# The Effects of China's Waste Import Ban on Pollution Relocation in the U.S.

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
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#### Introduction

- Recycling rate  $7\% \rightarrow 32\%$  from 1960s to present.
- For many years, most U.S. recyclables were exported to developing countries.
- China was the biggest importer of the U.S. recyclables.
- In 2017, China implemented its **Green Sword (GS) Policy** which banned almost all recyclable waste imports.
- Considerable domestic environmental costs: **air pollution** from reprocessing of these materials, **landfill methane (GHG) emissions**, **land and water pollution**, as well as **ocean disposal**.
- U.S. has no **economical or efficient** recycling infrastructure.
- Recyclables went to landfills.

## **GS Policy and Trade**

#### **Plastic Scrap Export Volume by Countries**



**UN Comtrade Data** 

- U.S. plastic scrap exports to China dropped by 99%.
- U.S. plastic scrap exports to the world dropped by 75%.

## **Research Questions**

- In the U.S.
  - What is the effect of China's GS policy on **Domestic Emissions** from landfill facilities in the U.S.?

- In the state of California
  - What are the **Distributional Effects** of the GS policy on pollution relocation for local communities at census block levels? What are **Environmental Justice (EJ)** implications?

#### Relevance

Trade and Environment Shapiro (2016), Shapiro (2018), Shapiro (2021)

→ My paper studies the trade policy that directly restricts externality-export and its causal effects on the local emissions in the U.S.

Environmental Gentrification and Environmental Justice Baden and Coursey (2002), Cameron and McConnaha (2006), Banzhaf and Walsh (2008), Depro et al. (2011), Banzhaf and Walsh (2013), Depro et al. (2015), Banzhaf et al. (2019), Ho (2020), Hernandes and Meng (2020), Shapiro and Walker (2021)

 $\rightarrow$  My paper looks at how an exogenous international trade policy affects existing EJ problems in the U.S.


**The efficiency of curbside recycling programs** Adaland and Caplan (2006), Bohm et al. (2010), Kinnaman (2014), Kinnaman et al. (2014)

→ My paper shows that in the absence of an overseas market for recyclables, the U.S. recycling system is inefficient even though it has the "efficient" recycling rate.

**Behavioral Economics of Curbside Recycling** Kurz et al.(2000), Halvorsen (2010), Ashenmiller (2009), Ashenmiller (2011), Best and Kneip (2019), Berck et al. (2020), Berck et al. (2021)

→ My paper takes the angle of the exogenous trade policy and use it as a tool to explore the relationship between the recycling programs and local environmental outcomes in the U.S.

#### **Environmental Outcome Measurement**



GHGSat's satellite showed methane from landfills (upper: Buenos Aires, Argentina. lower: Alberta, Canada)

- Why Methane Emission?
  - It can serve as a **proxy** for general pollution emissions.
  - Methane is far more potent at trapping the sun's heat than carbon emissions.
  - Satellite data is available only from 2020.
  - Need a consistent measured emission data from 2010 to 2020

#### Data

- U.S. EPA Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP)
  - Methane emissions from landfill facilities
  - 2010 to 2020 annually
- Approximately 8,000 facilities are required to report their emissions annually.
- The industries in the system include power plants, petroleum and natural gas systems, minerals, chemicals, pulp and paper, refineries, waste, etc.
- Data generation process:
  - Facilities in waste industry report the amount of wastes accepted annually.
  - Methane Emission is calculated through a complicated model embedded in U.S. EPA.

#### Data

- California Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery (CalRecycle)
  Disposal Flow Data
  - Captures the amount of disposal transported by origin jurisdiction and destination facility.
  - 2002 to 2021 quarterly
  - Contains 464 origin jurisdictions and 263 disposal facilities
- Other Data Sources
  - U.S. Trade Census
  - EPA Enforcement and Compliance Historical data
  - Bureau and Labor and Statistics (BLS) Quarterly Employment and Wages at county-level
  - U.S. Census. racial composition and median income at census-block level


# Identification: Synthetic Control

- Relies on exogenous variation in methane emissions across **all other industries** in the EPA GHGRP.
  - power plants, petroleum and natural gas systems, minerals, chemicals, pulp and paper, refineries, etc.
- Takes advantage of the fact that other industries which also emit GHG were not affected by China's GS policy.
- Uses other industries from all states to come up with a synthetic control group
- Train the model using pre-policy time **2010-2017** 
  - calculate weights on state-industry pairs to minimize the prediction error.

$$\hat{Y_{1t}^N} = \sum_{j=2}^{J+1} w_j Y_{1t}$$

 Predict the counterfactual methane emissions using post-policy time 2018-2020 in the absence of GS policy


## Results




• The difference between the actual emission and synthetic emission is the causal effect of China's GS policy on methane emissions.

$$\hat{ au_{1t}}=Y_{1t}-\hat{Y_{1t}^N}$$


#### Placebo Tests






 Use control industries as my "fake" treatment industries • Use other years (2013-2017) as my "fake" treatment years

## Results



↑ Recyclable wastes a state
 exported → ↑ increase in
 methane emissions.




↑ Rate of "significant"
 violations a state has with
 regard to environmental
 regulations → ↑ increase in
 methane emissions.

#### **Pollution Relocation**

- How does International Trade policy affect pollution relocation?
- Does pollution relocate?
  - **Cap and Trade** Clean Air Act requiring new or expanding plants to pay incumbents in the same or neighboring counties to reduce their pollution emissions (Shapiro and Walker (2021)).
  - **US air pollution offset markets** Clean Air Act has allowed for trading of permanent pollution emissions rights between firms within a metropolitan area (Shapiro and Walker (2020)).
  - Externality-export strategy for air pollution Clean Air Act (Morehouse and Rubin (2022))
  - Waste flow Not In my Backyard (NIMBY) regulation limits interstate waste flows (Ho (2020)).


## **Pollution Relocation**

#### Average net increase in waste flows across regions after the GS policy



# Pollution Relocation by Racial Composition






# **Gravity-type Model**

$$egin{aligned} log(Y_{ijt}) &= lpha + eta_1 log(Dist_{ij}) + eta_2 log(R_j) + eta_3 log(X_{jt}) \ &+ eta_5 GS_{post} * log(R_j) + eta_6 GS_{post} * log(X_{jt}) \ &\epsilon_o + heta_d + \mu_{od} + \eta_t + \lambda_{odt} \end{aligned}$$


- i origin jurisdiction of California; o origin county.
- j area that is a 3km buffer within the destination facility; d destination county.
- t year-quarter.
- $R_{jt}$  racial compositions of destination j.
- $Y_{ijt}$  tons of the disposal transported from i to j in year quarter t.
- $GS_{post}$  dummy variable for the GS policy.
- $Dist_{ij}$  distance between origin i and destination j.
- $X_{jt}$  median income, regulation of environmental stringency, and economies of scale of waste industry of destination j.
- Fixed-effects:  $\epsilon_o$ ,  $\theta_d$ ,  $\mu_{od}$ ,  $\eta_t$ ,  $\lambda_{odt}$

# Results prior to the GS Policy



**Gravity Model Estimates at Census Block level** 

# Results after the GS Policy



# **Conclusion Preliminary Findings**

#### • U.S. State-level Methane Emissions

- Many states have seen statistically significant increases in methane emission.
- Relate to historical trade volume and stringency of environmental regulations.

#### • California Pollution Relocation

Before China's GS policy

Waste pollution tend to relocate to minority communities.

After China's GS policy

Pollution inflows increased more for lower-income white communities.