A Unified Game-Theoretic Approach to Multiagent Reinforcement Learning

Prepared by:
Shirin Jamshidi – 810199570
Mahya Shahshahani – 810199598
Ouldouz Neysari – 810199505
Mohammad Mashreghi - 810199492

This paper introduces a new algorithm for general multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL), addressing the addressing the challenge of achieving general intelligence through agent interaction in shared environments. environments. The authors observe that policies learned using independent reinforcement learning (InRL) can learning (InRL) can overfit to other agents' policies during training, failing to generalize during execution. To execution. To quantify this effect, they introduce a new metric called joint-policy correlation.

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



The double oracle for extensive games

Algorithm Overview

1

Approximate Best Responses

The algorithm computes approximate best responses to mixtures of policies using deep reinforcement learning and reinforcement learning and empirical game-theoretic analysis.

2

Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis

It uses this analysis to compute meta-strategies for policy selection.

3

Generalization

The algorithm generalizes previous approaches such as InRL, iterated best response, double oracle, and fictitious and fictitious play.



Scalable Implementation

Memory Reduction

The scalable implementation reduces memory requirements through the use through the use of decoupled meta-solvers.

Centralized Training

The approach assumes centralized training for decentralized execution.

Separate Neural Networks

Policies are represented as separate neural networks without sharing gradients or architectures among agents.

Demonstration Settings

Gridworld Coordination Games

The algorithm's generality is demonstrated in partially partially observable grid world coordination games.



Poker

The algorithm is also tested in the partially observable observable setting of poker games.



Background and Related Work

1

Normal-Form Games

The paper introduces the concept of normal-form games as a tuple (Π, U, n) where n is n) where n is the number of players, Π is the set of policies, and U is the utility utility function.

2

Extensive Games

Extensive-form games extend these formalisms to the multistep sequential case (e.g. poker).

3

Double Oracle (DO)

Clearly, DO is guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium in two-player games. But, in the worst-case, the entire strategy space may have to be enumerated.



Challenges and Contributions

1

Overfitting in Multiagent Settings

The paper highlights the importance of addressing overfitting in multiagent multiagent environments, where dynamic reactions to observed behavior are crucial. are crucial.

2

Partial Observability

The authors discuss various approaches to handling partial observability in in multiagent settings, including policy iteration methods and decentralized decentralized cooperative problem-solving.

3

New Metric

The introduction of joint-policy correlation as a new metric to quantify the effects of the effects of policy correlation in independent learners is a key contribution of the contribution of the paper.

PSRO: Introduction and Concept

1

Policy Space Focus

PSRO operates on policy space, not action space, offering more more flexibility.

2

Generalization

It generalizes the Double Oracle approach and uses parameterized parameterized policies.

3

Meta-Solver Approach

PSRO computes new meta-strategies without domain-specific specific knowledge.

PSRO: Algorithm Overview

1. **Initialize**

   Start with initial policy sets for each player.

2. **Compute Utilities**

   Calculate expected utilities for each joint policy.

3. **Meta-Strategies**

   Begin with uniform distribution over initial policy set.

4. **Iterate**

   Sample policies, train oracles, update empirical game, compute new meta-strategies.

Algorithm 1: Policy-Space Response Oracles

input : initial policy sets for all players Π
Compute exp. utilities U^{Π} for each joint $\pi \in \Pi$
Initialize meta-strategies $\sigma_i = \textsc{Uniform}(\Pi_i)$
while *epoch* e *in* $\{1, 2, \cdots\}$ **do**
  for *player* $i \in [[n]]$ **do**
    for *many episodes* **do**
      Sample $\pi_{-i} \sim \sigma_{-i}$
      Train oracle π'_i over $\rho \sim (\pi'_i, \pi_{-i})$
    $\Pi_i = \Pi_i \cup \{\pi'_i\}$
  Compute missing entries in U^{Π} from Π
  Compute a meta-strategy σ from U^{Π}
Output current solution strategy σ_i for player i

Meta Solvers

Regret-Matching

adjusts strategy choices based on minimizing cumulative regrets from past decisions.

Hedge

an algorithm that balances exploration and exploitation by assigning weights to strategies based on past performance.

Projected Replicator Dynamics (PRD)

The PRD approach directs exploration, differing from standard replicator dynamics that include isotropic diffusion or mutation terms, which assume undirected and unbiased evolution.

$$P(x) = \arg\min_{x' \in \Delta_{K+1}^{\epsilon}} \|x' - x\|$$



Deep Cognitive Hierarchies (DCH): Motivation Motivation

PSRO Limitations

PSRO can be slow to converge in complex environments.

