



# MySQL Security for Fun and Profit

Ernie Souhrada

Senior Consultant, Percona

03 April 2014



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LIVE

- Introduction
- Thinking (in)Securely
- The 30-Second Guide to Network Security
- Don't Do THAT, Do THIS !
- Security + 1 = Performance – x
- Questions?

- Who?
  - 2 Years at Percona, 15 with MySQL, 20 in Technology
  - Digital Renaissance Man (sorry, I know it sounds pompous)
- What?
  - Security / Information Assurance in a MySQL Context
- Why?
  - Target, TJX, etc.
  - Ed Snowden
  - The NSA
  - Lessons Never Learned (Injection STILL the #1 webapp vulnerability[1])



# Thinking (in)Securely

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- The Traditional Risk Analysis Model
  - Who wants my data?
  - What are they willing to do/spend to get it?
  - What happens if they're successful?
  - What does it cost me to protect it?
  - Trusted vs. untrusted resources
- Assume You're Already Owned





- Consider everything as potentially hostile.
  - SQL injections
  - Packet sniffing and other MITM attacks
  - Malicious data
  - Bad/malicious code
  - MySQL direct packet injection (NSA's QUANTUMSQUEEL)
    - Just because the NSA has something doesn't mean that they are the only ones that have it.
- What are the implications of this mindset?

- Jimmy Hoffa runs the only secure server in the world.







The threats are real, but our responses still need to be realistic.

- If the NSA is interested in you, you're screwed.
- There's more to “Security” than just security.
- Performance and usability still matter.
- We don't have infinite resources.
- Not all data are of equal value.
- Maximize Security and minimize risk at minimum cost.
  - Traditional risk analysis model is still relevant.



# The 30-Second Guide to Security

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# The 30-Second Guide to Security

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- This is not a system / network security presentation, but ...
  - SELinux, AppArmor. Use them.
  - Network isolation, firewalling in **both** directions.
  - Keep software patched and current.
  - Two-factor authentication, random passwords, public-key cryptography.
  - Verify data integrity.
  - Maintain tight access controls.
  - Log everything.
  - Encrypt everything.



Don't Do THAT, Do THIS!

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## Don't Do THAT, Do THIS!

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DON'T	DO
Passwordless accounts	Passwords for every user, Delete the empty username account
old_passwords=1	PAM+LDAP, SHA256 in MySQL 5.6
Indiscriminate use of the root user, Blanket grants on *.* or `database`.*	Limited-access GRANTS
Role accounts used by people	Named-user accounts
MySQL's encryption functions	Encrypt at the application layer
Connections over cleartext	SSL, VPN tunnels

## Don't Do THAT, Do THIS!

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DON'T	DO
SQL_SECURITY=DEFINER	SQL_SECURITY=DEFINER SQL_SECURITY=INVOKER
VIEWS	Limited-access GRANTS
SQL_MODE=[unset]	SQL_MODE=STRICT_ALL_TABLES
sql_log_bin=OFF	binlog_format=ROW
LOAD DATA LOCAL INFILE	LOAD DATA INFILE
DNS / hostname-based ACLs	IP-based ACLs (skip_name_resolve)

## Don't Do THAT, Do THIS!

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### DON'T

Blind acceptance of user input

Simple passwords

Stale accounts, static credentials

File-based replication credentials

### DO

Sanitize, validate, whitelist,  
bind variables & prepared statements

Long random passwords,  
MySQL 5.6 password quality checking

Rotate usernames and passwords,  
Purge unused accounts

Crash-safe replication,  
START SLAVE USER / PASSWORD

# Don't Do THAT, Do THIS!

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DO:

- Encrypt backups.
- Checksum / verify important data.
  - In-row verification
  - Replication data integrity checking (pt-table-checksum)
- Track and audit user activity, log it elsewhere.
  - PAM + auditd + syslog
  - MariaDB audit plugin
  - Enterprise audit plugin (commercial licensees)



## Don't Do THAT, Do THIS : Examples

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## Don't Do THAT, Do THIS : Examples

