

The XL and XSL attacks on Baby Rijndael

by

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DEDICATION

To my family, for their guidance, support, love and enthusiasm. Without these things this thesis could not have been possible.

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ABSTRACT

There are several recently proposed algorithms for solving the overdefined MQ problem, two of them are XL represented in (2) and XSL represented in (3). There is an opinion that these algorithms may be used as an attack on AES, because AES can be represented as an overdefined MQ problem.

In our research we constructed a new cipher called Baby Rijndael. It is a scaled-down version of Rijndael with the same algebraic structure. We apply the XL and XSL attacks on Baby Rijndael to see if it might be possible to apply them on AES.

CHAPTER 1. Introduction

1.1 Ciphers

There are some very basic concepts in cryptography we should define.

Definition 1.1.1. A **cryptosystem** is a five-tuple (P, C, K, E, D) , where:

1. P is a finite set of possible inputs/plaintexts,
2. C is a finite set of possible outputs/ciphertexts,
3. K is a finite set of possible keys, and
4. for each $k \in K$ there is an encryption function $e_k \in E$, and a corresponding decryption function $d_k \in D$. Each $e_k : P \rightarrow C$ and $d_k : C \rightarrow P$ has the property $d_k(e_k(x)) = x$ for every plaintext element $x \in P$.

The function e_k is called a cipher. There are many different kinds of ciphers. All of them take a message as an input and give back some output. The message can be represented in many ways; it may be just an array of letters or words, or it might be text represented as numbers, or even binary numbers. The output also can be some array of letters or numbers.

We will call the input a plaintext block and the output a ciphertext block. The operation of transforming a plaintext block into a ciphertext block is called encryption. The operation of transforming a ciphertext block into a plaintext block is called decryption. Most of the ciphers use not only some input, but also a key, because it makes the cipher more secure.

Assume Alice wants to send a secret message to Bob. She wants to be sure that nobody except Bob can read the message. This is easy to do if they have some cipher that nobody but

them knows or if they share some secret key. However, in many cases, Bob will never see or speak to Alice, so they won't be able to agree upon such a cipher or a key.

There are two different kinds of ciphers using keys: public-key ciphers and private-key ciphers. The big difference between these two is that in a private-key cipher, only Alice and Bob know the secret key. In public-key cipher, the key is not secret—everyone knows it. We can define these concepts more precisely as follows.

Definition 1.1.2. A **public-key cryptosystem** is a cryptosystem in which each participant has a public key and a private key. It should be infeasible to determine the private key from knowledge of the public key. To send a message to Alice, Bob will use her public key. Nobody except Alice knows her private key, and one must know the private key to decrypt the message.

The most well-known public key cryptosystem is the RSA cryptosystem. More detail can be found in (8). However, in this paper we will be dealing with AES, also called Rijndael, which is a private-key cryptosystem.

Definition 1.1.3. A **symmetric-key cryptosystem** (or a private-key cryptosystem) is a cryptosystem in which the participants share a secret key. To encrypt a message, Bob will use this key. To decrypt the message Alice will either use the same key or will derive the decryption key from the secret key. In a symmetric-key cryptosystem, exposure of the private key makes the system insecure.

Definition 1.1.4. A **block cipher** is a function which maps n -bit plaintext blocks to n -bit ciphertext blocks. The function is parameterized by a key. n is called the block size.

Definition 1.1.5. An **iterated block cipher** is one that encrypts a plaintext block by a process that has several rounds. In each round, the same transformation or round function is applied to the intermediate result, called the state, using a round key. The set of round keys is usually derived from the user-provided secret key by a key schedule. The number of rounds in an iterated cipher depends on the desired security level. In most cases, an increased number of rounds will improve the security offered by a block cipher.




Figure 1.1 Iterative block cipher with three rounds. (4) pg. 25.

Definition 1.1.6. A **key-alternating block cipher** is an iterative block cipher with the following properties:

1. Alternation: The cipher is defined as the alternated application of key-independent round transformations and key additions. The first round key is added before the first round and the last round key is added after the last round.
2. Simple key addition: The round keys are added to the state by means of a simple addition modulo two, called XOR (\oplus).




Figure 1.2 Key-alternating block cipher with two rounds. (4) pg. 26.

We said that a block cipher is a function and this is true for any cipher. First, we want to

encrypt plaintext, and then we want to decrypt ciphertext to get our plaintext back. So the important condition for our function is to be one-to-one.

Definition 1.1.7. A function is **one-to-one** if no two different elements in the domain are mapped to the same element in image.

The purpose of a cipher is to make communication secure. It is not enough to be sure that you cannot crack the cipher you build, you should be sure that no one else can crack it either. There are many known attacks and you should check your cipher cannot be cracked by any of them, at least not easily.

There is one attack that can be applied to any symmetric-key cipher.

Definition 1.1.8. A **brute-force attack** is a known-plaintext attack. It tries every possible key until one of them “works”. That is, knowing the input and output, the attack will try all possible keys until it finds a key K so that the encryption of the input with K gives the desired output.

It is easy to see why this attack will always work. The problem is that the running time of such attack might be very large. It can sometimes take years! This is why AES can be cracked by Brute-Force in an ideal world, but in real life, based on current technology, it can not.

We should mention that there might be more than one key. That is, if you know both the plaintext and the ciphertext, there might be more than one key that will encrypt plaintext to this ciphertext. Actually, the false-positive probability for a key is $1 - e^{-2^{m-n}}$, if we know one block of size n , and the key size is m . If we know 2 blocks, then the false-positive probability will become smaller: $1 - e^{-2^{m-2n}}$.

In our research we will build a new cipher called Baby Rijndael. We will represent it as an MQ problem and try to attack it using MQ problem solving techniques.

1.2 MQ problem

The problem of a solving linear system of equations with n equations and n unknowns is easy. Gaussian elimination is a well-known algorithm for solving such a system and it has a

running time of $O(n^3)$. Actually, depending on the system of equations, there are even quicker techniques.

The MQ problem is a problem of solving multivariate quadratic equations. This means that the equations we will have in our system can have quadratic terms. We will consider a system with m equations and n unknowns with $m > n$, over the field $GF(2)$.

Each equation for the MQ problem can be represented as:

$$\sum_{i,j} a_{i,j,k} x_i x_j + \sum_i b_{i,k} x_i + c_k = 0$$

where x_i 's are unknown, $a_{i,j,k}, b_{i,k}, c_k \in GF(2)$ are constant and k index the equations we are looking at.

As we said before, a linear system of equations has a polynomial time running algorithm, but the MQ problem is NP-hard problem. For references see (5). Until now, it was believed that exponential time is needed to solve this problem.

However, for the overdefined system of multivariate quadratic equations, (that is, $m > n$), more algorithms with better running time have been found. For example, Kipnis and Shamir in (6) presented a new algorithm called relinearization. They think that for a sufficiently overdefined system, their algorithm will run in polynomial time. For more detail see (6). After their publication, many improved algorithms for relinearization were suggested.

The idea of all these algorithms is simple. We do not know in general how to solve the MQ problem, but we do know how to solve a linear system of equations. So we will transfer multivariate quadratic equations to linear equations. We will discuss this more in Chapter 4.

The problem is that it is not yet clear how these algorithms will work in real life and what running time they will have. It has only been checked on small examples, and there might be cases when the algorithms they present will not work.

CHAPTER 2. Rijndael - AES - Advanced Encryption Standard

2.1 AES

On January 2, 1997, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) began looking for a replacement for DES — the Data Encryption Standard. DES was used an encryption standard for almost 25 years. The decision was made to replace the standard because the key length of DES was too small and some new attacks using faster new computers could crack DES. Even a Brute-Force search is possible, because for DES, only 2^{55} key options exist. It was not secure anymore. The new cryptosystem would be called AES — the Advanced Encryption Standard. It should have a block length of 128 bits and support key lengths of 128, 192 and 256 bits. Fifteen of the submitted systems met these criteria and were accepted by NIST as candidates for AES. All of the candidaes were evaluated according to three main criteria: security, cost (such as computational efficiency), and algorithm and implementation characteristics (such as flexibility and algorithm simplicity). There were five finalists, all of which appeared to be secure. On October 2, 2000, Rijndael was selected to be the Advanced Encryption Standard, because its security, performance, efficiency, implementability and flexibility were judged to be superior to the other finalists. Finally, Rijndael was adopted as a standard on November 26, 2001, and published in the Federal Register on December 4, 2001.

