SMART CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT

for

MAKER FOUNDATION

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Contents

1 Introduction

Given the opportunity to review the **Multi-Collateral Dai (MCD)** design document and related smart contract source code, we in the report outline our systematic method to evaluate potential security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic inconsistency between smart contract code and the white paper, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of smart contracts can be further improved due to the presence of several issues related to either security or performance. This document outlines our audit results.

1.1 About Multi-Collateral Dai (MCD)

Multi-Collateral Dai (MCD) is a modular system of inter-dependent smart contracts developed for the Ethereum blockchain. An off-chain system of oracles is used to supply price data on which the system relies. The core system of permissioned modules is maintained by MKR governance, with updates being executed via approval voting. Non-permissioned front-ends such as the CDP Manager and SCD-MCD Migrator provide convenience for CDP operators and Dai holders.

The basic information of Multi-Collateral Dai (MCD) is as follows:

Table 1.1: Basic Information of Multi-Collateral Dai (MCD)

Item	Description
Issuer	Maker Foundation
Website	https://makerdao.com
Type	Ethereum Smart Contract
Platform	Solidity
Audit Method	Whitebox
Latest Audit Report	Oct 4, 2019

In the following, we show the Git repository of reviewed files and the commit hash value used in this audit:

- https://github.com/makerdao/dss.git (526fa6a)
- https://github.com/makerdao/dss-deploy.git (ec9a414)
- https://github.com/makerdao/median.git (d95bbc1)
- https://github.com/makerdao/oracles-v2.git (a216cd0)
- https://github.com/makerdao/dss-cdp-manager.git (c11ec39)
- https://github.com/makerdao/scd-mcd-migration.git (4f7030c)

1.2 About PeckShield

PeckShield Inc. [28] is a leading blockchain security company with the goal of elevating the security, privacy, and usability of current blockchain ecosystem by offering top-notch, industry-leading services and products (including the service of smart contract auditing). We are reachable at Telegram (https://t.me/peckshield), Twitter (http://twitter.com/peckshield), or Email (contact@peckshield.com).

Table 1.2: Vulnerability Severity Classification



1.3 Methodology

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on OWASP Risk Rating Methodology [23]:

- Likelihood represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild;
- Impact measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack;

- Severity demonstrates the overall criticality of the risk;

Likelihood and impact are categorized into three ratings: *H*, *M* and *L*, i.e., *high*, *medium* and *low* respectively. Severity is determined by likelihood and impact and can be classified into four categories accordingly, i.e., *Critical*, *High*, *Medium*, *Low* shown in Table 1.2.

To evaluate the risk, we go through a list of check items and each would be labeled with a severity category. For one check item, if our tool or analysis does not identify any issue, the contract is considered safe regarding the check item. For any discovered issue, we might further deploy contracts on our private testnet and run tests to confirm the findings. If necessary, we would additionally build a PoC to demonstrate the possibility of exploitation. The concrete list of check items is shown in Table 1.3.

In particular, we perform the audit according to the following procedure:

- Basic Coding Bugs: We first statically analyze given smart contracts with our proprietary static code analyzer for known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) all the issues found by our tool.
- Semantic Consistency Checks: We then manually check the logic of implemented smart contracts and compare with the description in the white paper.
- Advanced DeFi Scrutiny: We further review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.
- Additional Recommendations: We also provide additional suggestions regarding the coding and development of smart contracts from the perspective of proven programming practices.

To better describe each issue we identified, we categorize the findings with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE-699) [22], which is a community-developed list of software weakness types to better delineate and organize weaknesses around concepts frequently encountered in software development. Though some catogories used in CWE-699 may not be relevant in smart contracts, we use the CWE categories in Table 1.4 to classify our findings.

1.4 Disclaimer

Note that this audit does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues of the given smart contract(s), i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues. As one audit cannot be considered comprehensive, we always recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contract(s). Last but not least, this security audit should not be used as an investment advice.

Table 1.3: The Full List of Check Items

Category	Check Item
Basic Coding Bugs	Constructor Mismatch
	Ownership Takeover
	Redundant Fallback Function
	Overflows & Underflows
	Reentrancy
	Money-Giving Bug
	Blackhole
	Unauthorized Self-Destruct
	Revert DoS
	Unchecked External Call
	Gasless Send
	Send Instead Of Transfer
	Costly Loop
	(Unsafe) Use Of Untrusted Libraries
	(Unsafe) Use Of Predictable Variables
	Transaction Ordering Dependence
	Deprecated Uses
Semantic Consistency Checks	Semantic Consistency Checks
Advanced DeFi Scrutiny	Business Logics Review
	Functionality Checks
	Authentication Management
	Access Control & Authorization
	Oracle Security
	Digital Asset Escrow
	Kill-Switch Mechanism
	Operation Trails & Event Generation
	ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling
	Frontend-Contract Integration
	Deployment Consistency
	Holistic Risk Management
Additional Recommendations	Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array
	Using Fixed Compiler Version
	Making Visibility Level Explicit
	Making Type Inference Explicit
	Adhering To Function Declaration Strictly
	Following Other Best Practices

Table 1.4: Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Classifications Used In This Audit

Category	Summary
Configuration	Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during the configuration of the software.
Data Processing Issues	Weaknesses in this category are typically found in functionality that processes data.
Numeric Errors	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers.
Security Features	Weaknesses in this category are concerned with topics like authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography, and privilege management. (Software security is not security software.)
Time and State	Weaknesses in this category are related to the improper management of time and state in an environment that supports simultaneous or near-simultaneous computation by multiple systems, processes, or threads.
Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes	Weaknesses in this category include weaknesses that occur if a function does not generate the correct return/status code, or if the application does not handle all possible return/status codes that could be generated by a function.
Resource Management	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources.
Behavioral Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to unexpected behaviors from code that an application uses.
Business Logics	Weaknesses in this category identify some of the underlying problems that commonly allow attackers to manipulate the business logic of an application. Errors in business logic can be devastating to an entire application.
Initialization and Cleanup	Weaknesses in this category occur in behaviors that are used for initialization and breakdown.
Arguments and Parameters	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper use of arguments or parameters within function calls.
Expression Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to incorrectly written expressions within code.
Coding Practices	Weaknesses in this category are related to coding practices that are deemed unsafe and increase the chances that an exploitable vulnerability will be present in the application. They may not directly introduce a vulnerability, but indicate the product has not been carefully developed or maintained.

2 | Findings

2.1 Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after analyzing Multi-Collateral Dai (MCD) implementation. During the first phase of our audit, we studied the MCD source code and ran our in-house static code analyzer through the codebase, including areas such as ERC20 tokens, CDPs, Dai Saving Rate (DSR), auctions, permissions, price oracle, and inter-contract actions. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by our tool. We further manually review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

Severity	# of Findings	
Critical	0	
High	1	■
Medium	1	■
Low	3	■■■
Informational	11	■■■■■■■■■■■
Total	16	

We have so far identified a list of potential issues: some of them involve subtle corner cases that might not be previously thought of, while others refer to unusual interactions among multiple contracts. For each uncovered issue, we have therefore developed test cases for reasoning, reproduction, and/or verification. After further analysis and internal discussion, we determined that 16 issues of varying severities need to be brought up and paid more attention to, which are categorized in the above table. More information can be found in the next subsection, and the detailed discussions of each of them are in Section 3.

