

MAS433 Cryptography:  
Tutorial 4  
Public Key Encryption and  
Digital Signature  
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### Problem 1. Toy RSA

In a toy RSA encryption scheme,  $n = 209$ ,  $e = 7$ . Find the value of the private key  $d$ . Decrypt the ciphertext  $c = 3$ .

Solution:

$$n = 11 \times 19$$

$$\varphi(n) = (11-1) \times (19-1) = 180$$

Since  $e \cdot d \bmod \varphi(n) = 1$ , we apply the extended Euclidean algorithm to  $(e, \varphi(n))$ .

$$180$$

$$7$$

$$5 = 180 - 25 \times 7$$

$$2 = 7 - 5$$

$$1 = 5 - 2 \times 2$$

$$\therefore 1 = 5 - 2 \times 2 = 5 - 2 \times (7 - 5)$$

$$= -2 \times 7 + 3 \times 5$$

$$= -2 \times 7 + 3 \times (180 - 25 \times 7)$$

$$= 3 \times 180 - 77 \times 7$$

$$\therefore 7^{-1} \bmod 180 \equiv -77 \equiv 103 \pmod{180}$$

$$d = 7^{-1} \pmod{180} = 103 //$$

**Problem 2. RSA: Common Modulus**

Two users Alice and Bob use RSA public keys with the same modulus  $n$  but with different public exponents  $e_1$  and  $e_2$ .

- (a) Prove that Alice can decrypt messages sent to Bob.

*Lecture 14, slide 44. (Alice can factorize  $n$  easily) //*

- (b) Suppose that message padding is not used in RSA encryption. Prove that Eve can decrypt a message sent to Alice and Bob provided that  $\gcd(e_1, e_2) = 1$ . (Hint: how to find  $a$  and  $b$  satisfying  $a \times e_1 + b \times e_2 = 1$ )

Solution:

Since  $\gcd(e_1, e_2) = 1$ , we can find  $a, b$  satisfying  $a \cdot e_1 + b \cdot e_2 = 1$  (using the extended Euclidean algorithm)

A message  $m$  is sent to Alice and Bob.

Alice receives:  $C_1 = m^{e_1} \bmod n$

Bob receives:  $C_2 = m^{e_2} \bmod n$

An attacker can recover the message as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & C_1^a \times C_2^b \bmod n \\ &= (m^{e_1})^a \times (m^{e_2})^b \bmod n \\ &= m^{a \cdot e_1 + b \cdot e_2} \bmod n \\ &= m^1 \bmod n \\ &= m \quad // \end{aligned}$$

### Problem 3. RSA: $\lambda(n)$

In RSA,  $d$  can be computed as  $\underline{e \cdot d \equiv 1 \pmod{\lambda(n)}}$ , where

$$\lambda(n) = \frac{(p-1)(q-1)}{\gcd(p-1, q-1)} \quad \downarrow \quad ed = \alpha \lambda(n) + 1$$

(a) Prove that encryption and decryption are inverse operations.

$$\text{Let } g = \gcd(p-1, q-1)$$

$$\text{Then } p-1 = g p'$$

$$q-1 = g q'$$

$$\lambda(n) = g p' q'$$

Let the encryption be:  $C = m^e \pmod{n}$ .

$$C^d \pmod{p} = m^{ed} \pmod{p}$$

$$= m^{\alpha \cdot \lambda(n) + 1} \pmod{p} \quad (\text{since } ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\lambda(n)})$$

$$= m^{\alpha \cdot g \cdot p' \cdot q' + 1} \pmod{p}$$

$$= m^{\alpha(p-1) \cdot q' + 1} \pmod{p}$$

$$= m$$

$$\text{Similarly: } C^d \pmod{q} = m \pmod{q} \quad (2)$$

$$\text{From (1), } p \mid C^d - m \quad (3)$$

$$\text{From (2), } q \mid C^d - m \quad (4)$$

Since  $p$  and  $q$  are coprime, from (3) and (4):  $pq \mid C^d - m$

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$$\Rightarrow C^d \pmod{n} = m //$$



(b) Let  $n = 209$ ,  $e = 7$ . Find the value of the private key  $d$ . Decrypt the ciphertext  $c = 3$ .