There is only one difference between Rijndael and AES. Rijndael can support block and key lengths between 128 and 256 bits which are multiples of 32. AES only has a specific block length of 128 bits.

2.2 Rijndael structure

Rijndael is a key iterated and key-alternating block cipher. In this section, we will describe Rijndael with a block size and key size of 128 bits and with 10 rounds.

The cipher has the form

$$E(A) = r_{10} \circ r_9 \circ \cdots \circ r_2 \circ r_1(A \oplus K_0).$$

Every round except the last one has the form

$$r_i(A) = (t \circ \hat{\sigma} \circ S^*(A)) \oplus K_i,$$

where A is the state and K_i is the i th round key. The last round will not have the t operation.

We think about A and K as 4×4 arrays of bytes (one byte is equal to 8 bits).

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} a_{00} & a_{01} & a_{02} & a_{03} \\ a_{10} & a_{11} & a_{12} & a_{13} \\ a_{20} & a_{21} & a_{22} & a_{23} \\ a_{30} & a_{31} & a_{32} & a_{33} \end{pmatrix} \quad K = \begin{pmatrix} k_{00} & k_{01} & k_{02} & k_{03} \\ k_{10} & k_{11} & k_{12} & k_{13} \\ k_{20} & k_{21} & k_{22} & k_{23} \\ k_{30} & k_{31} & k_{32} & k_{33} \end{pmatrix}$$

Figure 2.1 The matrices A and K .

Every round starts by applying S^* to the state A . More precisely, S^* applies a function s to each byte of A . s is a nonlinear, invertible function which takes 8 bits and returns 8 bits. This function is called an S-box and in Rijndael implementation, it is called SubBytes (see Figure 2.4). We will see how this s function works in Section 2.4. For now, we can think about this s function as a table-lookup. We should mention that in some ciphers there is more than one S-box, and different S-boxes are applied on different inputs. In AES the same S-box is applied on all rounds and all inputs.

After computing $S^*(A)$, we apply $\hat{\sigma}$ to the result. $\hat{\sigma}$ is a permutation function called ShiftRow (see Figure 2.5) and is given by

$$\hat{\sigma}(a_{ij}) = a_{i,j-i(\bmod 4)}.$$

The next function to be applied is t . This function is called MixColumn (see Figure 2.6). $t(A) = M \cdot A$ where M is a 32×4 matrix of bits, see Figure 2.2. t is a linear function and

$t(A)$ is a 4×4 matrix, the new state. At the end of each round, we will XOR the state and the round key. This function is called `AddRoundKey` (see Figure 2.7).

$$M = \begin{pmatrix} 02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\ 03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \end{pmatrix}$$

Figure 2.2 The M matrix. (Where $02 = (00000010)^T$).

The only part we still need to explain is how to get the round keys. First, we will construct a list w_0, w_1, \dots, w_{43} , each of which is a 4-byte vector, according to the rule:

$$w_i = \begin{cases} (k_{4i}, k_{4i+1}, k_{4i+2}, k_{4i+3}) & \text{for } i=0,1,2,3 \\ w_{i-4} \oplus w_{i-1} & \text{for } i \bmod 4 \neq 0 \\ w_{i-4} \oplus S^*(\hat{\alpha}(w_{i-1})) \oplus c_i & \text{for } i \bmod 4 = 0 \end{cases}$$

$\hat{\alpha}$ is a function defined by $\hat{\alpha}(x, y, z, u) = (y, z, u, x)$, the c_i 's are constant vectors and k_0, \dots, k_{15} are the bytes of the cipher key. To get K_i for round i , we will just build a matrix with columns $w_{4i}, w_{4i+1}, w_{4i+2}, w_{4i+3}$.

In section 4, we will see a more detailed explanation of an S-box. There are more details about Rijndael structure in (4).

Rijndael has the very interesting property that the decryption algorithm is similar to the encryption algorithm. It will have the same steps, but with inverse functions. In our research we will not use the decryption algorithm at all, so we will not describe it here. A description of the decryption algorithm can be found in (4).

2.3 Algebra Definitions

In Section 2.4 we will introduce the way to represent each byte of the input of Rijndael as an element of the field $GF(2^8)$. In order to describe this, we need some basic definitions about fields.

Definition 2.3.1. A **group** is an ordered pair (G, \star) , where G is a set and \star is a binary operation on G satisfying the following axioms:

1. $((a \star b) \star c) = (a \star (b \star c))$, for all $a, b, c \in G$.
2. There exists an identity element e such that for all $a \in G$, $a \star e = e \star a = a$.
3. For each $a \in G$, there is an inverse element a^{-1} such that $a \star a^{-1} = a^{-1} \star a = e$.

Definition 2.3.2. A group is an **Abelian group** if for every $a, b \in G$, $a \star b = b \star a$.

Definition 2.3.3. A **field** is a set F together with the binary operations addition $(+)$ and multiplication (\cdot) on F such that:

1. $(F, +)$ is an abelian group with identity 0.
2. $(F - \{0\}, \cdot)$ is an abelian group.
3. For all $a, b, c \in F$, $a \cdot (b + c) = (a \cdot b) + (a \cdot c)$.

$GF(2^8)$ is a field whose elements are polynomials of degree less than 8, with coefficients 0 or 1. In other words, each element of $GF(2^8)$ can be written as:

$$a_7x^7 + a_6x^6 + a_5x^5 + a_4x^4 + a_3x^3 + a_2x^2 + a_1x + a_0$$

where $a_i \in \{0, 1\}$, for $i = 0, \dots, 7$.

As we can see from the definition of the field, there are two operations defined on $GF(2^8)$: addition and multiplication. Addition is performed by adding the coefficients for corresponding powers of the polynomials modulo 2. For example,

$$(x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + x) + (x^6 + x^5 + x^3 + x^2 + x + 1) = x^7 + x^6 + x^4 + x^3 + 1$$

Multiplication in $GF(2^8)$ is performed by multiplying the two polynomials together and then reducing this product modulo an irreducible polynomial of degree 8. For example, take irreducible polynomial $m(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$, then

$$(x^6 + x^4 + x^2 + x + 1) \cdot (x^7 + x + 1) = x^{13} + x^{11} + x^9 + x^8 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1.$$

Now, take the result mod $m(x)$:

$$x^{13} + x^{11} + x^9 + x^8 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + 1 \pmod{x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1} \equiv x^7 + x^6 + 1.$$

Definition 2.3.4. A polynomial is said to be **irreducible** if it cannot be factored into nontrivial polynomials over the same field. For example, over the finite field $GF(2^3)$, the polynomial $x^2 + x + 1$ is irreducible. However, the polynomial $x^2 + 1$ is not, because it can be written as $(x + 1)(x + 1) = x^2 + 2x + 1 = x^2 + 1$.

There is an inverse element for every element of the field except for the 0 polynomial. The existence of unique inverse element comes from the fact that the multiplication made modulo an irreducible polynomial. We will think of the inverse element of 0 as 0 itself. We will use these facts in the next chapter.

2.4 Rijndael and $GF(2^8)$

In this section, we describe how to represent a byte as an element of the finite field $GF(2^8)$. Let $b_7, b_6, b_5, b_4, b_3, b_2, b_1, b_0$ represent bits of a byte. Then the corresponding element of $GF(2^8)$ will be $b_7x^7 + b_6x^6 + b_5x^5 + b_4x^4 + b_3x^3 + b_2x^2 + b_1x + b_0$. The addition will just be the addition defined for $GF(2^8)$ and multiplication will be defined modulo the irreducible polynomial $m(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$.

In Section 2.3, we said that an S-box is a table-lookup. However, we can actually represent an S-box as a function s acting on elements from $GF(2^8)$. Assume the input to the S-box is some element $a \in GF(2^8)$. We can find the inverse element of a (call it a^{-1}). This inverse element corresponds to multiplication modulo $m(x)$ in $GF(2^8)$. If the S-box function was just defined as an “inverse” function, then it could be attacked using algebraic manipulations. This is why the S-box uses multiplication and addition. This makes the S-box an affine transformation. We denote the S-box by f and say that $c = f(d)$, where f is described in Figure 2.3.

