

小伙伴们智能之旅

ANDROID, BRILLO, RPI2B

BRILLO: SECURITY – SELINUX & CAPABILITY

2016-04-11 23:21:56 ~ 2016-11-03 22:49:50 | HZAK | 发表回复

我们知道在Linux系统中，可以建立不同的用户、组来进行权限管理。一个应用程序需要特定的用户才能执行，一个文件夹、文件可以设定用户及用户组，使得只有特定的用户组才能访问。而selinux与capability可以对权限做进一步的限制。

一般来说，我们对一个文件比较关注的是它的mode, ownership(user, group), timestamp(modify time/access time), size。对于cp命令来说，在copy文件时默认情况下只保留了mode, ownership, timestamp这些信息，对于如ext4支持额外属性的文件系统来说，在copy的过程中就会出现信息丢失的情况。

NAME	cp - copy files and directories
...	
DESCRIPTION	Copy SOURCE to DEST, or multiple SOURCE(s) to DIRECTORY.
...	
--preserve[=ATTR_LIST]	preserve the specified attributes (default: mode,ownership,timestamps), if possible additional attributes: context, links, xattr, all

附一份代码用于查看ext4 xattr信息：[2016_04_12_chkcap.cc](https://github.com/brillo-m10-dev-rpi3b)

Brillo项目中与security相关的目录结构如下（以brillo-m10-dev-rpi3b为例）：

/local/brillo-m10-dev-rpi3b
+-- build
-- tools
-- fs_config
+-- device
+-- generic
-- brillo
-- sepolicy
-- hzak
-- rpi3b
+-- base
-- sepolicy
-- fs_config
-- android_filesystem_config.h
+-- external
+-- libcap
-- progs
+-- getcap.c
+-- getpcap.c
-- setcap.c
+-- libcap-ng
+-- libselinux
-- src
-- android.c
+-- minijail
+-- selinux
-- sepolicy
-- system
+-- core
+-- include
-- private
+-- android_filesystem_capability.h
-- android_filesystem_config.h
-- libcutil
-- fs_config.c
-- extra
-- ext4_utils
-- contents.c

• security – SELinux

Android官方参考文档：

1. <https://source.android.com/security/selinux/>
2. <https://source.android.com/security/selinux/concepts.html>
3. <https://source.android.com/security/selinux/implement.html>
4. <https://source.android.com/security/selinux/customize.html>
5. <https://source.android.com/security/selinux/validate.html>

官方推荐文档：

1. <http://seandroid.bitbucket.org/PapersandPresentations.html>
2. <https://www.codeproject.com/Articles/806904/Android-Security-Customization-with-SEAndroid>

3. https://events.linuxfoundation.org/sites/events/files/slides/abs2014_seforandroid_smalley.pdf
4. https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/02_4.pdf
5. http://freecomputerbooks.com/books/The_SELinux_Notebook-4th_Edition.pdf
3. <http://selinuxproject.org/page/ObjectClassesPerms>
7. https://www.nsa.gov/research/_files/publications/implementing_selinux.pdf
3. https://www.nsa.gov/research/_files/publications/selinux_configuring_policy.pdf
3. <https://www.gnu.org/software/m4/manual/index.html>

由此可以看出关于selinux这方面内容已经很全面了。

- 相关的一些命令：

a. 通过ls -Z 命令查看系统中文件的SELinux security context：

```
$ adb shell ls -Z /system/bin
u:object_r:system_file:s0      acpi
u:object_r:apmanager_exec:s0   apmanager
u:object_r:system_file:s0      audio_hal_playback_test
u:object_r:system_file:s0      audio_hal_record_test
u:object_r:system_file:s0      avahi-browse
u:object_r:avahi_exec:s0        avahi-daemon
u:object_r:system_file:s0      base64
u:object_r:system_file:s0      basename
...
```

