

Traffic Modeling and Analysis

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Outline

- Problem Definition
- Traffic Classification
 - Vector Quantization (VQ)
 - Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM)
 - Test results
- Denial of Service (DoS) attack
- Linear prediction (LP) analysis
- TCP SYN flooding attack detection
- Conclusion

Introduction

- Internet growth has resulted in huge amount of data.
- Data can be used for bandwidth management, traffic prediction, network planning, Quality of Service, anomaly detection etc.
- Modeling and analysis of traffic data give useful information.

Problem definition

- Traffic modeling and classification.
- Linear prediction (LP) analysis for denial of service (DoS) attack detection.

⇒ *Traffic Modeling and Classification*

- DoS attack and LP analysis
- TCP SYN flooding attack detection


Why not port based classification ?

- Firewall related problems - relaying of non-web traffic using port 80.
- Ports are not defined with IANA registration for all applications.
- Non-privileged users run WWW servers on ports other than 80.
- Some well-known ports are used by multiple applications.
- Dynamic allocation of server ports (eg. FTP).


Parameters for modeling

- Traffic characteristics depends on the protocol or service.
- Commonly used parameters : *packet size, packet inter-arrival time, flow duration, packet train size, packet train length.*
- Packet train: *(src host, src port, dst host, dst port).*
Packet train length : Number of packets in a train.
Packet train size : Number of bytes in a train.
- Input traffic data represented as vectors: $\mathbf{X} = \{\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}_N\}$
 $\mathbf{x}_i = \{\text{packet train length, packet train size}\}$


Clusters in Pattern Space (Vector Quantisation)



PARTITIONED VECTOR
SPACE X = CENTROID OF
REGION



An Algorithm for Vector Quantisation



The average distortion D_i in cell C_i is given by

$$D_i = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in C_i} d(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z}_i)$$

where

- \mathbf{z}_i is the centroid of cell C_i and
- $d(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{z}_i) = (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{z}_i)^T (\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{z}_i)$
- N is the number of vectors

The centroids that are obtained finally are then stored in a codebook called the **VQ codebook**.

Modeling Using Vector Quantization

- Traffic data considered as vectors

$$\mathbf{X} = \{\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}_N\}$$

where $\mathbf{x}_i = \{\textit{packet train length}, \textit{packet train size}\}$

- \mathbf{X} divided into a set of k clusters, $C = \{C_1, C_2, \dots, C_k\}$, such that

$$\bigcup_{i=1}^k C_i = \mathbf{X} \quad \text{and} \quad \bigcap_{i=1}^k C_i = \phi$$

Algorithm for obtaining Clusters for Traffic Modeling

- Randomly select k vectors as the centroids of the k clusters.
- A vector \mathbf{x} belongs to cluster C_i , if

$$\|\mathbf{x} - \mu_i\| < \|\mathbf{x} - \mu_j\| \quad \text{for all } j \neq i$$

\Rightarrow partitions vectors into clusters.

- Recompute centroid after each iteration.

\Rightarrow Obtain clusters for each traffic class.





Figure 1: System based on VQ

Classification Using VQ

- For each vector, find the distance from every traffic class.
⇒ Find the distance to the nearest cluster of a traffic class.
- Find the distance of the input set from each traffic class.
- The traffic class of the given input set is identified as the one to which the distance is minimum.



Gaussian Mixture Models

Bayesian Classification using GMM

- \mathbf{X} divided into k mixtures, $\{m_1, m_2, \dots, m_k\}$

$$p(m_i) = \frac{n_{m_i}}{N}$$

$\theta_{\mathbf{i}}$ is the vector with components $\mu_{\mathbf{i}}$ and $\sigma_{\mathbf{i}}$ of the mixture m_i .

- Probability of \mathbf{x} belonging to a mixture m_i [1]

$$p(\theta_{\mathbf{i}}|\mathbf{x}) \approx p(m_i) \frac{1}{(2\pi)^{d/2} |\Sigma_{\mathbf{i}}|^{1/2}} e^{-\frac{1}{2}(\mathbf{x}-\mu_{\mathbf{i}})^t \Sigma_{\mathbf{i}}^{-1}(\mathbf{x}-\mu_{\mathbf{i}})}$$

- A vector \mathbf{x} belongs to mixture m_i , if

$$p(\theta_{\mathbf{i}}|\mathbf{x}) > p(\theta_{\mathbf{j}}|\mathbf{x}) \quad \text{for all } j \neq i$$

- $\theta_{\mathbf{i}}$ recomputed at the end of each iteration.

Bayesian Classification using GMM (continued)

- Given a set of input vectors $\mathbf{X} = \{\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, \dots, \mathbf{x}_N\}$ and s being a traffic class, probability that a vector \mathbf{x}_i is of traffic class s

$$p(\mathbf{x}_i, s) = \max_j p(\theta_j | \mathbf{x}_i) \quad 1 \leq j \leq n(s)$$

$n(s)$ is the number of mixtures in the traffic class denoted by s .

- Probability that the given set is of a particular traffic class s

$$P(s) = \prod_{i=1}^N p(\mathbf{x}_i, s)$$

where N is the total number of vectors.