DCH Solution

DCH is a parallel form of PSRO for PSRO for enhanced efficiency

Fixed Levels

DCH runs a fixed number of levels levels in parallel.

DCH: Efficiency and Scalability

Space Complexity

DCH reduces space complexity to to $O(n^2K^2)$, where n is players and K and K is levels.

Practical Efficiency

Trades some accuracy for increased increased efficiency compared to to PSRO.



Online Updates

Updates meta-strategies online instead of storing entire payoff tensor.



Decoupled Meta-Strategy Solvers:

Expert Algorithms

Full information about each option in every round.

Bandit Algorithms

Partial information, feedback only for chosen option.

Game Application

Apply sample-based adversarial bandits to games.

- Decoupled Regret-Matching
- Exp3 (Decoupled Hedge)
- Decoupled PRD

Experiments

Examine experiments were conducted in first-person grid world games world games and Leduc Poker, analyzing the effects of joint policy policy correlation and strategies for opponent modeling. The research research aims to address coordination issues in independent learners learners and develop robust policies for competitive scenarios.



The Reactor Model and Experimental Setup

1

Reactor Model

Employs Retrace(λ) for policy evaluation and β-Leave-One-Out policy gradients for updates

2

Recurrent Network Training

Supports effective handling of sequential data

3

Action Spaces

Identical for each player in experiments, but can handle non-identical identical spaces

First-Person Gridworld Games

1. **Limited View Environment**

   Agents operate with restricted visibility, simulating real-world world constraints

2. **Diverse Objectives**

   Games include tagging other agents, collecting apples, or reaching reaching destinations

3. **Common Framework**

   All variants share limited visibility, simultaneous actions, and 1000- and 1000-step episodes

Leduc Poker: A Benchmark for AI Strategies

Small Deck

Six cards total, creating a simplified yet challenging environment

Two Betting Rounds

Limited raises and antes to create the pot

Card Revelation

Players start with one private card, public card revealed revealed after first betting round

State Representation

One-hot encodings for cards and action history

Joint Policy Correlation in Independent Reinforcement Learning

JPC Matrices

Evaluate overfitting effects effects by analyzing policy policy performance across across multiple experiment experiment instances

Matrix Entries

Mean returns over 100 episodes for episodes for policy combinations combinations from different instances

Diagonal vs Off-Diagonal

Diagonal: policies trained together.
Off-diagonal: policies trained separately



Figure 3: Example JPC matrices for InRL on Laser Tag small2 map (left) and small4 (right)

DCH Agent Performance in Mitigating JPC

1

Significant Mitigation

DCH agents reduce expected reward loss by 28.7% to 56.7%

2

Meta-Strategy Importance

Fully-mixed strategy crucial for minimizing JPC losses

3

Hierarchical Effectiveness

Even lower levels (5 and 3) achieve substantial reductions in JPC



(a) (b)

Figure 4: (a) Effect of DCH parameters on NashConv in 2 player Leduc Poker. Left: decoupled PRD, Middle: decoupled RM, Right: Exp3, and (b) MAUC of the exploitation graph against cfr500.

Cfr500: CFR's average strategy after 500 iterations.

CFR: counterfactual regret

MUAC: mean area-under-the-curve

average proportional loss in reward as $R_- = (\bar{D} - \bar{O})/\bar{D}$

$\textsc{NashConv}(\sigma) = \sum_i^n \max_{\sigma_i' \in \Sigma_i} u_i(\sigma_i', \sigma_{-i}) - u_i(\sigma)$

Leduc Poker Policy Evaluation



(a) 2 players (b) 3 players

Figure 5: Exploitability for NFSP x DCH x PSRO.



(a) Random bots as ref. set (b) 2-player CFR500 bots as ref. set (c) 3-player CFR500 bots as ref. set

Figure 6: Evaluation against fixed set of bots. Each data point is an average of the four latest values.

Conclusion: PSRO/DCH Effectiveness

JPC Reduction

Significantly reduces joint policy correlation in partially observable coordination games

Robust Strategies

Develops effective counter-strategies strategies for competitive imperfect imperfect information games

Versatility

Acts as "opponent/teammate regularization," highlighting practical applicability

Additional work for PSRO:

Strategy Exploration

new MSS methods (overfitting, …..)