b. 通过ps -Z命令查看当前系统进程的SELinux security context：

```
$ adb shell ps -Z
LABEL          USER      PID  PPID  VSIZE  RSS    WCHAN          PC  NAME
u:r:init:s0    root      1     0    6672   1508   SyS_epoll_ 00089cec S /init
u:r:kernel:s0  root      2     0     0     0      kthreadd 00000000 S kthreadd
...
u:r:weaved:s0  system    122    1   13304  7484   SyS_epoll_ 76b811c0 S /system/bin/weaved
u:r:webservd:s0 webserv   123    1   10592  6436   SyS_epoll_ 768431c0 S /system/bin/webservd
u:r:apmanager:s0 system    129    1    6864  4584   SyS_epoll_ 76b5c1c0 S /system/bin/apmanager
u:r:shill:s0   root     131    1   10460  6684   SyS_epoll_ 76a161c0 S /system/bin/shill
u:r:tlsdated:s0 root     138   117   4744   368    pipe_wait 76ea9354 S /system/bin/tlsdated
...
```

c. 通过id命令查看当前shell的uid, gid, groups和SELinux security context：

```
$ adb shell id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
groups=0(root),1004(input),1007(log),1011(adb),1015(sdcard_rw),1028(sdcard_r),3001(net_bt_admin),3002(net_bt),3003(inet),3006(net_bw_stats),3009(readproc)
context=u:r:su:s0
```

d. 通过chcon命令修改文件的SELinux security context：

```
$ adb shell chcon
usage: chcon [-hRv] CONTEXT FILE...

Change the SELinux security context of listed file[s].

-h change symlinks instead of what they point to.
-R recurse into subdirectories.
-v verbose output.

chcon: Need 2 arguments
```

e. 还原文件默认的SELinux security context：

```
$ adb shell restorecon
usage: restorecon [-D] [-F] [-R] [-n] [-v] FILE...

Restores the default security contexts for the given files.

-D apply to /data/data too
-F force reset
-R recurse into directories
-n don't make any changes; useful with -v to see what would change
-v verbose: show any changes

restorecon: Needs 1 argument
```

f. 通过runcon命令使程序运行在指定的SELinux security context：

```
$ adb shell runcon
usage: runcon CONTEXT COMMAND [ARGS...]

Run a command in a specified security context.

runcon: Need 2 arguments
```

- 系统文件SELinux security context创建过程

在创建system image时指定了系统文件的file context：

```
make_ext4fs -T -l -S out/target/product/rpi3b/root/file_contexts.bin -L system -l 268435456 -a system
out/target/product/rpi3b/obj/PACKAGING/systemimage_intermediates/system.img out/target/product/rpi3b/system out/target/product/rpi3b/system
```

而file_contexts.bin是一个二进制文件，是这么创建出来的：

```
[ 35% 17/48] /bin/bash -c "(out/host/linux-x86/bin/checkfc out/target/product/rpi3b/obj/ETC/sepolicy_intermediates/sepolicy
out/target/product/rpi3b/obj/ETC/file_contexts.bin_intermediates/file_contexts.concat.tmp) && (out/host/linux-x86/bin/sefcontext_compile -o
out/target/product/rpi3b/obj/ETC/file_contexts.bin_intermediates/file_contexts.bin
out/target/product/rpi3b/obj/ETC/file_contexts.bin_intermediates/file_contexts.concat.tmp)"
```

file_contexts.concat.tmp内容如下：

```
#line 1 "out/target/product/rpi3b/obj/ETC/file_contexts.bin_intermediates/file_contexts.local.tmp"
#line 1 "external/sepolicy/file_contexts"
#####
# Root
/
      u:object_r:rootfs:s0

# Data files
/adb_keys      u:object_r:adb_keys_file:s0
/build/.prop   u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/default/.prop u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/fstab.*       u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/init.*        u:object_r:rootfs:s0
/res(/.*)?     u:object_r:rootfs:s0
...
```

可以看出sefcontext_compile将file_contexts.concat.tmp文本文件转换成了二进制文件，这个二进制文件包含了系统文件的SELinux security context。

