

SEED Labs: SQL Injection Attack Lab

Shivali Mate

I. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this lab was to examine common SQL injection vulnerabilities in a deliberately vulnerable employee-management web application, demonstrate how attackers can exploit both data-retrieval and data-modification flaws, and implement a practical defense using prepared statements. The exercises show how insecure concatenation of user input into SQL statements can lead to authentication bypass, data disclosure, and unauthorized modification of database records.

II. ENVIRONMENT AND SETUP

The lab used the SEED-provided Ubuntu image and a dockerized environment consisting of two containers: one hosting the web application and one hosting the MySQL database. The application hostname `www.seed-server.com` was mapped to the web container IP (`10.9.0.5`) in `/etc/hosts`. The docker environment was built and launched with:

```
docker-compose build
docker-compose up
```

Running containers were inspected with the provided alias `dockps` and shells were opened with `docksh`. The MySQL database was accessed using:

```
mysql -u root -pdees
```

The database `sqlab_users` and the table `credential` were then examined to learn the schema and sample data. (See Figure 1)

```
[...]
mysql> show tables;
+-----+
| Tables_in_sqlab_users |
+-----+
| credential |
+-----+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)

mysql> desc credential;
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| id | Salary | BirthDay | SSN | Nickname | Email |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 1 | 20000 | 1980-01-01 | 10211002 | Boby | bobby@seedserver.com | |
| 2 | 20000 | 30000 | 4/20 | 10211352 | Ryan | ryan@seedserver.com |
| 3 | 30000 | 40000 | 5/10 | 98993524 | Samy | samy@seedserver.com |
| 4 | 40000 | 50000 | 1/11 | 32193525 | Ted | ted@seedserver.com |
| 5 | 50000 | 60000 | 11/9 | 32111111 | Admin | admin@seedserver.com |
| 6 | 99999 | 400000 | 3/5 | 43254314 |          |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
6 rows in set (0.00 sec)

mysql> select * from credential;
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| id | Salary | BirthDay | SSN | Nickname | Email |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 1 | 20000 | 1980-01-01 | 10211002 | Boby | bobby@seedserver.com | |
| 2 | 20000 | 30000 | 4/20 | 10211352 | Ryan | ryan@seedserver.com |
| 3 | 30000 | 40000 | 5/10 | 98993524 | Samy | samy@seedserver.com |
| 4 | 40000 | 50000 | 1/11 | 32193525 | Ted | ted@seedserver.com |
| 5 | 50000 | 60000 | 11/9 | 32111111 | Admin | admin@seedserver.com |
| 6 | 99999 | 400000 | 3/5 | 43254314 |          |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
6 rows in set (0.00 sec)

mysql> select * from credential where Name = 'Alice';
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| id | Salary | BirthDay | SSN | Nickname | Email |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 6 | 99999 | 400000 | 3/5 | Alice | Alice@seedserver.com |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)

mysql>
```

Fig. 1: Output of dockps showing the running web and MySQL containers.

A. Task 1 — Familiarization with SQL statements

To inspect the provided data, the SQL commands `USE sqlab_users`; and `SHOW TABLES`; were used. A simple query printed Alice's full profile:

```
SELECT * FROM credential
WHERE name = 'Alice';
```

This query confirmed the schema employee id, salary, birthday, SSN, etc. and served as the baseline for constructing injection payloads. See Figure 2.

```
[...]
mysql> SELECT * FROM credential
WHERE name = 'Alice';
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| id | Salary | BirthDay | SSN | Nickname | Email |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
| 6 | 99999 | 400000 | 3/5 | Alice | Alice@seedserver.com |
+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)

mysql>
```

Fig. 2: Result of mysql queries showing Alice's profile fields.

B. Task 2 — SQL injection attack on SELECT Statement

The login logic in `unsafe_home.php` built a SQL SELECT by concatenating the username and the SHA1 of the password. Because user input was not sanitized or parameterized, the username field could contain SQL syntax and change the meaning of the query.

1) 2.1 Webpage attack: Submitting the username payload `admin' #` terminates the username string and comments out the password check. The database therefore authenticates as admin and returns all employee records. This demonstrates how a simple crafted username can bypass authentication and disclose sensitive data. See Figure 3.