We apply f on a^{-1} , so actually $d = a^{-1}$.

Another way of thinking about an affine function f is as a polynomial multiplication by fixed polynomial followed by addition of a constant.

So the S-box first finds the inverse element of a and then puts it in the affine transformation. Why did they build the S-box for Rijndael in this way? The affine function was chosen in such

$$\begin{pmatrix} c_7 \\ c_6 \\ c_5 \\ c_4 \\ c_3 \\ c_2 \\ c_1 \\ c_0 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \times \begin{pmatrix} d_7 \\ d_6 \\ d_5 \\ d_4 \\ d_3 \\ d_2 \\ d_1 \\ d_0 \end{pmatrix} \oplus \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Figure 2.3 The affine transformation.

a way so that for all S-boxes, there are no fixed points and no opposite fixed points. That is, $s(a) \oplus a \neq 00$ and $s(a) \oplus a \neq FF$. Where 00 is the zero polynomial of degree 7, and FF is the polynomial of degree 7 with all coefficients equal to 1. In (7), K. Nyberg gives several construction methods for S-boxes. The S-boxes for Rijndael are constructed using one of these methods.

The round function of Rijndael has two main parts: the linear part and the non-linear part. The only non-linear part is SubBytes. We will use the properties to build a system of non-linear equations in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.




Figure 2.4 SubBytes acts on the individual bytes of the state. (1) pg. 16.




Figure 2.5 ShiftRows operates on the rows of the state. (1) pg. 17.




Figure 2.6 MixColumns operates on the columns of the state. (1) pg. 18.




Figure 2.7 AddRoundKey XOR each column of the state with word from the key schedule. (l is a round number). (1) pg. 19.

CHAPTER 3. Baby Rijndael

3.1 Baby Rijndael structure

3.1.1 Introduction

For the purpose of our research we constructed a new cipher called Baby Rijndael. It is a scaled-down version of the AES cipher. Since Rijndael has an algebraic structure, it is easy to describe this smaller cipher with a similar structure. There were many choices made when Rijndael was constructed, so there is more than one way to build Baby Rijndael.

Baby Rijndael was constructed by Professor Clifford Bergman. He used this cipher as a homework exercise for the cryptography graduate course at Iowa State University. He wanted a cipher that would help his students learn how to implement Rijndael, but on a smaller, more manageable level.

The block size and key size of baby Rijndael will be 16 bits. We will think of them as 4 hexadecimal digits (called hex digits for short), $h_0h_1h_2h_3$ for blocks and $k_0k_1k_2k_3$ for cipher keys. Note that h_0 consists of the first four bits of the input stream. However, when h_0 is considered as a hex digit, the first bit is considered the high-order bit. The same is true for the cipher key.

For example, the input block 1000 1100 0111 0001 would be represented with $h_0 = 8$, $h_1 = c$, $h_2 = 7$, $h_3 = 1$.

Baby Rijndael consists of several rounds, all of which are identical in structure. The default number of rounds is four, but this number is subject to change. Changing the number of rounds affects the overall description of the cipher and also the key schedule in a small way. In our attack, we will use both one-round Baby Rijndael and four-round Baby Rijndael.

The steps of the cipher are applied to the state. The state is usually considered to be a 2×2 array of hex digits. However, for the t operation, the state is considered to be an 8×2 array of bits. In converting between the two, each hex digit is considered to be a *column* of 4 bits with the high-order bit at the top.

The input block is loaded into the state by mapping $h_0h_1h_2h_3$ to $\begin{pmatrix} h_0 & h_2 \\ h_1 & h_3 \end{pmatrix}$. For example, the input block 1000 1100 0111 0001 would be loaded as

$$\begin{pmatrix} 8 & 7 \\ c & 1 \end{pmatrix} \text{ which, as an } 8 \times 2 \text{ bit matrix is } \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

The state is usually denoted by \mathbf{a} .

3.1.2 The cipher

At the beginning of the cipher, the input block is loaded into the state as described above and the round keys are computed. The cipher has the overall structure:

$$E(\mathbf{a}) = r_4 \circ r_3 \circ r_2 \circ r_1(\mathbf{a} \oplus \mathbf{k}_0).$$

In this expression, \mathbf{a} denotes the state, $\mathbf{k}_0, \mathbf{k}_1, \mathbf{k}_2, \mathbf{k}_3, \mathbf{k}_4$ the round keys and

$$r_i(\mathbf{a}) = (\mathbf{t} \cdot \hat{\sigma}(S(\mathbf{a}))) \oplus \mathbf{k}_i,$$

except that in r_4 , multiplication by \mathbf{t} is omitted. At the end of the cipher, the state is unloaded into a 16-bit block in the same order in which it was loaded.

Here is a description of the individual functions of the cipher.

SubBytes: The S operation is a table lookup applied to each hex digit of the state, as shown in Figure 3.1.

$$\begin{pmatrix} h_0 & h_2 \\ h_1 & h_3 \end{pmatrix} \xrightarrow{S} \begin{pmatrix} s(h_0) & s(h_2) \\ s(h_1) & s(h_3) \end{pmatrix}$$

Figure 3.1 SubBytes operation.

where the s function is given by Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 S-box table lookup.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| x | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | a | b | c | d | e | f |
| $s(x)$ | a | 4 | 3 | b | 8 | e | 2 | c | 5 | 7 | 6 | f | 0 | 1 | 9 | d |

In the next section we will describe how to get this table.

ShiftRows: The $\hat{\sigma}$ operation simply swaps the entries in the second row of the state, Figure 3.2.

$$\begin{pmatrix} h_0 & h_2 \\ h_1 & h_3 \end{pmatrix} \xrightarrow{\hat{\sigma}} \begin{pmatrix} h_0 & h_2 \\ h_3 & h_1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Figure 3.2 ShiftRows operation.

MixColumns: The matrix \mathbf{t} is the 8×8 matrix of bits shown in Figure 3.3.

For this transformation, the state is considered to be an 8×2 matrix of bits. The state is multiplied by \mathbf{t} on the left using matrix multiplication modulo 2: $\mathbf{a} \mapsto \mathbf{t} \cdot \mathbf{a}$.

KeySchedule: At the beginning of the cipher and at the end of each round, the state is bitwise added (mod 2) to the round key. The round keys are 2×2 arrays of hex digits similar to the state. The *columns* of the round keys are defined recursively as follows:

$$w_0 = \begin{pmatrix} k_0 \\ k_1 \end{pmatrix} \quad w_1 = \begin{pmatrix} k_2 \\ k_3 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$w_{2i} = w_{2i-2} \oplus S(\text{reverse}(w_{2i-1})) \oplus y_i \quad w_{2i+1} = w_{2i-1} \oplus w_{2i}$$

for $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$. The constants are $y_i = (2^{i-1})$ and the reverse function interchanges the two entries in the column. Notice that y_i is a vector of length 8 bits and 2^{i-1} and 0 are each four bits. The S function is the same as the one used above. Note that all additions are bitwise

$$\mathbf{t} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Figure 3.3 MixColumn operation.

mod 2. Finally, for $i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4$, the round key \mathbf{k}_i is the matrix whose columns are w_{2i} and w_{2i+1} .

Baby Rijndael has a structure similar to Rijndael. If we look at a round of Baby Rijndael, it has the same functions as Rijndael. All the functions constructed for Baby Rijndael were built in the same way as the Rijndael functions, but they will work on a smaller state. For example, ShiftRows for Baby Rijndael works in the same way as ShiftRows of Rijndael works on the 2×2 upper left submatrix of Rijndael. The KeySchedule uses the same definition as in Rijndael, but only for 2 smaller w 's. In Section 3.2, we will see why the S-box construction of both ciphers is similar.

3.2 Baby Rijndael S-box Structure

We described in Section 2.4 how to represent a byte as an element of finite field $GF(2^8)$. Now we will show how to represent a hex digit as an element of field $GF(2^4)$. Let $b = b_3, b_2, b_1, b_0$. Then the corresponding element of $GF(2^4)$ will be $b_3x^3 + b_2x^2 + b_1x + b_0$ (see Table 3.2). The addition for $GF(2^4)$ will be defined in usual way and multiplication will be defined modulo the irreducible polynomial $m(x) = x^4 + x + 1$.

