	(33.9)	(38.4)
n	89	70	(rate: 0.440)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B2.

TABLE B5: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF GROUP REJECTION

variables	NonGRejected	GRejected	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.123	0.057	(7.5)	(9.7)	(11.8)
Head age	38.187	36.841	(28.4)	(28.5)	(28.7)
Household size	4.205	4.071	(43.6)	(44.9)	(46.2)
Prop. of non-textsfTraditional arms	0.808	0.429	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Flood at baseline	0.490	0.571	(16.9)	(19.1)	(21.2)
Household asset amount	1390	1246	(31.8)	(31.8)	(31.9)
Productive asset amount	1360	1070	(62.5)	(62.5)	(62.5)
Livestock value	5250	2000	(4.7)	(5.2)	(5.7)
Number of cattle holding	0.262	0.100	(4.7)	(5.2)	(5.7)
Net asset value	8743	3333	(4.2)	(4.2)	(4.2)
Broad net asset value	9628	3464	(2.3)	(2.3)	(2.3)
Risk preference	111	114	(51.2)	(55.5)	(59.9)
Time preference 1	383	393	(62.5)	(64.3)	(66.1)
Time preference 2	493	454	(2.7)	(3.1)	(3.5)
Present bias	0.451	0.610	(1.3)	(1.7)	(2.0)
n	702	70	(rate: 0.091)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B1.

TABLE B6: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF GROUP REJECTION AMONG TRADITIONAL ARM

variables	NonGRejected	GRejected	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.111	0.050	(22.4)	(29.5)	(36.6)
Head age	38.319	39.026	(69.9)	(70.2)	(70.5)
Household size	4.067	4.200	(57.6)	(59.8)	(62.0)
Flood at baseline	0.519	0.275	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.7)
Household asset amount	1500	1257	(23.0)	(23.1)	(23.3)
Productive asset amount	984	1147	(60.2)	(60.2)	(60.2)
Livestock value	5481	500	(0.9)	(1.0)	(1.2)
Number of cattle holding	0.274	0.025	(0.9)	(1.0)	(1.2)
Net asset value	10397	2171	(1.0)	(1.0)	(1.0)
Broad net asset value	11798	2191	(0.3)	(0.3)	(0.3)
Risk preference	116	111	(34.7)	(40.0)	(45.2)
Time preference 1	369	389	(40.1)	(43.2)	(46.4)
Time preference 2	487	472	(47.1)	(52.0)	(56.8)
Present bias	0.449	0.538	(27.1)	(31.7)	(36.3)
n	135	40	(rate: 0.229)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B2.

TABLE B7: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF GROUP REJECTION AMONG NON-TRADITIONAL ARM

variables	NonGRejected	GRejected	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.125	0.067	(24.5)	(32.8)	(41.1)
Head age	38.156	34.000	(2.8)	(2.8)	(2.9)
Household size	4.238	3.900	(19.6)	(20.8)	(22.0)
Flood at baseline	0.483	0.967	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Household asset amount	1369	1221	(55.0)	(55.1)	(55.1)
Productive asset amount	1451	970	(55.4)	(55.4)	(55.4)
Livestock value	5194	5000	(85.5)	(92.8)	(100.0)
Number of cattle holding	0.260	0.250	(85.5)	(92.8)	(100.0)
Net asset value	8417	6141	(62.0)	(62.0)	(62.0)
Broad net asset value	9200	6541	(56.7)	(56.7)	(56.7)
Risk preference	110	119	(19.7)	(24.2)	(28.8)
Time preference 1	387	400	(66.6)	(70.5)	(74.4)
Time preference 2	495	420	(1.5)	(1.8)	(2.1)
Present bias	0.452	0.750	(0.5)	(0.8)	(1.1)
n	567	30	(rate: 0.050)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B2.

TABLE B8: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF GROUP REJECTERS, TRADITIONAL VS. NON-TRADITIONAL ARM

variables	NonTradArm	TradArm	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.067	0.050	(62.7)	(81.4)	(100.0)
Head age	34.000	39.026	(2.7)	(2.7)	(2.8)
Household size	3.900	4.200	(34.2)	(36.6)	(39.0)
Prop. of non-textsfTraditional arms	1.000	0.000	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Flood at baseline	0.967	0.275	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Household asset amount	1221	1257	(88.1)	(88.4)	(88.6)
Productive asset amount	970	1147	(50.4)	(50.4)	(50.5)
Livestock value	5000	500	(0.1)	(0.7)	(1.3)
Number of cattle holding	0.250	0.025	(0.1)	(0.7)	(1.3)
Net asset value	6141	2171	(9.7)	(9.7)	(9.7)
Broad net asset value	6541	2191	(5.7)	(5.7)	(5.7)
Risk preference	119	111	(23.3)	(31.3)	(39.3)
Time preference 1	400	389	(56.7)	(67.4)	(78.0)
Time preference 2	420	472	(12.0)	(14.9)	(17.9)
Present bias	0.750	0.538	(9.3)	(12.7)	(16.0)
n	30	40	(rate: 0.571)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B2.

TABLE B9: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF INDIVIDUAL REJECTION

variables	NonIRejected	IRejected	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.126	0.101	(49.0)	(54.9)	(60.7)
Head age	38.131	38.593	(69.2)	(69.3)	(69.5)
Household size	4.258	3.843	(1.2)	(1.3)	(1.3)
Prop. of non-textsfTraditional arms	0.829	0.663	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Flood at baseline	0.475	0.596	(3.1)	(3.6)	(4.1)
Household asset amount	1413	1226	(16.0)	(16.1)	(16.2)
Productive asset amount	1438	826	(16.7)	(16.7)	(16.7)
Livestock value	5556	3146	(8.4)	(9.3)	(10.2)
Number of cattle holding	0.278	0.157	(8.4)	(9.3)	(10.2)
Net asset value	8993	6921	(40.8)	(40.8)	(40.8)
Broad net asset value	9945	7317	(29.3)	(29.3)	(29.3)
Risk preference	110	120	(1.9)	(2.2)	(2.5)
Time preference 1	384	375	(61.0)	(62.6)	(64.1)
Time preference 2	494	490	(78.2)	(81.8)	(85.4)
Present bias	0.452	0.444	(90.0)	(95.0)	(100.0)
n	613	89	(rate: 0.127)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B1.

TABLE B10: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF INDIVIDUAL REJECTION AMONG TRADITIONAL ARM

variables	NonIRejected	IRejected	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.095	0.167	(18.8)	(25.3)	(31.9)
Head age	38.848	36.467	(25.6)	(25.8)	(26.0)
Household size	4.181	3.667	(7.0)	(8.2)	(9.5)
Flood at baseline	0.514	0.533	(84.1)	(92.1)	(100.0)
Household asset amount	1538	1360	(56.2)	(56.6)	(56.9)
Productive asset amount	1016	869	(71.7)	(71.7)	(71.7)
Livestock value	6095	3333	(23.9)	(28.1)	(32.4)
Number of cattle holding	0.305	0.167	(23.9)	(28.1)	(32.3)
Net asset value	11103	7761	(50.7)	(50.7)	(50.7)
Broad net asset value	12547	9001	(47.4)	(47.4)	(47.4)
Risk preference	115	123	(16.9)	(21.6)	(26.3)
Time preference 1	376	342	(24.0)	(25.1)	(26.1)
Time preference 2	485	492	(72.0)	(78.8)	(85.6)
Present bias	0.465	0.385	(37.8)	(44.4)	(51.1)
n	105	30	(rate: 0.222)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B2.

TABLE B11: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF INDIVIDUAL REJECTION AMONG NON-TRADITIONAL ARM

variables	NonIRejected	IRejected	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.132	0.068	(14.5)	(17.8)	(21.1)
Head age	37.982	39.732	(21.9)	(22.0)	(22.2)
Household size	4.274	3.932	(8.4)	(8.9)	(9.3)
Flood at baseline	0.467	0.627	(1.9)	(2.3)	(2.6)
Household asset amount	1392	1174	(14.6)	(14.7)	(14.8)
Productive asset amount	1526	804	(15.9)	(15.9)	(15.9)
Livestock value	5444	3051	(15.1)	(17.0)	(18.9)
Number of cattle holding	0.272	0.153	(15.1)	(17.0)	(18.9)
Net asset value	8627	6580	(47.9)	(47.9)	(47.9)
Broad net asset value	9494	6634	(32.8)	(32.8)	(32.8)
Risk preference	109	118	(6.2)	(7.5)	(8.8)
Time preference 1	386	393	(72.0)	(73.9)	(75.8)
Time preference 2	495	489	(73.7)	(78.1)	(82.5)
Present bias	0.449	0.478	(64.3)	(70.0)	(75.7)
n	508	59	(rate: 0.104)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B2.

TABLE B12: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF INDIVIDUAL REJECTERS, TRADITIONAL VS. NON-TRADITIONAL ARM

variables	NonTradArm	TradArm	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.068	0.167	(16.1)	(21.1)	(26.2)
Head age	39.732	36.467	(25.8)	(26.0)	(26.2)
Household size	3.932	3.667	(48.1)	(50.1)	(52.1)
Prop. of non-textsfTraditional arms	1.000	0.000	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Flood at baseline	0.627	0.533	(36.7)	(42.9)	(49.2)
Household asset amount	1174	1360	(39.9)	(40.3)	(40.8)
Productive asset amount	804	869	(68.0)	(68.1)	(68.1)
Livestock value	3051	3333	(82.2)	(91.1)	(100.0)
Number of cattle holding	0.153	0.167	(82.2)	(91.1)	(100.0)
Net asset value	6580	7761	(70.0)	(70.0)	(70.0)
Broad net asset value	6634	9001	(53.6)	(53.6)	(53.6)
Risk preference	118	123	(39.9)	(49.1)	(58.2)
Time preference 1	393	342	(10.3)	(13.2)	(16.0)
Time preference 2	489	492	(86.5)	(93.3)	(100.0)
Present bias	0.478	0.385	(32.4)	(39.8)	(47.2)
n	59	30	(rate: 0.337)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B2.

TABLE B13: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF BORROWERS, CATTLE VS. NON-CATTLE ARMS

variables	NonCowArm	CowArm	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.111	0.167	(5.2)	(6.3)	(7.3)
Head age	38.306	37.642	(45.7)	(45.8)	(45.9)
Household size	4.288	4.173	(36.3)	(37.2)	(38.0)
Flood at baseline	0.479	0.463	(71.4)	(74.8)	(78.3)
Household asset amount	1334	1639	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)
Productive asset amount	1563	1089	(40.5)	(40.5)	(40.5)
Livestock value	5956	4444	(17.6)	(20.0)	(22.5)
Number of cattle holding	0.298	0.222	(17.6)	(20.1)	(22.6)
Net asset value	10048	5968	(4.4)	(4.4)	(4.4)
Broad net asset value	10764	7597	(12.7)	(12.7)	(12.7)
Risk preference	110	109	(66.1)	(69.3)	(72.4)
Time preference 1	374	412	(0.5)	(0.6)	(0.6)
Time preference 2	487	512	(3.8)	(4.2)	(4.6)
Present bias	0.446	0.469	(57.9)	(61.2)	(64.5)
n	451	162	(rate: 0.264)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000. Step-down method is used to adjust for multiple testing of a multi-factor grouping variable. The second and third columns show means of each group. For Arm, proportions of non-traditional arm between two groups are tested.

2. p-value.lower, p-value.mid, p-value.upper indicate lower-bound, mid point value, and upper-bound of the p values for observed test statistic and the null distribution, expressed in per centage units.

3. Contrasts between cattle arm and other arms. See the footnote of TABLE 3 for description of variables.

TABLE B1 shows test results of independence between loan receivers and nonreceivers (group, individual rejecters) on the analysis sample of 772 members. It shows that lower head literacy, smaller

household size, being affected by flood at the baseline, smaller livestock holding, and smaller net assets are correlated with opting out the offered type of lending. TABLE B2 indicates that lower asset and livestock holding is more pronounced among traditional rejecters relative to loan receivers. It also shows that flood exposure is less frequent, contrary to TABLE B1, among the rejecters. TABLE B3 indicates that lower head literacy, smaller household size, higher flood exposure, are more pronounced among non-traditional rejecters relative to loan receivers. It also shows that asset and livestock holding is no different relative to the receivers. Comparing rejecters of traditional arm, lower flood exposure may be the only stark difference against non-traditional arm members, and smaller asset and livestock holding is merely suggestive (TABLE B4).

Group rejecters and non-group rejecters are compared in TABLE B5. Marked differences are found in Arm (proportion of non-traditional arm members) and head literacy. TimePrefVal1 and TimePrefVal2 are values of premium required to give up the immediate gratification, now or 1 year from now, respectively. TimePrefVal2 shows that group rejecters are less impatient than the non-group rejecters. In the meantime, group rejecters have a higher proportion of individuals with present bias as indicated in PresentBias. There are no difference in terms of risk tolerance in RiskPrefVal. Group rejecters tend to have smaller livestock assets, as indicated by NumCows, LivestockValue and smaller overall assets in NarrowNetValue, NetValue. TABLE B6 compares group rejecters in traditional arm and finds smaller flood exposure and lower livestock and net asset holding are associated with group rejection. Group rejecters in non-traditional arm are examined in TABLE B7 and younger head age, flood at baseline, and smaller household asset holding are correlated with rejection. We also note group rejecters in non-traditional arms are less impatient but have a higher proportion of present biased members. Comparing group rejecters between traditional and non-traditional arms in TABLE B8, younger head age, higher flood exposure, larger net asset values and livestock holding are noted among the non-traditional group rejecters. These hint that for non-traditional arm group rejecters, it is the smaller household size and the baseline flood that may have constrained them from participation, and for traditional group rejecters, it is the low asset levels.

Acknowledging the reasons for rejection can be different, we tested the independence of each characteristics for individual rejecters (vs. non-individual rejecters) in TABLE B9. Smaller HHsize, being affected with FloodInRd1, and smaller LivestockValue, NumCows, NetValue, NarrowNetValue, and smaller risk tolerance in RiskPrefVal are associated with individual rejecters. Individual decisions not to participate may be more straightforward than group rejection: Smaller household size may indicate difficulty in securing the cattle production labour in a household, being hit with a flood may have resulted in lower livestock and asset levels that would prompt them to reconsider partaking in another livestock project.

TABLE B10 and TABLE B11 compare individual rejecters and nonrejecters in traditional arm and non-traditional arms, respectively. For both traditional and non-traditional rejecters, livestock and other asset values are not correlated with rejection, but the values are similar to TABLE B9 but with higher p values, indicating the results are due to smaller sample size. For non-traditional arm rejecters, household size and flood exposure are correlated. Comparison of individual rejecters between traditional and non-traditional arms show no detectable difference (TABLE B12). This suggests that individual rejecters in all arms were constrained with small household size and small asset holding. In TABLE B13, we compare if the cattle arm participants (borrowers) differ from participants in other arms at the baseline. It is worth noting that participants of cattle arm differ from other arms in having less cattle rearing experience as observed in smaller initial cattle holding (p value = .156) and in having lower net asset values (p value = .058), weakly hinting that the cattle arm's managerial support programs may have encouraged participation of inexperienced or lower asset holders. The cattle arm participants are more impatient than non-cattle arm participants as indicated in TimePrefVal1, TimePrefVal2, and have higher proportion of head literacy.

