

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

Lecture 36: Security I



Agenda

- **Security I**
 - **Basic Concepts**
 - **Information Leakage Channels**
 - **Cryptography**
 - **Authentication**

Basic Concepts

- Classic Goals & Threats
 - Confidentiality
 - Having secret data remain secret
 - Integrity
 - Unauthorized users should not be able to modify data
 - Availability
 - Nobody can disturb the system to make it unusable

Goal	Threat
Confidentiality	Exposure of data
Integrity	Tampering with data
Availability	Denial of service

Basic Concepts

- Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
 - the set of hardware and software necessary for enforcing all security rules
 - E.g., most hardware, part of OS kernel, user-level program with superuser privilege
 - should be minimal
 - E.g., MINIX 3 has about 10,000 lines of code in the kernel, orders of magnitude less than Linux
 - Easier to be correct
 - Potentially offer higher security

Basic Concepts

- Protection Domains
 - A computer system contains resources (“objects”) that need to be protected
 - E.g., hardware (CPU, memory, HDD, ...) or software (processes, files, ...)
 - Each object has a unique name and a finite set of operations
 - E.g., read()/write() a file named /foo/bar
 - Domain: a set of [object, rights] pairs
 - a right means permission to perform one of the operations
 - a domain may correspond to different entities
 - E.g., a user or a group of users

Basic Concepts


- Protection Domains (cont')
 - Protection matrix
 - Keep track of domains and the associated objects/rights in a matrix

		Object							
Domain		File1	File2	File3	File4	File5	File6	Printer1	Plotter2
1		Read	Read Write						
	2			Read	Read Write Execute	Read Write		Write	
	3						Read Write Execute	Write	Write

- problem: many cells are empty in a large matrix
 - waste storage space

Basic Concepts

- Access Control List (ACL)
 - slice up the matrix by columns
 - associate with each object an (ordered) list containing all the domains that may access the object, and how
 - E.g., three processes from three different users A/B/C (subjects) and three files (objects)



Basic Concepts

- Access Control List (ACL) (cont')
 - groups of users have group names and can be included in ACLs
 - groups are also called “roles”
 - e.g., system administrators, super users
 - E.g., two ACLs with groups

File	Access control list
Password	tana, sysadm: RW
Pigeon_data	bill, pigfan: RW; tana, pigfan: RW; ...

Basic Concepts

- Access Control List (ACL) (cont')
 - E.g., Linux file ACL
 - set file permission: **chmod()**

```
% ls -lR
```

```
..:
```

```
total 2
```

```
drwxr-x--x  2 mike      adm      1024 Dec 17 13:34 A
```

```
drwxr----- 2 mike      adm      1024 Dec 17 13:34 B
```

```
./A:
```

```
total 1
```

```
-rw-rw-rw-  1 mike      adm        593 Dec 17 13:34 x
```

```
./B:
```


```
total 2
```

```
-r--rw-rw-  1 mike      adm        446 Dec 17 13:34 x
```

```
-rw----rw-  1 bob        adm        446 Dec 17 13:45 y
```

Basic Concepts

- Capability List (C-list)
 - slice up the matrix by rows
 - associated with each user/process a list of objects that may be accessed
 - individual items on a C-list are called **capabilities**
 - Each capability grants the owner certain rights on a certain object




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 - Cryptography
 - Authentication


Information Leakage Channels

- Covert Channels
 - An insider process leaks information to an outsider process not normally allowed to access that information by using mechanisms that are not intended for communications
 - E.g., the encapsulated server can leak to the collaborator via covert channels



Information Leakage Channels

- Covert Channels (cont')
 - E.g., a covert channel using file locking



Information Leakage Channels

- Steganography
 - Hiding the existence of information
 - E.g., (a) Three zebras and a tree. (b) Three zebras, a tree, and the complete text of five plays by William Shakespeare.



(a)



(b)

Agenda


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Cryptography

- Purpose
 - Take a message (or file), called the **plaintext**, and encrypt it into **ciphertext** in such a way that only authorized people know how to convert it back to plaintext
 - for unauthorized people, the ciphertext is just an incomprehensible sequence of bits
- The encryption & decryption algorithms are public
 - The secrecy depends on parameters to the algorithms called **keys**

Cryptography

- Relationship between the plaintext and the ciphertext



Cryptography

- Secret-Key Cryptography
 - Sender and receiver must both be in possession of the shared secret key
 - Also called “symmetric-key cryptography”
 - Efficient because the computation required to encrypt or decrypt a message is relatively manageable

Cryptography

- Secret-Key Cryptography
 - E.g., monoalphabetic substitution
 - An encryption algorithm in which each letter is replaced by a different letter.

plaintext: A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

ciphertext: Q W E R T Y U I O P A S D F G H J K L Z X C V B N M


“ATTACK” \longleftrightarrow “QZZQEA”

Cryptography

- Public-Key Cryptography
 - Everyone picks a (public key, private key) pair and publishes the public key
 - Public key: encryption key
 - Private key: decryption key
 - Keys are generated automatically using an algorithm
 - E.g., RSA algorithm
 - Usually have some randomness or password fed into the algorithm as a seed
 - User X sends a secret message to User Y
 - X encrypts the message using Y's public key
 - Y decrypts the message using Y's secret key


Cryptography

- Digital Signature
 - Sender signs digital documents in such a way that they cannot be repudiated by the sender later
 - run the document through a one-way cryptographic hashing algorithm (e.g., SHA-1) that is very hard to invert
 - sender applies her private key to the hash to get $D(\text{hash})$, i.e., signature block
 - Signature block is appended to the doc and send to the receiver



Cryptography

- Digital Signature
 - Receiver:
 - computes the hash of the document (e.g., using SHA-1)
 - applies the sender's public key to the signature block to get $E(D(\text{hash}))$
 - Canceling out the effect of $D(\text{hash})$ to get the hash back
 - If the computed hash does not match the hash from the signature block, then the document, the signature block, or both have been tampered




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
Authentication

- Prove the identity of a user
- Based on three general principles:
 - Something the user knows.
 - Something the user has.
 - Something the user is
- Common methods
 - Password
 - Hardware token
 - E.g., RSA SecurID
 - Software token
 - E.g., private key in a public-key cryptosystem



Authentication

- Common Methods
 - Biometrics
 - E.g., fingerprint



- Multi-factor authentication
 - Combine multiple sources to verify identity
 - E.g., password + hardware token, password + security questions

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Questions?



*acknowledgement: slides include content from “Modern Operating Systems” by A. Tanenbaum, “Operating Systems Concepts” by A. Silberschatz etc., “Operating Systems: Three Easy Pieces” by R. Arpaci-Dusseau etc., and anonymous pictures from internet.