We will not change the structure of the S-box. It will stay same as for Rijndael, but we can not use the same affine transformation f we had before. Now we have a smaller sate. Let us define a new f for Baby Rijndael in Figure 3.4.

Table 3.2 Different representations for $GF(2^4)$ elements.

| hex | binomial | polynomial |
|-----|----------|---------------------|
| 0 | 0000 | 0 |
| 1 | 0001 | 1 |
| 2 | 0010 | x |
| 3 | 0011 | $x + 1$ |
| 4 | 0100 | x^2 |
| 5 | 0101 | $x^2 + 1$ |
| 6 | 0110 | $x^2 + x$ |
| 7 | 0111 | $x^2 + x + 1$ |
| 8 | 1000 | x^3 |
| 9 | 1001 | $x^3 + 1$ |
| a | 1010 | $x^3 + x$ |
| b | 1011 | $x^3 + x + 1$ |
| c | 1100 | $x^3 + x^2$ |
| d | 1101 | $x^3 + x^2 + 1$ |
| e | 1110 | $x^3 + x^2 + x$ |
| f | 1111 | $x^3 + x^2 + x + 1$ |

$$\begin{pmatrix} c_3 \\ c_2 \\ c_1 \\ c_0 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \times \begin{pmatrix} d_3 \\ d_2 \\ d_1 \\ d_0 \end{pmatrix} \oplus \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Figure 3.4 The affine transformation for Baby Rijndael.

As in Rijndael, we apply f on a^{-1} , so actually $d = a^{-1}$.

Another way of thinking about an affine function f is as polynomial multiplication followed by XOR with a constant. So it can be represented as $s(x) = b(x)g(x) + c(x)$. $g(x)$ is the inverse element of the input to the S-box, $b(x) = x^3 + x^2 + x$ and $c(x) = x^3 + x$. The result will be taken modulo $x^4 + 1$.

So the S-box first finds the inverse element of a and then puts it in the affine transformation. Table 3.3 shows all the inverse elements.

As you can see, our Baby Rijndael S-box has similar properties to the Rijndael S-box. It uses the inverse element and affine transformation and there are no fixed points or opposite

Table 3.3 The inverse elements.

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| x | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | a | b | c | d | e | f |
| x^{-1} | 0 | 1 | 9 | e | d | b | 7 | 6 | f | 2 | c | 5 | a | 4 | 3 | 8 |

fixed points. This is why we can use Rijndael attacks which uses S-box properties on Baby Rijndael.

3.3 Example

3.3.1 Example for Key Schedule

Sample key expansion for key=6b5d

$$w_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 6 \\ b \end{pmatrix} \quad w_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 5 \\ d \end{pmatrix}$$

$$w_1 \xrightarrow{\text{reverse}} \begin{pmatrix} d \\ 5 \end{pmatrix} \xrightarrow{S} \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ e \end{pmatrix} \oplus w_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 7 \\ 5 \end{pmatrix} \oplus y_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 6 \\ 5 \end{pmatrix} = w_2 \quad w_1 \oplus w_2 = \begin{pmatrix} 3 \\ 8 \end{pmatrix} = w_3$$

$$w_3 \xrightarrow{\text{reverse}} \begin{pmatrix} 8 \\ 3 \end{pmatrix} \xrightarrow{S} \begin{pmatrix} 5 \\ b \end{pmatrix} \oplus w_2 = \begin{pmatrix} 3 \\ e \end{pmatrix} \oplus y_2 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ e \end{pmatrix} = w_4 \quad w_3 \oplus w_4 = \begin{pmatrix} 2 \\ 6 \end{pmatrix} = w_5$$

$$w_5 \xrightarrow{\text{reverse}} \begin{pmatrix} 6 \\ 2 \end{pmatrix} \xrightarrow{S} \begin{pmatrix} 2 \\ 3 \end{pmatrix} \oplus w_4 = \begin{pmatrix} 3 \\ d \end{pmatrix} \oplus y_3 = \begin{pmatrix} 7 \\ d \end{pmatrix} = w_6 \quad w_5 \oplus w_6 = \begin{pmatrix} 5 \\ b \end{pmatrix} = w_7$$

$$w_7 \xrightarrow{\text{reverse}} \begin{pmatrix} b \\ 5 \end{pmatrix} \xrightarrow{S} \begin{pmatrix} f \\ e \end{pmatrix} \oplus w_6 = \begin{pmatrix} 8 \\ 3 \end{pmatrix} \oplus y_4 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 3 \end{pmatrix} = w_8 \quad w_7 \oplus w_8 = \begin{pmatrix} 5 \\ 8 \end{pmatrix} = w_9$$

$$\text{Where } y_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad y_2 = \begin{pmatrix} 2 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad y_3 = \begin{pmatrix} 4 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad y_4 = \begin{pmatrix} 8 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

3.3.2 Example for Encryption

Sample encryption for key=6b5d and plaintext block=2ca5.

| round | start | apply S | apply $\hat{\sigma}$ | mult by t | \oplus round key= | |
|--------|--|--|--|--|---|---|
| input | $\begin{pmatrix} 2 & a \\ c & 5 \end{pmatrix}$ | | | | $\oplus \begin{pmatrix} 6 & 5 \\ b & d \end{pmatrix}$ | = |
| 1 | $\begin{pmatrix} 4 & f \\ 7 & 8 \end{pmatrix}$ | $\begin{pmatrix} 8 & d \\ c & 5 \end{pmatrix}$ | $\begin{pmatrix} 8 & d \\ 5 & c \end{pmatrix}$ | $\begin{pmatrix} 2 & f \\ 0 & 7 \end{pmatrix}$ | $\oplus \begin{pmatrix} 6 & 3 \\ 5 & 8 \end{pmatrix}$ | = |
| 2 | $\begin{pmatrix} 4 & c \\ 5 & f \end{pmatrix}$ | $\begin{pmatrix} 8 & 0 \\ e & d \end{pmatrix}$ | $\begin{pmatrix} 8 & 0 \\ d & e \end{pmatrix}$ | $\begin{pmatrix} 0 & a \\ e & 3 \end{pmatrix}$ | $\oplus \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 \\ e & 6 \end{pmatrix}$ | = |
| 3 | $\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 8 \\ 0 & 5 \end{pmatrix}$ | $\begin{pmatrix} 4 & 5 \\ a & e \end{pmatrix}$ | $\begin{pmatrix} 4 & 5 \\ e & a \end{pmatrix}$ | $\begin{pmatrix} d & 9 \\ 2 & 8 \end{pmatrix}$ | $\oplus \begin{pmatrix} 7 & 5 \\ d & b \end{pmatrix}$ | = |
| 4 | $\begin{pmatrix} a & c \\ f & 3 \end{pmatrix}$ | $\begin{pmatrix} 6 & 0 \\ d & b \end{pmatrix}$ | $\begin{pmatrix} 6 & 0 \\ b & d \end{pmatrix}$ | | $\oplus \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 5 \\ 3 & 8 \end{pmatrix}$ | = |
| output | $\begin{pmatrix} 6 & 5 \\ 8 & 5 \end{pmatrix}$ | | | | | |

Thus the encryption of 2ca5 under key 6b5d is 6855.

CHAPTER 4. XL and XSL attacks

4.1 Relinearization technique

As described in Chapter 1, the idea of linearization is not hard. We simply replace every quadratic term in our system of multivariate quadratic equations by a new variable. That is, assume we have n variables: x_1, \dots, x_n . We will replace every quadratic term $x_i * x_j$ by a new variable y_{ij} . Now we have a system of linear equations, which we know how to solve. However, in order to solve a system of linear equations, we need to have at least as many equations as unknowns. Therefore, there is a big restriction on using this method, assuming that every quadratic term present, the number of equations we have must be at least $\frac{n^2}{2}$, where n is the number of original variables.

