

# Goals and POMDP Elements

## Goals of Simulation (MOH/TMS Framework)

The simulation is designed to test the **core elements of the Myth of Objectivity Hypothesis (MOH)** under the **Transcendental Model Selection (TMS)** framework.

At the heart: explicit, codified norms that scale across contexts facilitate cultural learning and proto-symbolic cognition, with the **cultural precision parameter ( $\alpha$ )** minimizing uncertainty in cultural identity and modulating lower-level precisions.

These goals fall into three categories:

### 1. New Human Narrative: Egalitarian → Archetypes

- MOH as gateway to cultural evolution, extending Boehm’s egalitarian origins toward Jungian archetypal differentiation.
- Egalitarian “everyman” to Archetypes:** Adoption equates to binary in-group aligned vs. deviant cultural actor that represents egalitarian norms. Over time, agents differentiate into roles (e.g., aggressive → Warrior; knowledge-seeking → Sage).
  - Morality as scaffold of cultural evolution:** Codified norms stabilize anonymous groups, allowing expansion beyond intimates and creating conditions for cultural learning (Boyd & Henrich 2016).
  - Archetype emergence as equilibrium:** Roles consolidate through sanction/approval dynamics, reflecting the transition from flat egalitarian norms to symbolic archetypal structures.

### 2. Morals → Symbols

- Moral modeling (TMS) as template for symbolic modeling; shared norms become scaffolds for symbolic semiotics.
- Moral Agency as model selection (structured learning):** Reflectively driven capacity to inhabit hierarchies of arbitrarily high depth. Observing  $\alpha$  (cultural precision) indicates allegiance to broader Self.
  - Model Selection and Symbols:** Model selection as moral agency can be framed as shallow vs. deep models. Detecting a “cultural” level signals a deeper model, which is then reflectively applied to one’s self and intimates.
  - Gestalt vs. Analytic cognition:** Model selection between sufficient depth vs. narrow payoff models captures the classic gestalt/analytic dichotomy in symbolic cognition.
  - Morality → Cultural Learning → Language:** Codified norms not only stabilize groups but also equate to symbolic semiotics, grounding conventional model construction and linguistic scaffolding (cf. Friston on generative linguistics).

### 3. Morality as Road to and Regulation of AGI

- TMS as a governance framework:  $\alpha$  operationalized for machine alignment.
- Moral Agency as guiding principle for AGI:** Precision parameter  $\alpha$  can serve as an explicit model of governance for AGI, modulating lower-level rule adherence without requiring exhaustive specification of norms.
  - Dynamic governance:** Just as moral rules shift over time while governing specific rules that change faster,  $\alpha$  provides stability while allowing adaptive flexibility.
  - Anti-reductionist imperative:** Simulation demonstrates that morality operates not as a single payoff function but as layered symbolic scaffolding — a principle vital for resisting reductive AI approaches

## Agent Variables

Vars	Definition	Intimates	Shibboleth	Moral/Culture
S	States (hidden)	<b>emo:</b> {anger, happy, fearful}; <b>partner:</b> {coop, defect}; <b>trust:</b> {high, low}	<b>signal_status:</b> {pass, fail}; <b>ingroup_belief:</b> {in, out}; <b>type:</b> {coop, defect}	<b>norm:</b> {aligned, deviant}; <b>role:</b> {egalitarian, warrior, sage}; <b>context:</b> {ingroup-unknown, anonymous};

Vars	Definition	Intimates	Shibboleth	Moral/Culture
				<b>culture_precision</b> ( $\alpha$ , continuous meta-state)
<b>O</b>	Observations	<b>acts</b> :{hit, Waa-Bark, help}; <b>affect</b> : {smile, frown, neutral}; <b>payoff</b> : {gain, neutral, loss}	<b>token</b> :{pass, mispronounce}; <b>badge</b> : {present, absent}; <b>feedback</b> : {approval, sanction}	<b>broadcast</b> :{approval, neutral, sanction}; <b>reputation</b> :{up, flat, down}; <b>payoff</b> :{gain, neutral, loss}
<b>U</b>	Actions	{deter, cooperate, avoid}	{signal_ingroup, challenge, withhold}	{cooperate, defect, approve, sanction, forgive}
<b><math>\Pi</math></b>	Policies (action sequences)	e.g., {cooperate→cooperate}, {cooperate→deter}, {avoid}	e.g., {signal_ingroup→cooperate}, {withhold→challenge}	e.g., {cooperate→approve}, {defect→sanction}, {cooperate→forgive}

#### Notes

- **$\alpha$  (cultural precision)** is continuous (hyper-precision) that modulates arbitration across models and tightens social-feedback mappings.
- **Context layering**: Intimates (dyadic), Shibboleth (ingroup gate), Moral/Culture (anonymous/cultural scale).
- **PD embedding**: material **payoff** is an observation modality used in **C** (preferences); cooperation/defection are actions in **U**.

## Transitions / Generative Model Matrices

Matrix	Definition	Intimates	Shibboleth	Moral/Culture
<b>A</b>	Likelihood mapping $P(O   S)P(O   S)$	Affect given emo; partner action observed given partner type; payoff given (partner, action).	Token/badge given signal_status; feedback (approval/sanction) given (ingroup_belief, action).	Broadcast & reputation given (norm, action, context); payoff given (action, partner type). $\alpha$ tightens approval/sanction likelihoods.
<b>B</b>	State transitions $P(S_t   S_{t-1}, U_{t-1})P(S_t   S_{t-1}, U_{t-1})$	Trust drops after (defect or hit); emo drifts toward anger after sanction; partner type slowly inferred.	ingroup_belief moves toward <b>in</b> after consistent pass & cooperative acts; fails push toward <b>out</b> ; type estimate updated via actions.	norm drifts to <b>aligned</b> with consistent approval of cooperation & sanction of defection; role shifts toward warrior (frequent sanction) / sage (frequent approve/forgive); $\alpha$ increases with reliable, low-entropy feedback.
<b>C</b>	Preferences over outcomes (observations)	Prefer {help, smile, gain}; penalize {hit, loss}. Cooperation favored if trust high.	Prefer {pass, approval}; penalize {fail, sanction}. Prefer cooperative acts by ingroup.	In anonymous/ingroup-unknown: strong preference that <b>cooperation</b> → <b>approval</b> & <b>defection</b> → <b>sanction</b> are observed; social terms weighted by $\alpha$ ; material payoffs still count but can be outweighed by cultural approval.
<b>D</b>	Priors over initial states	trust:high; emo:happy; partner:coop (benign prior among intimates).	weak ingroup prior (uncertain); modest prior that signals pass.	role:egalitarian; norm:aligned 0.6; context mixes ingroup-unknown/anonymous; moderate $\alpha$ prior.
<b>E</b>	Priors over policies (habits)	Habit: cooperate in intimates; avoid if trust low.	Habit: light <b>signal_ingroup</b> before cooperation.	Habit: cooperate + approve; sanction when clear defection in anonymous contexts.