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Empty username account leaks information; can be vector for a DoS.

```
mysql> show grants;
+-----+
| Grants for @localhost |
+-----+
| GRANT USAGE ON *.* TO ''@'localhost' |
+-----+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)

mysql> show databases;
+-----+
| Database |
+-----+
| information_schema |
| test |
+-----+
2 rows in set (0.00 sec)
```

```
mysql> use information_schema;
Reading table information for completion of table and column names
You can turn off this feature to get a quicker startup with -A

Database changed
mysql> pager md5sum
PAGER set to 'md5sum'
mysql> select * from tables t1;
9ff9aacbd4db78a17c83bf7ab71c71f9 -
70 rows in set (0.02 sec)

mysql> select * from tables t1 join tables t2;
1293da79477078cdc82a4c701838e6e6 -
4900 rows in set (0.06 sec)

mysql> select * from tables t1 join tables t2 join tables t3;
941ae6ac863b3672a26e973d41f3215a -
343000 rows in set (2.37 sec)
```

## Don't Do THAT, Do THIS : Examples

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### Old passwords vs. new passwords:

```
mysql> select old_password('foobar') AS oldpw\G
oldpw: 4655c05b05f11fab
```

This algorithm is broken[2]. See <http://www.sqlhack.com>

```
mysql> select password('foobar') AS newpw\G
newpw: *9B500343BC52E2911172EB52AE5CF4847604C6E5
```

```
mysql> select sha1(unhex(sha1('foobar')))) AS newpw\G
newpw: 9b500343bc52e2911172eb52ae5cf4847604c6e5
```

- Under 5.6, old passwords are disallowed by default.  
If needed, override this with **skip\_secure\_auth** in my.cnf

## Don't Do THAT, Do THIS : Examples

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### AES\_ENCRYPT() / AES\_DECRYPT()

- Information leakage in log files

- Slow query log:

```
# Time: 140330 1:36:21
# User@Host: root[root] @ localhost []
# Thread_id: 11 Schema: test QC_hit: No
# Query_time: 0.005958 Lock_time: 0.000189 Rows_sent: 0 Rows_examined: 0
SET timestamp=1396168581;
insert into encryption (i, data) values (4, aes_encrypt('plaintext','key'));
```

- General log:

```
140330 1:52:45 14 Query insert into encryption (i, data) values (4, aes_encrypt('plaintext','key'))
```

## Don't Do THAT, Do THIS : Examples

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### AES\_ENCRYPT() / AES\_DECRYPT(), continued

- Binary log where binlog format IN ('STATEMENT', 'MIXED')

```
#140330 1:36:21 server id 100 end_log_pos 1967          Query  thread_id=11
SET TIMESTAMP=1396168581/*!*/;
insert into encryption (i, data) values (4, aes_encrypt('plaintext','key'))
```

- No binlog leakage with RBR

```
BINLOG '
wNk3UxNkAAAAmWAAAEI AAAAAACI AAAAAAAEABHrlc3QACmVuY3J5cHRpb24AAgP8AQIC
wNk3UxdkAAAAAANAHHUI AAAAAACI AAAAAAAEAav/8AAAAABAA00sz0nrRsrfoaUdZGipM8Q==
/*!*/;
### INSERT INTO `test`.`encryption`
### SET
###   @1=0 /* INT meta=0 nullable=0 is_null=0 */
###   @2='003:z000iGY\xla*L0' /* BLOB/TEXT meta=2 nullable=1 is_null=0 */
```

- No binlog leakage with SBR and local variable.

## Don't Do THAT, Do THIS : Examples

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### AES\_ENCRYPT() / AES\_DECRYPT(), re-continued

```
SET @cipher := AES_ENCRYPT('plaintext', 'key');  
INSERT INTO encryption (i, data) VALUES (3, @cipher);
```

```
# at 1071  
#140330 1:27:15 server id 100  end_log_pos 1126      User_var  
SET @`cipher`:=_binary X'4AF7B9C80CAA006CAA48935386D983C6' COLLATE `binary`/*!*/;  
# at 1126  
#140330 1:27:15 server id 100  end_log_pos 1241      Query  thread_id=9      exec_time=0      error_code=0  
SET TIMESTAMP=1396168035/*!*/;  
insert into encryption (i, data) values (3, @cipher)
```

- Slow log and general log still leak information.