The relinearization technique was introduced by Aviad Kipnis and Adi Shamir in (6). This method should work for the MQ problem, if the number of equations is at least ϵm^2 , where m is the number of variables and $0 \leq \epsilon \leq \frac{1}{2}$. Assume that we have a system of multivariate quadratic equations which meets this requirement. To solve such a system, they suggest first making replacements as in the linearization technique. That is, replace every quadratic term $x_i * x_j$, $i \leq j$, by a new variable y_{ij} . Then construct more equations using connections between the new variables. For example, if $1 \leq a \leq b \leq c \leq d \leq n$, then $(x_a * x_b) * (x_c * x_d) = (x_a * x_c) * (x_b * x_d) = (x_a * x_d) * (x_b * x_c) \Rightarrow y_{ab} * y_{cd} = y_{ac} * y_{bd} = y_{ad} * y_{bc}$.

Now we have more equations, but all the new equations we get have quadratic terms in them. So we will use linearization again to get a system of linear equations. In (6) there is an explanation of why the linearization algorithm will work after we apply relinearization! If you still have more unknowns than equations, you can use the relinearization method again.

4.2 The XL method for solving MQ problem

XL (which stands for eXtended Linearization) was created by Nicolas Courtois, Alexander Klimov, Jacques Patarin and Adi Shamir in Eurocrypt'2000 (2). The problem they want to solve is described in (2) in the following way:

Let K be a field, and let A be a system of multivariate quadratic equations $l_i = 0$, ($1 \leq i \leq m$) where each l_i is the multivariate polynomial $f_i(x_1, \dots, x_n) - b_i$. The problem is to find at least one solution $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in K^n$, for a given $b = (b_1, \dots, b_m) \in K^m$.

In the XL algorithm, we will need to create equations of the form $(\prod_{j=1}^k x_{i_j}) * l_i = 0$, where $x_{i_j} \in (x_1, \dots, x_n)$. Equations of this type are denote by $x^k l$, and $x^k l$ also denotes the set of all such equations. The set of all terms of degree k is denoted by x^k (so $x^k = \{\prod_{j=1}^k x_{i_j} : x_{i_j} \in (x_1, \dots, x_n)\}$). Let $D \in \mathbb{N}$, then I_D will be the linear space generated by all the equations of the form $x^k l$ for $0 \leq k \leq D - 2$.

This is how they defined their algorithm.

Definition 4.2.1. The **XL algorithm** executes the following steps:

1. **Multiply:** Generate all the products $(\prod_{j=1}^k x_{i_j}) * l_i \in I_D$ with $k \leq D - 2$.
2. **Linearize:** Consider each monomial in x_i of degree $\leq D$ as a new variable and perform Gaussian elimination on the equations obtained in 1.

The ordering on the monomials must be such that all the terms containing one variable (say x_1) are eliminated last.

3. **Solve:** Assume that step 2 yields at least one univariate equation in the powers of x_i . Solve this equation over the finite field K .
4. **Repeat:** Simplify the equations and repeat the process to find the values of the other variables.

In other words, we will have a system of multivariate quadratic equations over the field K

represented as a system of equations where each equation looks like

$$\sum_{i,j} a_{i,j,k} x_i x_j + \sum_i b_k x_i + c_k = 0,$$

where the x_i 's are unknown, and k is the number of the equation.

To solve this system, we will first agree on some integer $D > 2$. A complexity evaluation of XL in (2) gives the following estimation:

$$D \geq \frac{n}{\sqrt{m}},$$

where m is the number of equations in the original system and n is the number of variables in the original system.

After we pick D , we will take the list of original variables and construct a new list of variables with every possible power less or equal to $D - 2$. For example, if the list of variables is (x, y, z) and $D = 4$, then the new list will be $(x, y, z, x^2, y^2, z^2, xy, xz, yz)$. Then we will multiply each original equation by each variable from the new list. This operation will give us more linearly independent equations. It is not necessarily true that all the new equations will be linearly independent, but most of them will be.

Now, let's combine the old and new systems of equations together. We will replace every monomial we have in equations by a new variable. For example, the equation $x^4 + x^3y + x^2yz + x^2z^2 + x^2y = 0$ will be $a + b + c + d + f = 0$, where $a = x^4, b = x^3y$, etc. Then we will have a linear system of equations, with the number of equations larger than the number of variables. This is why we should pick D carefully, so that after multiplication this condition on the number of variables and equations will hold.

Using Gaussian elimination we can find a solution, if one exists. We still have our original variables in the old equations, so we can get values for them. It might be that we have more than one solution. For more examples, see (2).

The bad thing about XL is that in general, we don't know the complexity of the algorithm. However, for proper choices of D it seems to be more efficient than the relinearization method.

In the next chapter, we will see an example of applying this algorithm on one round of Baby Rijndael.

4.3 XSL attack on MQ problem

The XL algorithm is designed for overdefined systems of quadratic equations and it seemed to work for most of them. Some MQ problems have the property of being sparse, which means that the equations will be missing many possible quadratic terms. People started to think about the option of using this property to attack the system.

XSL (eXtended Sparse Linearization) was created by Nicolas Courtois and Josef Pieprzyk in (3). The cipher was designed to crack XSL-ciphers, ciphers in which equations will be sparse.

Definition 4.3.1. An XSL-cipher is a composition of N_r similar rounds:

- X** The first round $i = 1$ starts by XORing the input with the session key K_{i-1} ,
- S** Then we apply a layer of B bijective S-boxes in parallel, each on s bits,
- L** Then we apply a linear diffusion layer,
- X** Then we XOR with another session key K_i . Finally, if $i = N_r$ we finish, otherwise we increment i and go back to step **S**.

It is easy to see that AES and Baby Rijndael are both XSL-ciphers. For AES, $s = 8$, $B = 4 * N_b$, where N_b is the number of columns in the state. The number of rounds N_r depends on the key size. For Baby Rijndael, we have $N_r = 4$, $s = 4$ and $B = 4$, because in each round we apply 4 S-Boxes.

In the case of the XL attack, the authors gave the steps in the algorithm. Unfortunately, we don't have such a definition of XSL, because there are many steps in the algorithm that are not clear yet even to the author. However, we do know that XSL will only work for sparse systems of quadratic equations.

The difference between XL and XSL is that the XL attack will multiply a system of equations by every possible monomial of degree at most $D-2$, where D is fixed. The XSL algorithm suggests multiplying the system of equations only by carefully selected monomials.

XSL will use the system of systems of quadratic equations built for each of the S-boxes. For each S-box, we will have some system of equations.

First fix a constant P . More details about picking P will be given later. In every step we

will fix up one S-box, and call it active. All the other S-boxes will be called passive for this step. Then we will multiply every equation of the active S-box by all products of $P - 1$ monomials arising from the passive S-Boxes. We will repeat until every S-box was active exactly once.

The authors did not present a way of computing an efficient P . If P is very big, then the attack will be similar to the XL method.

If after applying this algorithm we still do not have enough equations to use the relinearization or linearization method, Courtois and Pieprzyk in (3) suggest using the T' method.

After we have applied the XSL method, we will have a new system of equations. Let T be the set of monomials we have in those equations. We still want to build more linearly independent equations. Let T_{x_i} be the set of all the monomials from T that will still be in T when we multiply by x_i . For example, let $T = \{x_1, x_2, x_3, x_1 * x_2, x_2 * x_3\}$. If we work in $GF(2)$, then for every $x \in GF(2)$, $x^2 = x$ and $T_{x_1} = \{x_1, x_2, x_1 * x_2\}$.

Build T_{x_1} and T_{x_2} , and apply Gaussian elimination to both. We will think of every monomial as a new variable, and we want to represent every variable in $T - T_{x_1}$ as a combination of variables in T_{x_1} and every variable in $T - T_{x_2}$ as a combination of variables in T_{x_2} . We expect that some subset of this resulting system will contain only terms in T_{x_1} , call it C_1 , and some subset will contain only terms in T_{x_2} , call it C_2 . We would multiply every equation in C_1 by x_1 . After multiplication we will still have only terms from T in this system, so we can substitute, and represent every term in this system as a combination of variables in T_{x_2} . Combine these new equations and C_2 and multiply each of the equations by x_2 . Now we should have some new linearly independent equations. By iterating the process we should get more equations. There is a toy example for the T' method taken from (3) given in Appendix A.