C Attrition

TABLE C1: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF ATTRITION

variables	NonAttrited	Attrited	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.115	0.132	(61.1)	(66.9)	(72.7)
Head age	37.982	38.692	(52.9)	(53.1)	(53.3)
Household size	4.181	4.286	(51.2)	(52.5)	(53.7)
Prop. of non-textsfTraditional arms	0.789	0.659	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Flood at baseline	0.493	0.527	(50.3)	(54.1)	(57.8)
Household asset amount	1363	1515	(26.7)	(26.8)	(26.9)
Productive asset amount	1216	2239	(10.9)	(10.9)	(10.9)
Livestock value	4993	5000	(92.2)	(96.1)	(100.0)
Number of cattle holding	0.250	0.250	(92.1)	(96.1)	(100.0)
Net asset value	8195	8974	(75.4)	(75.4)	(75.4)
Broad net asset value	8945	10432	(55.4)	(55.4)	(55.4)
Risk preference	110	128	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.1)
Time preference 1	382	404	(30.3)	(31.6)	(32.9)
Time preference 2	490	486	(74.5)	(78.7)	(82.9)
Present bias	0.459	0.531	(30.3)	(34.0)	(37.7)
n	681	91	(rate: 0.118)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B1.

TABLE C2: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF ATTRITION AMONG TRADITIONAL ARM

variables	NonAttrited	Attrited	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.118	0.000	(1.5)	(3.0)	(4.6)
Head age	38.497	38.387	(95.3)	(95.7)	(96.1)
Household size	4.167	3.774	(15.0)	(16.1)	(17.2)
Flood at baseline	0.479	0.387	(32.5)	(37.6)	(42.8)
Household asset amount	1373	1700	(17.4)	(17.6)	(17.8)
Productive asset amount	1027	982	(87.8)	(87.9)	(87.9)
Livestock value	4722	2581	(28.3)	(33.4)	(38.6)
Number of cattle holding	0.236	0.129	(28.4)	(33.5)	(38.5)
Net asset value	8223	6979	(76.2)	(76.2)	(76.2)
Broad net asset value	9232	7938	(75.1)	(75.1)	(75.1)
Risk preference	113	131	(1.3)	(1.6)	(1.9)
Time preference 1	371	391	(49.8)	(54.5)	(59.2)
Time preference 2	485	470	(47.8)	(54.1)	(60.5)
Present bias	0.462	0.522	(50.3)	(58.0)	(65.7)
n	144	31	(rate: 0.177)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B2.

TABLE C3: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF ATTRITION AMONG NON-TRADITIONAL ARM

variables	NonAttrited	Attrited	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.114	0.200	(3.5)	(4.8)	(6.2)
Head age	37.845	38.850	(46.1)	(46.3)	(46.5)
Household size	4.184	4.550	(6.1)	(6.5)	(6.8)
Flood at baseline	0.497	0.600	(10.2)	(11.9)	(13.6)
Household asset amount	1360	1410	(76.4)	(76.8)	(77.1)
Productive asset amount	1266	2879	(9.6)	(9.6)	(9.6)
Livestock value	5065	6531	(41.1)	(44.1)	(47.1)
Number of cattle holding	0.253	0.327	(41.0)	(44.2)	(47.3)
Net asset value	8189	10105	(53.8)	(53.8)	(53.8)
Broad net asset value	8875	11845	(34.5)	(34.5)	(34.5)
Risk preference	110	125	(2.2)	(2.8)	(3.3)
Time preference 1	386	415	(30.4)	(32.4)	(34.3)
Time preference 2	492	500	(66.0)	(71.5)	(77.1)
Present bias	0.459	0.538	(42.9)	(48.7)	(54.5)
n	537	60	(rate: 0.101)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B2.

TABLE C4: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF ATTRIBUTES OF TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL ARMS

variables	NonTradArm	TradArm	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.200	0.000	(0.2)	(0.4)	(0.7)
Head age	38.850	38.387	(85.5)	(85.9)	(86.3)
Household size	4.550	3.774	(2.9)	(3.2)	(3.5)
Prop. of non-textsfTraditional arms	1.000	0.000	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Flood at baseline	0.600	0.387	(4.8)	(6.2)	(7.6)
Household asset amount	1410	1700	(38.8)	(39.2)	(39.6)
Productive asset amount	2879	982	(87.4)	(87.4)	(87.4)
Livestock value	6531	2581	(17.2)	(20.5)	(23.8)
Number of cattle holding	0.327	0.129	(17.0)	(20.3)	(23.7)
Net asset value	10105	6979	(78.0)	(78.0)	(78.0)
Broad net asset value	11845	7938	(69.7)	(69.7)	(69.7)
Risk preference	125	131	(39.3)	(48.8)	(58.3)
Time preference 1	415	391	(50.3)	(57.7)	(65.1)
Time preference 2	500	470	(29.6)	(36.1)	(42.6)
Present bias	0.538	0.522	(77.5)	(88.7)	(100.0)
n	60	31	(rate: 0.341)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B2.

TABLE C5: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF ACTIVE STATUS

variables	NonActive	Active	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.104	0.122	(45.7)	(49.8)	(53.8)
Head age	37.871	38.143	(73.9)	(74.0)	(74.2)
Household size	4.077	4.240	(15.4)	(15.8)	(16.2)
Prop. of non-textsfTraditional arms	0.584	0.849	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Flood at baseline	0.548	0.477	(6.8)	(7.5)	(8.1)
Household asset amount	1300	1407	(24.9)	(24.9)	(24.9)
Productive asset amount	1482	1277	(69.3)	(69.3)	(69.3)
Livestock value	3714	5481	(7.3)	(7.8)	(8.4)
Number of cattle holding	0.186	0.274	(7.2)	(7.7)	(8.2)
Net asset value	7015	8741	(30.7)	(30.7)	(30.7)
Broad net asset value	7751	9592	(28.3)	(28.3)	(28.3)
Risk preference	120	109	(0.0)	(0.0)	(0.0)
Time preference 1	388	383	(66.6)	(67.7)	(68.8)
Time preference 2	476	494	(13.8)	(14.6)	(15.5)
Present bias	0.520	0.447	(7.8)	(8.7)	(9.5)
n	221	551	(rate: 0.714)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B1.

TABLE C6: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF ACTIVE MEMBERS OF CATTLE AND LARGE GRACE ARMS

variables	NonCowArm	CowArm	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.107	0.144	(30.3)	(34.5)	(38.7)
Head age	38.440	37.973	(66.7)	(66.9)	(67.1)
Household size	4.176	4.110	(63.2)	(64.7)	(66.3)
Flood at baseline	0.352	0.459	(4.7)	(5.5)	(6.3)
Household asset amount	1311	1676	(0.9)	(0.9)	(0.9)
Productive asset amount	1544	1112	(29.9)	(29.9)	(29.9)
Livestock value	5283	3425	(12.4)	(13.9)	(15.4)
Number of cattle holding	0.264	0.171	(12.5)	(14.0)	(15.5)
Net asset value	8662	5457	(15.5)	(15.5)	(15.5)
Broad net asset value	8918	7251	(47.6)	(47.6)	(47.6)
Risk preference	113	108	(20.1)	(22.0)	(23.9)
Time preference 1	374	413	(1.9)	(2.0)	(2.1)
Time preference 2	479	515	(2.7)	(3.0)	(3.3)
Present bias	0.465	0.462	(90.8)	(95.4)	(100.0)
n	159	146	(rate: 0.479)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B2.

TABLE C7: PERMUTATION TEST RESULTS OF ACTIVE MEMBERS OF CATTLE AND ALL OTHER ARMS

variables	NonCowArm	CowArm	p-value.lower	p-value.mid	p-value.upper
Head literate	0.114	0.144	(30.1)	(33.7)	(37.4)
Head age	38.205	37.973	(80.3)	(80.5)	(80.7)
Household size	4.286	4.110	(18.9)	(19.4)	(20.0)
Flood at baseline	0.484	0.459	(56.4)	(59.8)	(63.1)
Household asset amount	1313	1676	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.1)
Productive asset amount	1336	1112	(47.1)	(47.2)	(47.2)
Livestock value	6222	3425	(1.8)	(2.0)	(2.2)
Number of cattle holding	0.311	0.171	(1.8)	(2.0)	(2.2)
Net asset value	9888	5457	(2.4)	(2.4)	(2.4)
Broad net asset value	10410	7251	(11.5)	(11.5)	(11.5)
Risk preference	109	108	(64.6)	(67.9)	(71.3)
Time preference 1	372	413	(0.4)	(0.5)	(0.5)
Time preference 2	487	515	(2.7)	(3.0)	(3.3)
Present bias	0.441	0.462	(62.5)	(66.1)	(69.6)
n	405	146	(rate: 0.265)		

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. R's package coin is used for baseline mean covariates to conduct approximate permutation tests. Number of repetition is set to 100000.

2. See footnotes of TABLE B2.

TABLE C1 shows results from tests of independence between attriters and nonattriters. Attrition is defined as attrition from household surveys, not from the lending program. We see the moderate rate of attrition is not correlated with household level characteristics at the conventional p value level. Productive asset amounts seem to differ between attriters and nonattriters at $p = .105$, with the former being larger than the latter. This positive attrition selection can cause underestimation of impacts, if the asset values are positively correlated with entrepreneurial capacity. We also see that the attriters are less risk tolerant in terms of minimum expected payoff to choose a risky option in RiskPrefVal. TABLE C2 shows attrition in the traditional arm. Household heads of attriters are relatively less literate than nonattriters. We observe the traditional arm attriters are less risk tolerant than the nonattriters. TABLE C3 compares attriters and nonattriters in the non-traditional arm. Unlike traditional arm attriters, non-traditional arm attriters have more literate household heads, have a larger household size, are more exposed to floods, and have larger productive assets. The traditional arm attriters may be less entrepreneurial, if anything, so their attrition may upwardly bias the positive gains of the arm, hence understate the impacts of non-traditional arm. These are explicitly shown in TABLE C4 where we compare attriters of traditional and non-traditional arms. Overall, attrition may have attenuated the impacts but is not likely to have inflated them.^{*33} We observe the non-traditional arm attriters are also less risk tolerant than the nonattriters.

For the microfinance institutions (MFIs), attrition of the loan receiving members poses a threat to their business continuation. Financial institutions often use observable characteristics, such as collateralisable assets, and easily surveyed characteristics, such as job experiences and schooling of borrowers, and are likely to lend if the assets levels are greater and the borrowers have relevant job experiences and more schooling. We first examine if such screening variables have any predictive power in terms of loan rejection or borrower attrition under our lending. TABLE C5 compares potential MFI targets (nonattriting borrowers, noted as Active) vs. non-targets (attriting borrowers or loan rejecters, noted as NonActive) in all arms. It shows potential targets at the baseline have larger values in livestock and greater number of cattle, and are less affected by the flood, which conforms the conventional wisdom of lenders in using these aspects in their loan decisions. We also see that more risk tolerant members are likely to be borrowers and do not attrit. Next, we examine if the relationship of having "less favourable" values in these characteristics and attrition is mitigated under various loan characteristics. In TABLE C6, we restrict our attention to the potential MFI targets, or the nonattriting borrowers, and compare between cattle and large grace arms, whose difference is effectively the presence of managerial supports that the former provides. Comparing against

^{*33} So one can employ the Lee bounds for stronger results, but doing so will give us less precision and require more assumptions. We will not use the Lee bounds [we can show them if necessary].

the large grace arm, nonattriting borrowers of the cattle arm are more exposed to the flood ($p = .055$), have less productive assets ($p = .003$), have lower net asset values ($p = .046$), and have fewer livestock ($p = .139$). This shows that the smaller livestock holders or individuals with less experienced in livestock are encouraged to participate and continue to operate in the cattle arm that has a managerial support program, with all other features being equal. This is consistent with our analysis of participation in TABLE B13 which weakly hints that the cattle arm's managerial support programs may have encouraged participation of inexperienced or lower asset holders. This also underscores our interpretation that the current impact estimates may be downwardly biased, if any, as people who would otherwise attrit or reject in the cattle arm stayed on. This result is confirmed with lower p values due to a larger sample size when we compare the nonattriting borrowers between cattle arm with all other arms in TABLE C7. At the baseline, cattle arm nonattriting borrowers have smaller baseline livestock holding (p value = .016) and smaller baseline net asset holding (p value = .007) than other arms' nonattriting borrowers.

D Impact estimation results

In this section, the ANCOVA estimates on various outcomes using (2) are presented. In each table, the first column shows the covariate names and their means and standard deviations in the second column in the sample of the richest specification of the table. Specification (1) is OLS estimates on the intercept, \mathbf{d}_i , and its period interactions. This is intended to provide a reference to ANCOVA estimates shown in the specification (2) onwards. Specification (2) follows the most basic specification under (2). From (3), we progressively add more covariates to control for the differences in initial conditions in an attempt to get more precise ANCOVA estimates. In the figures (FIGURE ??, FIGURE 8, FIGURE 11) shown in main texts, we omit OLS estimates of specification (1).

We annotate the number of periods that a household is observed with T . The total number of households is shown for each values of T . $T=4$ indicates the number of households with complete panel information, $T=3$ indicates number of households observed three times, $T=2$ indicates the number of households observed twice. N indicates total number of observations used in ANCOVA estimation, or $N=1 \times (T=2) + 2 \times (T=3) + 3 \times (T=4)$.

For FIGURE ??, FIGURE 8, we show cumulative impacts of the arm or functional attribute k relative to the traditional arm as given by b_{2k} , $b_{2k} + b_{3k}$, $b_{2k} + b_{4k}$ for periods 2, 3, and 4. In FIGURE 11, we show contemporaneous impacts relative to the traditional arm as given by b_{2k} , b_{3k} , b_{4k} for periods 2, 3, and 4.

