
Unpacking Process Injection - DarkCloud 5537D725807584D2B92E993A1B5F5430




Breakpoints set.

```
<25022111cyxo.pdf.exe.OptionalHeader
<kernel32.dll.VirtualAlloc>
<kernel32.dll.VirtualProtect>
<kernel32.dll.IsDebuggerPresent>
<kernel32.dll.WriteProcessMemory>
<ntdll.dll.ZwAllocateVirtualMemory>
<ntdll.dll.ZwMapViewOfSection>
<ntdll.dll.NtCreateSection>
```


First VirtualAlloc followed by A call to VirtualAlloc was observed, which allocated a region of memory within the target process's address space. This was immediately followed by a call to WriteProcessMemory, where the lpBuffer parameter pointed to data that was written into the memory region returned by VirtualAlloc.

This behavior is characteristic of code injection techniques, where memory is first allocated with VirtualAlloc (typically with PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE or PAGE_READWRITE protection), and then malicious or arbitrary code is written into that memory using WriteProcessMemory.


The key detail is that the **lpBaseAddress** argument in WriteProcessMemory matched the **address returned by VirtualAlloc**, indicating a deliberate setup for injecting or staging code. The lpBuffer in this case pointed to the source of the payload, either from the current process or a loaded buffer.



Parameters of WriteProcessMemory from ChatGPT




lpBuffer parameter points to the address on the allocated memory from VirtualAlloc



Current register Values. RSI is pointing to MSBuild.exe

```
<kernel32.WriteProcessMemory>
       00007FFDF391BCB0
RBX
       0000000055862785
RCX
       RDX
       0000000000400000
RBP
       0000008C2618F7A0
RSP
       0000008C2618EF38
RSI
       0000008C2618F4E0
                              "KC:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\MSBuild.exe"
RDI
      00000000A608C8E3
      0000020A68A33E80
R8
R9
       0000000000001000
R10
      00007FFDF572D304
                              ntdl1.00007FFDF572D304
R11
       0000000000000246
R12
      0000000094374349
R13
      00000000B6F832C6
R14
      00000000000000001
      000000002B430F34
R15
RIP
      00007FFDF32A05F0
                              <kernelbase.WriteProcessMemory>
RFLAGS
         0000000000010202
ZF 0 PF 0 AF 0
0F 0 SF 0 DF 0
CF 0 TF 0 IF 1
LastError 00000000 (ERROR_SUCCESS)
LastStatus C0000139 (STATUS_ENTRYPOINT_NOT_FOUND)
GS 002B FS 0053
ES 002B DS 002B
CS 0033 SS 002B
                                                                                                                ▼ 5
Default (x64 fastcall)
```


Apparently MSBuild is already running. I forgot to put the breakpoints for Process Creation (CreateProcessA, CreateProcessW, CreateProcessInternalW etc)




Process Writing to MSBuild.exe

		1	
00007FFDF32A05F	48:8BC4	mov rax,rsp	WriteProcessMemory
00007FFDF32A05F	48:8958 08	mov qword ptr ds:[rax+8],rbx	
00007FFDF32A05F	7 4C:8948 20	mov qword ptr ds:[rax+20],r9	
00007FFDF32A05F		mov qword ptr ds:[rax+18],r8	
00007FFDF32A05F	F 48:8950 10	mov qword ptr ds:[rax+10],rdx	
00007FFDF32A060		push rbp	
→ 00007FFDF32A060		push rsi	rsi:"KC:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework\\v4.0.30319\\MSBuild.exe"
00007EEDE32A060	57	push rdi	

WriteProcessMemory is called again and the lpBuffer has the MZ signature header of 4D 5A indicating that an executable is being loaded into memory into MSBuild.exe




Looking into the memory of MSBuild.exe using SystemInformer shows that the executable is being loaded into it at the base address of 0x400000. Note in the WriteProcessMemory call above, IpBaseAddress is pointing to 0x401000 for the next run.




It's possible to save and dump the file from SystemInformer by clicking on save and creating a new file from that region of memory.

Dumped file seems to be written in VB and is now 32bit instead of 64bit like the previous one.




VT was able to analyze this file with a lot of detection and some vendors labelling it as Dark Cloud.



PE-Bear on the dumped file. To fix the import address table; the Raw address is initially changed to match the virtual address and subtracting the values of the raw addresses (Next raw address subtracted by the previous one) and applying the value to raw size. Afterwards, match the virtual size with the raw size and try to fill in the memory for the last slot in the raw size. The image base in the Optional Hdr tab may also be needed to match the address from where we dumped.

Looks like there is no need to repair the IAT.



Some clear text configurations can be found running Strings on the dumped file

```
00031BA0 rollandcraig32@gmail.com
00031BD8 order@oleonidas.gr
00031C04 +}bVmK6i0mnd
00031C24 mail.oleonidas.gr
```

```
U0U31C64 @StrBotToken
00031C84 @ChatID
00031C98 \Microsoft\Windows\Templates\firefly.exe
00031CF0 HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\
00031D80 boos
00031D8C RegWrite
00031F2C http://showip.net
00031F54 http://www.mediacollege.com/internet/utilities/show-ip.shtml
00031FF0 ?id=
0003200C Uploader
00032024 POST
```

Seems like in the original dump1.bin there were two executables inside. I split them and did a quick look and it looks like the payloads are packed by upx.

DumpDarkCloudMaybe.bin	4/23/2025 10:23 PM	BIN File		340 KB
DumpDLLMaybe.bin 4/23/2025 10:22 PM BIN File				
▼ PE32				
Operation system: Windows(2000)[1386, 32-bit, DLL]				
Linker: Microsoft Linker(9.00.21022)				
Compiler: Microsoft Visual C/C++(15.00.21022)[C]				
Language: C			S	?
Tool: Visual Studio(2008)			S	?
Packer: UPX(3.03)[NRV,brute]			S	?
(Heur)Packer: Compressed or pack ▼ Overlay: Binary[Offset=0x00028600	S	?		
Unknown: Unknown	•		S	?

Strings content is still the same but Ida can interpret the dumped files properly now.