# Don't Do THAT, Do THIS : Examples

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## Blind acceptance of user input

### SQL Injection:

```
$sql = 'SELECT FROM users WHERE username=' + $username + ''';
```

Suppose \$username is:

```
A'; DROP TABLE users; SELECT 1 FROM DUAL WHERE 't'='t'
```

Then the SQL becomes:

```
SELECT FROM users WHERE username='A';  
DROP TABLE users;  
SELECT 1 FROM DUAL WHERE 't'='t'
```



# Don't Do THAT, Do THIS : Examples

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## Blind acceptance of user input, continued

### Whitelisting input characters:

```
$username = "A"; DROP TABLE users; SELECT 1 FROM DUAL WHERE 't'='t';  
$username =~ s/\W//g;  
$sql = 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=' + $username + ''';  
-> SELECT * FROM users WHERE  
    username='ADROPTABLEusersSELECT1FROMDUALWHEREt=t'
```

### Parameterized statements and bind variables:

```
$stmt = $db->prepare('SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=?');  
$stmt->execute($username);
```



# Don't Do THAT, Do THIS : Examples

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## Blind acceptance of user input, re-continued

### Stored XSS and script injection:

```
$comment_text = '<script language="javascript">
                    alert("gotcha!");
                    </script>';
```

```
$stmt = dbh->prepare('INSERT INTO comments (id, data) VALUES (?,?)');
$stmt->execute(1, $comment_text);
```

- some other script -

```
$comment_text = $dbh->selectrow_array("SELECT data FROM comments WHERE id=1");
print $comment_text;
```

**Marginally acceptable:** Sanitize/escape at output time.

**Much better:** Sanitize/escape at input time.

**Optimal:** Sanitize on both ends.

# Don't Do THAT, Do THIS : Examples

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## Password quality and complexity

- Enforcement with PAM authentication plugin
  - Only option prior to MySQL 5.6
- Password quality plugin:

```
mysql> INSTALL PLUGIN validate_password SONAME 'validate_password.so'
```

```
mysql> pager grep password
PAGER set to 'grep password'
mysql> show plugins;
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| mysql_native_password | ACTIVE | AUTHENTICATION | NULL | GPL |
| mysql_old_password   | ACTIVE | AUTHENTICATION | NULL | GPL |
| sha256_password       | ACTIVE | AUTHENTICATION | NULL | GPL |
| validate_password     | ACTIVE | VALIDATE PASSWORD | validate_password.so | GPL |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
48 rows in set (0.00 sec)

mysql> show variables like 'validate_password%';
+-----+-----+
| validate_password_dictionary_file | 8 |
| validate_password_length          | 1 |
| validate_password_mixed_case_count | 1 |
| validate_password_number_count    | MEDIUM |
| validate_password_policy          | 1 |
| validate_password_special_char_count | 1 |
+-----+-----+
6 rows in set (0.00 sec)
```

# Don't Do THAT, Do THIS : Examples

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## Auditing and Logging

- PAM authentication plugin with local accounts (login only):

```
$ sudo cat /etc/pam.d/mysqld
auth      required      pam_warn.so
auth      required      pam_unix.so audit
account   required      pam_unix.so audit
```

```
mysql> INSTALL PLUGIN auth_pam SONAME 'auth_pam.so';
mysql> CREATE USER 'ews'@'localhost' IDENTIFIED WITH auth_pam;
```

```
$ sudo chgrp mysql /etc/shadow
$ sudo chmod g+r /etc/shadow
$ mysql -u ews -pCORRECT_PASSWORD
Mar 30 06:03:35 pxc1 mysqld: pam_warn(mysqld:auth): function=[pam_sm_authenticate]
service=[mysqld] terminal=[<unknown>] user=[ews] ruser=[ews] rhost=[localhost]
```

```
$ mysql -u ews -pINCORRECT_PASSWORD
Mar 30 06:03:42 pxc1 mysqld: pam_warn(mysqld:auth): function=[pam_sm_authenticate]
service=[mysqld] terminal=[<unknown>] user=[ews] ruser=[ews] rhost=[localhost]
Mar 30 06:03:42 pxc1 unix_chkpwd[4028]: password check failed for user (ews)
Mar 30 06:03:42 pxc1 mysqld: pam_unix(mysqld:auth): authentication failure; logname=
uid=497 euid=497 tty= ruser=ews rhost=localhost user=ews
```