2.2 Key Findings

Overall, these smart contracts are well-designed and engineered, though the implementation can be improved with the identified issues, including 1 high-severity vulnerability, 1 medium-severity vulnerability, 3 low-severity vulnerabilities and 11 informational recommendations, as shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Key Audit Findings

ID	Severity	Title	Category	Status
PVE-001	Informational	Potential DoS in Global Settlement	Business Logics	Resolved
PVE-002	Informational	Potential Divide-By-Zero in Spotter	Numeric Errors	Confirmed
PVE-003	Informational	Inconsistent Time Type in Debt Engine	Coding Practices	Resolved
PVE-004	Low	approve()/transferFrom() Race Condition	Time and State	Confirmed
PVE-005	Informational	Unhandled Auction Corner Cases	Business Logics	Confirmed
PVE-006	Informational	CDP Fork Restrictiveness	Coding Practices	Confirmed
PVE-007	Informational	Drip Efficiency Improvement	Coding Practices	Confirmed
PVE-008	Informational	Debt Auction Prevention	Business Logics	Resolved
PVE-009	Medium	Misadjusted CDP Cancellation	Behavioral Issues	Resolved
PVE-010	High	Auction Kick-Off Authorization	Business Logics	Resolved
PVE-011	Informational	Auction Tick Validity	Time and State	Confirmed
PVE-012	Low	Auction Deal Inconsistency	Business Logics	Resolved
PVE-013	Informational	Bloated Setter Interface	Coding Practices	Resolved
PVE-014	Informational	Missed Deployment Dependency Checks	Coding Practices	Confirmed
PVE-015	Low	Excessive Authorization in Deployment	Security Features	Resolved
PVE-016	Informational	Collateral Check in MCD CDP Manager	Coding Practices	Confirmed

Please refer to Section 3 for details.

3 Detailed Results

3.1 Potential Denial-of-Service in Global Settlement

- ID: PVE-001
- Severity: Informational
- Likelihood: High
- Impact: None
- Target: src/end.sol
- Category: Business Logics [20]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-754 [14]

Description

The sixth step of 'End', thaw(), is vulnerable to a potential denial-of-service attack when vat.dai(address(vow))> 0. Specifically, throughout the five steps before thaw(), only the cage() step subtracts vat.dai(address(vow)) by calling vow.cage() which calls vat.heal(). However, in the condition of vat.dai(address(vow))> vat.sin(address(vow)), vat.dai(address(vow)) would be greater than 0 after vow.cage(). This results in the termination of thaw() due to the vat.dai(address(vow))== 0 check. Another easier way to exploit this vulnerability is simply calling vat.move() to add some dai balance to vat.dai(address(vow)) right before thaw() is executed.

Specifically, while auditing the thaw() of end.sol, we find line 313 is vulnerable to a potential denial-of-service attack when the attacker intentionally makes vow have some dai balance in vat.

```
310 function thaw() external note {
311     require(live == 0);
312     require(debt == 0);
313     require(vat.dai(address(vow)) == 0);
314     require(now >= add(when, wait));
315     debt = vat.debt();
316 }
```

Listing 3.1: src/end.sol

In particular, if we examine the first five steps before thaw() in end.sol to find out where vat.dai(address(vow)) is modified. In the first step, cage(), vow.cage() is invoked in line 259.

```
253 function cage() external note auth {
254     require(live == 1);
255     live = 0;
256     when = now;
257     vat.cage();
258     cat.cage();
259     vow.cage();
260 }
```

Listing 3.2: src/end.sol

Inside `vow.cage()`, `vat.heal()` is called with the smaller value between `vat.dai(address(vow))` and `vat.sin(address(vow))` as the parameter (line 138).

```
132 function cage() external note auth {
133     live = 0;
134     Sin = 0;
135     Ash = 0;
136     flapper.cage(vat.dai(address(flapper)));
137     flopper.cage();
138     vat.heal(min(vat.dai(address(this)), vat.sin(address(this))));
139 }
```

Listing 3.3: src/vow.sol

Here comes the interesting part. In `vat.heal()`, if `vat.dai(address(vow))> vat.sin(address(vow))`, `vat.dai(address(vow))` would be greater than 0 (line 241).

```
238 function heal(uint rad) external note {
239     address u = msg.sender;
240     sin[u] = sub(sin[u], rad);
241     dai[u] = sub(dai[u], rad);
242     vice   = sub(vice,   rad);
243     debt   = sub(debt,   rad);
244 }
```

Listing 3.4: src/vat.sol

In the following steps, `cage(ilk)`, `skip()`, `skim()`, `free()`, `vat.dai(address(vow))` is NOT subtracted but only added (e.g., `skip()` calls `vat.suck()`). As a result, the `vat.dai(address(vow))> 0` condition would not be changed until reaching `thaw()`, which leads to the termination of 'End' process.

Alternatively, another easier way to exploit this vulnerability is calling `vat.move(msg.sender, vow, 1)` in the case of `vat.dai[msg.sender] >= 1` before `thaw()` is triggered. Specifically, when the attacker has `vat.dai[msg.sender] >= 1`, she can easily move 1 dai balance to vow in vat (line 146-147). The only thing prevents this is the `require(wish(src, msg.sender))` check in line 145.

```
144 function move(address src, address dst, uint256 rad) external note {
145     require(wish(src, msg.sender));
146     dai[src] = sub(dai[src], rad);
147     dai[dst] = add(dai[dst], rad);
```

```
148 }
```

Listing 3.5: src/vat.sol

However, the check can be easily bypassed when `src == msg.sender` (i.e., the `bit == usr` case in line 31).

```
30 function wish(address bit, address usr) internal view returns (bool) {
31     return either(bit == usr, can[bit][usr] == 1);
32 }
```

Listing 3.6: src/vat.sol

To sum up, either the system is in the condition of `vat.dai(address(vow))> vat.sin(address(vow))` or the attacker intentionally calls `vat.move(msg.sender, vow, 1)` before thaw() is executed, the 'End' process might not be as smooth as expected because of this issue.

Fortunately, such attack can be effectively alleviated by calling `vow.heal()` right before the `thaw()` within the same transaction. In particular, the keeper responsible for the 'End' process needs to call `vow.heal()` right before the `thaw()` and needs to call it in the same transaction. This effectively becomes an operation issue that should be kept in mind when initiating the 'End' process. While we consider the severity lowered to be informational, it is strongly recommended to add this issue into related memos for proper 'End' operations.

Recommendation Alleviate the issue by combining a `vow.heal()` call in the same transaction as the `thaw()`.

3.2 Potential Divide-By-Zero in Spotter

- ID: PVE-002
- Severity: Informational
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: None
- Target: src/spot.sol
- Category: Numeric Errors [21]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-369 [8]

Description

The poke() function in spot.sol does not validate par and ilks[ilk].mat before dividing something by them respectively. Since the existence of file() functions for setting par and ilks[ilk].mat, this could lead to divide by zero exceptions.

In particular, while auditing poke(), we notice that there are two rdiv operations in line 84. However, neither of them check the divide by zero cases, leaving the EVM reverts without useful information.

```
82 function poke(bytes32 ilk) external {
83     (bytes32 val, bool zzz) = ilks[ilk].pip.peek();
84     if (zzz) {
85         uint256 spot = rdiv(rdiv(mul(uint(val), 10 ** 9), par), ilks[ilk].mat);
86         vat.file(ilk, "spot", spot);
87         emit Poke(ilk, val, spot);
88     }
89 }
```

Listing 3.7: src/spot.sol

Recommendation Alter the poke() function in Spotter to explicitly check the validity of rdiv operands as follows:

```
82 function poke(bytes32 ilk) external {
83     (bytes32 val, bool zzz) = ilks[ilk].pip.peek();
84     if (zzz) {
85         require(par > 0, "spot/invalid-par");
86         require(ilks[ilk.mat] > 0, "spot/invalid-ilk");
87         uint256 spot = rdiv(rdiv(mul(uint(val), 10 ** 9), par), ilks[ilk].mat);
88         vat.file(ilk, "spot", spot);
89         emit Poke(ilk, val, spot);
90     }
91 }
```

Listing 3.8: Revised src/spot.sol

3.3 Inconsistent Time Type in Debt Engine

- ID: PVE-003
- Severity: Informational
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: None
- Target: `src/vow.sol`
- Category: Coding Practices [18]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-474 [10]

Description

In `vow.sol`, the `uint256` variable, `wait`, is used to represent a specific time. However, other similar variables such as `ttl` and `tau` are declared with the type `uint48` in flop.sol.

