Towards Declarative Safety Rules for Perception Specification Architectures

Johann Thor Mogensen Ingibergsson MMMI, University of Southern Denmark joint work with Ulrik Pagh Schultz and Dirk Kraft


Field Robots

- Why field robots?
 - Dangerous work.
 - Decreasing workforce.
 - Ecological Concerns.
- SAFE Project.











Context: Safety Certification within Agriculture




- Why certification? Liability!
 - Robot causes damage due to manufacturing defects.
 - Robot causes damage simply by acting or reacting.

How to Certify Field Robots?

- No standard is available.
- Other Industries? Avionics?
- Interpretation for agriculture and field robots.






How is Certification Done within Software for Field Robots?

Issues with current standards.

Issue: Research is solution driven.


Issue: 20 papers in non-developmentrelated, suggesting apporaches are



[Source: Ingibergsson, Kuhrmann & Schultz, PROFES2015] 5

How to Certify Field Robots?

- Issues with current standards.
 - Issue: Use of standards is limited.
 - Issue: Loose connection between development practices and standards.



Simulation	Formal implementation verification	Mathematical modeling and algorithms	System architecture and reuse	Misc	Behavior modeling	Formal specification deriving implementation	Not SW dev- related	
0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	IEC 61508
0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	ISO 13482
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	ISO 26262
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	ISO 10218
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	IEC 61499
0	3	2	0	0	1	0	2	Guranteeing safety - Not necessarily using a Standard approach
4	1	0	2	1	9	2	15	Non-Standard Approach
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	No standards available


Certifying Field Robots


Based on Interpretation

- ISO 13482
 - Risk assessment
- ISO 13849
 - Functional safety Mechanics.
- ISO/DIS 18497
 - Performance
- ISO 25119
 - Functional safety electronics.
- IEC 61496
 - Electro-Sensitive Protective Equipment (EPSE).


Safety functions of robots	PL
Emergency Stop	d
Protective Stop	e
Limits to workspace (incl. forbidden area avoidance)	e
safety-related speed control	e
Hazardous collision avoidance	e
Stability Control (incl. overload protection)	d


PL Definition : Average probability of dangerous failure per hour 1/h	PL
$\geq 10^{-5} \ to \ < 10^{-4}$	a
$\geq 3 \times 10^{-6} \ to < 10^{-5}$	b
$\geq 10^{-6} \ to \ < 3 \times 10^{-6}$	С
$\geq 10^{-7} \ to \ < 10^{-6}$	d
$\geq 10^{-8} \ to \ < 10^{-7}$	e





Implications of Standards on Development of Field Robots in Practice?












Functional Safety vs Performance



ISO 26262-1:2011 [®]

Road vehicles -- Functional safety -- Part 1: Vocabulary

Preview ISO 26262-1:2011

Abstract


ISO 26262 does not address the nominal performance of E/E systems, even if dedicated functional performance standards exist for these systems (e.g. active and passive safety systems, brake systems, Adaptive Cruise Control)

ISO 25119-4:2010(en) Tractors and machinery for agriculture and forestry


Introduction


ISO 25119 sets out an approach to the design and assessment, for all safety life cycle activities, of safety-relevant systems comprising electrical and/or electronic and/or programmable electronic components (E/E/PES) on tractors used in agriculture and forestry, and on self-propelled ride-on machines and mounted, semi-mounted and trailed machines used in agriculture. It is also applicable to municipal equipment. It covers the possible hazards caused by the functional behaviour of E/E/PES safety-related systems, as distinct from hazards arising from the E/E/PES equipment itself (electric shock, fire, nominal performance level of E/E/PES dedicated to active and passive safety, etc.).

Example: Simple Vision Pipeline



Vision Pipeline Described with RPSL






How to Introduce Functional Safety

Based on Interpretation

- ISO 25119 Functional safety electronics.
 - Develop software and hardware according to the standard.
 - Software could be subjected to Misra, to create a foundation across standards.


- IEC 61496 Electro-Sensitive Protective Equipmen (EPSE).
 - Fault: Shall force the system to a safe-state, i.e. full stop.
 - Multiple Faults: Shall not influence the above reaction.
 - Periodic tests: Ascertain functionality.



DSL Proposal


```
h=Bayer2Mono Left.output.histogram;
length (nonempty (h.bins)) / length (h.bins) > 0.1;
max(h) - min(h) > 1000p;
length(PointCloud 3D.output.inArea
  (Camera Left Landmark))>900 3D points;
```

DSL Test images






(a) Left lens, covered.



(b) right lens, overexposed.



(c) Left lens, partial cover (d) right lens, partial cover

Conclusion

Contributions

- Analysis of safety standards in the agricultural domain.
- Language concept for extending RPSL with safety annotations.

Future work

- Code generation for safety-critical hardware.
- Systematic evaluation of language design for the safety domain.
- Evaluation by safety experts.