Username	Eid	Salary	Birthday	SSN	Nickname	Email	Address	Ph. Number
Alice	10000	20000	9/20	10211002				
Bobly	20000	30000	4/20	10211352				
Ryan	30000	50000	4/10	98993524				
Samy	40000	90000	1/11	32193525				
Ted	50000	110000	11/9	32111111				
Admin	99999	400000	3/5	43254314				

Fig. 3: Login page result after attack

2) 2.2 *Command-line attack*: The same injection is reproducible with curl by URL-encoding special characters. For example:

```
curl 'http://www.seed-server.com/  
unsafe_home.php?username=admin%27%20%23'
```

where %27 = ', %20 = space, and %23=#. The response returned Admin's record as in the browser-based attack Figure 4.

Fig. 4: Curl output demonstrating the same injection payload returns Admin's record.

3) 2.3 Append a new SQL statement: An attempt was made to append an UPDATE statement after the injected SELECT example

```
admin'; update credential  
set name='shivali' where name='Aryan'
```

This multi-statement approach failed because the server-side database interface did not permit multiple statements in a single query the application did not call the multi-statement API such as `mysql_multi_query`. The server returned a syntax/error response rather than executing the appended statement Figure 5.




Fig. 5: Error returned when attempting multi-statement injection; multi-query is not enabled in the backend API.

C. Task 3 – SOL injection on UPDATE

The Edit Profile functionality executed an UPDATE statement built from user-supplied fields. Because the server concatenated values directly into the SET clause, it was possible to

inject additional assignments and even craft a new WHERE clause.

1) 3.1 *Modify own salary*: Entering the query into the nickname input produced an UPDATE that set Alice's salary to 99999. The comma separates assignments in the SET clause and the crafted input relied on how the application wrapped values in quotes.

Alice' , Salary = '99999

The change persisted in the database (Figure 6).




Fig. 6: Alice's salary before and after injection demonstrating a successful modification of a protected field.

2) 3.2 *Modify another employee's salary*: To change Boby's salary from Alice's session, the payload:

```
Alice' , Salary= '1'  
where name = 'Boby' #
```

closed the original assignment, added a targeted assignment with a WHERE clause, and commented out the rest of the server-side query. The result was Boby's salary being set to 1 can be seen after logging to admin or boby's profiles.

3) 3.3 *Modify another employee's password:* Because the application stored password hashes, the attacker injected an assignment that wrote a known hash into Boby's password field:

```
Alice' , Password = sha1('Hacked!!!')  
where name = 'Boby' #
```

This change allowed the attacker to authenticate as Boby using the plaintext Hacked!!!. The password replacement and subsequent login were validated by logging into boby's profile with the new set password.

D. Task 4 — Counter Measure: Prepared Statements

To remediate the vulnerability, the defense code in the defense folder was rewritten to use prepared statements. The vulnerable concatenated query was converted to a parameterized query using placeholders ? and bind param. Example replacement:

```
$stmt = $conn->prepare(  
"SELECT id, name, eid, salary, ssn  
FROM credential  
WHERE name = ? AND Password = ?") ;
```

```
$stmt->bind_param("ss",
$input_uname, $hashed_pwd);
```

Because the database compiles the query structure before binding data, user input is treated strictly as data and cannot change the compiled query. After the fix, attempted inputs like ryan' # no longer leaked employee data; the defense page returned no sensitive results but just the column names without any data.

III. CONCLUSION

The lab demonstrates that concatenating user input into SQL statements enables straightforward and dangerous attacks. SELECT style injections allow unauthorized data disclosure, while UPDATE style injections permit unauthorized modification of records including salaries and passwords. Prepared statements parameterized queries effectively prevent the demonstrated attacks by separating code from data. Additionally, avoiding multi-statement execution in the database API reduces the attack surface for appended statements. Applying parameterized queries and additional input validation are practical, high-impact mitigations for real web applications.

REFERENCES

- [1] SEED Labs, “SQL Injection Attack Lab”, lab manual and lab setup files (SEED Labs). (Used lab instructions and provided container images.)
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