The `wait` variable declared in vow.sol is an `uint256` (line 57).

```
48 // --- Data ---
49 VatLike public vat;
50 Flapper public flapper;
51 Flopper public flopper;

53 mapping (uint256 => uint256) public sin; // debt queue
54 uint256 public Sin;   // queued debt          [rad]
55 uint256 public Ash;   // on-auction debt      [rad]

57 uint256 public wait;  // flop delay           [rad]
58 uint256 public sump;  // flop fixed lot size  [rad]
59 uint256 public bump;  // flap fixed lot size  [rad]
60 uint256 public hump;  // surplus buffer       [rad]
```

Listing 3.9: src/vow.sol

As shown in line 100, `wait` is used to represent a specific time.

```
99  function flog(uint era) external note {
100     require(add(era, wait) <= now);
101     Sin = sub(Sin, sin[era]);
102     sin[era] = 0;
103 }
```

Listing 3.10: src/vow.sol

However, in flop.sol, `ttl` and `tau` are declared as `uint48` variables but also used to represent time such as line 115.

```
112 function tick(uint id) external note {
113     require(bids[id].end < now);
114     require(bids[id].tic == 0);
115     bids[id].end = add(uint48(now), tau);
116 }
```

Listing 3.11: src/flop.sol

Recommendation Reflect `wait` with proper type casting such as line 87 in the following:

```
86 function file(bytes32 what, uint data) external note auth {
87     if (what == "wait") wait = uint(uint48(data));
88     if (what == "bump") bump = data;
89     if (what == "sump") sump = data;
90     if (what == "hump") hump = data;
91 }
```

Listing 3.12: Revised src/vow.sol

3.4 approve()/transferFrom() Race Condition

- ID: PVE-004
- Severity: Low
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: Medium
- Target: `src/dai.sol`
- Category: Time and State [17]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-362 [7]

Description

There is a known race condition issue regarding `approve()` / `transferFrom()` [3]. Specifically, when a user intends to reduce the allowed spending amount previously approved from, say, 10 DAI to 1 DAI. The previously approved spender might race to transfer the amount you initially approved (the 10 DAI) and then additionally spend the new amount you just approved (1 DAI). This breaks the user's intention of restricting the spender to the new amount, **not** the sum of old amount and new amount.

With the introduction of new `approve()`-style `permit()` and `transferFrom()`-style `push()`/`pull()`/`move()`, it apparently raises the concern of possible race conditions. To alleviate such concern, it is recommended to apply a known workaround (e.g., `increaseApproval()`/`decreaseApproval()`) and further add necessary sanity checks when entering the `approve()` function.

```
98     function approve(address usr, uint wad) external returns (bool) {
99         allowance[msg.sender][usr] = wad;
100        emit Approval(msg.sender, usr, wad);
101        return true;
102    }
```

Listing 3.13: src/dai.sol

Recommendation Add additional sanity checks in `approve()` and workaround functions `increaseApproval()`/`decreaseApproval()`.

```
98     function approve(address usr, uint wad) external returns (bool) {
99         require(wad == 0 || allowance[msg.sender][usr] == 0);
```

```
100         allowance[msg.sender][usr] = wad;
101         emit Approval(msg.sender, usr, wad);
102         return true;
103     }
104     function increaseApproval(address usr, uint wad) external returns (bool) {
105         allowance[msg.sender][usr] = add(allowance[msg.sender][usr], (wad));
106         emit Approval(msg.sender, usr, allowance[msg.sender][usr]);
107         return true;
108     }
109     function decreaseApproval(address usr, uint wad) external returns (bool) {
110         allowance[msg.sender][usr] = sub(allowance[msg.sender][usr], (wad));
111         emit Approval(msg.sender, usr, allowance[msg.sender][usr]);
112         return true;
113     }
```

Listing 3.14: Revised src/dai.sol

3.5 Unhandled Auction Corner Cases

- ID: PVE-005
- Severity: Informational
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: None
- Target: `src/{flip, flop, flap}.sol`
- Category: Business Logics [20]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-754 [14]

Description

The MCD introduces three types of auctions: `flip`, `flop`, and `flap`. The `flip` auction, known as the collateral auction, is used to sell off collateral from risky CDP positions in exchange for borrowed DAIs. The `flop` auction, known as the deficit auction, is used to cover underwater debt by selling off a fixed amount (`sump`) of DAI deficit at a time, resulting in diluted MKR valuation. The `flap` auction, known as the surplus auction, is used to auction off a fixed amount (`bump`) of DAI surplus at a time, resulting in increased MKR valuation.

In the current implementation, these three types of auctions share certain timing-related corner cases that have not be covered yet. Using the `flip` auction as an example, the auction has two termination conditions: either when `tau` seconds (initially `2 days`) have passed from the moment the auction was initiated, or when `ttl` seconds (initially `3 hours`) have passed from the moment the last bid was placed. Once each termination condition is met, `flip` will not accept any more bids, effectively considering the last bidder winning and allowing it to claim the auctioned collateral. Both `tau` and `ttl` are risk parameters, initially set to be `2 days` and `3 hours` respectively, but reconfigurable through governance (e.g., via the `file` interface).

Note that `flip` does not cover two particular auction moments, either when `bids[id].tic = now` or `bids[id].end = now`. The first moment refers to the exact moment when the last bid expires and the second moment refers to the exact moment when the auction expires (e.g., reaching the allowed time period). `flip` can be explicitly designed to either accept or deny any bids arrived in these two particular moments. Current `flip` seems to implicitly deny such last-minute bids. With that, the `deal()` should be allowed to claim the auctioned collateral starting from the very moment inclusively, not exclusively (current case).

```
127     function tend(uint id, uint lot, uint bid) external note {
128         require(bids[id].guy != address(0));
129         require(bids[id].tic > now || bids[id].tic == 0);
130         require(bids[id].end > now);
131         ...
132     }
```

Listing 3.15: src/flip.sol::tend()

```
144     function dent(uint id, uint lot, uint bid) external note {
145         require(bids[id].guy != address(0));
146         require(bids[id].tic > now || bids[id].tic == 0);
147         require(bids[id].end > now);
148         ...
149     }
```

Listing 3.16: src/flip.sol::dent()

```
161     function deal(uint id) external note {
162         require(bids[id].tic != 0 && (bids[id].tic < now || bids[id].end < now));
163         ...
164     }
```

Listing 3.17: src/flip.sol::deal()

Recommendation Cover these corner cases by either allowing last-minute bids on these particular moments in `flip.tend()`, `flip.dent()`, `flop.dent()`, and `flap.tend()` or allowing the immediate deal settlement in `flip.deal()`, `flop.deal()`, and `flap.deal()`. The latter requires minimal coding changes and has small tangible implication, and thus is strongly preferred. The required changes are shown in the following. Note this applies to `flip.deal()`, `flop.deal()`, and `flap.deal()`.

```
161     function deal(uint id) external note {
162         require(bids[id].tic != 0 && (bids[id].tic <= now || bids[id].end <= now));
163         ...
164     }
```

Listing 3.18: Revised src/flip.sol::deal()

3.6 CDP Fork Restrictiveness

- ID: PVE-006
- Severity: Informational
- Likelihood: High
- Impact: None
- Target: `src/vat.sol`
- Category: Coding Practices [18]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-474 [10]

Description

`vat` supports CDP fungibility (via `fork()`) by allowing the movement of related collateral and debt between two CDPs. The movement is granted on the condition that both `src` and `dst` consent the initiator, i.e., `msg.sender`. This condition can be relaxed such that either the affected CDP becomes more safe, or the owner consents. The relaxed condition shares the same spirit with the sanity check conditions (i.e., `require(either(both(dart <= 0, dink >= 0), wish(u, msg.sender)))`) applied in CDP-manipulating `frob()` in line 181.

```
197     function fork(bytes32 ilk, address src, address dst, int dink, int dart) external
            note {
198         Urn storage u = urns[ilk][src];
199         Urn storage v = urns[ilk][dst];
200         Ilk storage i = ilks[ilk];

202         u.ink = sub(u.ink, dink);
203         u.art = sub(u.art, dart);
204         v.ink = add(v.ink, dink);
205         v.art = add(v.art, dart);

207         uint utab = mul(u.art, i.rate);
208         uint vtab = mul(v.art, i.rate);

210         // both sides consent
211         require(wish(src, msg.sender) && wish(dst, msg.sender));

213         // both sides safe
214         require(utab <= mul(u.ink, i.spot));
215         require(vtab <= mul(v.ink, i.spot));

217         // both sides non-dusty
218         require(utab >= i.dust || u.art == 0);
219         require(vtab >= i.dust || v.art == 0);
220     }
```