- Input set of vectors belongs to the class having maximum probability.

Test Results

Traffic Type	Accuracy
HTTP	99.27%
SMTP	96.38%
DNS	100%
POP3	90.56%
SSH	88.40%

(a) VQ based

Traffic Type	Accuracy
HTTP	99.60%
SMTP	99.30%
DNS	100%
POP3	97.20%
SSH	96.92%

(b) GMM based

Table 1: Results using one hour data

Test Results (continued)

Traffic Type	Accuracy
HTTP	99.78%
SMTP	99.67%
DNS	100%
POP3	96.28%
SSH	94.53%

Table 2: Results using GMM for 15 minutes data

- Successful in classifying traffic.
- Can not be used for detection of a class of attacks - Denial of Service attacks.

- Traffic Modeling and Classification

⇒ *DoS attack and LP analysis*

- TCP SYN flooding attack detection

- Legitimate users denied service.
- UDP flooding, ICMP flooding, Smurf attack, TCP Reset attack, TCP SYN flooding etc.
- Distributed DoS.
- Low intensity and high intensity attacks.
- Loss incurred
 - From e-commerce companies like Amazon to small ISPs.
 - Top source of financial loss due to cybercrime in 2004 [2].
- **Detection** and Prevention




Figure 2: TCP Connection establishment

Properties of TCP SYN flooding attack

- One of the most commonly used attacks [3].
- Easy to launch.
- Achieved by sending less than 20 packets per second.
- Defense mechanisms (*SYN cookies*, *RandomDrop*, *SYN cache*, *SYNkill*, *SYNDefender* etc.) have limitations
- Since most of the applications use TCP, detection becomes all the more important.

Linear Prediction (LP) analysis

- LP approximately estimates a signal, s_n , as linearly weighted summation of past samples [4]

$$\tilde{s}_n \approx \sum_{k=1}^p a_k s_{n-k}$$

- Error percentage


$$e_n = \frac{s_n - \tilde{s}_n}{s_n} * 100$$

- What is s_n ?

- Traffic Modeling and Classification

- DoS attack and LP analysis

⇒ *TCP SYN flooding attack detection*




A SYN attack scenario

Algorithm for DoS attack detection

⇒ Detect deviation from normal traffic.

- Initial frame $\{s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4, s_5, s_6\}$
 s_i corresponds to difference in number of incoming SYN and outgoing SYN+ACK in i^{th} time slot.
- Compute the predictor coefficients $\{a_1, a_2, a_3, a_4\}$.
- Predict next signal value. Obtain actual signal value.
- Compute e , if $e > \alpha(threshold)$, then probability of attack is high.
- Recompute LP coefficients periodically using **normal** frames.



Plot of error for signal values

Power spectrum analysis

- Frame is advanced by one signal value.

$$F_1 = \{s_1, s_2, s_3, s_4, s_5, s_6\}$$

$$F_2 = \{s_2, s_3, s_4, s_5, s_6, s_7\}$$

$$F_3 = \{s_3, s_4, s_5, s_6, s_7, s_8\}$$


⋮

- Transfer function,

$$H(z) = \frac{G}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^p a_k z^{-k}}$$

where G is the gain factor.


- Compute spectrum for each frame.



Spectrum for half-open connections to TeNeT network

Detection using Entropy estimation

- Entropy is estimated for each spectrum.
- For normal frames, deviation of entropy from frame to frame is of the order of 10^{-3} .
- Entropy of a frame with one anomalous signal value deviates in the order of 10^{-1} .



Entropy difference between adjacent frames

Performance evaluation

SYNs per second	Best delay	Worst delay
20	8	17
30	7	16
40	6	15
50-90	5	14
≥ 100	4	13

Table 3: Detection delay in seconds for different attack rates

Detection and Defense

- Detection system can be installed on firewalls and leaf router.
- Firewalls \Rightarrow low-intensity SYN flooding attack detection.
- Attack detection \Rightarrow trigger defense mechanism like SYNDefender on firewall.
- Routers \Rightarrow high-intensity SYN flooding attack detection.
- Attacks to paralyze defense mechanism will be detected at the router level.

Conclusion

- ⇒ Bayesian classification using GMMs gives highly accurate classification.
- ⇒ *packet train length* together with *packet train size* form better parameters for identifying traffic compared to existing ones in literature .
- ⇒ Linear prediction analysis of traffic is a new approach to detect DoS attacks.
- ⇒ The difference in number of SYN and SYN/ACK packets is a new parameter to detect TCP SYN flooding attack.

References

- [1] Richard O. Duda, Peter E. Hart, and David G. Stork, *Pattern Classification*, Wiley-Interscience Publication, second edition, 2001.
- [2] L. Gordon et al., *CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey*, Computer Security Inst., 2004.
- [3] David Moore, Geoffrey M. Voelker, and Stefan Savage, “Inferring Internet Denial-of-Service Activity,” in *Proceedings of the 10th USENIX Security Symposium*, 2001, pp. 9–22.
- [4] J. Makhoul, “Linear Prediction: A Tutorial Review,” *Proceedings of the IEEE*, vol. 63(4), pp. 561–580, 1975.