It is not clear how to choose x_1 and x_2 , because sometimes this algorithm fails and does not give linearly independent equations. However, the authors of the method suggest that if one system fails, then we should pick some new variables and try the method again. They say that most of the variables should work. More details can be found in (3). Complexity estimates for this attack are also given in the paper.

There are two different kinds of MQ attacks on block ciphers. One of them ignores key

schedules, the second one uses key schedules. We should notice that the key schedule of Rijndael uses the same S-boxes as a round of Rijndael. This is why we can build more equations using the key schedule. The XSL attack can be applied in both MQ attacks if the block cipher we use is an XSL-cipher.

CHAPTER 5. XL attack on one round of Baby Rijndael

5.1 Constructing equations

Every function can be represented as a system of equations. In this section, we will show how to build these equations for Baby Rijndael. We will build these equations using two different techniques. One way will use the null space equations for the S-boxes. The other way will use the structure of the S-boxes we discussed in Section 3.2.

In this section we will use $X = (x_3, x_2, x_1, x_0)$ to represent the input to an S-box and $Y = (y_3, y_2, y_1, y_0)$ to represent the output of an S-box.

5.1.1 Null space equations

To find the null space equations, we will build a 16×37 matrix. Each row will contain the values of 37 monomials: $\{1, x_3, \dots, x_0, y_3, \dots, y_0, x_3x_2, x_3x_1, \dots, x_1x_0, x_3y_3, x_3y_2, \dots, x_0y_0, y_3y_2, y_3y_1, \dots, y_1y_0\}$, for each of 16 possible inputs of $\{x_3, x_2, x_1, x_0\}$. See Table 5.1.

After we build this matrix we can find the null space by row reduction. We use the Mathematica function NullSpace for this. The null space will give us 21 quadratic equations.

$$1 + x_0x_1 + x_0x_2 + x_1x_2 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + y_0y_1 + y_2 + y_3 = 0$$

$$x_1 + x_0x_1 + x_2 + x_0x_2 + x_1x_2 + x_3 + x_0x_3 + x_1x_3 + y_1 + y_0y_2 + y_3 = 0$$

$$1 + x_0 + x_1 + x_0x_1 + x_2 + x_0x_2 + x_0x_3 + y_0y_1 + y_2 + y_3 = 0$$

$$x_0 + x_1 + x_0x_1 + x_2 + x_0x_2 + x_1x_2 + x_3 + y_1 + y_2 + y_3 + y_0y_3 = 0$$

$$x_0x_1 + x_1x_2 + x_3 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + y_0 + y_1 + y_1y_3 = 0$$

$$1 + x_2 + x_0x_2 + x_1x_2 + x_0x_3 + x_1x_3 + y_1 + y_2 + y_2y_3 = 0$$

$$\begin{aligned}
x_0 + x_1 + x_0x_1 + x_2 + x_0x_2 + x_1x_2 + x_3 + x_0x_3 + x_0y_0 + y_1 + y_2 + y_3 + x_3y_3 &= 0 \\
1 + x_1x_2 + x_3 + x_0x_3 + x_1x_3 + y_0 + x_0y_1 + y_2 + y_3 &= 0 \\
x_0x_1 + x_2 + x_0x_2 + x_2x_3 + y_0 + y_1 + y_2 + x_0y_2 + y_3 &= 0 \\
1 + x_0 + x_1 + x_0x_1 + x_3 + x_0x_3 + x_1x_3 + y_3 + x_0y_3 + x_3y_3 &= 0 \\
1 + x_2 + x_1x_2 + x_3 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + y_0 + x_1y_0 + y_1 + y_2 + x_3y_3 &= 0 \\
x_0 + x_1 + x_0x_1 + x_3 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_1y_1 + y_2 + x_3y_3 &= 0 \\
x_0 + x_1 + x_2 + x_0x_2 + x_1x_2 + x_3 + x_1x_3 + y_1 + y_2 + x_1y_2 + y_3 &= 0 \\
1 + x_0x_2 + x_1x_2 + x_3 + x_1x_3 + y_0 + y_2 + y_3 + x_1y_3 + x_3y_3 &= 0 \\
1 + x_2 + x_1x_2 + x_0x_3 + x_1x_3 + x_2y_0 + y_1 + y_2 + x_3y_3 &= 0 \\
1 + x_1 + x_0x_1 + x_1x_2 + x_1x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_2y_1 + y_2 + y_3 &= 0 \\
x_1 + x_0x_2 + x_1x_2 + x_3 + x_2x_3 + y_0 + x_2y_2 + x_3y_3 &= 0 \\
1 + x_0 + x_1 + x_0x_1 + x_1x_2 + x_1x_3 + x_2x_3 + y_0 + y_1 + x_2y_3 + x_3y_3 &= 0 \\
1 + x_2 + x_1x_2 + x_3 + x_0x_3 + x_2x_3 + x_3y_0 + y_1 + y_2 &= 0 \\
x_0x_1 + x_2 + x_0x_2 + x_3 + x_1x_3 + y_0 + y_1 + x_3y_1 + y_3 + x_3y_3 &= 0 \\
x_1 + x_0x_1 + x_2 + x_0x_2 + x_1x_2 + x_3 + x_0x_3 + y_1 + x_3y_2 + y_3 + x_3y_3 &= 0
\end{aligned}$$

This yields to 21 equations for each S-box. For one round of Baby Rijndael we will have six S-boxes: four S-boxes in the round and another two S-boxes in the Key Schedule. This means that we will get $21 \cdot 6 = 126$ equations. How many unknowns will we have? Each S-box has 4 input bits and 4 output bits, so we will have $8 \cdot 6 = 48$ simple variables. In addition to these null space equations, we also have plaintext/ciphertext pair we can use. We also know something about the structure of Baby Rijndael, so we can reduce the number of variables that we have. We will do it in Section 5.1.3.

5.1.2 Equations with inverse property

As we showed before, an S-box of Baby Rijndael first finds the inverse element of the input and then uses affine transformations. Let $X = (x_3, x_2, x_1, x_0)$ be the input to S-box and

let $Y = (y_3, y_2, y_1, y_0)$ be the output of the S-box. The affine transformation is a one-to-one function, so there exists an inverse function, call it h . By applying this inverse function to Y , we will get the inverse element of X . Therefore, we have $h(Y) = X^{-1}$, or $X * h(Y) = (0, 0, 0, 1)$. We can write four equations based on this relationship by equating each of the bits on the lefthand side with a bit on the righthand side.

The equations we get are:

$$\begin{aligned}
& x_0 + x_2 + x_3 + x_0y_0 + x_1y_0 + x_2y_0 + \\
& \quad + x_3y_0 + x_0y_1 + x_1y_1 + x_0y_2 + x_2y_2 + x_1y_3 + x_2y_3 + x_3y_3 = 0 \\
& x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_0y_0 + x_1y_0 + x_2y_0 + \\
& \quad + x_0y_1 + x_1y_2 + x_3y_2 + x_0y_3 + x_1y_3 + x_2y_3 + x_3y_3 = 0 \\
& x_0 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_0y_0 + x_1y_0 + \\
& \quad + x_3y_1 + x_0y_2 + x_2y_2 + x_3y_2 + x_0y_3 + x_1y_3 + x_2y_3 = 0 \\
& x_1 + x_3 + x_1y_0 + x_2y_0 + x_3y_0 + x_0y_1 + \\
& \quad + x_1y_1 + x_2y_1 + x_0y_2 + x_1y_2 + x_3y_2 + x_0y_3 + x_2y_3 + x_3y_3 = 1
\end{aligned}$$

We have a problem if $X = 0$, because then $X * h(Y) = (0, 0, 0, 0)$. This means that our last equation is incorrect, the righthand side should be 0 instead of 1. However, we can still use three equations.

In our attack we will use all four equations for each S-box, because for one round it is not likely that $X = (0, 0, 0, 0)$. If we find out that there is no solution for our system of equations, we will erase the “bad” equations from our system and recompute it. We will do the same if the solution we found is wrong; that is, if the solution does not properly encrypt the given plaintext to the ciphertext. We always can check if the key we found is the correct one by encrypting the plaintext with this key and checking that we get the same ciphertext we have.

For each S-box we will build four equations, so we have another $4*6=24$ equations (for total of 150 equations) and still $8*6=48$ variables. We will reduce the number of unknowns in the next section.