而make_ext4fs创建system image的时候会去读取这个文件，将文件系统中的文件设置SELinux security context。

• Security – capability

在make_ext4fs创建system image设置SELinux security context的同时，还会去设置文件的capability：

system/extra/ext4_utils/make_ext4fs.c

```
static u32 build_directory_structure(const char *full_path, const char *dir_path, const char *target_out_path,
                                     u32 dir_inode, fs_config_func_t fs_config_func,
                                     struct selabel_handle *sehd, int verbose, time_t fixed_time)
{
    if (fs_config_func != NULL) {
#ifdef ANDROID
        unsigned int mode = 0;
        unsigned int uid = 0;
        unsigned int gid = 0;
        int dir = S_ISDIR(stat.st_mode);
        fs_config_func(dentries[i].path, dir, target_out_path, &uid, &gid, &mode, &capabilities);
        dentries[i].mode = mode;
        dentries[i].uid = uid;
        dentries[i].gid = gid;
        dentries[i].capabilities = capabilities;
#else
        error("can't set android permissions - built without android support");
#endif
    }
    // ...
    /*
     * It's important to call inode_set_selinux() before
     * inode_set_capabilities(). Extended attributes need to
     * be stored sorted order, and we guarantee this by making
     * the calls in the proper order.
     * Please see xattr_assert_sane() in contents.c
     */
    ret = inode_set_selinux(entry_inode, dentries[i].secon);
    if (ret)
        error("failed to set SELinux context on %s\n", dentries[i].path);
    ret = inode_set_capabilities(entry_inode, dentries[i].capabilities);
    if (ret)
        error("failed to set capability on %s\n", dentries[i].path);
    // ...
}
```

system/extras/ext4_utils/contents.c：

```
int inode_set_capabilities(u32 inode_num, uint64_t capabilities) {
    if (capabilities == 0)
        return 0;

    struct vfs_cap_data cap_data;
    memset(&cap_data, 0, sizeof(cap_data));

    cap_data.magic_etc = VFS_CAP_REVISION | VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
    cap_data.data[0].permitted = (uint32_t) (capabilities & 0xffffffff);
    cap_data.data[0].inheritable = 0;
    cap_data.data[1].permitted = (uint32_t) (capabilities >> 32);
    cap_data.data[1].inheritable = 0;

    return xattr_add(inode_num, EXT4_XATTR_INDEX_SECURITY,
                    XATTR_CAPS_SUFFIX, &cap_data, sizeof(cap_data));
}
```

而文件的capability属性是从下面这两个文件来的：

a. device/hzak/rpi3b/fs_config/android_filesystem_config.h

```
static const struct fs_path_config android_device_files[] = {
    { 00755, AID_SYSTEM,  AID_SHELL,  CAP_MASK_LONG(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE) | CAP_MASK_LONG(CAP_NET_ADMIN) |
      CAP_MASK_LONG(CAP_NET_RAW),      "system/bin/dnsmasq" },

    { 00700, AID_SYSTEM,  AID_SHELL,  CAP_MASK_LONG(CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND),      "system/bin/nativepowerman" },
    { 00700, AID_SYSTEM,  AID_SHELL,  CAP_MASK_LONG(CAP_SYS_TIME),            "system/bin/tlsdated" },
    { 00700, AID_WEBSERV, AID_SHELL,  CAP_MASK_LONG(CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE), "system/bin/webservd" },
    // ...
    { 00755, AID_WIFI,    AID_SHELL,  CAP_MASK_LONG(CAP_NET_ADMIN) |
      CAP_MASK_LONG(CAP_NET_RAW),      "system/bin/apmanager" },

    // ...
};
```

b. system/core/libcutils/fs_config.c

```
static const struct fs_path_config android_files[] = {
    { 00440, AID_ROOT,    AID_SHELL,    0, "system/etc/init.goldfish.rc" },
    { 00550, AID_ROOT,    AID_SHELL,    0, "system/etc/init.goldfish.sh" },
    { 00550, AID_ROOT,    AID_SHELL,    0, "system/etc/init.ril" },
    { 00550, AID_DHCP,    AID_SHELL,    0, "system/etc/dhpcpd/dhpcpd-run-hooks" },
    // ...
};
```

