YIHANG ZHOU

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. Economics, University of Texas at Austin, May 2024 (Expected)
B.A. Finance & B.S. Mathematics, Peking University, 2018

REFERENCES

V. Bhaskar (Chair)
Sue Killam Professor
Department of Economics
University of Texas at Austin
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Thomas E Wiseman
Professor and Department Chair
Department of Economics
University of Texas at Austin
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Caroline Thomas
Associate Professor
Department of Sociology
University of Texas at Austin
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RESEARCH FIELDS

Fields: Game theory, Information Economics, Bargaining theory

HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS, AND FELLOWSHIPS

2022 – 2013 Graduate Student Professional Development Award, UT Austin,

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE AND OTHER EMPLOYMENT

2017 – 2018 Research assistant for Prof. Weiguo Zhong, Peking University

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

As instructor

Summer 2021-2022	Math Camp, UT Austin

As teaching assistant

Spring 2021-2023	Microeconomics II (PhD), UT Austin
Fall 2022	1-Introduction to Game Theory (PhD), UTAustin
Spring 2022	Introductory Game Theory, UTAustin
Fall 2021	Math for Economics (PhD), UT Austin
Fall 2020	Introduction to Microeconomics, UT Austin
Spring 2020	Micro Theory for Business, UT Austin
Fall 2018-2019	Introduction to Econometrics, UT Austin
Spring 2019	Public Economics, UT Austin

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Conferences:

2023	Midwest Economic Theory Conference (University of Tennessee, Knoxville)
2022	Stony Brook Conference on Game Theory; Texas Economic Theory Camp (Rice); Midwest Economic Theory Conference (Notre Dame) (Purdue)

WORKING PAPERS

"Strategic Experimentation with Two-sided Private information"

I study a symmetric two-player game of strategic experimentation where both players have private information. I find that two-sided private information improves welfare, both at the ex ante and interim stages, by mitigating the free-rider problem. Furthermore, in some states of the world, there may be over-experimentation, i.e., players may experiment more than the social planner would under complete information.

"Information Suppression in Bayesian Persuasion"

A sender is seeking approval from the receiver(s). He conducts experiments to two receivers with identical preferences sequentially. The first receiver can approve, reject, or delay the decision to the next receiver while the second receiver must approve or reject. Upon delay, the first receiver can communicate his information to the second receiver or hide it. This chance of information suppression creates the incentive to delay when the second receiver is naive -- interpreting the absence of communication as the absence of information. Facing this incentive, the sender discloses more information to the first receiver to induce immediate action when delay is very costly, and discloses less information so that the first receiver may delay when delay is not so costly. And in the former possibility, the first receiver is better off than the static game and has a positive value of persuasion.

"Cheap Talk and Advertising with Naive Receivers"

Based on the cheap talk model with naive receivers who take the message at face value in Ottaviani and Squintani (2006), I endogenize the probability of the receiver blindly believing in the sender by allowing the sender to increase this naivety probability at a cost. When the probability chosen is observed by receivers, receivers can benefit from this ability of the sender, and the fully revealing equilibrium is possible. But this ability of the sender damages information transmission and removes the fully revealing equilibrium if the probability is not observable. These results can explain how information is conveyed in advertising when the advertiser can design the content of advertising as well as use extra expenditure to affect the consumers' gullibility.

WORK IN PROGRESS

"Sequential Bargaining with Multiple Buyers", with David Sibley