Alternative games

Improvements in PSRO

Applications

Implementation

LLMs

Hyperparameters tuning

Chosen paper:

1. GRAD a new robust reinforcement learning method
2. Green security games (DeDOL
3. Red teaming game (LLM)



The GRAD Algorithm

Algorithm 2 Game-theoretic Response approach for Adversarial Defense (GRAD)

Input: Initial policy sets for the agent and adversary $\Pi : \{\Pi_a, \Pi_v\}$
Compute expected utilities as empirical payoff matrix U^Π for each joint $\pi : \{\pi_a, \pi_v\} \in \Pi$
Compute meta-Nash equilibrium σ_a and σ_v over policy sets (Π_a, Π_v)
for epoch in $\{1, 2, \ldots\}$ **do**
  for many iterations N_{π_a} **do**
    Sample the adversary policy $\pi_v \sim \sigma_v$
    Train π'_a with trajectories against the fixed adversary π_v: $\mathcal{D}_{\pi'_a} := \{(\hat{s}^k_t, a^k_t, r^k_t, \hat{s}^k_{t+1})\}\big|^B_{k=1}$
    (when the fixed adversary only attacks the action space, $\hat{s}_t = s_t$.)
  end for
  $\Pi_a = \Pi_a \cup \{\pi'_a\}$
  for many iterations N_{π_v} **do**
    Sample the agent policy $\pi_a \sim \sigma_a$
    Train the adversary policy π'_v with trajectories: $\mathcal{D}_{\pi'_v} := \{(s^k_t, \bar{a}^k_t, -r^k_t, s^k_{t+1})\}\big|^B_{k=1}$
    (π'_v applies attacks to the fixed victim agent π_a based on $\bar{a}_t$ using different methods)
  end for
  $\Pi_v = \Pi_v \cup \{\pi'_v\}$
  Compute missing entries in U^Π from Π
  Compute new meta strategies σ_a and σ_v from U^Π
end for
Return: current meta Nash equilibrium on whole population σ_a and σ_v





Key Features of GRAD

1

Temporally-Coupled Perturbations

GRAD addresses environmental disturbances that are associated over time, a crucial aspect often overlooked by traditional methods.

2

Game-Theoretic Approach

By framing the problem as a two-player, zero-sum game, GRAD provides a more comprehensive strategy for handling adversarial challenges. challenges.

3

Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO)

GRAD uses PSRO to iteratively iteratively improve strategies strategies until reaching a Nash Nash Equilibrium, ensuring neither side can unilaterally improve their outcome.



Experimental Results

Method	Reward
GRAD	Highest
Traditional Deep RL	Lower
Other Robust RL	Lower

Experimental results demonstrate that GRAD outperforms current techniques in both traditional and temporally-coupled perturbation scenarios. The algorithm consistently achieved the highest rewards in each test compared to other deep RL methods, showcasing its effectiveness in handling complex, dynamic environments.

Result:



(a) Non-temporally-Coupling Mixed Attacks **(b)** Temporally-Coupling Mixed Attacks

Applications of GRAD

Autonomous Driving

GRAD's ability to handle dynamic and adversarial situations makes it valuable for developing robust autonomous driving systems that can adapt to changing road conditions and unexpected obstacles.

Cybersecurity

In the realm of cybersecurity, GRAD can enhance the resilience of systems against evolving threats and temporally-coupled attacks, improving overall defense strategies.

Robotic Control

GRAD's performance in simulated robotic control tasks suggests its potential for improving the adaptability and robustness of physical robotic systems in real-world environments.

Green Security Games (GSGs)

Optimizing Patrols

GSGs have been proposed to optimize patrols conducted by law law enforcement agencies in green green security domains such as combating poaching, illegal logging, logging, and overfishing.

Mixed Strategy Solution

GSGs propose an MSS (Mixed Strategy Solution) that combines combines Nash Equilibrium with a with a uniform distribution as the the best response target.

Exploration Elements

This approach enables the best response to a Nash Equilibrium strategy mixed with exploration exploration elements, enhancing enhancing adaptability in real-world world scenarios.

Game environment:



Algorithm:

Algorithm 1 DeDOL-S

Require: Mode (local/global), attacker entry point (if local), initial subgame G_0, exploration rate α

for iteration t **do**

  Run simulations to obtain current game matrix G_t.

  $Nash(G_t) = (\sigma_t^d, \sigma_t^a)$, $Unif(G_t) = (\rho_t^d, \rho_t^a)$.

  Train defender DQN f_t^d against $(1-\alpha)\sigma_t^a + \alpha\rho_t^a$.

  Train attacker DQN f_t^a against $(1-\alpha)\sigma_t^d + \alpha\rho_t^d$.

