

Authentication

- ▶ Passwords
- ▶ Hopelessness
- ▶ Password Managers
- ▶ Password attacks
- ▶ Password defenses
- ▶ Incident response plan!

The beginning of the end of the password

- ▶ This might be the last time I have to talk about passwords in the present tense.
 - ▶ ▶ Matt Kijowski, Sep 12, 2023
 - ▶ ▶ Matt Kijowski, Jan 16, 2024
 - ▶ ▶ Matt Kijowski, Sep 5, 2024

What is Authentication

- ▶ The act of showing something to be true, genuine, or valid.


In cybersecurity this usually means

Verifying the identity of a user or process

Passwords

- ▶ Most common form of authentication
- ▶ “Something you know”
- ▶ Different ideas of strong versus weak passwords
- ▶ 12345

CorrectHorseBatteryStaple



~28 BITS OF ENTROPY


$2^{28} = 3 \text{ DAYS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$

(PLAUSIBLE ATTACK ON A WEAK REMOTE WEB SERVICE. YES, CRACKING A STOLEN HASH IS FASTER, BUT IT'S NOT WHAT THE AVERAGE USER SHOULD WORRY ABOUT.)


DIFFICULTY TO GUESS: **EASY**

WAS IT TROMBONE? NO, TROUBADOR. AND ONE OF THE 0s WAS A ZERO?

AND THERE WAS SOME SYMBOL...



DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER: **HARD**




~44 BITS OF ENTROPY

$2^{44} = 550 \text{ YEARS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$

DIFFICULTY TO GUESS: **HARD**

THAT'S A BATTERY STAPLE.

CORRECT!



DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER: **YOU'VE ALREADY MEMORIZED IT**

THROUGH 20 YEARS OF EFFORT, WE'VE SUCCESSFULLY TRAINED EVERYONE TO USE PASSWORDS THAT ARE HARD FOR HUMANS TO REMEMBER, BUT EASY FOR COMPUTERS TO GUESS.

Password weaknesses

- ▶ People
- ▶ Weak passwords
- ▶ Phishing
- ▶ Shoulder surfing
- ▶ Leaks (raw or hashed!)
- ▶ Dictionaries
- ▶ Rainbow Tables
- ▶ Brute force
- ▶ Side channel attacks!!!
 - ▶ Password resets
 - ▶ Removal of MFA devices
 - ▶ Account recovery
- ▶ Bypass attacks
- ▶ People

Password Attacks

Generally can be classified into two types:

- ▶ Online Password attacks
- ▶ Offline Password attacks

Online Password Attacks

Attacks the login interface directly, frequently limited by speed (of network / response from authenticator / input).

- ▶ Brute force
- ▶ Smarter brute force (dictionary / rainbow tables)
- ▶ Shoulder surfing (watching someone enter password)
- ▶ Pass the hash (application accepts hashes or passwords)
- ▶ Bypass (steal / access an already authenticated system)

This slide is bad...

But is a good example of an online password attack that does NOT require the internet.

9 9 9 9 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 1 1 9 1 1 1 3
7 1 1 1 3 9 1 1 1 5 3 1 1 1 5 5 1 1 1 5 7 1 1 1 5 9 1 1 1
7 7 1 1 1 7 9 1 1 1 9 3 1 1 1 9 5 1 1 1 9 7 1 1 1 9 9 1 1
3 1 7 1 1 3 1 9 1 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 3 5 1 1 3 3 7 1 1 3 3 9 1
1 3 5 7 1 1 3 5 9 1 1 3 7 3 1 1 3 7 5 1 1 3 7 7 1 1 3 7 9
1 1 3 9 7 1 1 3 9 9 1 1 5 1 3 1 1 5 1 5 1 1 5 1 7 1 1 5 1
5 1 1 5 3 7 1 1 5 3 9 1 1 5 5 3 1 1 5 5 5 1 1 5 5 7 1 1 5
7 5 1 1 5 7 7 1 1 5 7 9 1 1 5 9 3 1 1 5 9 5 1 1 5 9 7 1 1
7 1 5 1 1 7 1 7 1 1 7 1 9 1 1 7 3 3 1 1 7 3 5 1 1 7 3 7 1
1 7 5 5 1 1 7 5 7 1 1 7 5 9 1 1 7 7 3 1 1 7 7 5 1 1 7 7 7
1 1 7 9 5 1 1 7 9 7 1 1 7 9 9 1 1 9 1 3 1 1 9 1 5 1 1 9 1
3 1 1 9 3 5 1 1 9 3 7 1 1 9 3 9 1 1 9 5 3 1 1 9 5 5 1 1 9
7 3 1 1 9 7 5 1 1 9 7 7 1 1 9 7 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 1 9 9 5 1 1
1 3 3 1 3 1 3 5 1 3 1 3 7 1 3 1 3 9 1 3 1 5 3 1 3 1 5 5 1
3 1 7 3 1 3 1 7 5 1 3 1 7 7 1 3 1 7 9 1 3 1 9 3 1 3 1 9 5
1 3 3 1 5 1 3 3 1 7 1 3 3 1 9 1 3 3 3 3 1 3 3 3 5 1 3 3 3

Offline Password Attacks

We will perform one of these in our next lab.

