
# Cascading Behavior in Networks

**Social Computing** 

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### Lecture Topics

UMASS

- Modeling Diffusion
- Cascades & Clusters
- Cascade Capacity

#### Diffusion



- Cascade from structural perspective:
  - Individuals influenced by neighbors
    - Technology that friends use
    - Friends political views, etc.
- "Nodes" adopt a new behavior once a **sufficient proportion of their neighbors** have done so.



- Networked Coordination Game
  - Nodes choose btw behaviors A or B.
  - Neighbors receive payoff if their behaviors match.
    - v and w both adopt  $\underline{A}$ , each get a payoff of  $\underline{a} > \underline{o}$ ;
    - v and w both adopt B, each get a payoff of b > c;
    - $\mathbf{o}$  payoff if v and w adopt opposite behaviors.

 Nodes behavior depends on choices made by neighbors!






• p fraction of v's neighbors choose A

(1-p) fraction choose B.

• *v* has *d* neighbors

 Which behavior should v adopt?






- p fraction of v's neighbors choose A
- (1 p) fraction choose B.
- *v* has <u>*d*</u> neighbors
  - If v chooses A




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- p fraction of v's neighbors choose A
- (1 p) fraction choose B.
- *v* has *d* neighbors
  - If v chooses A
    - payoff =  $p \times d \times a$
  - If v chooses B
    - payoff =  $(1 p) \times d \times b$

- A is the better if






- p fraction of v's neighbors choose A
- (1 p) fraction choose B.
- *v* has *d* neighbors
  - If v chooses A
    - payoff =  $p \times d(a)$
  - If v chooses B
    - payoff =  $(1 p) \times d \times b$

A is the better if

$$pda \ge (1-p)db p \ge$$





- Cascading
  - Everyone adopts A,

  - Intermediate state: some adopt A and some adopt B!



- Suppose B is the default behavior.
- Some initial adopters (IA) switch to A.
- Cascade may start:
  - neighbors of IA may switch to A, their neighbors, etc.
- Cascade stops if:
  - Complete cascade: every node switch over to A!
  - No node wants to switch: Coexistence btw A and B.



What factors contribute to start/stop of cascades?



- What factors contribute to start/stop of cascades?
  - network structure,
  - choice of initial adopters,
  - value of the threshold q





• Payoff a=3 and b=2.


q = 2/5, nodes switch to A if at least 40% of their

neighbors are using A!


v and w are initial adopters of A!























• q = 2/5 = 40.

• 7 and 8 are initial adopters of A!






- Takes 3 steps for the cascade to stop!
  - 5 and 10 switch to A, then
  - nodes 4 and 9, then
  - node 6.





- Takes 3 steps for the cascade to stop!
  - 5 and 10 switch to A, then
  - nodes 4 and 9, then
  - node 6.



Tightly-knit communities in the network can hinder the spread of a behavior.



• What are useful strategies to push adoption of A (assume A and B are competing technologies)?




- Strategies that are useful to push adoption of A
  - Change the payoff

```
q = b/(a+b).
```

- Say from a = 3 to a = 4!
- q drops from 2/5 down to 1/3
  - · then all nodes will switch to A in the above example.



- Strategies that are useful to push adoption of A
  - Convince a small number of key nodes in the part of the network using B to switch to A
    - · Choose carefully to get the cascade going again!
    - Convince 12?
    - Convince 14?



### Lecture Topics

UMASS

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- Cascade Capacity





• Question: What makes a cascade stop? Or prevents it from breaking into all parts of a network?

#### Cascades & Clusters



- Question: What makes a cascade stop? Or prevents it from breaking into all parts of a network?
  - A cascade comes to stop when it runs into a dense cluster (tightly-knit communities & homophily),
  - This is the only thing that causes cascades to stop!



#### Cluster Density

 Cluster density p: a set of nodes where each node has at least p fraction of its neighbors in the set.