TABLE D1: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF NARROW NET ASSETS BY PERIOD

covariates	mean/std	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)		14336.1 (0.0)	12573.5 (0.0)	6258.2 (14.3)	12448.8 (0.8)	7899.2 (7.1)	12070.1 (1.1)
Large	0.307 (0.46)	14141.9 (0.0)	14941.6 (0.0)	14775.3 (0.0)	8995.6 (1.7)	12381.5 (0.3)	8892.1 (1.9)
LargeGrace	0.254 (0.44)	8015.4 (0.1)	7370.6 (2.6)	7659.5 (2.0)	3707.8 (21.3)	5291.7 (9.1)	3598.6 (22.7)
Cattle	0.252 (0.43)	8533.5 (0.0)	7487.7 (0.7)	7782.0 (0.6)	3214.9 (24.2)	5417.3 (4.3)	3280.8 (22.7)
rd 3	0.342 (0.47)	3444.3 (0.0)	3131.7 (1.2)	3382.5 (0.7)	4261.1 (0.2)	3505.3 (0.7)	4266.5 (0.2)
Large × rd 3	0.103 (0.30)	-2711.3 (32.7)	-1275.0 (73.1)	-683.6 (85.7)	-2022.5 (65.2)	-1170.6 (77.0)	-2043.2 (64.9)
LargeGrace × rd 3	0.087 (0.28)	155.6 (95.0)	2416.1 (50.1)	2793.2 (42.6)	3294.7 (41.4)	2309.1 (53.7)	3274.2 (41.7)
Cattle × rd 3	0.086 (0.28)	-1592.4 (42.0)	537.6 (84.0)	834.0 (75.1)	16.3 (99.6)	351.0 (90.5)	7.9 (99.8)
rd 4	0.314 (0.46)	4718.2 (0.0)	4111.5 (0.2)	4249.5 (0.1)	6383.8 (0.0)	4474.6 (0.1)	6356.4 (0.0)
Large × rd 4	0.101 (0.30)	-397.8 (91.0)	-12.2 (99.8)	-119.5 (97.6)	-2848.4 (51.6)	-1031.8 (80.4)	-2884.1 (51.1)
LargeGrace × rd 4	0.082 (0.27)	1553.8 (56.9)	4372.6 (23.6)	4738.5 (19.1)	5285.3 (20.8)	3831.7 (31.5)	5238.1 (21.1)
Cattle × rd 4	0.078 (0.27)	1812.7 (43.8)	3301.5 (21.9)	3738.4 (15.3)	1459.1 (65.7)	2807.2 (32.7)	1300.9 (69.1)
HadCattle	0.261 (0.44)				8243.9 (17.4)		9906.3 (13.5)
HadCattle × rd 3	0.090 (0.29)				-3872.1 (15.3)		-3864.4 (15.4)
HadCattle × rd 4	0.083 (0.28)				-3075.8 (39.9)		-3110.0 (39.4)
FloodInRd1	0.413 (0.49)			306.8 (89.4)	1501.8 (52.2)	223.4 (92.5)	1608.5 (50.6)
Head literate0	0.146 (0.35)			-1416.9 (60.8)	-1454.0 (62.3)	-1954.0 (48.1)	-1490.7 (61.4)
Narrownet asset value _t	9030.984 (15090.20)		0.4 (0.0)	0.5 (0.1)	0.2 (37.6)	0.5 (4.9)	0.6 (4.4)
HHsize0	4.540 (1.34)			1387.1 (8.7)	1199.9 (18.5)	1577.9 (6.5)	1155.3 (20.2)
HadCattle × Large	0.092 (0.29)				16578.9 (14.3)		17162.4 (12.7)
HadCattle × Large × rd 3	0.031 (0.17)				785.1 (92.6)		734.8 (93.0)
HadCattle × Large × rd 4	0.030 (0.17)				163.1 (98.8)		352.9 (97.4)
HadCattle × LargeGrace	0.072 (0.26)				4439.2 (51.3)		5028.2 (45.0)
HadCattle × LargeGrace × rd 3	0.025 (0.15)				-23651.6 (0.9)		-23721.8 (0.9)
HadCattle × LargeGrace × rd 4	0.024 (0.15)				-27384.4 (2.5)		-27200.8 (2.6)
HadCattle × Cattle	0.052 (0.22)				8576.3 (19.2)		8620.3 (18.1)
HadCattle × Cattle × rd 3	0.018 (0.13)				-5963.0 (43.1)		-6028.6 (42.6)
HadCattle × Cattle × rd 4	0.015 (0.12)				-7945.1 (40.8)		-7794.4 (41.5)
NumCattle0	0.373 (0.73)					-1061.0 (86.8)	-9510.2 (23.4)
mean of dependent variable		24789 16	24789 7	24789 7	24789 9	24789 7	24789 9
$T = 2$							
$T = 3$		53	30	27	30	27	30
$T = 4$		690	400	400	344	385	344
\bar{R}^2		0.05	0.117	0.123	0.108	0.105	0.109
N	1101	2192	1267	1261	1101	1216	1101

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. ANCOVA estimates using administrative and survey data. Post treatment regressands are regressed on categorical variables, pre-treatment regressand and other covariates. FloodInRd1 and HeadLiterate0 are indicator variables for the presence of self reported damage by a flood at the baseline, and literacy of household head, respectively. HHsize0 is household size at the baseline. We annotate the number of periods that a household is observed with T. The total number of households is shown for each values of T. T=4 indicates the number of households with complete panel information, T=3 indicates number of households observed three times, T=2 indicates the number of households observed twice. N indicates total number of observations used in ANCOVA estimation, or $N=1 \times (T=2) + 2 \times (T=3) + 3 \times (T=4)$. Large, LargeGrace, Cattle are indicator variables of the large, large grace, and cattle arms, respectively. The default arm category is traditional arm. Narrow net assets = Narrow assets + net saving - debt to GUK - debts to relatives and money lenders. Narrow assets use only items observed for all 4 rounds for household assets. Household assets do not include livestock. Regressions (1)-(3), (5)-(6) use only arm and calendar information. (4) and (7) use previous six month repayment and saving information which is lacking in rd 1, hence starts from rd 2.

2. P values in percentages in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at group (village) level.

TABLE D2: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF NET ASSETS BY PERIOD

covariates	mean/std	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)		9846.6 (0.0)	6795.3 (2.7)	-166.6 (97.0)	8022.1 (9.8)	3297.9 (47.0)	6994.4 (15.5)
Large	0.048 (0.46)	13609.2 (0.0)	13772.5 (0.1)	13573.3 (0.1)	6523.4 (8.6)	10458.4 (1.4)	6586.4 (8.6)
LargeGrace	0.006 (0.43)	5904.1 (4.9)	4728.4 (20.2)	4894.7 (18.1)	-142.5 (96.4)	1685.6 (62.1)	-291.9 (92.7)
Cattle	0.009 (0.44)	5675.4 (1.1)	5305.6 (9.6)	5392.0 (8.7)	135.8 (96.2)	2761.9 (32.7)	215.5 (93.9)
rd 3	0.342 (0.47)	5637.3 (0.0)	5935.1 (0.0)	6002.1 (0.0)	8494.7 (0.0)	7501.6 (0.0)	8592.1 (0.0)
Large × rd 3	0.104 (0.30)	1040.0 (76.0)	2877.7 (48.7)	2863.9 (49.1)	2191.4 (65.3)	3249.5 (45.3)	2519.2 (60.6)
LargeGrace × rd 3	0.085 (0.28)	7109.0 (1.8)	9327.4 (1.8)	9400.5 (1.8)	10981.5 (1.8)	9269.2 (3.3)	10942.2 (1.9)
Cattle × rd 3	0.087 (0.28)	3298.4 (24.1)	4431.4 (16.9)	4449.5 (16.3)	5346.2 (16.3)	5803.4 (7.2)	5332.1 (16.5)
rd 4	0.315 (0.46)	10333.5 (0.0)	10421.8 (0.0)	10531.5 (0.0)	14091.2 (0.0)	12042.9 (0.0)	14153.5 (0.0)
Large × rd 4	0.102 (0.30)	3138.6 (47.5)	4950.7 (26.4)	4896.4 (27.0)	4129.9 (37.8)	5601.6 (21.5)	4453.6 (34.2)
LargeGrace × rd 4	0.080 (0.27)	9211.8 (0.4)	12281.8 (0.2)	12367.1 (0.2)	15469.4 (0.1)	12581.3 (0.3)	15375.2 (0.1)
Cattle × rd 4	0.079 (0.27)	7367.6 (2.2)	8548.4 (1.3)	8680.4 (1.1)	9955.1 (0.8)	10302.6 (0.2)	9753.9 (0.9)
HadCattle	0.265 (0.44)				7844.7 (20.3)		10322.0 (11.8)
HadCattle × rd 3	0.092 (0.29)				-4533.7 (11.0)		-4613.9 (10.2)
HadCattle × rd 4	0.084 (0.28)				-2318.8 (54.3)		-2443.7 (52.1)
FloodInRd1	0.414 (0.49)			217.4 (92.0)	1956.7 (41.3)	377.2 (87.7)	2134.2 (39.4)
Head literate0	0.149 (0.36)			-231.7 (93.2)	-1625.8 (58.6)	-2035.7 (47.3)	-1618.0 (59.1)
net asset value _t	10261.899 (15197.09)		0.5 (0.0)	0.5 (0.0)	0.2 (38.7)	0.6 (5.5)	0.7 (4.7)
HHsize0	4.538 (1.35)			1551.0 (5.0)	1341.8 (15.2)	1633.0 (6.6)	1273.0 (17.1)
HadCattle × Large	0.024 (0.25)				17624.6 (11.2)		17922.7 (10.5)
HadCattle × Large × rd 3	0.008 (0.15)				3450.3 (69.2)		3020.9 (72.8)
HadCattle × Large × rd 4	0.009 (0.14)				818.9 (94.2)		665.8 (95.2)
HadCattle × LargeGrace	0.009 (0.23)				7123.7 (32.2)		7883.5 (26.1)
HadCattle × LargeGrace × rd 3	0.003 (0.14)				-24243.5 (1.1)		-24292.4 (1.1)
HadCattle × LargeGrace × rd 4	0.004 (0.13)				-29993.9 (1.7)		-29696.8 (1.8)
HadCattle × Cattle	-0.012 (0.21)				11774.6 (8.6)		11719.1 (7.9)
HadCattle × Cattle × rd 3	-0.004 (0.12)				-3368.5 (65.9)		-3444.3 (65.1)
HadCattle × Cattle × rd 4	-0.005 (0.11)				-7135.7 (45.5)		-6917.8 (46.7)
NumCattle0	0.380 (0.73)					-2867.9 (66.8)	-12092.9 (15.4)
mean of dependent variable		21897	21897	21897	21897	21897	21897
$T = 2$		42	13	13	13	10	13
$T = 3$		134	81	81	38	40	36
$T = 4$		569	377	377	327	362	327
\bar{R}^2		0.07	0.151	0.156	0.138	0.127	0.141
N	1081	2017	1306	1306	1070	1176	1066

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. ANCOVA estimates using administrative and survey data. Post treatment regressands are regressed on categorical variables, pre-treatment regressand and other covariates. FloodInRd1 and HeadLiterate0 are indicator variables for the presence of self reported damage by a flood at the baseline, and literacy of household head, respectively. HHsize0 is household size at the baseline. We annotate the number of periods that a household is observed with T. The total number of households is shown for each values of T. T=4 indicates the number of households with complete panel information, T=3 indicates number of households observed three times, T=2 indicates the number of households observed twice. N indicates total number of observations used in ANCOVA estimation, or $N=1 \times (T=2) + 2 \times (T=3) + 3 \times (T=4)$. Large, LargeGrace, Cattle are indicator variables of the large, large grace, and cattle arms, respectively. The default arm category is traditional arm. Household assets do not include livestock. Regressions (1)-(3), (5)-(6) use only arm and calendar information. (4) and (7) use previous six month repayment and saving information which is lacking in rd 1, hence starts from rd 2.

2. P values in percentages in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at group (village) level.

TABLE D3: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF NARROW NET ASSETS BY ATTRIBUTES AND PERIOD

covariates	mean/std	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)		14336.1 (0.0)	12573.5 (0.0)	6258.2 (14.3)	12448.8 (0.8)	7899.2 (7.1)	12070.1 (1.1)
Unfront	0.813 (0.39)	14141.9 (0.0)	14941.6 (0.0)	14775.3 (0.0)	8995.6 (1.7)	12381.5 (0.3)	8892.1 (1.9)
WithGrace	0.506 (0.50)	-6126.5 (7.2)	-7571.1 (6.4)	-7115.8 (9.5)	-5287.8 (13.8)	-7089.7 (9.7)	-5293.5 (14.8)
InKind	0.252 (0.43)	518.1 (81.5)	117.2 (96.6)	122.5 (96.4)	-492.9 (83.7)	125.6 (96.2)	-317.8 (89.6)
rd 3	0.342 (0.47)	3444.3 (0.0)	3131.7 (1.2)	3382.5 (0.7)	4261.1 (0.2)	3505.3 (0.7)	4266.5 (0.2)
Unfront × rd 3	0.276 (0.45)	-2711.3 (32.7)	-1275.0 (73.1)	-683.6 (85.7)	-2022.5 (65.2)	-1170.6 (77.0)	-2043.2 (64.9)
WithGrace × rd 3	0.173 (0.38)	2867.0 (32.5)	3691.1 (37.8)	3476.8 (40.8)	5317.2 (21.1)	3479.8 (40.8)	5317.4 (21.1)
InKind × rd 3	0.086 (0.28)	-1748.0 (42.1)	-1878.5 (57.1)	-1959.2 (54.1)	-3278.4 (29.7)	-1958.1 (54.2)	-3266.3 (29.8)
rd 4	0.314 (0.46)	4718.2 (0.0)	4111.5 (0.2)	4249.5 (0.1)	6383.8 (0.0)	4474.6 (0.1)	6356.4 (0.0)
Unfront × rd 4	0.261 (0.44)	-397.8 (91.0)	-12.2 (99.8)	-119.5 (97.6)	-2848.4 (51.6)	-1031.8 (80.4)	-2884.1 (51.1)
WithGrace × rd 4	0.160 (0.37)	1951.6 (60.2)	4384.8 (34.3)	4858.0 (28.9)	8133.7 (6.8)	4863.5 (28.9)	8122.2 (6.8)
InKind × rd 4	0.078 (0.27)	258.9 (92.2)	-1071.1 (76.9)	-1000.1 (77.4)	-3826.2 (25.4)	-1024.5 (76.9)	-3937.2 (24.5)
HadCattle	0.261 (0.44)				8243.9 (17.4)		9906.3 (13.5)
HadCattle × rd 3	0.090 (0.29)				-3872.1 (15.3)		-3864.4 (15.4)
HadCattle × rd 4	0.083 (0.28)				-3075.8 (39.9)		-3110.0 (39.4)
FloodInRd1	0.413 (0.49)			306.8 (89.4)	1501.8 (52.2)	223.4 (92.5)	1608.5 (50.6)
Head literate0	0.146 (0.35)			-1416.9 (60.8)	-1454.0 (62.3)	-1954.0 (48.1)	-1490.7 (61.4)
Narrownet asset value _i	9030.984 (15090.20)		0.4 (0.0)	0.5 (0.1)	0.2 (37.6)	0.5 (4.9)	0.6 (4.4)
HHsize0	4.540 (1.34)			1387.1 (8.7)	1199.9 (18.5)	1577.9 (6.5)	1155.3 (20.2)
HadCattle × Unfront	0.215 (0.41)				16578.9 (14.3)		17162.4 (12.7)
HadCattle × Upfront × rd 3	0.074 (0.26)				785.1 (92.6)		734.8 (93.0)
HadCattle × Unfront × rd 4	0.069 (0.25)				163.1 (98.8)		352.9 (97.4)
HadCattle × WithGrace	0.124 (0.33)				-12139.6 (25.8)		-12134.2 (26.4)
HadCattle × WithGrace × rd 3	0.043 (0.20)				-24436.7 (0.2)		-24456.7 (0.2)
HadCattle × WithGrace × rd 4	0.039 (0.19)				-27547.5 (1.2)		-27553.8 (1.2)
HadCattle × InKind	0.052 (0.22)				4137.1 (45.0)		3592.2 (51.2)
HadCattle × InKind × rd 3	0.018 (0.13)				17688.6 (1.0)		17693.2 (1.0)
HadCattle × InKind × rd 4	0.015 (0.12)				19439.3 (4.3)		19406.5 (4.3)
NumCattle0	0.373 (0.73)					-1061.0 (86.8)	-9510.2 (23.4)
mean of dependent variable		24789	24789	24789	24789	24789	24789
$T = 2$		16	7	7	9	7	9
$T = 3$		53	30	27	30	27	30
$T = 4$		690	400	400	344	385	344
\bar{R}^2		0.05	0.117	0.123	0.108	0.105	0.109
N	1101	2192	1267	1261	1101	1216	1101

Notes : See footnotes of TABLE D2.