Listing 3.19: src/vat.sol

Recommendation Relax the restrictive src-and-dst-consenting condition to either the affected CDP becomes more safe or the owner consents (in `fork()`).

```
197     function fork(bytes32 ilk, address src, address dst, int dink, int dart) external
            note {
198         Urn storage u = urns[ilk][src];
199         Urn storage v = urns[ilk][dst];
200         Ilk storage i = ilks[ilk];

202         u.ink = sub(u.ink, dink);
203         u.art = sub(u.art, dart);
204         v.ink = add(v.ink, dink);
205         v.art = add(v.art, dart);

207         uint utab = mul(u.art, i.rate);
208         uint vtab = mul(v.art, i.rate);

210         // src urn is either more safe, or src owner consents
211         require(either(both(dart <= 0, dink >= 0), wish(src, msg.sender)));
212         // dst urn is either more safe, or dst owner consents
213         require(either(both(dart >= 0, dink <= 0), wish(dst, msg.sender)));

215         // both sides safe
216         require(utab <= mul(u.ink, i.spot));
217         require(vtab <= mul(v.ink, i.spot));

219         // both sides non-dusty
220         require(utab >= i.dust || u.art == 0);
221         require(vtab >= i.dust || v.art == 0);
222     }
```

Listing 3.20: Revised src/vat.sol

3.7 Drip Efficiency Improvement

- ID: PVE-007
- Severity: Informational
- Likelihood: High
- Impact: None
- Target: `src/{jug.sol, pot.sol}`
- Category: Coding Practices [18]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-1164 [5]

Description

Both `jug` and `pot` contracts implement the `drip()` op to collect either stability fees or saving interests. Note that the operation records the last collection time in `rho`. And the operation will proceed when `require(now >= ilks[ilk].rho)` (in `jug.drip()`) or `require(now >= rho)` (in `pot.drip()`). The `drip()` can be further improved by changing the `require()` to `if` condition: `if (ilks[ilk].rho >= now) return ;` (in `jug.drip()`) or `if (rho >= now) return;` (in `pot.drip()`).

One benefit is to avoid unnecessary friction potentially caused by `require()` (that might revert ongoing transaction). The second benefit is the improved gas efficiency by avoiding unnecessary computations and inter-contract calls.

```
95      // --- Stability Fee Collection ---
96      function drip(bytes32 ilk) external note {
97          require(now >= ilks[ilk].rho);
98          VatLike.Ilk memory i = vat.ilks(ilk);
99          vat.fold(ilk, vow, diff(rmul(rpow(add(base, ilks[ilk].duty), now - ilks[ilk].rho
        , ONE), i.rate), i.rate));
100         ilks[ilk].rho = now;
101     }
```

Listing 3.21: src/jug.sol

```
124     // --- Savings Rate Accumulation ---
125     function drip() external note {
126         require(now >= rho);
127         uint chi_ = sub(rmul(rpow(dsr, now - rho, ONE), chi), chi);
128         chi = add(chi, chi_);
129         rho = now;
130         vat.suck(address(vow), address(this), mul(Pie, chi_));
131     }
```

Listing 3.22: src/pot.sol

Recommendation Improve the `drip()` efficiency by removing the = in the required condition. Moreover, replace `require` accordingly with `if` to avoid introducing unnecessary frictions.

```
95      // --- Stability Fee Collection ---
96      function drip(bytes32 ilk) external note {
97          if (ilks[ilk].rho >= now) return;
98          VatLike.Ilk memory i = vat.ilks(ilk);
99          vat.fold(ilk, vow, diff(rmul(rpow(add(base, ilks[ilk].duty), now - ilks[ilk].rho
        , ONE), i.rate), i.rate));
100         ilks[ilk].rho = now;
101     }
```

Listing 3.23: Revised src/jug.sol

```
124     // --- Savings Rate Accumulation ---
125     function drip() external note {
126         if (rho >= now) return;
127         uint chi_ = sub(rmul(rpow(dsr, now - rho, ONE), chi), chi);
128         chi = add(chi, chi_);
129         rho = now;
130         vat.suck(address(vow), address(this), mul(Pie, chi_));
131     }
```

Listing 3.24: Revised src/pot.sol

3.8 Debt Auction Prevention

- ID: PVE-008
- Severity: Informational
- Likelihood: High
- Impact: None
- Target: src/vow.sol
- Category: Business Logics [20]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-754 [14]

Description

The debt engine, vow, is vulnerable to a potential denial-of-service attack when vat.dai(address(vow)) > 0. This is a similar issue with PVE-001, but in a much more realistic context. Specifically, flop() is the function that kicks off a debt deficit auction. However, the kick-off requires vat.dai(address(this)) = 0 where this is vow itself. Similar to PVE-001, if someone attempts to deposit some tiny dai amount to make vat.dai(address(vow)) > 0, which effectively prevents the debt auction from proceeding.

Fortunately, such issue can be effectively alleviated by calling vow.heal() right before the flop() within the same transaction, hence the severity is similarly lowered to informational. However, it is strongly recommended to add this issue into related memos for proper auction flop() operations.

```
118     // Debt auction
119     function flop() external note returns (uint id) {
120         require(sump <= sub(sub(vat.sin(address(this)), Sin), Ash));
121         require(vat.dai(address(this)) == 0);
122         Ash = add(Ash, sump);
123         id = flopper.kick(address(this), uint(-1), sump);
124     }
```

Listing 3.25: src/vow.sol

Recommendation Alleviate the issue by combining with a vow.heal() call in the same transaction as the flop().

3.9 Misadjusted CDP Cancellation

- ID: PVE-009
- Severity: Medium
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: High
- Target: src/end.sol
- Category: Behavioral Issues [19]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-440 [9]

Description

The fourth step of 'End', skim(), is designed to cancel current CDPs. It basically grab()s away current CDP debt with the goal of converting all art to sin. Note the owed debt is calculated and saved in the local owe variable, i.e., owe = rmul(rmul(u.art, i.rate), tag[ilk]) (line 294 in end.sol). However, it misses the par factor, the reference price feed per dai, leading to debt misadjustment in CDP Cancellation.

```
289     function skim(bytes32 ilk, address urn) external note {
290         require(tag[ilk] != 0);
291         VatLike.Ilk memory i = vat.ilks(ilk);
292         VatLike.Urn memory u = vat.urns(ilk, urn);
293
294         uint owe = rmul(rmul(u.art, i.rate), tag[ilk]);
295         uint wad = min(u.ink, owe);
296         gap[ilk] = add(gap[ilk], sub(owe, wad));
297
298         require(wad <= 2**255 && u.art <= 2**255);
299         vat.grab(ilk, urn, address(this), address(vow), -int(wad), -int(u.art));
300     }
```

Listing 3.26: src/end.sol

Recommendation Reconsider the associated , i.e., par, in the calculation of owed debt when canceling CDPs.

3.10 Auction Kick-Off Authorization

- ID: PVE-010
- Severity: High
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: High
- Target: src/{flip, flap}.sol
- Category: Business Logics [20]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-862 [15]

Description

As mentioned in Section 3.5, MCD has three types of auctions: flip, flop, and flap. The flip auction, known as the collateral auction, is used to sell off collateral from risky CDP positions in exchange for borrowed DAIs. The kick-off is initiated when a keeper calls cat.bite(). The flop auction, known as the deficit auction, is used to cover underwater debt by selling off a fixed amount (sump) of DAI deficit at a time, resulting in diluted MKR valuation. The kick-off is initiated when a keeper calls vow.flop(). The flap auction, known as the surplus auction, is used to auction off a fixed amount (bump) of DAI surplus at a time, resulting in increased MKR valuation. The kick-off should be initiated when a keeper calls vow.flap().