  VALID(f_t^d, f_t^a, G_t)

  if TERMINATE condition satisfied **then**

    $k^* = \arg\max_k \{defEU((1-\alpha)\sigma_k^d + \alpha\rho_k^d, f_k^a)$, and $defEU(\sigma_k^d, \overline{f_k^a})$ if any were ever calculated$\}$

    return Defender optimal strategy from the k^*th iteration per above, current subgame G_t

---

Result:



Defender's Utility
Number of Episodes
6
4
2
0
−2
−4
−6
−8
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
300000
vanilla double DQN, Random
enhanced DQN, Random
vanilla double DQN, Gaussian
enhanced DQN, Gaussian

Red-teaming Game (RTG)

1

Framework Introduction

RTG is a novel game-theoretic framework designed to enhance the security and and robustness of large language models (LLMs) by automating the red teaming teaming process.

2

Bi-level Optimization

RTG models interactions between adversarial red team language models (RLMs) and (RLMs) and defensive blue team language models (BLMs) as a bi-level optimization optimization problem.

3

GRTS Implementation

Utilizes the Gamified Red Teaming Solver (GRTS) based on Policy Space Response Response Oracles (PSRO) to iteratively approximate Nash equilibria.



RTG Outcomes and Impact

Enhanced Security

RTG effectively identifies diverse attack strategies and improves the security and alignment of LLMs, LLMs, outperforming existing manual and heuristic approaches.

Performance Metrics

Training outcomes show improvements in exploitability, attack success rates, and the trade-off between harmlessness and helpfulness in LLMs.

Alignment Trade-offs

Results reflect the alignment tax incurred by BLMs in aligning with the red team, demonstrating the complex the complex balance between security and functionality.

Sample Attack and defence:



Attack Topics:



(a) Proportion of attack topics.

(b) Proportion of attack forms.

Algorithem:

Algorithm 1 Gamified Red Teaming Solver

Initialize populations for RLMs $\{R_1, R_2, ..., R_{m-1}\}$ and LLMs B_m

Compute exploitability $\text{Expl}(\sigma)$ and utilities U for each joint policy $\{(\pi_1, ..., \pi_{m-1}), \pi_m\} \in \Pi_{\text{RLMs}} \cup \Pi_{\text{BLM}}$.

Initialize meta-strategies $(\sigma_1, ..., \sigma_{m-1}) = \text{UNIFORM}(\Pi_{\text{RLMs}}), \sigma_m = \text{UNIFORM}(\Pi_{\text{BLM}})$,

for *epoch* e in 1,2,... **do**

    for LLM (RLMs and BLM) $i \in \{\text{RLMs}, \text{BLM}\}$ **do**

        for $many\ episodes$ **do**

            Train oracle $\pi_i^{'}$ over $\rho \sim (\pi_i^{'}, \pi_{-i})$ with diversity measure of semantic space

        end for

        $\Pi_i = \Pi_i \cup \pi_i^{'}$

    end for

    Compute missing entries in U from $\Pi_{\text{RLMs}} \cup \Pi_{\text{BLM}}$

    Compute a meta-strategy $\sigma = \{(\sigma_1, ..., \sigma_{m-1}), \sigma_m\}$ from U

end for

Output current meta-strategy $\sigma^* = \{(\sigma_1^*, ..., \sigma_{m-1}^*), \sigma_m^*\}$ for each RLM and BLM, which is an ϵ -approximate Nash equilibrium.

Result:


EXP. in PSRO
Exploitability
PSRO Iteration
(a) Exploitability.
BLM reward
prompt numbers
Turn 1
Turn 2
Turn 3
(b) Reward in one iteration.
Cost Score
Cost ± 0.3*Std Scope
Attack Success Rate
Checkpoints at different steps
Cost
(c) Cost and ASR.
RLM checkpoints at different steps
Attack Success Rate
Cost
(d) Cost and ASR.
Inter-Traj Similarity
Inner-Traj Similarity
(e) Diversity of semantic space.
BLM at 100 step
BLM at 900 step
distribution shift
Density
Cost Score
(f) Cost distribution shift.
Turn1 Pareto Curve
Turn2 Pareto Curve
Turn3 Pareto Curve
reward value
cost value
(g) Pareto optimality
Turn1 Perplexity
Turn2 Perplexity
Turn3 Perplexity
Turn1 Reward
Turn2 Reward
Turn3 Reward
Reward
Perplexity
Checkpoints at different steps
(h) Alignment and perplexity.
Turn 1
Turn 2
Turn 3
attack success rate
RLM vs. BLM pair at different step
(i) ASR in different turn.
Turn 1 (answer prompt)
Turn 2
Turn 3
Harmful
Safe
BLM at different steps
Prompt
RLM at different steps
game evolution
(j) Performance of RLM and BLM in multi-turn attacks