TABLE D4: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF NET ASSETS BY ATTRIBUTES AND PERIOD

covariates	mean/std	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)		9846.6 (0.0)	6795.3 (2.7)	-166.6 (97.0)	8022.1 (9.8)	3297.9 (47.0)	6994.4 (15.5)
Unfront	0.063 (0.39)	13609.2 (0.0)	13772.5 (0.1)	13573.3 (0.1)	6523.4 (8.6)	10458.4 (1.4)	6586.4 (8.6)
WithGrace	0.014 (0.50)	-7705.1 (3.4)	-9044.1 (2.4)	-8678.6 (3.5)	-6666.0 (7.1)	-8772.8 (4.5)	-6878.3 (7.3)
InKind	0.009 (0.44)	-228.6 (92.8)	577.2 (84.7)	497.3 (86.3)	278.3 (91.6)	1076.3 (71.2)	507.4 (85.1)
rd 3	0.342 (0.47)	5637.3 (0.0)	5935.1 (0.0)	6002.1 (0.0)	8494.7 (0.0)	7501.6 (0.0)	8592.1 (0.0)
Unfront × rd 3	0.276 (0.45)	1040.0 (76.0)	2877.7 (48.7)	2863.9 (49.1)	2191.4 (65.3)	3249.5 (45.3)	2519.2 (60.6)
WithGrace × rd 3	0.172 (0.38)	6069.0 (9.1)	6449.8 (15.5)	6536.6 (15.3)	8790.2 (6.4)	6019.7 (20.7)	8423.0 (7.5)
InKind × rd 3	0.087 (0.28)	-3810.6 (20.9)	-4896.0 (19.3)	-4951.0 (18.9)	-5635.3 (12.4)	-3465.8 (36.3)	-5610.1 (12.4)
rd 4	0.315 (0.46)	10333.5 (0.0)	10421.8 (0.0)	10531.5 (0.0)	14091.2 (0.0)	12042.9 (0.0)	14153.5 (0.0)
Unfront × rd 4	0.260 (0.44)	3138.6 (47.5)	4950.7 (26.4)	4896.4 (27.0)	4129.9 (37.8)	5601.6 (21.5)	4453.6 (34.2)
WithGrace × rd 4	0.158 (0.37)	6073.2 (19.5)	7331.1 (14.4)	7470.7 (13.9)	11339.5 (2.9)	6979.7 (18.3)	10921.6 (3.4)
InKind × rd 4	0.079 (0.27)	-1844.2 (60.8)	-3733.4 (37.8)	-3686.7 (38.3)	-5514.3 (20.3)	-2278.7 (59.8)	-5621.3 (19.7)
HadCattle	0.265 (0.44)				7844.7 (20.3)		10322.0 (11.8)
HadCattle × rd 3	0.092 (0.29)				-4533.7 (11.0)		-4613.9 (10.2)
HadCattle × rd 4	0.084 (0.28)				-2318.8 (54.3)		-2443.7 (52.1)
FloodInRd1	0.414 (0.49)			217.4 (92.0)	1956.7 (41.3)	377.2 (87.7)	2134.2 (39.4)
Head literate0	0.149 (0.36)			-231.7 (93.2)	-1625.8 (58.6)	-2035.7 (47.3)	-1618.0 (59.1)
net asset value _i	10261.899 (15197.09)		0.5 (0.0)	0.5 (0.0)	0.2 (38.7)	0.6 (5.5)	0.7 (4.7)
HHsize0	4.538 (1.35)			1551.0 (5.0)	1341.8 (15.2)	1633.0 (6.6)	1273.0 (17.1)
HadCattle × Unfront	0.021 (0.20)				17624.6 (11.2)		17922.7 (10.5)
HadCattle × Upfront × rd 3	0.006 (0.12)				3450.3 (69.2)		3020.9 (72.8)
HadCattle × Unfront × rd 4	0.007 (0.11)				818.9 (94.2)		665.8 (95.2)
HadCattle × WithGrace	-0.003 (0.26)				-10500.8 (31.2)		-10039.2 (34.1)
HadCattle × WithGrace × rd 3	-0.001 (0.15)				-27693.8 (0.1)		-27313.3 (0.1)
HadCattle × WithGrace × rd 4	-0.001 (0.14)				-30812.8 (1.0)		-30362.7 (1.1)
HadCattle × InKind	-0.012 (0.21)				4650.9 (41.6)		3835.7 (50.2)
HadCattle × InKind × rd 3	-0.004 (0.12)				20875.1 (0.5)		20848.1 (0.5)
HadCattle × InKind × rd 4	-0.005 (0.11)				22858.2 (2.9)		22779.1 (2.9)
NumCattle0	0.380 (0.73)					-2867.9 (66.8)	-12092.9 (15.4)
mean of dependent variable		21897	21897	21897	21897	21897	21897
$T = 2$		42	13	13	13	10	13
$T = 3$		134	81	81	38	40	36
$T = 4$		569	377	377	327	362	327
\bar{R}^2		0.07	0.151	0.156	0.138	0.127	0.141
N	1081	2017	1306	1306	1070	1176	1066

Notes : See footnotes of TABLE D3.

TABLE D5: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF NET ASSETS BY PERIOD, CATTLE REARING EXPERIENCES

	mean/std			(1)		
	Adi	Own	None	Adi	Own	None
(Intercept)				22139.9 (0.0)	25982.2 (0.0)	12725.2 (0.0)
Large	0.322 (0.47)	0.348 (0.48)	0.266 (0.44)	4916.3 (34.7)	21759.0 (0.7)	9061.0 (0.0)
LargeGrace	0.144 (0.35)	0.273 (0.45)	0.266 (0.44)	2148.6 (72.4)	10223.5 (4.2)	5264.4 (2.8)
Cattle	0.299 (0.46)	0.205 (0.40)	0.255 (0.44)	3559.4 (45.2)	6610.4 (12.8)	6934.3 (0.5)
rd 3	0.339 (0.47)	0.341 (0.47)	0.339 (0.47)	1800.8 (44.3)	946.4 (69.5)	4815.8 (0.0)
Large × rd 3	0.109 (0.31)	0.116 (0.32)	0.088 (0.28)	-9527.3 (25.9)	-1410.9 (84.3)	-2105.2 (41.5)
LargeGrace × rd 3	0.046 (0.21)	0.092 (0.29)	0.089 (0.29)	2336.8 (66.0)	-11891.3 (13.0)	2222.2 (33.8)
Cattle × rd 3	0.103 (0.31)	0.072 (0.26)	0.087 (0.28)	-4845.1 (36.9)	1108.2 (86.3)	-2160.8 (28.4)
rd 4	0.328 (0.47)	0.324 (0.47)	0.319 (0.47)	4345.7 (20.3)	1988.8 (51.1)	6039.2 (0.0)
Large × rd 4	0.109 (0.31)	0.116 (0.32)	0.088 (0.28)	-4412.7 (64.4)	2894.5 (74.4)	-1313.9 (65.9)
LargeGrace × rd 4	0.046 (0.21)	0.092 (0.29)	0.088 (0.28)	9029.5 (37.1)	-10561.9 (22.7)	2684.1 (32.7)
Cattle × rd 4	0.098 (0.30)	0.061 (0.24)	0.080 (0.27)	-3455.2 (63.4)	5312.5 (47.0)	1861.0 (44.5)
FloodInRd1	0.540 (0.50)	0.444 (0.50)	0.386 (0.49)			
Head literate0	0.132 (0.34)	0.167 (0.37)	0.151 (0.36)			
Narrownet asset value ₁	1039.569 (886.09)	30420.000 (14911.45)	1531.372 (2958.40)			
HHsize0	4.552 (1.25)	4.587 (1.42)	4.437 (1.35)			
mean of dependent variable				26870 1	38002 2	21768 13
$T = 2$						
$T = 3$				8	10	34
$T = 4$				101	125	440
\bar{R}^2				-0.016	0.061	0.04
N	174	293	749	320	397	1401

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. ANCOVA estimates using administrative and survey data. Post treatment regressands are regressed on categorical variables, pre-treatment regressand and other covariates. FloodInRd1 and HeadLiterate0 are indicator variables for the presence of self reported damage by a flood at the baseline, and literacy of household head, respectively. HHsize0 is household size at the baseline. We annotate the number of periods that a household is observed with T. The total number of households is shown for each values of T. T=4 indicates the number of households with complete panel information, T=3 indicates number of households observed three times, T=2 indicates the number of households observed twice. N indicates total number of observations used in ANCOVA estimation, or $N=1 \times (T=2) + 2 \times (T=3) + 3 \times (T=4)$. Large, LargeGrace, Cattle are indicator variables of the large, large grace, and cattle arms, respectively. The default arm category is traditional arm. Narrow net assets = Narrow assets + net saving - debt to GUK - debts to relatives and money lenders. Narrow assets use only items observed for all 4 rounds for household assets. Household assets do not include livestock. Regressions (1)-(3), (5)-(6) use only arm and calendar information. (4) and (7) use previous six month repayment and saving information which is lacking in rd 1, hence starts from rd 2.

2. P values in percentages in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at group (village) level.

TABLE D5: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF NET ASSETS BY PERIOD, CATTLE REARING EXPERIENCES (CONTINUED)

	(2)			(3)		
	Adi	Own	None	Adi	Own	None
(Intercept)	21779.3 (0.0)	23399.0 (0.9)	11534.3 (0.0)	-4533.5 (65.7)	23260.0 (10.5)	5402.3 (14.6)
Large	1445.0 (82.8)	21670.3 (4.7)	10816.1 (0.1)	-2344.8 (67.1)	22364.5 (5.0)	10191.2 (0.3)
LargeGrace	3686.8 (72.0)	5112.3 (40.9)	6799.7 (2.2)	2680.3 (70.2)	6685.6 (30.4)	6365.0 (3.8)
Cattle	2086.2 (74.0)	7235.2 (22.2)	5165.7 (6.6)	239.3 (97.0)	8024.0 (18.0)	4780.9 (9.0)
rd 3	-879.0 (77.6)	519.6 (85.1)	5743.5 (0.0)	-463.2 (88.3)	1221.9 (65.1)	5756.5 (0.0)
Large × rd 3	-5959.0 (59.4)	-3223.2 (71.9)	-362.0 (90.8)	-5690.2 (61.4)	-1646.9 (85.5)	-347.5 (91.2)
LargeGrace × rd 3	13999.1 (0.6)	-16715.7 (8.0)	6933.7 (5.5)	14190.3 (0.5)	-15797.2 (9.3)	6963.1 (5.4)
Cattle × rd 3	-321.2 (94.6)	-5019.6 (52.7)	1891.6 (53.0)	892.5 (85.5)	-5114.3 (52.6)	1949.9 (51.2)
rd 4	3787.5 (44.3)	2380.3 (47.2)	6021.3 (0.0)	4405.3 (37.7)	2393.3 (46.5)	6062.1 (0.0)
Large × rd 4	-1676.0 (88.7)	-1491.6 (88.6)	-1182.7 (69.0)	-1496.3 (90.0)	-2023.9 (84.8)	-1212.7 (68.4)
LargeGrace × rd 4	29748.7 (6.2)	-16582.8 (13.8)	7298.3 (6.0)	29850.9 (6.1)	-15484.3 (15.7)	7310.0 (6.0)
Cattle × rd 4	-833.4 (88.3)	-3707.3 (67.9)	5451.5 (7.7)	1017.8 (85.7)	-3949.3 (66.9)	5505.8 (6.9)
FloodInRd1				-11184.9 (1.0)	1924.9 (74.7)	1204.2 (62.1)
Head literate0				7408.5 (27.8)	-3907.9 (50.1)	-1485.4 (60.5)
Narrownet asset value ₁	5.2 (0.0)	0.2 (37.9)	0.5 (15.4)	4.6 (0.0)	0.2 (42.0)	0.4 (20.4)
HHsize0				7381.7 (0.1)	-345.6 (89.2)	1432.4 (5.6)
mean of dependent variable $T = 2$	26870 1	38002 1	21768 5	26870 1	38002 1	21768 5
$T = 3$	4	7	18	4	5	18
$T = 4$	55	94	236	55	94	236
\bar{R}^2	0.01	0.061	0.05	0.163	0.052	0.056
N	174	297	749	174	293	749

Notes : See footnotes of TABLE D5.

TABLE D6: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF NARROW NET ASSETS BY ATTRIBUTES AND PERIOD, CATTLE REARING EXPERIENCES

	mean/std			(1)		
	Adi	Own	None	Adi	Own	None
(Intercept)				22139.9 (0.0)	25982.2 (0.0)	12725.2 (0.0)
Unfront	0.764 (0.43)	0.826 (0.38)	0.786 (0.41)	4916.3 (34.7)	21759.0 (0.7)	9061.0 (0.0)
WithGrace	0.443 (0.50)	0.478 (0.50)	0.521 (0.50)	-2767.7 (65.5)	-11535.5 (14.2)	-3796.6 (10.1)
InKind	0.299 (0.46)	0.205 (0.40)	0.255 (0.44)	1410.8 (80.8)	-3613.1 (35.9)	1669.9 (47.8)
rd 3	0.339 (0.47)	0.341 (0.47)	0.339 (0.47)	1800.8 (44.3)	946.4 (69.5)	4815.8 (0.0)
Unfront × rd 3	0.259 (0.44)	0.280 (0.45)	0.264 (0.44)	-9527.3 (25.9)	-1410.9 (84.3)	-2105.2 (41.5)
WithGrace × rd 3	0.149 (0.36)	0.164 (0.37)	0.176 (0.38)	11864.0 (11.1)	-10480.4 (14.7)	4327.4 (11.5)
InKind × rd 3	0.103 (0.31)	0.072 (0.26)	0.087 (0.28)	-7181.9 (4.8)	12999.5 (4.7)	-4382.9 (4.8)
rd 4	0.328 (0.47)	0.324 (0.47)	0.319 (0.47)	4345.7 (20.3)	1988.8 (51.1)	6039.2 (0.0)
Unfront × rd 4	0.253 (0.44)	0.270 (0.44)	0.256 (0.44)	-4412.7 (64.4)	2894.5 (74.4)	-1313.9 (65.9)
WithGrace × rd 4	0.144 (0.35)	0.154 (0.36)	0.168 (0.37)	13442.2 (24.5)	-13456.4 (16.0)	3998.1 (20.6)
InKind × rd 4	0.098 (0.30)	0.061 (0.24)	0.080 (0.27)	-12484.6 (20.0)	15874.3 (5.3)	-823.2 (75.6)
FloodInRd1	0.540 (0.50)	0.444 (0.50)	0.386 (0.49)			
Head literate0	0.132 (0.34)	0.167 (0.37)	0.151 (0.36)			
Narrownet asset value ₁	1039.569 (886.09)	30420.000 (14911.45)	1531.372 (2958.40)			
HHsize0	4.552 (1.25)	4.587 (1.42)	4.437 (1.35)			
mean of dependent variable				26870 1	38002 2	21768 13
$T = 2$						
$T = 3$				8	10	34
$T = 4$				101	125	440
\bar{R}^2				-0.016	0.061	0.04
N	174	293	749	320	397	1401

Notes : See footnotes of TABLE D6.

