



BLOCKCHAINS

ARCHITECTURE, DESIGN AND USE CASES

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


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
<https://steemit.com/blockchain/@tariq3nir/what-is-blockchain-technology>





Research Aspects - IV

ByzCoin



IIT KHARAGPUR



-  keyblock (co-signed)
-  microblock (co-signed)
-  share
-  miner (co-signer)
- L** leader




Image Source:

<http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/08/04/byzcoin/>

Kogias, E. K., Jovanovic, P., Gailly, N., Khoffi, I., Gasser, L., & Ford, B. (2016, August). Enhancing bitcoin security and performance with strong consistency via collective signing. In *25th USENIX Security Symposium 2016*

Byzcoin



Requirements for Blockchain Consensus

- **Byzantine fault tolerant** – the system should work even in the presence of malicious users while operating across multiple administrative domains
- Should provide **strong consistency guarantee** across replicas
- Should **scale well to increasing workloads** in terms of transactions processed per unit time
- Should **scale well to increasing network size**




Problems with Bitcoin

- There is **no verifiable commitment** of the system that a block would exist
 - Probability of successful fork attack decreases as the size of the Blockchain increases




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Problems with Bitcoin-NG


- A faulty key block is verified only after end of the round
 - A faulty miner can introduce a number of correct microblocks following a faulty microblock in the system - certainly a overhead for the application - **a fork alleviates the problem further**



Problems with Bitcoin-NG


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Solve this problem by a set of **PBFT verifier - who will verify a block and then only the block is added in the Blockchain**



PBFTCoin - A Strawman Design

- **Assumption:** $3f+1$ fixed "trustees" are there, who will run the PBFT to withstand f failures
 - Avoid the probabilistic strong consistency - introduces low latency in the system
 - No forks in the system - Blocks are added only after verification from the trustees



Problems of PBFT

- PBFT requires a **static consensus group** (because of message passing)
- **Scalability** (in terms of nodes) is a problem for PBFT
 - $O(n^2)$ communication complexity
 - $O(n)$ verification complexity
 - Absence of third-party verifiable proofs (PBFT uses MAC - need to share the keys among the miners)
- **Sybil attack** - create multiple pseudonymous identities to subvert the **3f+1** requirements of PBFT




Open the Consensus Group

- Use PoW based system to give a *proof of membership* of a miner as a part of the trustees
- Maintains a “balance of power” within the BFT consensus group
 - Use a fixed-size sliding window
 - Each time a miner finds a new block, it receives a *consensus group share*
 - The share proves the miner’s membership in the trustee group



Open the Consensus Group



Replace MAC with CoSi

- Substitute MACs with public-key cryptography
 - Elliptic curve based cryptography (ECDSA) provides more efficiency
 - Third-party verifiable
 - PoW Blockchain as PKI
 - Use specific topology (ring or chain based) for collective verification



Improve Efficiency


- **Improve $O(n)$ communication complexity**
 - Use tree based multicast protocol - share information with $O(\log n)$
- **Improve $O(n)$ complexity for verification**
 - Use Schnorr multisignatures or BLS for verification
 - Verification can be done in $O(1)$ through signature aggregation
- Multisignatures + Communication trees - **CoSi**




CoSi as BFT Protocol

- CoSi is not a BFT protocol
- PBFT can be implemented over two subsequent CoSi rounds - Prepare and Commit


Phase 1: Announcement
(send message-to-witness, optional)




Phase 2: Commitment
(collect aggregate commit)



Phase 3: Challenge
(send collective challenge)




Phase 4: Response
(collect aggregate response)




Further Improvement


- Inherit Bitcoin NG's idea of separating out **transaction verification** and **leader election**



ByzCoin Performance



ByzCoin Performance



Further Read and Explore

- <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/kogias>
- Byzcoin source:
<https://github.com/dedis/cothority/tree/v0/protocols/byzcoin>





thank you!

