

CSC110 Lecture 18:

Introduction to Cryptography

David Liu, Department of Computer Science

Navigation tip for web slides: press ? to see keyboard navigation controls.

Announcements and Today's plan

Announcements

- Assignment 3 has been posted
 - Check out the [A3 FAQ \(+ corrections\)](#)
 - [Additional TA office hours](#)
 - Review [advice on academic integrity](#)
- Term Test 2 is next Monday!
 - Check out the [Term Test 2 Info Page](#)
 - Test [time](#) and [location](#) (not MY 150!)
 - Test [coverage](#)
 - Advice for preparing for the test
 - Review the posted [reference sheet](#) (this will be provided to you at the test!)
- [PythonTA survey 1](#)

Announcements

No tutorial this Friday! (To give you more time for Assignment 3/Term Test 2.)

We will post last year's tutorial for additional practice with this week's material.

Today you'll learn to...

1. Define the components and requirements of a **secure symmetric-key cryptosystem**.
2. Define and implement the **one-time pad** symmetric-key cryptosystem.
3. Define and trace the **Diffie-Hellman key exchange** algorithm.
4. Define the terms **perfect secrecy** and **discrete logarithm problem**, and explain how they are related to the algorithms we study today.

Reviewing symmetric-key cryptosystems

Encryption and decryption

Two people, Alice and Bob, want to communicate with each other.

Alice and Bob share a **secret key** $k \in \mathcal{K}$.

Alice **encrypts** a plaintext message $m \in \mathcal{P}$ using k to obtain a ciphertext $c \in \mathcal{C}$, and sends c to Bob.

Bob **decrypts** the ciphertext c using k to obtain the original plaintext message m .

Two properties for a symmetric-key cryptosystem

Correctness

For all $k \in \mathcal{K}$ and $m \in \mathcal{P}$, $Decrypt(k, Encrypt(k, m)) = m$.

Security

For all $k \in \mathcal{K}$ and $m \in \mathcal{P}$, if an eavesdropper only knows the value of $c = Encrypt(k, m)$ but does not know k , it is **computationally infeasible** to find m .

Example: Caesar cipher

Plaintext and ciphertext messages are strings of ASCII characters.

Secret key k is a numeric shift of each letter:

$$c[i] = (m[i] + k) \% 128$$

The One-Time Pad Cryptosystem

Problem with the Caesar cipher

Ciphertext: 'OLaTO+T^+NZZW'

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
O	L	a	T	O	+	T	^	+	N	Z	Z	W

Any cryptosystem based on character substitution reveals information about the structure of the original message.

The one-time pad cryptosystem

The secret key k is now a **string**. We can encrypt a message m up to the same length as k :

$$c[i] = (m[i] + k[i]) \% 128$$

We call the secret key a “one-time pad”.

Example

Encrypt message 'HELLO' with secret key 'david'.

Plaintext	Secret key	Ciphertext
H 72	d 100	$(72 + 100) \% 128 = 44$,
E 69	a 97	$(69 + 97) \% 128 = 38$ &
L 76	v 118	$(76 + 118) \% 128 = 66$ B
L 76	i 105	$(76 + 105) \% 128 = 53$ 5
O 79	d 100	$(79 + 100) \% 128 = 51$ 3

Exercise 1: The One-Time Pad Cryptosystem

Perfect secrecy

Given the ciphertext 'AAAAA' from the one-time pad encryption, what plaintext message could we have started with?

For **every** string of length 5, there exists a secret key that yields the ciphertext 'AAAAA'.

The one-time pad has **perfect secrecy**: the ciphertext yields **no** information about the plaintext. An eavesdropper seeing the ciphertext can't determine anything about the plaintext!

Limitations of the one-time pad cryptosystem

1. The length of the secret key must be \geq the length of the plaintext message.
2. If a secret key is reused, we no longer have perfect secrecy.

Stream ciphers

Stream ciphers are based on the one-time pad, but use a small shared secret key as a starting point to generate new “random” numbers.

Example: starting with the integer key $k \in \{1, 2, \dots, 127\}$, generate the sequence

$$k, (k^2 \% 128), (k^3 \% 128), (k^4 \% 128), \dots$$

But modular exponentiation repeats—not a “random” sequence!

Establishing shared keys

Two people want to use a symmetric-key cryptosystem to communicate securely.

Problem: how do they establish a shared secret key?

The Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm

The **Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm** is an algorithm that allows two people to establish a shared secret key while **only communicating publicly**.

Diffie-Hellman (Step 1)

Context: David and you (yes, you!) want to establish a shared secret key, but can only communicate publicly.

1. David chooses p , a prime number greater than 2, and $g \in \{2, 3, \dots, p - 1\}$. David sends p and g to you.

$$p = 6553, \text{ and } g = 10$$

Diffie-Hellman (Step 2)

2. David chooses a **secret** number a , and sends you $A = g^a \% p$.

$$A = 6433 \text{ (but I'm not sending } a\text{!)}$$

Diffie-Hellman (Step 3)

3. You choose a **secret** number b , and send David $B = g^b \% p$.

Type your B (but not b) into the **Campuswire chat**!
(Remember, $p = 6553$, and $g = 10$.)

Diffie-Hellman (Step 4)

4. David calculates $k_A = B^a \% p$. You calculate $k_B = A^b \% p$.

$k_A = k_B$, and this is our shared secret key!

(Remember, $p = 6553$, $g = 10$, and $A = 6433$.)

Moment of truth!

Why is Diffie-Hellman correct?

David has p, g .

You have p, g .

David has a .

You have $A = g^a \% p$.

David has $B = g^b \% p$.

You have b .

David has $k_A = B^a \% p$.

You have $k_B = A^b \% p$.

Theorem (Correctness of Diffie-Hellman key exchange).

For all $p, g, a, b \in \mathbb{Z}^+$, $(g^b \% p)^a \% p = (g^a \% p)^b \% p$.

Proof key idea (see Section 8.3 for full proof):

$$(g^a)^b \equiv g^{ab} \equiv (g^b)^a \pmod{p}$$

Why is Diffie-Hellman secure?

David has:

$$p, g$$

$$a$$

$$B = g^b \% p$$

$$k_A = B^a \% p$$

You have:

$$p, g$$

$$A = g^a \% p$$

$$b$$

$$k_B = A^b \% p$$

Eavesdropper has:

$$p, g$$

$$A = g^a \% p$$

$$B = g^b \% p$$

$$\dots?$$

E.g., eavesdropper has $p = 6553$, $g = 10$, $A = 6433$, and your B .

From p , g , A , and B , can the eavesdropper compute k_A/k_B ?

Or, given $g^a \% p$ and $g^b \% p$, can the eavesdropper compute $g^{ab} \% p$?

Why is Diffie-Hellman secure?

Discrete logarithm problem: given $p, g, A \in \mathbb{Z}^+$, find $a \in \mathbb{Z}^+$ such that $g^a \equiv A \pmod{p}$, if such an a exists.

There is **no known efficient algorithm** for solving the discrete logarithm problem!

We say that Diffie-Hellman is **computationally secure**: for large enough primes (e.g., $p \approx 2^{2048}$), there is no computationally efficient way of determining the secret key from just the public communication.

Exercise 2: The Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm

Summary

Today you learned to...

1. Define the components and requirements of a **secure symmetric-key cryptosystem**.
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Homework

- Readings from today: 8.1 (prep), 8.2, 8.3
- Readings for tomorrow: 7.5 (review), 8.4
- Work on Assignment 3
- Study for Term Test 2