TABLE D6: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF NET ASSETS BY ATTRIBUTES AND PERIOD, CATTLE REARING EXPERIENCES
(CONTINUED)

	(2)			(3)		
	Adi	Own	None	Adi	Own	None
(Intercept)	21779.3 (0.0)	23399.0 (0.9)	11534.3 (0.0)	-4533.5 (65.7)	23260.0 (10.5)	5402.3 (14.6)
Upfront	1445.0 (82.8)	21670.3 (4.7)	10816.1 (0.1)	-2344.8 (67.1)	22364.5 (5.0)	10191.2 (0.3)
WithGrace	2241.8 (83.3)	-16558.0 (11.1)	-4016.4 (17.8)	5025.1 (46.6)	-15678.9 (17.3)	-3826.3 (21.7)
InKind	-1600.6 (87.7)	2122.8 (67.7)	-1634.0 (53.7)	-2441.0 (75.1)	1338.3 (80.1)	-1584.1 (54.2)
rd 3	-879.0 (77.6)	519.6 (85.1)	5743.5 (0.0)	-463.2 (88.3)	1221.9 (65.1)	5756.5 (0.0)
Upfront × rd 3	-5959.0 (59.4)	-3223.2 (71.9)	-362.0 (90.8)	-5690.2 (61.4)	-1646.9 (85.5)	-347.5 (91.2)
WithGrace × rd 3	19958.0 (7.3)	-13492.5 (7.2)	7295.8 (6.4)	19880.5 (7.5)	-14150.3 (5.0)	7310.6 (6.3)
InKind × rd 3	-14320.3 (0.1)	11696.1 (7.0)	-5042.1 (18.8)	-13297.8 (0.4)	10682.9 (7.7)	-5013.2 (19.0)
rd 4	3787.5 (44.3)	2380.3 (47.2)	6021.3 (0.0)	4405.3 (37.7)	2393.3 (46.5)	6062.1 (0.0)
Upfront × rd 4	-1676.0 (88.7)	-1491.6 (88.6)	-1182.7 (69.0)	-1496.3 (90.0)	-2023.9 (84.8)	-1212.7 (68.4)
WithGrace × rd 4	31424.7 (9.9)	-15091.2 (11.2)	8481.1 (4.4)	31347.1 (10.2)	-13460.4 (15.4)	8522.7 (4.3)
InKind × rd 4	-30582.1 (5.6)	12875.5 (11.7)	-1846.8 (66.7)	-28833.1 (7.1)	11535.0 (12.8)	-1804.2 (67.2)
FloodInRd1				-11184.9 (1.0)	1924.9 (74.7)	1204.2 (62.1)
Head literate0				7408.5 (27.8)	-3907.9 (50.1)	-1485.4 (60.5)
Narrownet asset value ₁	5.2 (0.0)	0.2 (37.9)	0.5 (15.4)	4.6 (0.0)	0.2 (42.0)	0.4 (20.4)
HHsize0				7381.7 (0.1)	-345.6 (89.2)	1432.4 (5.6)
mean of dependent variable $T = 2$	26870 1	38002 1	21768 5	26870 1	38002 1	21768 5
$T = 3$	4	7	18	4	5	18
$T = 4$	55	94	236	55	94	236
\bar{R}^2	0.01	0.061	0.05	0.163	0.052	0.056
N	174	297	749	174	293	749

Notes : See footnotes of TABLE D7.

TABLE D7: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF NET NON-LIVESTOCK ASSETS BY ATTRIBUTES AND PERIOD

covariates	mean/std	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)		942.1 (0.3)	625.1 (38.1)	1660.5 (2.4)	1339.6 (9.6)	1535.8 (4.3)	1330.0 (11.0)
Unfront	0.813 (0.39)	1796.6 (0.9)	2763.3 (1.0)	3047.0 (0.5)	3481.4 (0.5)	3229.3 (0.4)	3477.7 (0.5)
WithGrace	0.506 (0.50)	-1131.7 (23.9)	-1610.9 (27.1)	-1959.8 (16.1)	-2346.1 (11.7)	-1975.4 (15.7)	-2343.3 (11.6)
InKind	0.252 (0.43)	76.1 (91.9)	-337.6 (77.1)	-183.1 (86.9)	139.9 (90.0)	-196.7 (85.6)	135.1 (90.2)
rd 3	0.342 (0.47)	795.8 (0.7)	868.1 (6.7)	861.9 (6.8)	1023.1 (5.5)	932.0 (6.1)	1023.1 (5.5)
Unfront × rd 3	0.276 (0.45)	-1063.3 (12.5)	-1917.5 (13.9)	-1902.4 (14.3)	-2414.7 (11.3)	-2178.7 (13.0)	-2415.1 (11.3)
WithGrace × rd 3	0.173 (0.38)	1995.9 (6.1)	2693.2 (9.0)	2732.2 (8.3)	3445.7 (4.6)	2733.5 (8.3)	3445.3 (4.6)
InKind × rd 3	0.086 (0.28)	-1536.1 (11.6)	-1788.3 (20.5)	-1896.4 (17.2)	-2369.7 (11.6)	-1897.7 (17.3)	-2369.3 (11.6)
rd 4	0.314 (0.46)	-65.3 (84.4)	-267.4 (61.7)	-269.9 (61.3)	-126.2 (82.4)	-193.1 (72.7)	-126.4 (82.4)
Unfront × rd 4	0.261 (0.44)	-1951.4 (1.2)	-3171.8 (1.9)	-3219.1 (1.8)	-3725.3 (1.6)	-3526.8 (1.8)	-3725.0 (1.6)
WithGrace × rd 4	0.160 (0.37)	1521.7 (21.5)	2189.3 (24.7)	2204.8 (24.2)	2852.3 (13.5)	2206.2 (24.3)	2852.1 (13.5)
InKind × rd 4	0.078 (0.27)	-316.8 (77.2)	-268.4 (87.4)	-335.6 (84.1)	-845.9 (61.6)	-342.2 (83.9)	-847.0 (61.6)
HadCattle	0.261 (0.44)				-441.9 (63.7)		-290.6 (87.1)
HadCattle × rd 3	0.090 (0.29)				732.6 (64.1)		732.8 (64.1)
HadCattle × rd 4	0.083 (0.28)				670.5 (70.2)		669.4 (70.3)
FloodInRd1	0.413 (0.49)			-1534.1 (1.0)	-1662.3 (0.9)	-1585.4 (0.9)	-1658.0 (1.1)
Head literate0	0.146 (0.35)			19.7 (96.7)	-59.3 (91.6)	56.9 (90.6)	-57.7 (91.9)
NarrowNetNLAssetValue0	1565.044 (2770.26)		0.2 (1.4)	0.2 (0.7)	0.2 (0.2)	0.2 (0.3)	0.2 (0.2)
HHsize0	4.540 (1.34)			-106.8 (61.9)	-84.1 (72.3)	-110.9 (63.6)	-82.1 (73.8)
HadCattle × Unfront	0.215 (0.41)				1690.1 (59.8)		1680.5 (60.3)
HadCattle × Upfront × rd 3	0.074 (0.26)				-3458.4 (54.4)		-3461.1 (54.3)
HadCattle × Unfront × rd 4	0.069 (0.25)				-3732.6 (51.8)		-3731.3 (51.9)
HadCattle × WithGrace	0.124 (0.33)				2767.7 (28.0)		2777.9 (26.9)
HadCattle × WithGrace × rd 3	0.043 (0.20)				-6124.8 (2.7)		-6126.8 (2.6)
HadCattle × WithGrace × rd 4	0.039 (0.19)				-6248.2 (14.8)		-6249.5 (14.7)
HadCattle × InKind	0.052 (0.22)				-1795.5 (40.2)		-1818.7 (37.1)
HadCattle × InKind × rd 3	0.018 (0.13)				3200.5 (21.4)		3202.4 (21.2)
HadCattle × InKind × rd 4	0.015 (0.12)				4012.6 (31.6)		4006.6 (32.1)
NumCattle0	0.373 (0.73)					-151.7 (73.9)	-106.3 (91.7)
mean of dependent variable		2000 T = 2	2000 7	2000 7	2000 9	2000 7	2000 9
T = 3		53	30	27	30	27	30
T = 4		690	400	400	344	385	344
R ²		0.007	0.012	0.018	0.015	0.017	0.014
N	1101	2192	1267	1261	1101	1216	1101

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. ANCOVA estimates using administrative and survey data. Post treatment regressands are regressed on categorical variables, pre-treatment regressand and other covariates. FloodInRd1 and HeadLiterate0 are indicator variables for the presence of self reported damage by a flood at the baseline, and literacy of household head, respectively. HHsize0 is household size at the baseline. We annotate the number of periods that a household is observed with T. The total number of households is shown for each values of T. T=4 indicates the number of households with complete panel information, T=3 indicates number of households observed three times, T=2 indicates the number of households observed twice. N indicates total number of observations used in ANCOVA estimation, or $N=1 \times (T=2) + 2 \times (T=3) + 3 \times (T=4)$. Upfront is an indicator variable of the arm with an upfront large disbursement, WithGrace is an indicator variable of the arm with a grace period, InKind is an indicator variable of the arm which lends a heifer. Narrow net assets = Narrow assets + net saving - debt to GUK - debts to relatives and money lenders. Narrow assets use only items observed for all 4 rounds for household assets. Household assets do not include livestock. Regressions (1)-(3), (5)-(6) use only arm and calendar information. (4) and (7) use previous six month repayment and saving information which is lacking in rd 1, hence starts from rd 2.

2. P values in percentages in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at group (village) level.

TABLE D8: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF CATTLE HOLDING BY ARM AND PERIOD

covariates	mean/std	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)		1.47 (0.0)	1.36 (0.0)	1.12 (0.0)	1.14 (0.0)
Large	0.273 (0.45)	0.39 (0.6)	0.37 (0.4)	0.35 (0.8)	0.30 (0.7)
LargeGrace	0.248 (0.43)	0.01 (93.4)	0.02 (87.4)	0.02 (83.9)	-0.00 (99.4)
Cattle	0.264 (0.44)	-0.05 (44.1)	-0.03 (72.0)	-0.03 (67.5)	-0.05 (44.5)
rd 3	0.348 (0.48)	-0.02 (71.4)	0.00 (97.3)	0.00 (93.8)	0.00 (94.5)
Large × rd 3	0.094 (0.29)	-0.05 (74.9)	-0.05 (75.5)	-0.05 (77.9)	-0.02 (91.3)
LargeGrace × rd 3	0.085 (0.28)	0.19 (28.5)	0.20 (25.5)	0.21 (24.9)	0.25 (15.2)
Cattle × rd 3	0.091 (0.29)	0.17 (18.0)	0.16 (23.6)	0.16 (24.6)	0.18 (15.7)
rd 4	0.326 (0.47)	0.16 (1.0)	0.18 (0.5)	0.19 (0.4)	0.19 (0.3)
Large × rd 4	0.094 (0.29)	0.04 (80.3)	0.04 (81.9)	0.05 (78.2)	0.08 (62.6)
LargeGrace × rd 4	0.081 (0.27)	0.41 (3.0)	0.39 (3.2)	0.40 (3.0)	0.45 (1.2)
Cattle × rd 4	0.085 (0.28)	0.34 (0.8)	0.34 (1.1)	0.35 (1.1)	0.37 (0.4)
HadCattle	0.195 (0.40)				0.16 (40.9)
HadCattle × rd 3	0.067 (0.25)				0.05 (69.7)
HadCattle × rd 4	0.061 (0.24)				-0.05 (74.4)
FloodInRd1	0.491 (0.50)			0.05 (57.2)	0.05 (50.6)
Head literate0	0.114 (0.32)			0.02 (85.6)	0.02 (85.2)
NumCattle0	0.266 (0.62)		0.31 (0.3)	0.29 (0.6)	0.19 (21.1)
HHsize0	4.219 (1.43)			0.05 (3.7)	0.05 (4.2)
HadCattle × Large	0.063 (0.24)				0.70 (4.4)
HadCattle × Large × rd 3	0.021 (0.14)				0.15 (63.4)
HadCattle × Large × rd 4	0.021 (0.14)				0.10 (81.6)
HadCattle × LargeGrace	0.049 (0.22)				0.49 (1.3)
HadCattle × LargeGrace × rd 3	0.017 (0.13)				-0.17 (62.4)
HadCattle × LargeGrace × rd 4	0.016 (0.13)				-0.61 (10.4)
HadCattle × Cattle	0.045 (0.21)				0.27 (18.3)
HadCattle × Cattle × rd 3	0.016 (0.13)				0.15 (58.6)
HadCattle × Cattle × rd 4	0.013 (0.11)				0.07 (82.8)
mean of dependent variable		1.61	1.61	1.61	1.61
$T = 2$		85	85	85	85
$T = 3$		168	168	168	168
$T = 4$		395	395	395	395
\bar{R}^2		0.039	0.083	0.089	0.099
N	1998	1606	1606	1606	1606

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. ANCOVA estimates using administrative and survey data. Post treatment regressands are regressed on categorical variables, pre-treatment regressand and other covariates. FloodInRd1 and HeadLiterate0 are indicator variables for the presence of self reported damage by a flood at the baseline, and literacy of household head, respectively. HHsize0 is household size at the baseline. We annotate the number of periods that a household is observed with T. The total number of households is shown for each values of T. T=4 indicates the number of households with complete panel information, T=3 indicates number of households observed three times, T=2 indicates the number of households observed twice. N indicates total number of observations used in ANCOVA estimation, or $N=1 \times (T=2) + 2 \times (T=3) + 3 \times (T=4)$. Large, LargeGrace, Cattle are indicator variables of the large, large grace, and cattle arms, respectively. The default arm category is traditional arm. rd2, rd3, rd4 are dummy variables for second, third, and fourth round of survey. Sample is continuing members and replacing members of early rejecters and received loans prior to 2015 January. Regressand is NumCows, number of cattle holding.

2. P values in percentages in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at group (village) level.

TABLE D9: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF CATTLE HOLDING BY ATTRIBUTES AND PERIOD

covariates	mean/std	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)		1.47 (0.0)	1.36 (0.0)	1.12 (0.0)	1.14 (0.0)
Unfront	0.785 (0.41)	0.39 (0.6)	0.37 (0.4)	0.35 (0.8)	0.30 (0.7)
WithGrace	0.512 (0.50)	-0.38 (2.6)	-0.35 (1.9)	-0.33 (3.7)	-0.31 (3.4)
InKind	0.264 (0.44)	-0.06 (59.8)	-0.05 (68.3)	-0.05 (62.1)	-0.05 (63.8)
rd 3	0.348 (0.48)	-0.02 (71.4)	0.00 (97.3)	0.00 (93.8)	0.00 (94.5)
Unfront × rd 3	0.269 (0.44)	-0.05 (74.9)	-0.05 (75.5)	-0.05 (77.9)	-0.02 (91.3)
WithGrace × rd 3	0.176 (0.38)	0.24 (17.1)	0.25 (14.2)	0.25 (14.7)	0.27 (13.1)
InKind × rd 3	0.091 (0.29)	-0.02 (90.7)	-0.05 (75.1)	-0.05 (72.5)	-0.07 (64.2)
rd 4	0.326 (0.47)	0.16 (1.0)	0.18 (0.5)	0.19 (0.4)	0.19 (0.3)
Unfront × rd 4	0.260 (0.44)	0.04 (80.3)	0.04 (81.9)	0.05 (78.2)	0.08 (62.6)
WithGrace × rd 4	0.166 (0.37)	0.36 (7.8)	0.35 (8.3)	0.36 (8.4)	0.37 (6.9)
InKind × rd 4	0.085 (0.28)	-0.06 (73.2)	-0.05 (77.4)	-0.05 (76.1)	-0.08 (66.3)
HadCattle	0.195 (0.40)				0.16 (40.9)
HadCattle × rd 3	0.067 (0.25)				0.05 (69.7)
HadCattle × rd 4	0.061 (0.24)				-0.05 (74.4)
FloodInRd1	0.491 (0.50)			0.05 (57.2)	0.05 (50.6)
Head literate0	0.114 (0.32)			0.02 (85.6)	0.02 (85.2)
NumCattle0	0.266 (0.62)		0.31 (0.3)	0.29 (0.6)	0.19 (21.1)
HHsize0	4.219 (1.43)			0.05 (3.7)	0.05 (4.2)
HadCattle × Unfront	0.157 (0.36)				0.70 (4.4)
HadCattle × Unfront × rd 3	0.054 (0.23)				0.15 (63.4)
HadCattle × Unfront × rd 4	0.050 (0.22)				0.10 (81.6)
HadCattle × WithGrace	0.094 (0.29)				-0.21 (53.3)
HadCattle × WithGrace × rd 3	0.033 (0.18)				-0.33 (37.2)
HadCattle × WithGrace × rd 4	0.029 (0.17)				-0.71 (11.0)
HadCattle × InKind	0.045 (0.21)				-0.22 (22.0)
HadCattle × InKind × rd 3	0.016 (0.13)				0.32 (34.1)
HadCattle × InKind × rd 4	0.013 (0.11)				0.68 (6.1)
mean of dependent variable		1.61	1.61	1.61	1.61
$T = 2$		85	85	85	85
$T = 3$		168	168	168	168
$T = 4$		395	395	395	395
\bar{R}^2		0.039	0.083	0.089	0.099
N	1998	1606	1606	1606	1606

Notes : See footnotes of TABLE D10.