We emphasize that the kick-offs of these three auctions should only be initiated from cat.bite(), vow.flop(), and vow.flap() respectively. In other words, there is a need to add necessary authorization to ensure that related kick()s are only called from these trusted contracts. Note that the current code base only has the required authorization in place for flop.kick(), but not flip.kick() and flap.kick(). If there is no such authorization, it is possible to inject crafted auctions that will be later finalized in deal to cause asset loss or manipulation.

To elaborate, the crafted auctions via flap.kick() injection, once finalized in flap.deal(), could lead to gem.burn(address(this), bids[id].bid) -- line 135 in flap.sol where the burned amount bids[id].bid is directly controlled by the attacker. Note this attack might be readily launched without much cost (basically transaction gas fee) and could seriously affect MKR valuation and even the stability of entire DAI surplus auction subsystem.

Specifically, an attacker could simply kick off (via flap.kick()) a honeypot auction (e.g., initialized with an extremely high 1,000MRK bid for a very low 0.01DAI lot). This honeypot auction will not likely attract any external bidders (including bots) as it does not appear to be profitable. Until the auction expires, say, 2 days later, the attacker could simply call flap.deal() to finalize the auction. Due to the issue identified in PVE-013 (Section 3.12), the honeypot auction will be successfully closed, but the closed deal() will cause the auction subsystem to burn (via gem.burn()) the amount of MKR specified in the honeypot auction (as far as it is less than the amount held by the flap auction subsystem at the moment when deal() is being closed). The burnt MKR amount leads to a direct loss of flap auction subsystem and could cascading impact other ongoing surplus auctions. We consider this a

high-severity issue since the difficulty of launching this attack is very low, but the impact of causing MKR loss and disrupting normal surplus auctions is quite serious!

For the crafted auctions via `flip.kick()` injection, it may not immediately lead to materialized cost as the `flip.deal()` simply "returns" back the collateralized asset. But if such auction is injected right before 'End', such auction will be trusted by 'End' and the claimed `bids[id].bid` (controlled by injector) will be "credited", effectively stealing assets through 'End'.

During our investigation, we also notice that both `flip` and `flop` auctions have the `tick` mechanism that can be used to re-start (or extend) the auction if there is no bid received yet. If `tick` is designed to be callable by any entity (likely the first bidder), there is no need to add authorization. However, if it is intended for specific auction entity, there is a need to add similar authorization. It is our understanding that the former is the case, i.e., `tick` is designed to be callable by any entity.

```
103     // --- Auction ---
104     function kick(address usr, address gal, uint tab, uint lot, uint bid)
105         public returns (uint id)
106     {
107         require(kicks < uint(-1));
108         id = ++kicks;
109
110         bids[id].bid = bid;
111         bids[id].lot = lot;
112         bids[id].guy = msg.sender; // configurable??
113         bids[id].end = add(uint48(now), tau);
114         bids[id].usr = usr;
115         bids[id].gal = gal;
116         bids[id].tab = tab;
117
118         vat.flux(ilk, msg.sender, address(this), lot);
119
120         emit Kick(id, lot, bid, tab, usr, gal);
121     }
122     function tick(uint id) external note {
123         require(bids[id].end < now);
124         require(bids[id].tic == 0);
125         bids[id].end = add(uint48(now), tau);
126     }
```

Listing 3.27: src/flip.sol

```
 99     // --- Auction ---
100     function kick(address gal, uint lot, uint bid) external auth returns (uint id) {
101         require(live == 1);
102         require(kicks < uint(-1));
103         id = ++kicks;
104
105         bids[id].bid = bid;
106         bids[id].lot = lot;
107         bids[id].guy = gal;
108         bids[id].end = add(uint48(now), tau);
```

```
110         emit Kick(id, lot, bid, gal);
111     }
112     function tick(uint id) external note {
113         require(bids[id].end < now);
114         require(bids[id].tic == 0);
115         bids[id].end = add(uint48(now), tau);
116     }
```

Listing 3.28: src/flop.sol

```
98      // --- Auction ---
99      function kick(uint lot, uint bid) external returns (uint id) {
100         require(live == 1);
101         require(kicks < uint(-1));
102         id = ++kicks;

104         bids[id].bid = bid;
105         bids[id].lot = lot;
106         bids[id].guy = msg.sender; // configurable??
107         bids[id].end = add(uint48(now), tau);

109         vat.move(msg.sender, address(this), lot);

111         emit Kick(id, lot, bid);
112     }
```

Listing 3.29: src/flap.sol

Recommendation Add necessary authorization to ensure auctions are `kick()`'ed-off from trusted contracts, i.e., `cat` and `vow` respectively.

```
103     // --- Auction ---
104     function kick(address usr, address gal, uint tab, uint lot, uint bid)
105         public auth returns (uint id)
106     {
107         require(kicks < uint(-1));
108         id = ++kicks;

110         bids[id].bid = bid;
111         bids[id].lot = lot;
112         bids[id].guy = msg.sender; // configurable??
113         bids[id].end = add(uint48(now), tau);
114         bids[id].usr = usr;
115         bids[id].gal = gal;
116         bids[id].tab = tab;

118         vat.flux(ilk, msg.sender, address(this), lot);

120         emit Kick(id, lot, bid, tab, usr, gal);
121     }
```

Listing 3.30: Revised src/flip.sol

```
98      // --- Auction ---
99      function kick(uint lot, uint bid) external auth returns (uint id) {
100         require(live == 1);
101         require(kicks < uint(-1));
102         id = ++kicks;
104         bids[id].bid = bid;
105         bids[id].lot = lot;
106         bids[id].guy = msg.sender; // configurable??
107         bids[id].end = add(uint48(now), tau);
109         vat.move(msg.sender, address(this), lot);
111         emit Kick(id, lot, bid);
112     }
```

Listing 3.31: Revised src/flap.sol

3.11 Auction Tick Validity

- ID: PVE-011
- Severity: Informational
- Likelihood: High
- Impact: None
- Target: `src/{flip, flop}.sol`
- Category: Time and State [17]
- CWE subcategory: CVE-668 [13]

Description

As mentioned in PVE-011 (Section 3.10), both `flip` and `flop` auctions have the `tick` mechanism that can be used to re-start (or extend) the auction if there is no bid received yet. And `tick` is designed to be callable by any entity and thus does not require `auth` protection.

However, current `tick` mechanism does not validate whether the given auction ID exists yet and, once called, will simply set the given auction's total auction time. Note the given auction must not receive any bids yet, and the current implementation allows those upcoming, but not present yet, auctions as well.

```
122     function tick(uint id) external note {
123         require(bids[id].end < now);
124         require(bids[id].tic == 0);
125         bids[id].end = add(uint48(now), tau);
126     }
```

Listing 3.32: src/flip.sol

Specifically, if we take a look at the `tick` implementation in `flip.sol`, current sanity checks verify the `require(bids[id].end < now)` and `require(bids[id].tic == 0)`. Both succeed as for a non-present

auction, the `end` field and the `tic` field hold the default 0. Therefore, the non-present auction's end time is now pre-set. Fortunately, when the upcoming auction is kicked-off, `kick` will reset the auction end time, neutralizing previous effect.

Our assessment indicates this might not be an intended behavior, and though no harmful impact or exploitation have been identified yet, it is still recommended to add necessary validity check inside `tick()` function.