# Don't Do THAT, Do THIS : Examples

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## Auditing and Logging

- User/Query Auditing with MariaDB Audit Plugin (Windows version available! Not currently 5.6 compatible.)

```
mysql> install plugin server_audit SONAME 'server_audit.so';  
mysql> show global variables like 'server_audit%';
```

Variable_name	Value
server_audit_events	
server_audit_excl_users	
server_audit_file_path	server_audit.log
server_audit_file_rotate_now	OFF
server_audit_file_rotate_size	1000000
server_audit_file_rotations	9
server_audit_incl_users	
server_audit_logging	OFF
server_audit_mode	1
server_audit_output_type	file
server_audit_syslog_facility	LOG_USER
server_audit_syslog_ident	mysql-server_auditing
server_audit_syslog_info	
server_audit_syslog_priority	LOG_INFO

# Don't Do THAT, Do THIS : Examples

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## Auditing and Logging

- MariaDB Audit Log Plugin, continued (log to remote syslog server)

```
mysql> SET GLOBAL server_audit_output_type='syslog';
mysql> SET GLOBAL server_audit_syslog_facility='LOG_LOCAL6';
mysql> SET GLOBAL server_audit_logging='ON';
```

On MySQL server:

```
root# echo 'local6.*      @10.10.10.18:514' >> /etc/rsyslog.conf
```

On syslog server:

```
root# echo 'local6.*      /var/log/mysql-audit.log' >> /etc/rsyslog.conf
```

```
Mar 30 08:07:39 raven mysql-server_auditing: raven.deadbunny.lan,root,localhost,421,17,QUERY,, 'set global server_audit_logging='\ON'',0
Mar 30 08:08:24 raven mysql-server_auditing: raven.deadbunny.lan,repl,10.10.10.130,432,0,FAILED_CONNECT,,,1045
Mar 30 08:08:24 raven mysql-server_auditing: raven.deadbunny.lan,repl,10.10.10.130,432,0,DISCONNECT,,,0
Mar 30 08:08:56 raven mysql-server_auditing: raven.deadbunny.lan,root,localhost,421,17,QUERY,, 'show slave status',0
Mar 30 08:09:24 raven mysql-server_auditing: raven.deadbunny.lan,repl,10.10.10.130,433,0,FAILED_CONNECT,,,1045
Mar 30 08:09:24 raven mysql-server_auditing: raven.deadbunny.lan,repl,10.10.10.130,433,0,DISCONNECT,,,0
Mar 30 08:10:24 raven mysql-server_auditing: raven.deadbunny.lan,repl,10.10.10.130,434,0,FAILED_CONNECT,,,1045
Mar 30 08:10:24 raven mysql-server_auditing: raven.deadbunny.lan,repl,10.10.10.130,434,0,DISCONNECT,,,0
Mar 30 08:17:08 raven mysql-server_auditing: raven.deadbunny.lan,root,localhost,421,0,DISCONNECT,,,0
Mar 30 08:26:54 raven mysql-server_auditing: raven.deadbunny.lan,root,localhost,435,0,CONNECT,,,0
Mar 30 08:26:54 raven mysql-server_auditing: raven.deadbunny.lan,root,localhost,435,30,QUERY,, 'select @@version_comment limit 1',0
Mar 30 08:26:54 raven mysql-server_auditing: raven.deadbunny.lan,root,localhost,435,31,QUERY,, 'select USER()',0
Mar 30 08:27:12 raven mysql-server_auditing: raven.deadbunny.lan,root,localhost,435,32,QUERY,, 'select * from mysql.user',0
```