TABLE D10: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF CONSUMPTION BY PERIOD

covariates	mean/std	Per capita consumption (Tk)			Total consumption (Tk)		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)		2704.3 (0.0)	1997.0 (0.0)	3219.3 (0.0)	10905.6 (0.0)	5373.6 (0.0)	3492.3 (0.0)
Large	0.273 (0.45)	34.7 (65.3)	58.8 (41.3)	94.3 (19.7)	670.7 (17.8)	533.6 (13.6)	342.7 (25.0)
LargeGrace	0.244 (0.43)	10.5 (89.4)	1.3 (98.5)	20.6 (79.4)	289.2 (61.6)	16.8 (96.2)	64.6 (83.0)
Cattle	0.261 (0.44)	46.3 (50.7)	67.8 (29.3)	57.6 (39.0)	212.2 (62.1)	443.3 (16.1)	267.7 (33.8)
rd 4	0.493 (0.50)	108.3 (0.9)	102.5 (1.5)	101.5 (1.7)	-23.0 (88.8)	-37.1 (82.1)	5.2 (97.4)
Large × rd 4	0.001 (0.24)	36.2 (74.3)	29.1 (78.7)	25.8 (81.0)	21.8 (96.1)	60.5 (89.3)	97.4 (82.8)
LargeGrace × rd 4	0.001 (0.23)	71.3 (59.4)	62.4 (63.6)	52.5 (69.1)	37.6 (93.9)	129.3 (79.2)	181.2 (71.0)
Cattle × rd 4	-0.002 (0.23)	-67.8 (52.4)	-90.1 (39.0)	-103.0 (33.2)	-665.6 (14.8)	-587.5 (20.0)	-435.6 (30.6)
FloodInRd1	0.489 (0.50)			-49.8 (20.2)			33.5 (84.4)
Head literate0	0.117 (0.32)			118.5 (1.7)			566.1 (2.8)
per capita consumption ₂	2212.703 (653.86)		0.3 (0.0)	0.1 (0.2)			
HHsize0	4.354 (1.47)			-188.2 (0.0)			1173.9 (0.0)
household consumption ₂	9208.982 (3172.47)					0.6 (0.0)	0.3 (0.0)
mean of dependent variable $T = 2$		2782 50	2782 50	2782 50	11205 50	11205 50	11205 50
$T = 3$ R^2		665 0.002	665 0.084	665 0.205	665 0.003	665 0.326	665 0.483
N	77	1380	1380	1380	1380	1380	1380

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. ANCOVA estimates using administrative and survey data. Post treatment regressands are regressed on categorical variables, pre-treatment regressand and other covariates. FloodInRd1 and HeadLiterate0 are indicator variables for the presence of self reported damage by a flood at the baseline, and literacy of household head, respectively. HHsize0 is household size at the baseline. We annotate the number of periods that a household is observed with T. The total number of households is shown for each values of T. T=4 indicates the number of households with complete panel information, T=3 indicates number of households observed three times, T=2 indicates the number of households observed twice. N indicates total number of observations used in ANCOVA estimation, or $N=1 \times (T=2) + 2 \times (T=3) + 3 \times (T=4)$. UltraPoor is an indicator variable if the household is classified as the ultra poor. Large, LargeGrace, Cattle are indicator variables of the large, large grace, and cattle arms, respectively. The default arm category is traditional arm. Consumption is annualised values.

2. P values in percentages in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at group (village) level.

TABLE D11: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF CONSUMPTION BY ATTRIBUTES AND PERIOD

covariates	mean/std	Per capita consumption (Tk)			Total consumption (Tk)		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)		2704.3 (0.0)	1997.0 (0.0)	3219.3 (0.0)	10905.6 (0.0)	5373.6 (0.0)	3492.3 (0.0)
Unfront	0.778 (0.42)	34.7 (65.3)	58.8 (41.3)	94.3 (19.7)	670.7 (17.8)	533.6 (13.6)	342.7 (25.0)
WithGrace	0.505 (0.50)	-24.2 (78.2)	-57.5 (47.0)	-73.7 (33.9)	-381.6 (51.8)	-516.8 (17.8)	-278.1 (41.0)
InKind	0.261 (0.44)	35.8 (65.8)	66.5 (36.1)	37.0 (60.4)	-77.0 (88.5)	426.5 (22.7)	203.1 (52.6)
rd 4	0.493 (0.50)	108.3 (0.9)	102.5 (1.5)	101.5 (1.7)	-23.0 (88.8)	-37.1 (82.1)	5.2 (97.4)
Unfront × rd 4	0.001 (0.22)	36.2 (74.3)	29.1 (78.7)	25.8 (81.0)	21.8 (96.1)	60.5 (89.3)	97.4 (82.8)
WithGrace × rd 4	-0.001 (0.26)	35.1 (78.5)	33.3 (79.6)	26.7 (83.6)	15.8 (97.3)	68.7 (88.3)	83.8 (85.7)
InKind × rd 4	-0.002 (0.23)	-139.0 (26.7)	-152.5 (23.0)	-155.5 (22.5)	-703.1 (14.3)	-716.8 (13.2)	-616.8 (16.6)
FloodInRd1	0.489 (0.50)			-49.8 (20.2)			33.5 (84.4)
Head literate0	0.117 (0.32)			118.5 (1.7)			566.1 (2.8)
per capita consumption ₂	2212.703 (653.86)		0.3 (0.0)	0.1 (0.2)			
HHsize0	4.354 (1.47)			-188.2 (0.0)			1173.9 (0.0)
household consumption ₂	9208.982 (3172.47)					0.6 (0.0)	0.3 (0.0)
mean of dependent variable $T = 2$		2782 50	2782 50	2782 50	11205 50	11205 50	11205 50
$T = 3$ R^2		665 0.002	665 0.084	665 0.205	665 0.003	665 0.326	665 0.483
N	77	1380	1380	1380	1380	1380	1380

Notes : See footnotes of TABLE D12.

TABLE D12: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF HOUSEHOLD LABOUR INCOMES AND FARM INCOMES BY PERIOD

covariates	mean/std	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)		-8847.11 (11.5)	-7464.61 (17.8)	-64693.29 (0.0)
Large	0.278 (0.45)	193.34 (97.9)	-301.33 (96.7)	-4081.79 (52.3)
LargeGrace	0.248 (0.43)	-1516.59 (84.6)	-5950.50 (40.1)	-5749.56 (28.2)
Cattle	0.254 (0.44)	-2363.49 (75.1)	-3488.37 (62.5)	-3786.13 (51.9)
rd 3	0.343 (0.47)	12826.35 (0.0)	12726.78 (0.0)	12533.21 (0.0)
Large × rd 3	0.094 (0.29)	-5904.74 (34.9)	-5706.05 (36.0)	-3202.98 (57.7)
LargeGrace × rd 3	0.085 (0.28)	1243.65 (85.2)	545.72 (93.3)	2510.64 (66.8)
Cattle × rd 3	0.086 (0.28)	-8767.76 (27.3)	-7999.96 (30.0)	-4708.92 (50.0)
rd 4	0.326 (0.47)	23562.04 (0.0)	23314.19 (0.0)	23381.34 (0.0)
Large × rd 4	0.095 (0.29)	10278.34 (43.7)	10389.16 (43.1)	12187.73 (34.7)
LargeGrace × rd 4	0.082 (0.27)	313.08 (96.8)	-651.75 (93.1)	1415.67 (83.7)
Cattle × rd 4	0.081 (0.27)	-6744.19 (50.2)	-6607.35 (50.9)	-2208.07 (81.3)
FloodInRd1	0.488 (0.50)			7086.54 (14.6)
Head literate0	0.113 (0.32)			-6837.51 (20.9)
household labour income ₁	2397.862 (172385.37)		0.10 (0.0)	0.06 (15.2)
HHsize0	4.405 (1.53)			12629.79 (0.0)
pcHHLabourIncome0	15499.124 (29821.83)			0.16 (52.9)
mean of dependent variable		2410	2410	2410
$T = 2$		105	105	105
$T = 3$		83	83	83
$T = 4$		658	658	658
\bar{R}^2		0.013	0.064	0.119
N	2557	2557	2557	2557

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. ANCOVA estimates using administrative and survey data. Post treatment regressands are regressed on categorical variables, pre-treatment regressand and other covariates. FloodInRd1 and HeadLiterat0 are indicator variables for the presence of self reported damage by a flood at the baseline, and literacy of household head, respectively. HHsize0 is household size at the baseline. We annotate the number of periods that a household is observed with T. The total number of households is shown for each values of T. T=4 indicates the number of households with complete panel information, T=3 indicates number of households observed three times, T=2 indicates the number of households observed twice. N indicates total number of observations used in ANCOVA estimation, or $N=1 \times (T=2) + 2 \times (T=3) + 3 \times (T=4)$. Large, LargeGrace, Cattle are indicator variables of the large, large grace, and cattle arms, respectively. The default arm category is traditional arm. rd2, rd3, rd4 are dummy variables for second, third, and fourth round of survey. Labour incomes are in 1000 Tk units and are a sum of all earned labour incomes of household members. Farm revenues are in 1000 Tk units and are a total of agricultural produce sales.

2. P values in percentages in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at group (village) level.

TABLE D13: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF HOUSEHOLD LABOUR INCOMES AND FARM INCOMES BY ATTRIBUTES AND PERIOD

covariates	mean/std	(1)	(2)	(3)
(Intercept)		-8847.11 (11.5)	-7464.61 (17.8)	-64693.29 (0.0)
Unfront	0.779 (0.41)	193.34 (97.9)	-301.33 (96.7)	-4081.79 (52.3)
WithGrace	0.502 (0.50)	-1709.93 (81.4)	-5649.17 (37.2)	-1667.77 (74.7)
InKind	0.254 (0.44)	-846.90 (90.7)	2462.13 (69.4)	1963.44 (67.4)
rd 3	0.343 (0.47)	12826.35 (0.0)	12726.78 (0.0)	12533.21 (0.0)
Unfront × rd 3	0.266 (0.44)	-5904.74 (34.9)	-5706.05 (36.0)	-3202.98 (57.7)
WithGrace × rd 3	0.172 (0.38)	7148.39 (17.7)	6251.77 (22.1)	5713.63 (23.6)
InKind × rd 3	0.086 (0.28)	-10011.41 (16.6)	-8545.69 (21.3)	-7219.56 (24.6)
rd 4	0.326 (0.47)	23562.04 (0.0)	23314.19 (0.0)	23381.34 (0.0)
Unfront × rd 4	0.258 (0.44)	10278.34 (43.7)	10389.16 (43.1)	12187.73 (34.7)
WithGrace × rd 4	0.163 (0.37)	-9965.26 (43.2)	-11040.90 (37.8)	-10772.06 (38.9)
InKind × rd 4	0.081 (0.27)	-7057.27 (44.9)	-5955.61 (51.3)	-3623.74 (67.3)
FloodInRd1	0.488 (0.50)			7086.54 (14.6)
Head literate0	0.113 (0.32)			-6837.51 (20.9)
household labour income ₁	2397.862 (172385.37)		0.10 (0.0)	0.06 (15.2)
HHsize0	4.405 (1.53)			12629.79 (0.0)
pcHHLabourIncome0	15499.124 (29821.83)			0.16 (52.9)
mean of dependent variable		2410	2410	2410
$T = 2$		105	105	105
$T = 3$		83	83	83
$T = 4$		658	658	658
\bar{R}^2		0.013	0.064	0.119
N	2557	2557	2557	2557

Notes : See footnotes of TABLE D14.

TABLE D14: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY TIME

covariates	mean/std	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)		0.92 (0.0)	0.70 (0.0)	0.70 (0.0)	0.81 (0.0)	0.69 (0.0)	0.78 (0.0)
Secondary	0.338 (0.47)	-0.08 (0.1)	-0.15 (0.0)	-0.15 (0.0)	-0.12 (0.0)	-0.14 (0.0)	-0.12 (0.0)
College	0.172 (0.38)	-0.21 (0.0)	-0.24 (0.0)	-0.24 (0.0)	-0.21 (0.0)	-0.22 (0.0)	-0.20 (0.0)
Large	0.777 (0.44)	-0.03 (43.5)	-0.04 (18.4)	-0.04 (18.4)	-0.04 (20.4)	-0.04 (25.1)	-0.03 (36.5)
LargeGrace	0.247 (0.43)	-0.04 (31.7)	-0.05 (14.7)	-0.05 (14.7)	-0.04 (12.7)	-0.04 (22.2)	-0.03 (24.3)
Cattle	0.257 (0.44)	-0.06 (13.6)	-0.07 (2.2)	-0.07 (2.2)	-0.06 (4.0)	-0.06 (4.1)	-0.05 (8.0)
Large × Secondary	0.085 (0.28)	0.06 (36.5)	0.03 (62.5)	0.03 (62.5)	0.05 (42.5)	0.04 (54.5)	0.06 (34.3)
LargeGrace × Secondary	0.083 (0.28)	-0.08 (27.6)	-0.08 (22.9)	-0.08 (22.9)	-0.07 (29.5)	-0.05 (45.4)	-0.05 (43.3)
Cattle × Secondary	0.088 (0.28)	-0.03 (67.5)	-0.02 (77.5)	-0.02 (77.5)	-0.01 (91.4)	-0.01 (87.1)	0.00 (98.8)
Large × College	0.049 (0.22)	0.05 (53.7)	0.04 (60.1)	0.04 (60.1)	0.06 (41.4)	0.07 (39.9)	0.15 (5.9)
LargeGrace × College	0.049 (0.22)	-0.00 (98.4)	0.00 (99.7)	0.00 (99.7)	-0.01 (91.5)	0.00 (99.2)	0.02 (83.9)
Cattle × College	0.035 (0.18)	-0.16 (17.4)	-0.09 (26.3)	-0.09 (26.3)	-0.11 (16.0)	-0.05 (57.5)	-0.05 (59.5)
Female	0.450 (0.50)					0.04 (5.3)	0.05 (5.1)
Secondary × Female	0.152 (0.36)					0.11 (0.4)	0.10 (0.6)
College × Female	0.059 (0.24)					0.07 (18.9)	0.08 (19.3)
Large × Female	0.121 (0.33)					0.02 (76.4)	0.04 (44.3)
LargeGrace × Female	0.114 (0.32)					0.10 (5.6)	0.08 (11.6)
Cattle × Female	0.114 (0.32)					0.06 (20.3)	0.07 (13.9)
Large × Secondary × Female	0.041 (0.20)					-0.14 (18.1)	-0.18 (4.9)
LargeGrace × Secondary × Female	0.036 (0.19)					0.09 (38.0)	0.09 (35.5)
Cattle × Secondary × Female	0.037 (0.19)					-0.05 (67.9)	-0.04 (75.9)
Large × College × Female	0.016 (0.12)					0.10 (58.1)	0.26 (15.8)
LargeGrace × College × Female	0.018 (0.13)					-0.04 (85.4)	0.06 (78.5)
Cattle × College × Female	0.010 (0.10)					0.23 (21.8)	0.25 (22.4)

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative and survey data.