- ▶ Frequently much faster (attack speed can scale with attacker resources)
- ▶ Can be invisible to defenders (you dont know if/when your password is compromised)
- ▶ Many of the same attacks as online (brute force, dictionary, rainbow tables, etc.)
- ▶ Requires an offline source to attack
 - ▶ File containing stolen password hashes
 - ▶ Phishing the user themselves
 - ▶ Key logging software that captures the password

'/etc/shadow' Exercise

- ▶ Create a new user `sudo adduser tempuser`
- ▶ Give it a weak password (that you can share with other students)
 - ▶ No more than one use of the password: password per table please!!
- ▶ Print out that user's salted + hashed password
 - ▶ `sudo cat /etc/shadow | grep tempuser`
- ▶ Submit that entire output to Pilot (include the user name and all trailing :::
 - ▶ Reminder: plain text files only!!!
- ▶ I recommend deleting the created user as well:
 - ▶ `sudo userdel tempuser`

Authentication defenses

- ▶ Password managers
- ▶ Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA / 2FA)
- ▶ Keys/tokens (PKI)
- ▶ Biometrics
- ▶ Policies and procedures

Password Managers

- ▶ Allow for much stronger passwords
- ▶ Convenient for users
 - ▶ Until they are **very** inconvenient. . .
- ▶ Helps prevent easily guessable passwords
- ▶ Helps prevent re-used passwords

Multi-factor Authentication (MFA)

- ▶ If passwords are so weak, then we will use another form of authentication alongside them.
- ▶ Hopefully a second form of authentication is chosen that is both secure and easy to remember.
- ▶ Processes introduced to deal with lost or forgotten MFA can provide attackers avenues of entry or data gathering.

Key based authentication

- ▶ Public/Private Key pairs
 - ▶ User provides ***public key*** securely upon account setup
 - ▶ User authenticates with ***private key***
- ▶ Digital Certificates build upon key based authentication
 - ▶ Includes digital signature of a certification authority
 - ▶ Server verifies credibility of the certificate authority

Biometric authentication

Relies on unique biological characteristics of the user such as:

- ▶ fingerprints
- ▶ facial recognition
- ▶ speech recognition
- ▶ retinal scan
- ▶ etc.

Token based authentication

User authenticates and receives a unique encrypted string to use for authentication against other related servers.

Typically used with APIs with multiple frameworks and clients.

Policies and Procedures

- ▶ How the people and processes handle all parts of authentication
- ▶ How many password attempts?
- ▶ How long do you wait for MFA?
- ▶ How do you verify a user during account recovery?
- ▶ etc.

Incident Response

You (will) get hacked. Then what?

Mat Honan - A case study

- ▶ circa 2012
- ▶ Wired.com tech blogger
- ▶ twitter @mat
- ▶ Apple fanboy (joking, but does use apple products)
 - ▶ m*****@me.com
- ▶ Enjoys amazon.com delivery of goods to his home address

What happened

- ▶ August 2012
- ▶ 5pm iphone resets
- ▶ phone power on and iphone is at setup screen
 - ▶ (backups etc were done nightly so no fear yet)
- ▶ plug phone in to laptop to restore/recover
 - ▶ notification on macbook of incorrect credentials
 - ▶ macbook has new (unknown) 4 digit pin protection

What would you do?

What actually happened (all times are approximate)

- ▶ Aug 2012
- ▶ 4pm buys a toothbrush amazon.com
- ▶ 4:30pm amazon account reset with unknown credit card and Mat Honan's address
- ▶ 4:45pm me.com reset with last 4 of Mat Honan's CC and address
- ▶ 4:47pm gmail.com reset with me.com
- ▶ 4:50pm twitter.com reset with gmail.com
- ▶ 4:55pm me.com and gmail.com accounts ***permanently deleted*** with all data
- ▶ 5pm hacker brags on their newly acquired @mat handle of their hack

The hack

These are the steps the attacker went through:

- ▶ First all, the reason behind it, they (attacker) wanted @mat Twitter handle
 - ▶ Yes I chose not to update this slide to the new name of X, they are all still tweets in my mind. . .
 - ▶ background research revealed @mat is Matthew Honan
 - ▶ find physical address from various online lookups
 - ▶ find email address from various online lookups
- ▶ try to sign into twitter with that gmail address
 - ▶ this confirmed that the gmail address is @mat
- ▶ try to sign into that gmail address
 - ▶ ***no 2fa !!! :(!!! :(!!!***
 - ▶ account recovery is m*****@me.com

The hackening continued

- ▶ me.com allows for account recovery with two simple things
 - ▶ last 4 of your credit card
 - ▶ billing address
- ▶ try to sign in with various Mat Honan emails
 - ▶ finds the one that works
 - ▶ crafts a purchase for a toothbrush *using the hacker's credit card*
 - ▶ amazon used to let you purchase save credit card to account without credentials
 - ▶ spend money faster!!!
 - ▶ buys toothbrush and delivers it to Mat Honan
 - ▶ immediately calls amazon, recovers login with hackers credit card info
 - ▶ Attacker can now see last 4 of all CC in Amazon as well as billing addresses

Scorched earth

- ▶ This lets people into me.com (AppleID)
- ▶ which gave them his gmail
- ▶ which gave them his twitter
- ▶ which was really his entire digital life...
- ▶ Hacker resets twitter account info, password, and recovery email
- ▶ Hacker initiates google account removal, deleting ***ALL google data and account*** (no twitter recovery email anymore)
- ▶ Hacker initiates me.com account removal, deleting ***ALL apple data, purchased songs, movies, stored pictures, and removes access to phone and laptop***
- ▶ Hacker tweets about his victory

Incident response plan

- ▶ Know what ALL forms of authentication are for critical services
- ▶ Setup MFA for critical/all accounts
- ▶ Know how to disable/re-enable the MFA
- ▶ Be prepared to provide necessary information
- ▶ Be aware of chained accounts / vulnerabilities

Amazon's fault?

- ▶ Yes
- ▶ of course
- ▶ in hindsight sounded like a great idea