## Encryption in flight

- Traditional SSL connections
  - Certificate acquisition process identical to SSL for websites
  - Varying levels of certificate specificity requirements (lowest to highest):
    - `CREATE USER ... REQUIRE SSL` (encryption required)
    - `CREATE USER ... REQUIRE X509` (valid certificate required)
    - `CREATE USER ... REQUIRE CIPHER` (specific cipher or set of ciphers)
    - `CREATE USER ... REQUIRE ISSUER` (specific CA)
    - `CREATE USER ... REQUIRE SUBJECT` (specific entity definition)
    - `CREATE USER ... REQUIRE ISSUER AND SUBJECT AND CIPHER`
- SSH tunnel
  - Monitor/restart SSH sessions - `autossh[3]`
- Performance....



Security + 1 = Performance – x



## Security + 1 = Performance – x

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- Audit Mechanisms
- To SSL or Not to SSL?

- MariaDB Audit Plugin vs. General Log

- 10 minute sysbench OLTP read-only test with 16 threads
- 16 tables of 1M rows each; 16M rows total, 3.9GB of data (8GB buffer pool)
- Server: PS 5.5.36, CentOS 6.5, SSD RAID-0, 32GB RAM, 8 HT cores[4]
- Client: Fedora 20, SSD, 32GB RAM, 8 HT cores

```
sysbench --test=/usr/share/sysbench/db/oltp.lua --mysql-host=10.10.10.4 \  
--mysql-port=3306 --mysql-user=sbtest --mysql-password=sbtest \  
--num-threads=16 --oltp-read-only=on --max-time=600 --rand-seed=31337 \  
--oltp-tables-count=16 --max-requests=0 --forced-shutdown=2 \  
--report-interval=1 --oltp-skip-trx=on run
```

- Test 1: No logs of any kind (baseline)
- Test 2: General log enabled (writing to local file)
- Test 3: Audit plugin enabled (writing to local file)
- Test 4: Audit plugin enabled (writing to remote file via syslog)




# Security + 1 = Performance – x


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## ● MariaDB Audit Plugin vs. General Log

Sysbench R/O – 16 threads



Sysbench R/O – 16 threads



# Security + 1 = Performance – x

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- MariaDB Audit Plugin vs. General Log:

Test	QPS	Latency(ms): Min   Avg   95 <sup>th</sup> %   Max
No Log	23619.91	4.58   9.48   16.49   123.89
General Log	23573.93	4.65   9.50   15.09   134.71
Audit Plugin (Local File)	24011.38	4.34   9.33   13.81   117.12
Audit Plugin (Remote Syslog)	22497.01	4.64   9.95   14.20   117.65


- Limiting factor for remote logging is rsyslogd performance.
  - Disable rate limiting on rsyslogd or events will get lost.
  - Materially slower than the other tests.
- For local options, throughput numbers are within 2%; difference in average throughput is in the same range. I don't consider these variances statistically significant.

# Security + 1 = Performance – x


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- SSL Encryption[4]
  - Sysbench R/O from 1 to 32 thread

Sysbench Read-Only - Throughput




Sysbench Read-Only - Response Time (95th percentile)



# Security + 1 = Performance – x


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- SSL Encryption:  
Connection overhead[4,5]



# Security + 1 = Performance – x

- SSL Encryption[5]  
SSH tunnel vs. SSL
- You do what you  
have to do...





## References

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1. [https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top\\_10\\_2013-Top\\_10](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2013-Top_10)
2. <http://www.sqlhack.com>
3. <http://www.harding.motd.ca/autossh/>
4. <http://www.mysqlperformanceblog.com/2013/10/10/mysql-ssl-performance-overhead/>
5. <http://www.mysqlperformanceblog.com/2013/11/18/mysql-encryption-performance-revisited/>





# Questions?

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Email: [ernest.souhrada@percona.com](mailto:ernest.souhrada@percona.com)

Twitter: [@denshikarasu](https://twitter.com/denshikarasu)