For our convenience, we will rewrite the last equation in the form:

$$x_1 + x_3 + x_1y_0 + x_2y_0 + x_3y_0 + x_0y_1 + x_1y_1 + \\ + x_2y_1 + x_0y_2 + x_1y_2 + x_3y_2 + x_0y_3 + x_2y_3 + x_3y_3 + 1 = 0$$

5.1.3 Decrease number of variables

One round of Baby Rijndael can be represented as Figure 5.1. This is why we can represent every input of every S-box as a plaintext XOR an initial key and every output of every S-box as a ciphertext XOR a round key. In this way we can already decrease the number of variables from 48 to $8 \cdot 4 = 32$, the number of bits in the initial key and the round key.




Figure 5.1 One round of Baby Rijndael.

Until now, we have only used the structure of a Baby Rijndael round. We have not used the KeySchedule yet. This will give us even more information and allow us to further decrease

the number of unknowns. Let $K = \begin{pmatrix} k_0 & k_2 \\ k_1 & k_3 \end{pmatrix}$. If we will go back to Section 3.1.2, then we will see that $w_3 = w_1 \oplus w_2$. This means that the second column of the round key is the XOR of the second column of the initial key and the first column of the round key. In this way we can get rid of 8 more variables, leaving us with only 24 variables.

In the next section, we will solve the system of 150 quadratic equations with 24 variables using the XL attack.

5.2 Applying XL attack on equations

In the last section, we ended up with $m = 150$ quadratic equations and $n = 24$ simple variables. We want to solve this system in order to find the secret key. We can't use linearization methods because $n^2 = 576$ and $m \not\geq \frac{n^2}{2}$, so we need more equations. We will get these equations by applying the XL attack.

Let's denote the system of equations we have by S . The XL method uses a constant integer $D \geq \frac{n}{\sqrt{m}} = \frac{24}{\sqrt{150}} \approx 1.96$. We want D to be as small as possible, because D will be the degree of the new system, but D must be larger than two, otherwise we will stay with the same system, so we take $D = 3$. This means that we should multiply every equation in S by every original variable, because $D - 2 = 1$.

After this multiplication we get $150 \cdot 24 = 3600$ equations plus the original 150 equations, so we have a total of 3750 equations with at most $\binom{24}{3} + \binom{24}{2} + 24 = 2324$ monomials. This calculates every possible cubic, quadratic or single term. Now we can use the linearization method. We will replace every monomial by a new variable, but we will not rename the original variables. For example, each $x_i x_j x_k = a_{ijk}$, $x_i x_j = a_{ij}$ and if we have in some equation just x_i it will remain x_i .

Remember that we are in the field $GF(2)$. This means we have some "rules" that are not true in general, but are true in this field. For example, $x^2 = x$, $x^3 = x$, $2x = 0$, $3x = x$, etc. We will apply this rules to make our system easier to solve.

The idea was to use the Solve command in Mathematica to solve this linear system of

equations, but it did not work out. It took a lot of time and then gave an error message or ran out of RAM. Then we built a 3750×2325 matrix. Each of the first 2324 columns will represent a variable we might have in our system of equations and the last column will represent the constant term. Each row is an equation from our system. To solve the system of equations, we used Mathematica to find the Row Reduced Form of this matrix. It took less than one minute to reduce the matrix.

The matrix in Row Reduced Form had a rank of 2292. This means that we have more than one solution. We actually found four different solutions using the equations. We checked all of them using the plaintext and ciphertext that we had. All four solutions we found encrypted the plaintext we have to the ciphertext we have. So in our case the attack worked pretty well.

CHAPTER 6. The XL and XSL attacks on four round Baby Rijndael

6.1 Equations for four round Baby Rijndael

We want to represent Baby Rijndael as an MQ problem. To do this, we will use null space equations and properties of the S-boxes as in Chapter 5. The null space equations will stay the same as they were in Section 5.1.1. One round of Baby Rijndael uses the same S-boxes as four round Baby Rijndael, so again let $X = (x_3, x_2, x_1, x_0)$ be the input to the S-box and let $Y = (y_3, y_2, y_1, y_0)$ be the output of the S-box. Let h be the inverse function of the affine part of the S-box, just as in Section 5.1.2. Then $X * h(Y) = (0, 0, 0, 1)$, unless $X = (0, 0, 0, 0)$.

In four round Baby Rijndael, we have four S-boxes for each round and another eight S-boxes in the Key Schedule, so we have a total of 24 S-boxes. This means that we will have $21 \cdot 24 = 504$ null space equations and another $4 \cdot 24 = 96$ equations from the inverse property. Therefore, we have a total of 600 equations. We have four input bits to each S-box and four output bits for each S-box, which gives $8 \cdot 24 = 192$ variables.

As in Section 5.1.3, we can reduce the number of variables. See Figure 6.1. We can represent each output of an S-box as the input to the next S-box XOR with the round key. We know the plaintext and ciphertext and we can represent the input to the first round S-box as the plaintext XOR the initial key (K_0). The output of the last round S-box will be the ciphertext XOR the round key (K_4). As in the last chapter, we have only eight (not 16) new bits for each round key, because we can represent the other eight bits using eight bits we have and an initial key or another round key.

In this way, we can reduce the number of original variables to 96. If we compute $\frac{n^2}{2}$ we will get 4608. We only have 600 equations, so we don't have enough equations to use the linearization method. We need more equations.




Figure 6.1 Four rounds of Baby Rijndael.

First, we will use the inverse property of the S-boxes again. We know $X * h(Y) = (0, 0, 0, 1)$, and this means that $X^2 * h(Y) = X$ and $X * h(Y)^2 = h(Y)$. If we look at this bitwise, we will get eight new equations for each S-box and they are linearly independent of the original inverse equations. Now we have total of $504 + (8 \cdot 24) = 792$ equations. This is better, but still not enough!

After we built the equations, we computed the actual number of monomials we have in the equations, and we had 2332 different monomials. If we compute the possible number of quadratic and single terms we can have using 96 different variables, we will get $\binom{96}{2} + 96 = 4656$ monomials. We can conclude that we have the sparse property in our equations, many monomials are missing.

6.2 The XL method for four round Baby Rijndael

We have a system of $n = 96$ original variables and $m = 792$ quadratic equations. Let's compute the value of D we need to solve such a system using the XL method:

$$D \geq \frac{n}{\sqrt{m}} = \frac{96}{\sqrt{792}} \approx 3.41.$$

Therefore, $D = 4$. This means we should multiply each equation of our system by each possible single term and each possible monomial. We already computed this number in the last section, the number is 4656. This means we will have a total of $792 \cdot 4656 + 792 = 3,688,344$ equations with $\binom{96}{4} + \binom{96}{3} + \binom{96}{2} + 96 = 3,469,496$ variables. This system should be solvable. Unfortunately, we were unable to check it because the system was too big to be solved on our computer.

Remember that in Section 5.1.2, we showed that the four equations we get from $X * h(Y) = (0, 0, 0, 1)$ are true only in the case that $X \neq 0$, but we can not be sure that this condition holds. Therefore, it might be better to drop the equation we get using the first bit. Then we will have only three equations for each S-box, and it will reduce our system of equations to $792 - 24 = 768$ quadratic equations. The number of variables will stay the same. The XL method in this case will have $768 \cdot 4656 + 768 = 3,576,576$ equations. It is still should be solvable, but again it was too large for the computer to solve.

The XL method does not use the sparse property of equations, but the XSL method uses it. In the next section, we will use the XSL method to crack Baby Rijndael.

6.3 The XSL method for four round Baby Rijndael

We have a system of $n = 96$ original variables and $m = 792$ quadratic equations, but with only 2332 monomials. For the XL method, we had the parameter D ; for the XSL method we need to decide on a parameter P . Unfortunately, we don't have a formula to compute P .

We know that P should be bigger than 1, so let's try to take $P = 2$. Then the algorithm we gave in Section 4.3 says we should multiply every equation of the fixed — active S-box by all

products of $P - 1$ monomials arising from all the other — passive S-boxes. We should repeat this multiplication until every S-box is active exactly once.

How many equations will we build and how many monomials will we have? For each S-box we have $21 + 4 + 8 = 33$ equations. Let t_i be the number of monomials in the passive S-boxes when S-box number i is active. Using Mathematica we calculated the value of these t_i 's. See Table 6.3.