Solution:

$$n = 11 \times 19$$

$$\lambda(n) = 90$$

Since  $e \cdot d \bmod \lambda(n) = 1$ , we apply the extended Euclidean algorithm to  $(e, \lambda(n))$

$$90$$

$$7$$

$$6 = 90 - 12 \times 7$$

$$1 = 7 - 6$$

$$\begin{aligned} \therefore 1 &= 7 - 6 = 7 - (90 - 12 \times 7) \\ &= -90 + 13 \times 7 \end{aligned}$$

$$\therefore d = 13$$

$$m = c^d \bmod n$$

$$= 3^{13} \bmod 209$$

$$= 71 //$$

**Problem 4.** RSA: small difference between  $p$  and  $q$

The  $p$  and  $q$  in RSA should be randomly generated, and they are the same size. The difference between  $p$  and  $q$  should not be small.

- (a) Suppose that  $p$  and  $q$  are 1024-bit prime numbers, but the difference between  $p$  and  $q$  is small, say,  $u = |p - q| < 2^{32}$ . How to factorize the product of  $p$  and  $q$ ?

*Solution:* Let  $u = 2v$ . Suppose that  $p > q$ .

$$p - q = 2v$$

$$p^2 - pq = 2pv$$

$$p^2 - 2pv = n$$

$$p^2 - 2pv + v^2 = n + v^2$$

$$(p - v)^2 = n + v^2$$

$$p - v = \sqrt{n + v^2} \quad (p \gg v)$$

$$p = v + \sqrt{n + v^2}$$

Then we try all the possible values of  $v$ .

If the value of  $v$  is guessed correctly,

$\sqrt{n + v^2}$  should be an integer.

(b) Suppose that  $u = |p - q| < 20$ , and  $p \times q = 2189284635403183$ . Find the values of  $p$  and  $q$ .

Solution:  $u = 20$

$$p = v + \sqrt{n + v^2}$$

Try  $v = 1, 2, 3, \dots, 9$

When  $v = 9$ ,

$$p = 9 + \sqrt{n + v^2}$$

$$= 9 + 46789792$$

$$= 46789801 //$$

$$q = n/p = 46789783 //$$



## Problem 5.

Dixon's Random Squares Algorithm

Factorize 256961 using Dixon's Random Squares Algorithm. The factor base

$\{-1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31\}$  may be used.

Solution.

$$m = \lfloor \sqrt{256961} \rfloor = 506$$

$$Q(x_i) = (m + x_i)^2 - n$$

$$\text{If } x_i = -3, \quad Q(-3) = 503^2 \bmod n = (-1) \times 2^4 \times 13 \times 19$$

$$\text{If } x_i = -2, \quad Q(-2) = 504^2 \bmod n = (-1) \times 5 \times 19 \times 31$$

$$\text{If } x_i = -1, \quad Q(-1) = 505^2 \bmod n = (-1) \times 2^4 \times 11^2$$

$$\text{If } x_i = 1, \quad Q(1) = 507^2 \bmod n = 2^3 \times 11$$

$$\text{If } x_i = 5, \quad Q(5) = 511^2 \bmod n = 2^6 \times 5 \times 13$$

$$\text{If } x_i = 10, \quad Q(10) = 516^2 \bmod n = \cancel{2^6} \times 5 \times 11 \times 13^2$$

$$\text{If } x_i = 13, \quad Q(13) = 519^2 \bmod n = 2^4 \times 5^2 \times 31$$

For  $x_i = -3, -2, 5, 13$ , we obtain:

$$(503 \times 504 \times 511 \times 519)^2 \equiv (2^7 \times 5^2 \times 13 \times 19 \times 31)^2 \pmod{n}$$

$$75319^2 \equiv 91105^2 \pmod{n}$$

$$\gcd(75319 + 91105, 256961) = 293$$

$$\gcd(75319 - 91105, 256961) = 877$$

$$\} \Rightarrow 256961$$

$$= 293 \times 877 //$$

(9)

### Problem 6. Toy ElGamal Encryption

In a toy ElGamal encryption scheme,  $p = 227$ ,  $g = 2$ , and  $x = 15$ . Decrypt the ciphertext  $(10, 159)$ .

Solution:

$$m = C_1^{-x} \cdot C_2 \bmod p, \text{ where } C_1 = g^k \bmod p, C_2 = y^{k \cdot m} \bmod p \\ = (10^{15})^{-1} \times 159 \bmod 227$$

$$10^{15} \bmod 227 = 76$$

$$76^{-1} \bmod 227 = 3$$

$$\therefore m = 159 \times 3 \bmod 227$$

$$= 23 //$$

### Problem 7. Index Calculus Algorithm

Let  $p = 227$ . The element  $g = 2$  is a generator of the multiplicative group  $Z_p^*$ .

(a) Compute  $g^{32}$ ,  $g^{40}$ ,  $g^{59}$  and  $g^{156}$  modulo  $p$ , and factorize them.