Recommendation Validate the auction ID when entering `tick()`. This applies to `flip.tick()` and `flop.tick()`

```
122     function tick(uint id) external note {
123         require(bids[id].guy != address(0));
124         require(bids[id].end < now);
125         require(bids[id].tic == 0);
126         bids[id].end = add(uint48(now), tau);
127     }
```

Listing 3.33: Revised src/flip.sol

```
112     function tick(uint id) external note {
113         require(bids[id].guy != address(0));
114         require(bids[id].end < now);
115         require(bids[id].tic == 0);
116         bids[id].end = add(uint48(now), tau);
117     }
```

Listing 3.34: Revised src/flop.sol

3.12 Auction Deal Inconsistency

- ID: PVE-012
- Severity: Low
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: Low
- Target: `src/{flop, flap}.sol`
- Category: Business Logics [20]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-754 [14]

Description

To finalize an auction, the `deal` mechanism is implemented in `flip`, `flap`, and `flop`. However, in `flip.deal()`, the sanity checks are subtly inconsistent with those in `flap.deal()` and `flop.deal()`.

```
161     function deal(uint id) external note {
162         require(bids[id].tic != 0 && (bids[id].tic < now || bids[id].end < now));
163         vat.flux(ilk, address(this), bids[id].guy, bids[id].lot);
164         delete bids[id];
```

```
165     }
```

Listing 3.35: src/flip.sol

In particular, in `flip.deal():162`, `bids[id].tic != 0` is a necessary condition to enter `flip.deal()`. Then, either `bids[id].tic < now` or `bids[id].end < now` can pass the sanity checks.

```
130     function deal(uint id) external note {
131         require(live == 1);
132         require(bids[id].tic < now && bids[id].tic != 0 ||
133                 bids[id].end < now);
134         vat.move(address(this), bids[id].guy, bids[id].lot);
135         gem.burn(address(this), bids[id].bid);
136         delete bids[id];
137     }
```

Listing 3.36: src/flap.sol

```
133     function deal(uint id) external note {
134         require(live == 1);
135         require(bids[id].tic < now && bids[id].tic != 0 ||
136                 bids[id].end < now);
137         gem.mint(bids[id].guy, bids[id].lot);
138         delete bids[id];
139     }
```

Listing 3.37: src/flop.sol

However, in `flap.deal():132-133` and `flop.deal():135-136`, the sanity checks allows any `bids[id]` with `bids[id].end < now` to pass the checks, which is inconsistent with the implementation of `flip.deal()`. As discussed in Section 3.10, such inconsistency can be exploited together with PVE-011 to cause damages to the surplus auction subsystem.

Furthermore, an attacker can use a non-present `id` to trigger `flap.deal()` and `flop.deal()` due to the fact that `bids[id].end < now` is always true for non-present `id` (i.e., `bids[id].end` is 0). This also has the noisy side-effect of generating non-meaningful events (e.g., `Transfer` events generated by `gem.burn()` with zero amount).

Recommendation Make the sanity checks of `flap.deal()` and `flop.deal()` consistent with `flip.deal()` as follows:

```
130     function deal(uint id) external note {
131         require(live == 1);
132         require(bids[id].tic != 0 && (bids[id].tic < now || bids[id].end < now));
133         vat.move(address(this), bids[id].guy, bids[id].lot);
134         gem.burn(address(this), bids[id].bid);
135         delete bids[id];
136     }
```

Listing 3.38: Revised src/flap.sol

```
133     function deal(uint id) external note {
134         require(live == 1);
135         require(bids[id].tic != 0 && (bids[id].tic < now || bids[id].end < now));
136         gem.mint(bids[id].guy, bids[id].lot);
137         delete bids[id];
138     }
```

Listing 3.39: Revised src/flop.sol

3.13 Bloated Setter Interface

- ID: PVE-013
- Severity: Informational
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: None
- Target: dss-deploy/src/govActions.sol
- Category: Coding Practices [18]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-561 [11]

Description

The `Setter` interface defines a common way to set up various risk parameters agreed upon through governance. Currently, there are 7 variants of `file` ops defined in `Setter`. However, among the 7 variants, the following 3 are not used in MCD: `function file(address) public`, `function file(uint) public`, and `function file(bytes32, bytes32) public`. These unused interfaces unnecessarily complicate the abstraction and understanding, and therefore are suggested for removal.

```
3  contract Setter {
4      function file(address) public;
5      function file(uint) public;
6      function file(bytes32, address) public;
7      function file(bytes32, uint) public;
8      function file(bytes32, bytes32) public;
9      function file(bytes32, bytes32, uint) public;
10     function file(bytes32, bytes32, address) public;
11     function rely(address) public;
12     function deny(address) public;
13     function init(bytes32) public;
14 }
```

Listing 3.40: dss-deploy/src/govActions.sol

Accordingly, on top of the `Setter.file()` interface, `GovActions` defines 7 related `file` high-level abstraction ops. And 3 of them are similarly unused in this MCD.

```
26 contract GovActions {
27     function file(address who, address data) public {
28         Setter(who).file(data);
29     }
```

```
31      function file(address who, uint data) public {
32          Setter(who).file(data);
33      }

35      function file(address who, bytes32 what, address data) public {
36          Setter(who).file(what, data);
37      }

39      function file(address who, bytes32 what, uint data) public {
40          Setter(who).file(what, data);
41      }

43      function file(address who, bytes32 what, bytes32 data) public {
44          Setter(who).file(what, data);
45      }

47      function file(address who, bytes32 ilk, bytes32 what, uint data) public {
48          Setter(who).file(ilk, what, data);
49      }

51      function file(address who, bytes32 ilk, bytes32 what, address data) public {
52          Setter(who).file(ilk, what, data);
53      }
54      ...
55  }
```

Listing 3.41: dss-deploy/src/govActions.sol

Recommendation Assuming `Setter` and `govActions` are designed only for MCD, we suggest the previously-mentioned unused 3 `file` interfaces in both `Setter` and `govActions` can be removed.

3.14 Missed Deployment Dependency Checks

- ID: PVE-014
- Severity: Informational
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: None
- Target: `dss-deploy/src/DssDeploy.sol`
- Category: Coding Practices [18]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-1120 [4]

Description

During the deployment of various MCD modules, there are multiple required dependency checks to ensure that those modules used in this deployment are ready for use. However, we identified a few occasions where some of these dependency checks are missing:

```
252     function deployLiquidator() public auth {
```

```
253         require(address(vow) != address(0), "Missing previous step");

255         // Deploy
256         cat = catFab.newCat(address(vat));

258         // Internal references set up
259         cat.file("vow", address(vow));

261         // Internal auth
262         vat.rely(address(cat));
263         vow.rely(address(cat));
264     }
```

Listing 3.42: src/DssDeploy.sol

In `deployLiquidator()`, `vat` is used in line 256 to deploy `cat` but the dependency check for `address(vat)` is missing.

```
266     function deployShutdown(address gov, address pit, uint256 min) public auth {
267         require(address(cat) != address(0), "Missing previous step");

269         // Deploy
270         end = endFab.newEnd();

272         // Internal references set up
273         end.file("vat", address(vat));
274         end.file("cat", address(cat));
275         end.file("vow", address(vow));
276         end.file("pot", address(pot));
277         end.file("spot", address(spotter));

279         // Internal auth
280         vat.rely(address(end));
281         cat.rely(address(end));
282         vow.rely(address(end));
283         pot.rely(address(end));

285         // Deploy ESM
286         esm = new ESM(gov, address(end), address(pit), min);
287         end.rely(address(esm));
288     }
```

Listing 3.43: src/DssDeploy.sol

In `deployShutdown()`, `vat`, `vow`, `pot`, and `spotter`, are used in line 273-277, but the dependency checks for them are missing as well.

```
290     function deployPause(uint delay, DSAuthority authority) public auth {
291         require(address(dai) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
292         require(address(end) != address(0), "Missing previous step");

294         pause = pauseFab.newPause(delay, address(0), authority);
```

```
296         vat.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
297         cat.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
298         vow.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
299         jug.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
300         pot.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
301         spotter.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
302         flap.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
303         flop.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
304         end.rely(address(pause.proxy()));

306         this.setAuthority(authority);
307         this.setOwner(address(0));
308     }
```

Listing 3.44: src/DssDeploy.sol

In `deployPause()`, `vat`, `cat`, `vow`, `jug`, `pot`, `spotter`, `flap`, `flop` are used in line 296-303, but not checked for their presences at the beginning of the function.

```
310     function deployCollateral(bytes32 ilk, address adapter, address pip) public auth {
311         require(ilk != bytes32(""), "Missing ilk name");
312         require(adapter != address(0), "Missing adapter address");
313         require(pip != address(0), "Missing PIP address");
314         require(address(pause) != address(0), "Missing previous step");

316         // Deploy
317         ilks[ilk].flip = flipFab.newFlip(address(vat), ilk);
318         ilks[ilk].adapter = adapter;
319         Spotter(spotter).file(ilk, address(pip)); // Set pip

321         // Internal references set up
322         cat.file(ilk, "flip", address(ilks[ilk].flip));
323         vat.init(ilk);
324         jug.init(ilk);

326         // Internal auth
327         vat.rely(adapter);
328         ilks[ilk].flip.rely(address(end));
329         ilks[ilk].flip.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
330     }
```

Listing 3.45: src/DssDeploy.sol

In `deployCollateral()`, `cat`, `vat`, `jug` are used in line 322-324, but not checked before the usage.