We will have 1,807,740 equations. Now we should check how many monomials we have in these equations. We can find an upper bound on the number of monomials by considering what kind of monomials we have in our system of equations. Each monomial has degree at most four. If we calculate all possible monomials of degree less than or equal to four of 96 variables, we will get 3,469,496. However, we had only 2332 monomials in our original system, and then we multiplied only by these monomials so actually we can represent it as $\binom{2332}{2} + 2332 = 2,720,278$ monomials at most. This number is smaller, but still not good enough. Using Mathematica we found that the actual number of monomials in our system is 1,723,469. This means that we have more equations than variables and the system should be solvable. We need to replace every monomial by a new variable to get a linear system of equations and then we should be able to solve this system. However, even 1,807,740 equations is too much for our computer and we were unable to solve them.

6.4 Conclusions

From our research, we can conclude that the XL and XSL methods might work on AES. They, at least, seemed to work on Baby Rijndael. In one round Baby Rijndael, the XL method works for sure. For four round Baby Rijndael, we were able to construct many new equations and get a system of linear equations with more equations than unknowns. However, we can not be sure how many of these equations are linearly independent. We may have fewer linearly independent equations, but we hope (and so do the authors of XL and XSL) that this method will still work. We have a connection between the variables we don't use in linearization method, the new variables we constructed y_{ij} are built from the multiplication of the old

variables x_i and x_j , and $y_{ij} = x_i x_j$. We can find the best solution we can from linear equations and then try to use this connection. We could also use the relinearization method to build more linearly independent equations, because we hope we will miss only a small number of equations. For a sparse system of equations we can try to apply the T' method. As it is easy to see from the last section, the number of monomials we have in our system is very small compared to what it could be: we actually have 1,723,469 monomials and the upper bound is 3,469,496 monomials. We built these new monomials using most of the same variables, so there is a good chance we will have big enough sets T' and T'' .

The XSL method seems to work better than the XL method for four round Baby Rijndael. The number of equations we end up with in the XL method is 3,688,344 and the number of equations for the XSL method is only 1,807,740. The number of variables we end up with for the XL method is 3,469,496 and for the XSL this number is much smaller — only 1,723,469.

It is still not clear if the XSL method will give a better running time than a Brute Force attack. The authors of the papers (2) and (3) think it might be better; they calculated the estimated time for cracking AES using XSL. In our case, the Brute Force attack has a better running time, but our initial key is much smaller than a regular Rijndael key.

It is still not clear whether XSL can break AES, but nobody has shown that it can not. In our case, XSL seems to work, although we were unable to solve the system using our computer. Much more research still needs to be done on the XL and XSL methods. There is disagreement as to whether or not AES can be successfully attacked using methods to solve MQ problem.

Table 6.1 Values of t_i .

| t_1 | t_2 | t_3 | t_4 | t_5 | t_6 | t_7 | t_8 | t_9 | t_{10} | t_{11} | t_{12} | t_{13} | t_{14} | t_{15} | t_{16} | t_{17} | t_{18} | t_{19} | t_{20} | t_{21} | t_{22} | t_{23} | t_{24} |
|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 2300 | 2300 | 2312 | 2300 | 2256 | 2268 | 2248 | 2212 | 2272 | 2284 | 2240 | 2228 | 2288 | 2224 | 2224 | 2252 | 2304 | 2304 | 2332 | 2332 | 2304 | 2332 | 2332 | 2332 |

APPENDIX. A Toy Example of “ T' method”

This is an example of the “ T' method”. We work in $GF(2)$. We build a system of eight quadratic equations for the five original variables: x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5 . In this case,

$$T = \{1, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_1x_2, x_1x_3, x_1x_4, x_1x_5, x_2x_3, x_2x_4, x_2x_5, x_3x_4, x_3x_5, x_4x_5\}$$

and the length of T is 16. We will build T' with respect to x_1 and T'' with respect to x_2 . The length of T' and T'' is 10.

$$T' = \{x_2x_3, x_2x_4, x_2x_5, x_3x_4, x_3x_5, x_4x_5, x_1x_2, x_1x_3, x_1x_4, x_1x_5, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, 1\}$$

$$T'' = \{x_3x_4, x_3x_5, x_4x_5, x_1x_3, x_1x_4, x_1x_5, x_1x_2, x_2x_3, x_2x_4, x_2x_5, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, 1\}$$

The equations from Gaussian elimination with respect to T' will be:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{lcl} x_2x_3 & = & x_1x_4 + x_5 + x_3 \\ x_2x_4 & = & x_1x_5 + x_4 + 1 \\ x_2x_5 & = & x_1x_4 + x_1x_5 + x_1 + x_3 + x_4 \\ x_3x_4 & = & x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4 \\ x_3x_5 & = & x_1x_4 + x_2 + 1 \\ x_4x_5 & = & x_1x_5 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 \\ 0 & = & x_1x_3 + x_1x_5 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4 \\ 1 & = & x_1x_2 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4 + x_5 \end{array} \right.$$

The equations from Gaussian elimination with respect to T'' will be:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{lcl} x_3x_4 & = & x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4 \\ x_3x_5 & = & x_2x_4 + x_2x_5 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 \\ x_4x_5 & = & x_2x_4 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4 + 1 \\ x_1x_3 & = & x_2x_4 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + 1 \\ x_1x_4 & = & x_2x_4 + x_2x_5 + x_1 + x_3 + 1 \\ x_1x_5 & = & x_2x_4 + x_4 + 1 \\ 1 & = & x_1x_2 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4 + x_5 \\ 1 & = & x_2x_3 + x_2x_4 + x_2x_5 + x_1 + x_5 \end{array} \right.$$

Using notation from Chapter 4:

$$C_1 = \{0 = x_1x_3 + x_1x_5 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4, 1 = x_1x_2 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4 + x_5\}$$

$$C_2 = \{1 = x_1x_2 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4 + x_5, 1 = x_2x_3 + x_2x_4 + x_2x_5 + x_1 + x_5\}.$$

Next, we should multiply C_1 by x_1 . The two equations we will get are:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{lcl} 0 & = & x_1x_2 + x_1x_4 + x_1x_5 + x_1 \\ 0 & = & x_1x_3 + x_1x_4 + x_1x_5 \end{array} \right.$$

We already have 10 equations, all of them are still linearly independent, this can be checked.

Now, we rewrite them using the system of equations we have for T'' and combine with C_2 .

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{lcl} 1 & = & x_2x_4 + x_2x_5 + x_2 + x_4 \\ 0 & = & x_1x_2 + x_2x_5 + x_3 + x_4 \\ 1 & = & x_1x_2 + x_1 + x_2 + x_3 + x_4 + x_5 \\ 1 & = & x_2x_3 + x_2x_4 + x_2x_5 + x_1 + x_5 \end{array} \right.$$

Now, we will multiply each of these equations by x_2 :

$$\begin{cases} 0 &= x_2x_5 \\ 0 &= x_1x_2 + x_2x_3 + x_2x_4 + x_2x_5 \\ 0 &= x_2x_3 + x_2x_4 + x_2x_5 \\ 0 &= x_2x_3 + x_1x_2 + x_2x_4 + x_2 \end{cases}$$

We have 13 equations linearly independent equation, we drop last equation it is not linearly independent. We need two more equations. Two find them we rewrite three new equations we have from last step using Gaussian elimination for T' .

$$\begin{cases} 1 &= x_1 + x_5 \\ 1 &= x_1x_2 + x_1 + x_5 \\ 0 &= x_1x_4 + x_1x_5 + x_1 + x_3 + x_4 \end{cases}$$

Now we will multiply them by x_1 .

$$\begin{cases} 0 &= x_1x_5 \\ 0 &= x_1x_2 + x_1x_5 \\ 0 &= x_1x_3 + x_1x_5 + x_1 \end{cases}$$

Unfortunately, all the new equations we get are linearly dependent with the old equations. We stay with only 13 equations. If we solve this system using the linearization technique we will get an answer, and this answer will depend on two variables only. If we apply the connection between the new variables and old variables, $y_{ij} = x_ix_j$ we will be able to solve it.

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