Solution:  
(a)  $2^{32} \bmod 227 = 176 = 2^4 \times 11 \quad (1)$

$$2^{40} \bmod 227 = 110 = 2 \times 5 \times 11 \quad (2)$$

$$2^{59} \bmod 227 = 60 = 2^2 \times 3 \times 5 \quad (3)$$

$$2^{156} \bmod 227 = 28 = 2^2 \times 7 \quad (4)$$

Solution:  
(b) From (1), (2), (3) and (4), we obtain:

$$4 \times \log_2 2 + \log_2 11 \equiv 32 \bmod 226 \quad (5)$$

$$\log_2 2 + \log_2 5 + \log_2 11 \equiv 40 \bmod 226 \quad (6)$$

$$2 \times \log_2 2 + \log_2 3 + \log_2 5 \equiv 59 \bmod 226 \quad (7)$$

$$2 \times \log_2 2 + \log_2 7 \equiv 156 \bmod 226 \quad (8)$$

Solve (5), (6), (7) and (8), we obtain

$$\log_2 3 = 46$$

$$\log_2 5 = 11$$

$$\log_2 7 = 154$$

$$\log_2 11 = 28$$

(b) Find the values of  $\log_g 2 \bmod p$ ,  $\log_g 3 \bmod p$ ,  $\log_g 5 \bmod p$ ,  $\log_g 7 \bmod p$ , and  $\log_g 11 \bmod p$ .

*Solution on the previous page.*

- (c) Suppose that we wish to compute  $\log_g 173 \pmod p$ . Multiply 173 by  $g^{177} \pmod p$ , and factorize the result. What is the value of  $\log_g 173 \pmod p$ ?

Solution:

$$173 \times 2^{177} \equiv 168 \equiv 2^3 \times 3 \times 7 \pmod{227}$$

$$\therefore \log_2 173 + 177 \equiv 3 \times \log_2 2 + \log_2 3 + \log_2 7 \pmod{226}$$

$$\log_2 173 \equiv 3 + \log_2 3 + \log_2 7 - 177 \pmod{226}$$

$$\equiv 3 + 46 + 154 - 177 \pmod{226}$$

$$\equiv 26 \pmod{226}$$

//



### Problem 8. RSA Signature Scheme

Suppose that hash function is not used in RSA digital signature scheme. The signature is generated as  $s = m^d \bmod n$ . Given a message  $m$  and its signature  $s$ , how to modify  $m$  without being detected?

*Solution:*

Let  $m' = m + \alpha \cdot n$  for any arbitrary  $\alpha$ ,

the signature of  $m'$  is the same as that of  $m$ .

## Problem 9. ElGamal Signature Scheme

- (a) In the Elgamal signature scheme, why should the signature with  $s = 0$  be deleted?

Solution:

In Elgamal Signature Scheme,  $s$  is generated as:

$$S = (H(m) - x \cdot r) \cdot k^{-1} \bmod p-1$$

If  $s = 0$ , it means that

$$(H(m) - x \cdot r) \cdot k^{-1} \bmod p-1 = 0 \quad (1)$$

$k$  is chosen so that  $\gcd(k, p-1) = 1$ , so  $k \neq 0$  (2)

From (1) & (2),

$$H(m) - x \cdot r \bmod p-1 = 0 \quad (3)$$

If  $\gcd(r, p-1) = 1$ , (3) can be solved directly;  
Otherwise, there are more than one solutions for  $x$ ,  
and we need to test those solutions to determine  
the value of  $x$ .

- (b) In the Elgamal signature scheme, each per-message secret integer  $k$  should be used only once. If the per-message secret integer  $k$  is reused, how to attack this digital signature algorithm?

*Solution Outline:*

$$r = g^k$$

$$S_1 = ((H(m_1) - x \cdot r) \cdot k^{-1} \bmod p-1) \quad (1)$$

$$S_2 = ((H(m_2) - x \cdot r) \cdot k^{-1} \bmod p-1) \quad (2)$$

From (1):

$$k S_1 \equiv H(m_1) - x r \pmod{p-1} \quad (3)$$

From (2):

$$k S_2 \equiv H(m_2) - x r \pmod{p-1} \quad (4)$$

$$(3) \times S_2 - (4) \times S_1 :$$

$$0 \equiv S_2 (H(m_1) - x r) - S_1 (H(m_2) - x r) \pmod{p-1}$$

- (c) In the Elgamal signature scheme, each per-message secret integer  $k$  should be randomly generated. If the per-message secret integer  $k$  is generated as follows:  $k_0$  is randomly generated,  $k_{i+1} = k_i + a$ , where  $a$  is a known constant. Develop an attack to recover the private key.