Figure 19.6: A collection of four-node clusters, each of density 2/3.



- Claim: Given initial adopters of A & threshold q:
  - i. If remaining network contains a cluster of density greater than 1 q, then no complete cascade.
  - ii. If there is no complete cascade, the remaining network contains a cluster of density > 1 q.





$$q = 2/5 = 40\%$$

Cluster density = 2/3 = 66%

Cluster density > (1-q) = 60%






i. If remaining network contains a cluster of density greater than 1 - q, then no complete cascade.




- i. If remaining network contains a cluster of density greater than 1 q, then no complete cascade.
- Solution
  - Assume there is a node inside the cluster (density > 1-q) that adopts A
  - Let v be the **first** node that does so.





- i. If remaining network contains a cluster of density greater than 1 q, then no complete cascade.
- Solution
  - Neighbors of v that use A are outside cluster.
  - More than 1-q fraction of v's neighbors are inside the cluster  $\rightarrow$  less than q fraction of v's neighbors are outside the cluster.
    - *v* cannot adopt A #

clusters block the spread of cascades






ii. If there is no complete cascade, the remaining network contains a cluster of density > 1 - q.




- ii. If there is no complete cascade, the remaining network contains a cluster of density > 1 q.
- Solution
  - Run the process until it stops!
    - there are nodes using B that don't want to switch.
    - let S denote such nodes.





- ii. If there is no complete cascade, the remaining network contains a cluster of density > 1 q.
- Solution
  - Run the process until it stops!
    - consider any node  $w \in S$
    - fraction of w's neighbors using A is < q.
    - fraction of w's neighbors using B is > 1 q.
    - This holds for any node  $w \in S$ 
      - S is a cluster of density > 1 q.

Whenever a cascade comes to a stop, there's a cluster that can be used to explain why.



#### **Extensions of Cascade Model**




- Heterogeneous thresholds
  - node-specific thresholds for adopting a behavior!
- Payoff for v:
  - Choosing A:  $pda_v$
  - Choosing B:  $(1-p)db_v$ .
- A is better for v if
  - $pda_v > (1-p)db_v$ .

$$p \ge \frac{b_v}{a_v + b_v}.$$

#### Extensions of Cascade Model- Cnt.





- No cascade without node-specific thresholds.
- The extremely low threshold of node 3 lead to diffusion.

The power of **influential nodes** is correlated to the extent to which such nodes have access to easily **influenceable nodes**.

- Clusters are still obstacle to cascades
- A **blocking cluster** is a set of nodes for which each node v has  $> 1-q_v$  fraction of its neighbors in the set.

### Lecture Topics


UMASS

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## **Cascade Capacity**



- The maximum q for which some small set of initial adopters can cause a complete cascade!
  - Indicates how different network structures are hospitable to cascades!







- Let black nodes be the early adopters of A.
- What is cascade capacity?
  - the maximum q for complete cascade?



### Cascade Capacity- Cnt.



- Let black nodes be the early adopters of A.
- What is cascade capacity?
  - the maximum q for complete cascade?




If  $q \le 1/2$ , complete cascade.

If  $q > \frac{1}{2}$ , no finite set of initial adopters can get any node to switch to A.

Cascade capacity= 1/2












If  $q \le 3/8$ , then there is a complete cascade: first to nodes c, h, i, n; then to nodes b, d, f, g, j, k, m, o; and then to others

If q > 3/8, no node will choose to adopt A.

Cascade Capacity=3/8







 How easy cascades propagate in a network with large cascade capacity?





- How easy cascades propagate in a network with large cascade capacity?
  - Happen more "easily!"
  - Cascades happen even for behaviors A that don't offer much payoff advantage over the B.





• What is the maximum possible value for cascade capacity?





https://snikolov.wordpress.com/2012/11/12/information-diffusion-on-twitter/

# Reading



Ch.19 Cascading Behavior in Networks [NCM]