Notes: 1. ANCOVA estimates using administrative and survey data. Post treatment regressands are regressed on categorical variables, pre-treatment regressand and other covariates. FloodInRd1 and HeadLiterate0 are indicator variables for the presence of self reported damage by a flood at the baseline, and literacy of household head, respectively. HHsize0 is household size at the baseline. We annotate the number of periods that a household is observed with T. The total number of households is shown for each values of T. T=4 indicates the number of households with complete panel information, T=3 indicates number of households observed three times, T=2 indicates the number of households observed twice. N indicates total number of observations used in ANCOVA estimation, or $N=1 \times (T=2) + 2 \times (T=3) + 3 \times (T=4)$. Large, LargeGrace, Cattle are indicator variables of the large, large grace, and cattle arms, respectively. The default arm category is traditional arm. Secondary and College are indicator variables of secondary schooling (ages 13-15) and tertiary schooling (ages 16-18), both at the time of baseline. Default category is primary (ages 05-12). rd2, rd3, rd4 are dummy variables for second, third, and fourth round of survey. Interaction terms of dummy variables are demeaned before interacting. The first column gives mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of each covariates before demeaning.

2. P values in percentages in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at group (village) level.

TABLE D14: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY TIME (CONTINUED)

covariates	mean/std	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
rd 3	0.344 (0.48)	0.06 (0.0)	0.06 (0.0)	0.06 (0.0)	0.04 (0.0)	0.06 (0.0)	0.04 (0.1)
Secondary × rd 3	0.117 (0.32)	0.01 (86.0)	-0.02 (47.1)	-0.02 (47.1)	-0.04 (21.8)	-0.03 (35.9)	-0.05 (15.2)
College × rd 3	0.055 (0.23)	0.04 (34.6)	-0.02 (69.2)	-0.02 (69.2)	-0.03 (43.1)	-0.01 (73.0)	-0.04 (36.9)
Large × rd 3	0.091 (0.29)	-0.06 (8.6)	-0.05 (9.8)	-0.05 (9.8)	-0.06 (6.7)	-0.05 (13.7)	-0.07 (2.1)
LargeGrace × rd 3	0.086 (0.28)	-0.04 (34.1)	-0.05 (18.8)	-0.05 (18.8)	-0.07 (6.6)	-0.07 (8.5)	-0.08 (1.8)
Cattle × rd 3	0.090 (0.29)	-0.02 (54.9)	-0.03 (34.6)	-0.03 (34.6)	-0.04 (24.8)	-0.04 (26.7)	-0.06 (15.9)
Large × Secondary × rd 3	0.028 (0.16)	-0.05 (52.8)	-0.04 (63.4)	-0.04 (63.4)	-0.07 (36.0)	-0.04 (61.0)	-0.08 (32.9)
LargeGrace × Secondary × rd 3	0.028 (0.16)	0.08 (34.4)	0.08 (31.6)	0.08 (31.6)	0.04 (65.3)	0.02 (80.4)	-0.01 (90.9)
Cattle × Secondary × rd 3	0.032 (0.17)	0.08 (45.6)	0.08 (42.0)	0.08 (42.0)	0.04 (64.8)	0.08 (39.9)	0.05 (61.9)
Large × College × rd 3	0.015 (0.12)	0.02 (84.8)	-0.01 (92.4)	-0.01 (92.4)	-0.07 (56.1)	0.01 (95.3)	-0.13 (22.3)
LargeGrace × College × rd 3	0.017 (0.13)	-0.01 (89.8)	-0.00 (96.9)	-0.00 (96.9)	-0.02 (88.6)	-0.00 (98.8)	-0.05 (65.9)
Cattle × College × rd 3	0.012 (0.11)	0.11 (41.0)	0.02 (85.0)	0.02 (85.0)	-0.00 (96.9)	-0.04 (73.2)	-0.09 (50.3)
Female × rd 3	0.156 (0.36)					-0.01 (67.2)	-0.00 (85.0)
Large × Female × rd 3	0.041 (0.20)					0.03 (60.9)	0.02 (64.2)
LargeGrace × Female × rd 3	0.040 (0.20)					-0.02 (77.8)	0.01 (86.9)
Cattle × Female × rd 3	0.040 (0.20)					0.05 (44.9)	0.06 (39.3)
Large × Secondary × Female × rd 3	0.014 (0.12)					0.08 (64.2)	0.10 (51.1)
LargeGrace × Secondary × Female × rd 3	0.012 (0.11)					0.10 (50.9)	0.14 (37.2)
Cattle × Secondary × Female × rd 3	0.012 (0.11)					0.31 (8.4)	0.24 (13.2)
Large × College × Female × rd 3	0.003 (0.06)					0.17 (38.3)	-0.06 (75.2)
LargeGrace × College × Female × rd 3	0.005 (0.07)					0.17 (37.1)	0.09 (67.6)
Cattle × College × Female × rd 3	0.003 (0.06)					-0.22 (36.4)	-0.27 (33.9)
Secondary × Female × rd 3	0.052 (0.22)					-0.05 (42.7)	-0.02 (74.4)
College × Female × rd 3	0.016 (0.13)					0.03 (69.1)	0.00 (99.3)

Notes : See footnotes of TABLE D16.

TABLE D14: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY TIME (CONTINUED 2)

covariates	mean/std	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
rd 4	0.294 (0.46)	0.10 (0.0)	0.13 (0.0)	0.13 (0.0)	0.12 (0.0)	0.13 (0.0)	0.12 (0.0)
Secondary × rd 4	0.150 (0.36)	0.07 (11.6)	-0.03 (41.3)	-0.03 (41.3)	-0.05 (26.8)	-0.05 (26.4)	-0.06 (17.8)
College × rd 4	0.062 (0.24)	0.12 (0.8)	-0.02 (71.0)	-0.02 (71.0)	-0.03 (48.0)	-0.02 (57.6)	-0.04 (33.0)
WithGrace × rd 4	0.147 (0.35)	0.01 (75.9)	0.01 (76.2)	0.01 (76.2)	0.01 (73.3)	-0.00 (94.1)	0.02 (62.8)
Upfront × rd 4	0.232 (0.42)	-0.05 (19.3)	-0.06 (16.2)	-0.06 (16.2)	-0.07 (11.1)	-0.07 (11.1)	-0.09 (2.2)
InKind × rd 4	0.073 (0.26)	0.04 (37.8)	0.02 (67.8)	0.02 (67.8)	0.02 (69.2)	0.02 (49.6)	0.02 (58.2)
WithGrace × Secondary × rd 4	0.076 (0.27)	0.18 (9.1)	0.15 (10.3)	0.15 (10.3)	0.15 (11.9)	0.10 (28.7)	0.11 (24.3)
Unfront × Secondary × rd 4	0.114 (0.32)	-0.04 (69.7)	-0.03 (74.4)	-0.03 (74.4)	-0.09 (38.5)	-0.03 (71.3)	-0.09 (33.5)
InKind × Secondary × rd 4	0.040 (0.20)	-0.09 (46.8)	-0.05 (60.8)	-0.05 (60.8)	-0.05 (67.4)	-0.01 (93.7)	-0.01 (93.5)
WithGrace × College × rd 4	0.029 (0.17)	-0.09 (33.7)	-0.05 (59.9)	-0.05 (59.9)	-0.01 (87.8)	-0.02 (83.4)	0.07 (41.4)
Upfront × College × rd 4	0.049 (0.22)	-0.05 (72.9)	-0.05 (70.1)	-0.05 (70.1)	-0.08 (49.6)	-0.09 (46.1)	-0.22 (5.7)
InKind × College × rd 4	0.012 (0.11)	0.08 (50.1)	0.02 (83.1)	0.02 (83.1)	0.03 (79.2)	-0.02 (84.1)	0.01 (94.7)
Female × rd 4	0.142 (0.35)					-0.04 (6.1)	-0.04 (3.3)
WithGrace × Female × rd 4	0.071 (0.26)					-0.06 (20.5)	-0.07 (15.8)
Upfront × Female × rd 4	0.112 (0.32)					0.13 (1.3)	0.12 (2.6)
InKind × Female × rd 4	0.034 (0.18)					0.08 (26.4)	0.10 (14.9)
WithGrace × Secondary × Female × rd 4	0.037 (0.19)					-0.17 (33.2)	-0.14 (37.3)
Upfront × Secondary × Female × rd 4	0.054 (0.23)					-0.10 (56.6)	-0.00 (99.5)
InKind × Secondary × Female × rd 4	0.019 (0.14)					0.31 (10.3)	0.17 (33.5)
WithGrace × College × Female × rd 4	0.012 (0.11)					0.35 (5.4)	0.55 (0.1)
Upfront × College × Female × rd 4	0.023 (0.15)					-0.19 (40.3)	-0.50 (4.0)
InKind × College × Female × rd 4	0.004 (0.07)					-0.19 (46.6)	-0.15 (57.6)
Secondary × Female × rd 4	0.070 (0.26)					-0.04 (47.7)	-0.02 (69.5)
College × Female × rd 4	0.032 (0.17)					0.14 (11.0)	0.13 (15.6)
FloodInRd1	0.464 (0.50)				-0.05 (4.2)		-0.05 (2.8)
EldestSon	0.267 (0.44)				0.02 (62.9)		0.04 (22.2)
EldestDaughter	0.188 (0.39)				0.04 (28.3)		0.01 (84.8)
Head literate0	0.108 (0.31)				0.06 (2.7)		0.05 (2.9)
Head age0	39.153 (7.38)				-0.00 (26.3)		-0.00 (21.8)
Enrolled0	0.760 (0.43)		0.33 (0.0)	0.33 (0.0)	0.30 (0.0)	0.32 (0.0)	0.30 (0.0)
ChildAgeOrderAtRd1	1.826 (0.98)				0.02 (23.0)		0.02 (25.3)
HHsize0	4.974 (1.15)				-0.01 (25.6)		-0.01 (39.6)
mean of dependent variable		0.88 75	0.88 75	0.88 75	0.88 63	0.88 75	0.88 63
$T = 3$		112	112	112	103	112	103
$T = 4$		539	539	539	500	539	500
\bar{R}^2		0.056	0.226	0.226	0.215	0.235	0.221
N	1841	1976	1976	1976	1841	1976	1841

Notes: See footnotes of TABLE D14.

TABLE D15: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY ATTRIBUTES AND TIME

covariates	mean/std	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)		0.92 (0.0)	0.70 (0.0)	0.70 (0.0)	0.81 (0.0)	0.69 (0.0)	0.78 (0.0)
Secondary	0.338 (0.47)	-0.08 (0.1)	-0.15 (0.0)	-0.15 (0.0)	-0.12 (0.0)	-0.14 (0.0)	-0.12 (0.0)
College	0.172 (0.38)	-0.21 (0.0)	-0.24 (0.0)	-0.24 (0.0)	-0.21 (0.0)	-0.22 (0.0)	-0.20 (0.0)
Unfront	0.776 (0.42)	-0.03 (43.5)	-0.04 (18.4)	-0.04 (18.4)	-0.04 (20.4)	-0.04 (25.1)	-0.03 (36.5)
WithGrace	0.504 (0.50)	-0.01 (88.2)	-0.00 (91.3)	-0.00 (91.3)	-0.00 (90.4)	-0.00 (97.8)	-0.01 (87.4)
InKind	0.257 (0.44)	-0.02 (64.8)	-0.02 (55.5)	-0.02 (55.5)	-0.01 (63.7)	-0.02 (55.2)	-0.01 (60.9)
WithGrace × Secondary	0.171 (0.38)	-0.14 (3.2)	-0.11 (5.4)	-0.11 (5.4)	-0.13 (4.5)	-0.08 (13.6)	-0.11 (6.9)
Unfront × Secondary	0.255 (0.44)	0.06 (36.5)	0.03 (62.5)	0.03 (62.5)	0.05 (42.5)	0.04 (54.5)	0.06 (34.3)
InKind × Secondary	0.088 (0.28)	0.05 (50.8)	0.06 (31.6)	0.06 (31.6)	0.07 (31.8)	0.04 (54.6)	0.05 (41.8)
WithGrace × College	0.084 (0.28)	-0.06 (46.5)	-0.04 (53.7)	-0.04 (53.7)	-0.07 (31.0)	-0.06 (34.1)	-0.13 (4.6)
Upfront × College	0.134 (0.34)	0.05 (53.7)	0.04 (60.1)	0.04 (60.1)	0.06 (41.4)	0.07 (39.9)	0.15 (5.9)
InKind × College	0.035 (0.18)	-0.15 (14.9)	-0.09 (19.9)	-0.09 (19.9)	-0.10 (16.5)	-0.05 (51.8)	-0.06 (40.2)
Female	0.450 (0.50)					0.04 (5.3)	0.05 (5.1)
Secondary × Female	0.152 (0.36)					0.11 (0.4)	0.10 (0.6)
College × Female	0.059 (0.24)					0.07 (18.9)	0.08 (19.3)
WithGrace × Female	0.228 (0.42)					0.09 (19.5)	0.04 (58.3)
Upfront × Female	0.349 (0.48)					0.02 (76.4)	0.04 (44.3)
InKind × Female	0.114 (0.32)					-0.04 (57.7)	-0.01 (93.1)
WithGrace × Secondary × Female	0.074 (0.26)					0.23 (0.7)	0.28 (0.1)
Unfront × Secondary × Female	0.115 (0.32)					-0.14 (18.1)	-0.18 (4.9)
InKind × Secondary × Female	0.037 (0.19)					-0.14 (19.0)	-0.13 (21.6)
WithGrace × College × Female	0.028 (0.17)					-0.13 (36.5)	-0.20 (16.8)
Upfront × College × Female	0.044 (0.21)					0.10 (58.1)	0.26 (15.8)
InKind × College × Female	0.010 (0.10)					0.27 (10.0)	0.19 (26.7)

Notes : See footnotes of TABLE D18.