*Solution Outline:*

$$r_0 = g^{k_0} \bmod p$$

$$r_1 = g^{k_0+a} \bmod p = \alpha \cdot r_0 \bmod p \quad (\alpha = g^a)$$

$$s_0 = (H(m_0) - x \cdot r_0) \cdot k_0^{-1} \bmod p-1 \quad (1)$$

$$\begin{aligned} s_1 &= (H(m_1) - x \cdot r_1) \cdot k_1^{-1} \bmod p-1 \\ &= (H(m_1) - \alpha \cdot x \cdot r_0) \cdot (k_0 + a)^{-1} \bmod p-1 \quad (2) \end{aligned}$$

Solve (1) & (2) for  $x$ .



(d) In the ElGamal signature scheme, each per-message secret integer  $k$  should be randomly generated. If the per-message secret integer  $k$  is generated as follows:  $k_0$  is randomly generated,  $k_{i+1} = k_i + a$ , where  $a$  is a large unknown constant. Develop an attack to recover the private key.

*Solution Outline:*

$$S_0 = (H(m_0) - x r_0) k_0^{-1} \bmod p-1 \quad (1)$$

$$S_1 = (H(m_1) - x r_1) k_1^{-1} \bmod p-1 \quad (2)$$

$$S_2 = (H(m_2) - x r_2) k_2^{-1} \bmod p-1 \quad (3)$$

Solve (1), (2) & (3) for  $x$ .



### Problem 10. Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)

- (a) In the Digital Signature Algorithm, if the per-message secret integer  $k$  is reused, how to attack this digital signature algorithm?

*Solution Outline:*

*In Digital Signature Algorithm,  $r = (g^k \bmod p) \bmod q$ ,*

$$S = (H(m) + xr) \cdot k^{-1} \bmod q$$

*If  $S$  is reused,*

$$S_1 = (H(m_1) + xr) \cdot k^{-1} \bmod q \quad (1)$$

$$S_2 = (H(m_2) + xr) \cdot k^{-1} \bmod q \quad (2)$$

*Solve (1) & (2) for  $x$ .*

(b) In a modified DSA,  $s$  is generated as  $s = k^{-1}(H(m) - xr) \bmod q$ . What is the signature verification algorithm for this modified DSA?

*Solution:*

$$\text{In DSA, } u_1 = H(m) s^{-1} \bmod q$$

$$u_2 = r \cdot s^{-1} \bmod q$$

$$v = (g^{u_1} y^{u_2} \bmod p) \bmod q$$

If  $s = k^{-1}(H(m) - xr) \bmod q$ , then

$$r = (g^k \bmod p) \bmod q$$

$$= (g^{s^{-1}(H(m) - xr)} \bmod p) \bmod q$$

$$= (g^{H(m) \cdot s^{-1}} \cdot y^{-rs^{-1}} \bmod p) \bmod q$$

$$= (g^{u_1} y^{-u_2} \bmod p) \bmod q$$

Thus we need to compute  $v'$  as

$$v' = (g^{u_1} y^{-u_2} \bmod p) \bmod q,$$

then check whether  $r \stackrel{?}{=} v'$

(c) Let  $p$  and  $q$  be prime numbers and  $q$  is a divisor of  $p - 1$ . Show that for any integer  $t$ , if  $g = h^{(p-1)/q} \pmod{p}$ , then  $g^t \pmod{p} = g^{t \pmod{q}} \pmod{p}$ .

*Solution:*

Let  $t = \alpha q + \beta$ , where  $\beta = t \pmod{q}$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
 & g^t \pmod{p} \\
 &= (h^{(p-1)/q} \pmod{p})^t \pmod{p} \\
 &= h^{(\frac{p-1}{q})t} \pmod{p} \\
 &= h^{(\frac{p-1}{q}) \times (\alpha q + \beta)} \pmod{p} \\
 &= h^{(p-1) + (\frac{p-1}{q}) \cdot \beta} \pmod{p} \\
 &= h^{(\frac{p-1}{q}) \times \beta} \pmod{p} \\
 &= g^\beta \pmod{p}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\therefore g^t \pmod{p} = (g^{t \pmod{q}}) \pmod{p};$$

**Problem 11.** Unconditionally secure and computationally secure

Is there unconditionally secure public key cryptosystem? Briefly explain why.

*There is no unconditionally secure public key cryptosystem.*

*In public key cryptosystem, the public key is known to every one.*

*With unlimited computing power, an attacker can always recover the private key from the public key.*