

Workload Identity Management in Agentic Platform




Identity and Authorization Management Summary

Challenges:

- Agents need to perform actions on behalf of users
- Static credentials (e.g., API Keys) violate zero-trust principles
- Need to give agents just the right set of permissions to perform an action


Approach:

- Leverage standardized approaches for workload identity (SPIFFE/SPIRE)
- Token Exchange: leverage identity and access management (Keycloak)





Background


- ▶ In agentic applications, transaction flows are more **dynamic** than ever
 - Users calling agents
 - Agents calling tools on behalf of users
 - Agents calling agents



What we're avoiding: "workloads act as users"



OAuth2.0 for short-lived user delegation




```
{  
  "exp": 1739379637,  
  "iss": "http://keycloak.example.com/realms/Demo",  
  ...  
}
```

 User Credentials


 Keycloak-issued JWT

Passed access tokens should
be **minimally-scoped**.

What we're avoiding: token passthrough




Token Exchange




Workload credentials should
be **dynamic**.

What we're avoiding: static secrets




Workload Authentication with SPIRE





How this fits into a
Kagenti platform

Kagenti before authn/authz




Kagenti before authn/authz







 User Credentials

 Keycloak-issued JWT

Phase 0



Phase 0



User Credentials







Keycloak-issued JWT




SPIRE-issued JWT

Phase 0




-  User Credentials
-  Keycloak-issued JWT
-  SPIRE-issued JWT


Phase 1




Phase 1




Phase 1




Phase 2



Phase 3



Phase 4



Kagenti – Putting it all together