Recommendation Add necessary dependency checks as follows:

```
252     function deployLiquidator() public auth {
253         require(address(vat) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
254         require(address(vow) != address(0), "Missing previous step");

256         // Deploy
257         cat = catFab.newCat(address(vat));
```

```
259         // Internal references set up
260         cat.file("vow", address(vow));
261
262         // Internal auth
263         vat.rely(address(cat));
264         vow.rely(address(cat));
265     }
```

Listing 3.46: Revised deployLiquidator()

```
266     function deployShutdown(address gov, address pit, uint256 min) public auth {
267         require(address(vat) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
268         require(address(cat) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
269         require(address(vow) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
270         require(address(pot) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
271         require(address(spotter) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
272
273         // Deploy
274         end = endFab.newEnd();
275
276         // Internal references set up
277         end.file("vat", address(vat));
278         end.file("cat", address(cat));
279         end.file("vow", address(vow));
280         end.file("pot", address(pot));
281         end.file("spot", address(spotter));
282
283         // Internal auth
284         vat.rely(address(end));
285         cat.rely(address(end));
286         vow.rely(address(end));
287         pot.rely(address(end));
288
289         // Deploy ESM
290         esm = new ESM(gov, address(end), address(pit), min);
291         end.rely(address(esm));
292     }
```

Listing 3.47: Revised deployShutdown()

```
290     function deployPause(uint delay, DSAuthority authority) public auth {
291         require(address(dai) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
292         require(address(end) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
293         require(address(vat) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
294         require(address(cat) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
295         require(address(vow) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
296         require(address(pot) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
297         require(address(spotter) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
298         require(address(flap) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
299         require(address(flop) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
```

```
301         pause = pauseFab.newPause(delay, address(0), authority);

303         vat.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
304         cat.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
305         vow.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
306         jug.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
307         pot.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
308         spotter.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
309         flap.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
310         flop.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
311         end.rely(address(pause.proxy()));

313         this.setAuthority(authority);
314         this.setOwner(address(0));
315     }
```

Listing 3.48: Revised deployPause()

```
310     function deployCollateral(bytes32 ilk, address adapter, address pip) public auth {
311         require(ilk != bytes32(""), "Missing ilk name");
312         require(adapter != address(0), "Missing adapter address");
313         require(pip != address(0), "Missing PIP address");
314         require(address(pause) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
315         require(address(cat) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
316         require(address(vat) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
317         require(address(jug) != address(0), "Missing previous step");

319         // Deploy
320         ilks[ilk].flip = flipFab.newFlip(address(vat), ilk);
321         ilks[ilk].adapter = adapter;
322         Spotter(spotter).file(ilk, address(pip)); // Set pip

324         // Internal references set up
325         cat.file(ilk, "flip", address(ilks[ilk].flip));
326         vat.init(ilk);
327         jug.init(ilk);

329         // Internal auth
330         vat.rely(adapter);
331         ilks[ilk].flip.rely(address(end));
332         ilks[ilk].flip.rely(address(pause.proxy()));
333     }
```

Listing 3.49: Revised deployCollateral ()

After the discussion with Maker Foundation, this issue has no impact because of the existence of variable dependencies which guarantee the order of deployment functions. For example, the `require(address(vow) != address(0))` check in `deployLiquidator()` ensures `deployTaxationAndAuctions()` was successfully executed with `vow` set before entering `deployLiquidator()`. Since `deployTaxationAndAuctions()` checks `require(address(vat) != address(0))`, `deployLiquidator()` does not need to check `vat`. However, this implementation makes it difficult to understand and/or maintain the software.

3.15 Excessive Authorization in Deployment

- ID: PVE-015
- Severity: Low
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: Low
- Target: `dss-deploy/src/DssDeploy.sol`
- Category: Security Features [16]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-287 [6]

Description

During the deployment of various MCD modules, the `rely()` mechanism is used to configure the trusted entities of a given contract. However, we identified some improper authorization settings:

```
229     function deployTaxationAndAuctions(address gov) public auth {
230         require(gov != address(0), "Missing GOV address");
231         require(address(vat) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
233         // Deploy
234         jug = jugFab.newJug(address(vat));
235         pot = potFab.newPot(address(vat));
236         flap = flapFab.newFlap(address(vat), gov);
237         flop = flopFab.newFlop(address(vat), gov);
238         vow = vowFab.newVow(address(vat), address(flap), address(flop));
240         // Internal references set up
241         jug.file("vow", address(vow));
242         pot.file("vow", address(vow));
244         // Internal auth
245         vat.rely(address(vow));
246         vat.rely(address(jug));
247         vat.rely(address(pot));
248         flap.rely(address(vow));
249         flop.rely(address(vow));
250     }
```

Listing 3.50: dss-deploy/src/DssDeploy.sol::deployTaxationAndAuctions()

As shown in the above code snippet, `vat` is set to trust `vow` to call its functions in line 245. However, if we look into the `vow` implementation, the only function of `vat` called by `vow` is `vat.heal()` which needs no authorization at all. In other words, there is no `auth` modifier in `vat.heal()` declaration.

```
238     function heal(uint rad) external note {
239         address u = msg.sender;
240         sin[u] = sub(sin[u], rad);
241         dai[u] = sub(dai[u], rad);
242         vice   = sub(vice,   rad);
243         debt   = sub(debt,   rad);
```

```
244     }
```

Listing 3.51: dss/src/vat.sol::heal()

We point out that the documented contract-level permission graph [2] contains the `rely` arrow from `vat` to `vow`, which could be removed for consistency.

```
266     function deployShutdown(address gov, address pit, uint256 min) public auth {
267         require(address(cat) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
268
269         // Deploy
270         end = endFab.newEnd();
271
272         // Internal references set up
273         end.file("vat", address(vat));
274         end.file("cat", address(cat));
275         end.file("vow", address(vow));
276         end.file("pot", address(pot));
277         end.file("spot", address(spotter));
278
279         // Internal auth
280         vat.rely(address(end));
281         cat.rely(address(end));
282         vow.rely(address(end));
283         pot.rely(address(end));
284
285         // Deploy ESM
286         esm = new ESM(gov, address(end), address(pit), min);
287         end.rely(address(esm));
288     }
```

Listing 3.52: dss/src/vat.sol::heal()

In addition, there exists another authorization setting that does not comply with the same permission graph. Specifically, in line 282, `vow` trusts `end` because of the need of calling `vow.cage()` when `end` kicks off its first step of **Global Settlement**. However, the permission graph misses one `rely` arrow from `vow` to `end`. This leads to inconsistency and brings unnecessary confusions for understanding.