TABLE D15: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY ATTRIBUTES AND TIME (CONTINUED)

covariates	mean/std	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
rd 3	0.344 (0.48)	0.06 (0.0)	0.06 (0.0)	0.06 (0.0)	0.04 (0.0)	0.06 (0.0)	0.04 (0.1)
Secondary × rd 3	0.117 (0.32)	0.01 (86.0)	-0.02 (47.1)	-0.02 (47.1)	-0.04 (21.8)	-0.03 (35.9)	-0.05 (15.2)
College × rd 3	0.055 (0.23)	0.04 (34.6)	-0.02 (69.2)	-0.02 (69.2)	-0.03 (43.1)	-0.01 (73.0)	-0.04 (36.9)
WithGrace × rd 3	0.175 (0.38)	0.01 (75.8)	0.00 (99.6)	0.00 (99.6)	-0.01 (80.2)	-0.02 (65.6)	-0.01 (68.9)
Upfront × rd 3	0.267 (0.44)	-0.06 (8.6)	-0.05 (9.8)	-0.05 (9.8)	-0.06 (6.7)	-0.05 (13.7)	-0.07 (2.1)
InKind × rd 3	0.090 (0.29)	0.02 (68.5)	0.02 (67.0)	0.02 (67.0)	0.03 (51.9)	0.02 (59.6)	0.03 (50.4)
WithGrace × Secondary × rd 3	0.059 (0.24)	0.13 (17.0)	0.11 (18.7)	0.11 (18.7)	0.11 (23.5)	0.06 (50.7)	0.07 (45.8)
Unfront × Secondary × rd 3	0.087 (0.28)	-0.05 (52.8)	-0.04 (63.4)	-0.04 (63.4)	-0.07 (36.0)	-0.04 (61.0)	-0.08 (32.9)
InKind × Secondary × rd 3	0.032 (0.17)	-0.00 (96.8)	-0.00 (98.7)	-0.00 (98.7)	0.01 (94.0)	0.06 (55.9)	0.06 (58.8)
WithGrace × College × rd 3	0.029 (0.17)	-0.04 (71.4)	0.01 (94.7)	0.01 (94.7)	0.06 (59.2)	-0.01 (93.6)	0.08 (31.6)
Upfront × College × rd 3	0.044 (0.21)	0.02 (84.8)	-0.01 (92.4)	-0.01 (92.4)	-0.07 (56.1)	0.01 (95.3)	-0.13 (22.3)
InKind × College × rd 3	0.012 (0.11)	0.12 (29.5)	0.03 (80.3)	0.03 (80.3)	0.01 (91.6)	-0.04 (72.6)	-0.04 (71.9)
Female × rd 3	0.156 (0.36)					-0.01 (67.2)	-0.00 (85.0)
WithGrace × Female × rd 3	0.080 (0.27)					-0.04 (45.8)	-0.01 (78.4)
Upfront × Female × rd 3	0.121 (0.33)					0.03 (60.9)	0.02 (64.2)
InKind × Female × rd 3	0.040 (0.20)					0.07 (35.2)	0.05 (47.7)
WithGrace × Secondary × Female × rd 3	0.025 (0.16)					0.02 (88.5)	0.05 (76.8)
Upfront × Secondary × Female × rd 3	0.039 (0.19)					0.08 (64.2)	0.10 (51.1)
InKind × Secondary × Female × rd 3	0.012 (0.11)					0.21 (23.0)	0.10 (57.4)
WithGrace × College × Female × rd 3	0.009 (0.09)					0.00 (97.9)	0.16 (33.2)
Upfront × College × Female × rd 3	0.012 (0.11)					0.17 (38.3)	-0.06 (75.2)
InKind × College × Female × rd 3	0.003 (0.06)					-0.39 (8.3)	-0.36 (14.7)
Secondary × Female × rd 3	0.052 (0.22)					-0.05 (42.7)	-0.02 (74.4)
College × Female × rd 3	0.016 (0.13)					0.03 (69.1)	0.00 (99.3)

Notes : See footnotes of TABLE D19.

TABLE D15: ANCOVA ESTIMATION OF SCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY ATTRIBUTES AND TIME (CONTINUED 2)

covariates	mean/std	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
rd 4	0.294 (0.46)	0.10 (0.0)	0.13 (0.0)	0.13 (0.0)	0.12 (0.0)	0.13 (0.0)	0.12 (0.0)
Secondary × rd 4	0.150 (0.36)	0.07 (11.6)	-0.03 (41.3)	-0.03 (41.3)	-0.05 (26.8)	-0.05 (26.4)	-0.06 (17.8)
College × rd 4	0.062 (0.24)	0.12 (0.8)	-0.02 (71.0)	-0.02 (71.0)	-0.03 (48.0)	-0.02 (57.6)	-0.04 (33.0)
WithGrace × rd 4	0.147 (0.35)	0.01 (75.9)	0.01 (76.2)	0.01 (76.2)	0.01 (73.3)	-0.00 (94.1)	0.02 (62.8)
Upfront × rd 4	0.232 (0.42)	-0.05 (19.3)	-0.06 (16.2)	-0.06 (16.2)	-0.07 (11.1)	-0.07 (11.1)	-0.09 (2.2)
InKind × rd 4	0.073 (0.26)	0.04 (37.8)	0.02 (67.8)	0.02 (67.8)	0.02 (69.2)	0.02 (49.6)	0.02 (58.2)
WithGrace × Secondary × rd 4	0.076 (0.27)	0.18 (9.1)	0.15 (10.3)	0.15 (10.3)	0.15 (11.9)	0.10 (28.7)	0.11 (24.3)
Unfront × Secondary × rd 4	0.114 (0.32)	-0.04 (69.7)	-0.03 (74.4)	-0.03 (74.4)	-0.09 (38.5)	-0.03 (71.3)	-0.09 (33.5)
InKind × Secondary × rd 4	0.040 (0.20)	-0.09 (46.8)	-0.05 (60.8)	-0.05 (60.8)	-0.05 (67.4)	-0.01 (93.7)	-0.01 (93.5)
WithGrace × College × rd 4	0.029 (0.17)	-0.09 (33.7)	-0.05 (59.9)	-0.05 (59.9)	-0.01 (87.8)	-0.02 (83.4)	0.07 (41.4)
Upfront × College × rd 4	0.049 (0.22)	-0.05 (72.9)	-0.05 (70.1)	-0.05 (70.1)	-0.08 (49.6)	-0.09 (46.1)	-0.22 (5.7)
InKind × College × rd 4	0.012 (0.11)	0.08 (50.1)	0.02 (83.1)	0.02 (83.1)	0.03 (79.2)	-0.02 (84.1)	0.01 (94.7)
Female × rd 4	0.142 (0.35)					-0.04 (6.1)	-0.04 (3.3)
WithGrace × Female × rd 4	0.071 (0.26)					-0.06 (20.5)	-0.07 (15.8)
Upfront × Female × rd 4	0.112 (0.32)					0.13 (1.3)	0.12 (2.6)
InKind × Female × rd 4	0.034 (0.18)					0.08 (26.4)	0.10 (14.9)
WithGrace × Secondary × Female × rd 4	0.037 (0.19)					-0.17 (33.2)	-0.14 (37.3)
Upfront × Secondary × Female × rd 4	0.054 (0.23)					-0.10 (56.6)	-0.00 (99.5)
InKind × Secondary × Female × rd 4	0.019 (0.14)					0.31 (10.3)	0.17 (33.5)
WithGrace × College × Female × rd 4	0.012 (0.11)					0.35 (5.4)	0.55 (0.1)
Upfront × College × Female × rd 4	0.023 (0.15)					-0.19 (40.3)	-0.50 (4.0)
InKind × College × Female × rd 4	0.004 (0.07)					-0.19 (46.6)	-0.15 (57.6)
Secondary × Female × rd 4	0.070 (0.26)					-0.04 (47.7)	-0.02 (69.5)
College × Female × rd 4	0.032 (0.17)					0.14 (11.0)	0.13 (15.6)
FloodInRd1	0.464 (0.50)				-0.05 (4.2)		-0.05 (2.8)
EldestSon	0.267 (0.44)				0.02 (62.9)		0.04 (22.2)
EldestDaughter	0.188 (0.39)				0.04 (28.3)		0.01 (84.8)
Head literate0	0.108 (0.31)				0.06 (2.7)		0.05 (2.9)
Head age0	39.153 (7.38)				-0.00 (26.3)		-0.00 (21.8)
Enrolled0	0.760 (0.43)		0.33 (0.0)	0.33 (0.0)	0.30 (0.0)	0.32 (0.0)	0.30 (0.0)
ChildAgeOrderAtRd1	1.826 (0.98)				0.02 (23.0)		0.02 (25.3)
HHsize0	4.974 (1.15)				-0.01 (25.6)		-0.01 (39.6)
mean of dependent variable		0.88 75	0.88 75	0.88 75	0.88 63	0.88 75	0.88 63
$T = 3$		112	112	112	103	112	103
$T = 4$		539	539	539	500	539	500
\bar{R}^2		0.056	0.226	0.226	0.215	0.235	0.221
N	1841	1976	1976	1976	1841	1976	1841

Notes : See footnotes of TABLE D20.

E Correlates of repayment shortfall

TABLE E16: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL EFFECTS OF REPAYMENT SHORTFALL

covariates	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(Intercept)	3.11 (3.9)	14.20 (12.6)	31.23 (0.8)	131.82 (0.0)	51.21 (0.0)	51.21 (0.0)
Large	-1.13 (53.2)	-4.99 (9.9)	23.71 (9.6)		21.65 (18.2)	
LargeGrace	-1.21 (53.5)	-6.71 (3.6)	-138.02 (0.0)		-148.27 (0.0)	
Cattle	-1.37 (46.8)	-6.65 (5.0)	-140.01 (0.0)		-152.05 (0.0)	
Upfront				-16.99 (9.6)		21.65 (18.2)
WithGrace				-75.48 (0.0)		-169.92 (0.0)
InKind				2.08 (75.4)		-3.78 (80.0)
UltraPoor					-0.07 (99.5)	-0.07 (99.5)
Large × UltraPoor					-4.07 (75.7)	
LargeGrace × UltraPoor					7.80 (49.0)	
Cattle × UltraPoor					10.38 (37.3)	
Upfront × UltraPoor						-4.07 (75.7)
WithGrace × UltraPoor						11.87 (14.1)
InKind × UltraPoor						2.57 (64.3)
LY2			21.94 (7.6)	86.56 (0.0)	53.91 (0.2)	53.91 (0.2)
Large × LY2			-20.54 (1.5)		-47.15 (1.7)	
LargeGrace × LY2			202.85 (0.0)		166.12 (0.0)	
Cattle × LY2			216.04 (0.0)		182.78 (0.0)	
Upfront × LY2				-1.51 (91.5)		-47.15 (1.7)
WithGrace × LY2				54.29 (0.1)		213.27 (0.0)
InKind × LY2				-15.18 (36.8)		16.65 (46.7)
UltraPoor × LY2					-7.27 (54.8)	-7.27 (54.8)
Large × UltraPoor × LY2					5.27 (70.3)	
LargeGrace × UltraPoor × LY2					6.76 (63.9)	
Cattle × UltraPoor × LY2					-1.32 (93.3)	
Upfront × UltraPoor × LY2						5.27 (70.3)
WithGrace × UltraPoor × LY2						1.49 (88.5)
InKind × UltraPoor × LY2						-8.09 (53.6)

Source: Estimated with GUK administrative data.

Notes: 1. Estimates of repayment shortfall controlling for group/village and year-month fixed effects using 48 month administrative records. The estimated model is $\tilde{y}_{it} = b_1 + b'_1 \mathbf{d}_i + b_2 \text{LY2} + b'_2 \mathbf{d}_i \text{LY2} + b_3 \text{LY3} + b'_3 \mathbf{d}_i \text{LY3} + b_4 \text{LY4} + b'_4 \mathbf{d}_i \text{LY4} + \tilde{e}_{it}$, where \tilde{x}_{it} is group and time demeaned value of variable x , $t = 1, \dots, 48$ is an ellapsed month index, \mathbf{d}_i is a three element vector of arms or functional attributes, LY2, LY3, LY4 are indicator variables of loan years 2, 3, 4. Loan years are defined with the ellapsed months since the first disbursement date, 13-24 for LY2, 25-36 for LY3, and 37-48 for LY4. Fixed effects are controlled by differencing out respective means from the data matrix. Shortfall y_{it} is (planned installment) - (actual repayment). Group shortfall $_{t-1}$ indicates a one month lagged mean shortfall amount of a group. Per member group net saving $_{t-1}$ and Per member cumulative group net saving (BDT1000) $_{t-1}$ give one month lagged average net saving in a group and their accumulated sums, respectively. Median group repayent shortfall rate is -1.42. 69 groups participated in the lending program.

2. P values in percentages in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at group (village) level.

TABLE E16: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL EFFECTS OF REPAYMENT SHORTFALL (CONTINUED)

covariates	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
LY3			43.46 (0.4)	70.77 (0.0)	76.73 (0.0)	76.73 (0.0)
Large × LY3			-17.04 (17.2)		-83.16 (0.1)	
LargeGrace × LY3			242.61 (0.0)		184.25 (0.0)	
Cattle × LY3			260.48 (0.0)		225.16 (0.0)	
Upfront × LY3				-89.08 (0.0)		-83.16 (0.1)
WithGrace × LY3				140.00 (0.0)		267.41 (0.0)
InKind × LY3				-9.03 (68.9)		40.91 (23.6)
UltraPoor × LY3					-10.02 (26.8)	-10.02 (26.8)
Large × UltraPoor × LY3					17.87 (33.4)	
LargeGrace × UltraPoor × LY3					7.12 (60.8)	
Cattle × UltraPoor × LY3					-29.52 (20.0)	
Unfront × UltraPoor × LY3						17.87 (33.4)
WithGrace × UltraPoor × LY3						-10.75 (58.1)
InKind × UltraPoor × LY3						-36.64 (12.3)
LY4			-283.74 (0.0)	-168.44 (0.0)	-269.18 (0.0)	-269.18 (0.0)
Large × LY4			-264.49 (0.0)		-7.66 (87.4)	
LargeGrace × LY4			-91.78 (0.2)		155.19 (0.1)	
Cattle × LY4			-136.17 (0.1)		141.55 (2.3)	
Upfront × LY4				-125.24 (0.8)		-7.66 (87.4)
WithGrace × LY4				227.68 (0.0)		162.85 (0.2)
InKind × LY4				-13.03 (83.0)		-13.63 (83.2)
UltraPoor × LY4					-13.10 (69.5)	-13.10 (69.5)
Large × UltraPoor × LY4					17.81 (67.1)	
LargeGrace × UltraPoor × LY4					43.79 (27.6)	
Cattle × UltraPoor × LY4					13.61 (73.8)	
Upfront × UltraPoor × LY4						17.81 (67.1)
WithGrace × UltraPoor × LY4						25.98 (44.8)
InKind × UltraPoor × LY4						-30.18 (36.6)


Notes : See footnotes of TABLE D22.

TABLE E16: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL EFFECTS OF REPAYMENT SHORTFALL (CONTINUED)

covariates	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Group shortfall _{t-1}		-0.07 (23.6)			-0.22 (0.0)	-0.22 (0.0)
shortfall _{t-1}		0.45 (0.0)	0.27 (0.0)	-0.05 (0.0)	0.30 (0.0)	0.30 (0.0)
Per member group net saving _{t-1}					-0.11 (0.0)	-0.11 (0.0)
Per member cumulative group net saving (BDT1000) _{t-1}					-0.03 (41.0)	-0.03 (41.0)
number of clusters	69	69	69	69	69	69
R ²	0	0.102	0.172	0.121	0.179	0.179
N	41901	41722	41722	41722	41722	41722

Notes : See footnotes of TABLE D23.


FIGURE E1: ASSETS BY PERIOD



Source: Tabulated with survey data.

Note: Red squares are means of respective data. Asset values are expressed in BDT. Net assets=total assets - debts. Debts include outstanding loaned amount of the experiment. Total assets use items observed in all 4 rounds of household surveys. Net non livestock assets=net assets-livestock asset values. Number of cattle is a headcount of cattle holding. All net assets are in logarithms, number of cattle is in natural numbers.

FIGURE E2: CUMULATIVE IMPACTS ON ASSETS RELATIVE TO CONCURRENT TRADITIONAL ARM



Source: Estimated with survey data.

Note: Cumulative impacts on various asset measures. Net assets, broad net assets, net non livestock assets, land are in BDT, cattle holding is in natural units.