Recommendation Remove the unnecessary `rely()` from `deployTaxationAndAuctions()` and accordingly fix the contract-level permission graph in [2] (with the addition of `rely` arrow from `vow` to `end` and the removal of `rely` arrow from `vat` to `vow`).

```
229     function deployTaxationAndAuctions(address gov) public auth {
230         require(gov != address(0), "Missing GOV address");
231         require(address(vat) != address(0), "Missing previous step");
232
233         // Deploy
234         jug = jugFab.newJug(address(vat));
235         pot = potFab.newPot(address(vat));
236         flap = flapFab.newFlap(address(vat), gov);
237         flop = flopFab.newFlop(address(vat), gov);
```

```
238         vow = vowFab.newVow(address(vat), address(flap), address(flop));

240         // Internal references set up
241         jug.file("vow", address(vow));
242         pot.file("vow", address(vow));

244         // Internal auth
245         vat.rely(address(jug));
246         vat.rely(address(pot));
247         flap.rely(address(vow));
248         flop.rely(address(vow));
249     }
```

Listing 3.53: Revised dss-deploy/src/DssDeploy.sol::deployTaxationAndAuctions()

3.16 Collateral Check in MCD CDP Manager

- ID: PVE-016
- Severity: Informational
- Likelihood: High
- Impact: None
- Target: `dss-cdp-manager/src/DssCdpManager.sol`
- Category: Coding Practices [18]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-628 [12]

Description

The `DssCdpManager` smart contract provides an interface to manage MCD-based CDPs in a way similar to manage SCD-based CDPs. However, when opening a CDP, it does not validate the provided collateral type, i.e., `ilk`. In other words, a user can open a CDP by providing an arbitrary `ilk`. As a result, current `DssCdpManager` implementation allows the opening of a basically non-functional CDP and defers the warning back to the owner until a later stage when the opened CDP is being operated (e.g., via `frob`). It is better to add sanity check up-front to ensure the provided collateral type is currently being supported in MCD.

```
108     // Open a new cdp for a given usr address.
109     function open(
110         bytes32 ilk,
111         address usr
112     ) public note returns (uint) {
113         require(usr != address(0), "usr-address-0");

115         cdpi = add(cdpi, 1);
116         urns[cdpi] = address(new UrnHandler(vat));
117         owns[cdpi] = usr;
```

```
118         ilks[cdpi] = ilk;

120         // Add new CDP to double linked list and pointers
121         if (first[usr] == 0) {
122             first[usr] = cdpi;
123         }
124         if (last[usr] != 0) {
125             list[cdpi].prev = last[usr];
126             list[last[usr]].next = cdpi;
127         }
128         last[usr] = cdpi;
129         count[usr] = add(count[usr], 1);

131         emit NewCdp(msg.sender, usr, cdpi);
132         return cdpi;
133     }
```

Listing 3.54: DssCdpManager.sol::open()

As shown in the above code snippet, the CDP is opened without checking the validity of `ilk`.

Recommendation Validate the provided collateral type `ilk` when a new MCD CDP is being opened. The validity can simply check whether the given `ilk` has been initialized yet in the MCD CDP engine `vat`.

```
6  contract VatLike {
7      function ilks(bytes32) public view returns (uint, uint, uint, uint, uint);
8      function urns(bytes32, address) public view returns (uint, uint);
9      function hope(address) public;
10     function flux(bytes32, address, address, uint) public;
11     function move(address, address, uint) public;
12     function frob(bytes32, address, address, address, int, int) public;
13     function fork(bytes32, address, address, int, int) public;
14 }


17     // Open a new cdp for a given usr address.
18     function open(
19         bytes32 ilk,
20         address usr
21     ) public note returns (uint) {
22         require(usr != address(0), "usr-address-0");

24         (, uint rate,,,) = vat.ilks(ilk);
25         require(rate != 0);

27         cdpi = add(cdpi, 1);
28         urns[cdpi] = address(new UrnHandler(vat));
29         owns[cdpi] = usr;
30         ilks[cdpi] = ilk;
```

```
32          // Add new CDP to double linked list and pointers
33          if (first[usr] == 0) {
34              first[usr] = cdpi;
35          }
36          if (last[usr] != 0) {
37              list[cdpi].prev = last[usr];
38              list[last[usr]].next = cdpi;
39          }
40          last[usr] = cdpi;
41          count[usr] = add(count[usr], 1);

43          emit NewCdp(msg.sender, usr, cdpi);
44          return cdpi;
45      }
```

Listing 3.55: Revised DssCdpManager.sol

3.17 Other Suggestions

Due to the fact that compiler upgrades might bring unexpected compatibility or inter-version consistencies, it is always suggested to use fixed compiler versions whenever possible. As an example, we highly encourage to explicitly indicate the Solidity compiler version, e.g., `pragma solidity 0.5.0;` instead of `pragma solidity ^0.5.0;`.

Moreover, we strongly suggest not to use experimental Solidity features or third-party unaudited libraries. If necessary, refactor current code base to only use stable features or trusted libraries. In case there is an absolute need of leveraging experimental features or integrating external libraries, make necessary contingency plans.

4 | Conclusion

In this audit, we have analyzed the Multi-Collateral Dai (MCD) implementation. During our auditing process, we are constantly impressed by the thinkings behind the Multi-Collateral Dai (MCD). It is indeed a rather complex system with various functionalities, but the entire system is cleanly designed and engineered. The related smart contracts are also neatly organized and elegantly implemented. Those identified issues are promptly confirmed and fixed.

Meanwhile, we emphasize that smart contracts are still in an early, but exciting stage of development. As disclaimed in Section 1.4, we greatly welcome any constructive feedbacks or suggestions regarding this report, including our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.

5 Appendix

5.1 Basic Coding Bugs

5.1.1 Constructor Mismatch

- Description: Whether the contract name and its constructor are not identical to each other.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Critical

5.1.2 Ownership Takeover

- Description: Whether the set owner function is not protected.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Critical

5.1.3 Redundant Fallback Function

- Description: Whether the contract has a redundant fallback function.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Critical

5.1.4 Overflows & Underflows

- Description: Whether the contract has general overflow or underflow vulnerabilities [24, 25, 26, 27, 29].
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Critical

5.1.5 Reentrancy

- Description: Reentrancy [30] is an issue when code can call back into your contract and change state, such as withdrawing ETHs.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Critical

5.1.6 Money-Giving Bug

- Description: Whether the contract returns funds to an arbitrary address.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: High

5.1.7 Blackhole

- Description: Whether the contract locks ETH indefinitely: merely in without out.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: High

5.1.8 Unauthorized Self-Destruct

- Description: Whether the contract can be killed by any arbitrary address.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Medium

5.1.9 Revert DoS

- Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to DoS attack because of unexpected `revert`.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Medium

5.1.10 Unchecked External `Call`

- Description: Whether the contract has any external `call` without checking the return value.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Medium

5.1.11 Gasless `Send`

- Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to gasless `send`.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Medium

5.1.12 `Send` Instead Of `Transfer`

- Description: Whether the contract uses `send` instead of `transfer`.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Medium

5.1.13 Costly Loop

- Description: Whether the contract has any costly loop which may lead to `Out-Of-Gas` exception.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Medium

5.1.14 (Unsafe) Use Of Untrusted Libraries

- Description: Whether the contract use any suspicious libraries.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Medium

5.1.15 (Unsafe) Use Of Predictable Variables

- Description: Whether the contract contains any randomness variable, but its value can be predicated.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Medium

5.1.16 Transaction Ordering Dependence

- Description: Whether the final state of the contract depends on the order of the transactions.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Medium

5.1.17 Deprecated Uses

- Description: Whether the contract use the deprecated `tx.origin` to perform the authorization.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Medium

5.2 Semantic Consistency Checks

- Description: Whether the semantic of the white paper is different from the implementation of the contract.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Critical

5.3 Additional Recommendations

5.3.1 Avoid Use of Variadic Byte Array

- Description: Use fixed-size byte array is better than that of `byte[]`, as the latter is a waste of space.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Low

5.3.2 Use Fixed Compiler Version

- Description: Use fixed compiler version is better.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Low

5.3.3 Make Visibility Level Explicit

- Description: Assign explicit visibility specifiers for functions and state variables.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Low

5.3.4 Make Type Inference Explicit

- Description: Do not use keyword `var` to specify the type, i.e., it asks the compiler to deduce the type, which is not safe especially in a loop.
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Low

5.3.5 Adhere To Function Declaration Strictly

- Description: Solidity compiler (version 0.4.23) enforces strict ABI length checks for return data from `calls()` [1], which may break the the execution if the function implementation does NOT follow its declaration (e.g., no return in implementing `transfer()` of ERC20 tokens).
- Result: Not found
- Severity: Low

References

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