而struct fs_path_config包含这几个字段：

```
struct fs_path_config {
    unsigned mode;
    unsigned uid;
    unsigned gid;
    uint64_t capabilities;
    const char *prefix;
};
```

NOTE: 系统在查找文件capability时，采用的是first match, 并且先查找device/hzak/rpi3b/fs_config/android_filesystem_config.h中的配置。

相关工具(external/libcap/progs)：

a. getcap – 查看文件的capability

```
$ adb shell getcap /system/bin/dnsmasq
/system/bin/dnsmasq = cap_net_bind_service,cap_net_admin,cap_net_raw+ep
```

b. getpcap – 查看进程的capability

```
$ adb shell getpcap `pid init`
Capabilities for `1': =
cap_chown,cap_dac_override,cap_dac_read_search,cap_fowner,cap_fsetid,cap_kill,cap_setgid,cap_setuid,cap_setpcap,cap_linux_immutable,cap_net_bind_service,cap_net_broadcast,cap_net_admin,cap_net_raw,cap_ipc_lock,cap_ipc_owner,cap_sys_module,cap_sys_rawio,cap_sys_chroot,cap_sys_ptrace,cap_sys_pacct,cap_sys_admin,cap_sys_boot,cap_sys_nice,cap_sys_resource,cap_sys_time,cap_sys_tty_config,cap_mknod,cap_lease,cap_audit_write,cap_audit_control,cap_setfcap,cap_mac_override,cap_mac_admin,cap_syslog,cap_wake_alarm,cap_block_suspend,37+ep
```

c. setcap – 设置文件的capability

NOTE: external/libcap/progs/setcap.c：

Under Linux, effective file capabilities must either be empty, or exactly match the union of selected permitted and inheritable bits

附相关的编译脚本（external/libcap/progs/Android.mk）：

```
LOCAL_PATH:= $(call my-dir)

define my-build-caps
include $(CLEAR_VARS)
LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := debug
LOCAL_MODULE := $(1)
LOCAL_SRC_FILES := $(2)
LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES := libcap
include $(BUILD_EXECUTABLE)
endef

$(eval $(call my-build-caps,getcap,getcap.c))
$(eval $(call my-build-caps,getpcap,getpcap.c))
$(eval $(call my-build-caps,setcap,setcap.c))
```

其他请参考这篇文档：POSIX 文件能力：分配根用户的能力

<http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/cn/linux/l-posixcap.html?ca=drs-cn>

• adb sync system

adb sync system命令可以很方便地将本地修改的文件同步到设备中。由于在做adb sync system时，adbd系统服务只是去重新设置了SELinux security context, 对于文件的capability并没有去重新设置，这使得原有文件的capability信息丢失，程序运行时会出现访问某些资源会没有权限。如你不小心修改了apmanager的代码，而又去做了adb sync system，那么Brillo系统中的apmanager就失去了CAP_NET_ADMIN和CAP_NET_RAW的权限，apmanager就无法去设置wlan0的IP地址。

在system/core/adb/file_sync_service.cpp中做file sync只是更新了SELinux security context：

```
static bool handle_send_file(int s, const char* path, uid_t uid,
                             gid_t gid, mode_t mode, std::vector<char*>& buffer, bool do_unlink) {
    syncmsg msg;
    unsigned int timestamp = 0;

    __android_log_security_bswrite(SEC_TAG_ADB_SEND_FILE, path);
```

```

int fd = adb_open_mode(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_CLOEXEC, mode);
if (fd < 0 && errno == ENOENT) {
    if (!secure_mkdirs(adb_dirname(path))) {
        SendSyncFailErrno(s, "secure_mkdirs failed");
        goto fail;
    }
    fd = adb_open_mode(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_CLOEXEC, mode);
}
if (fd < 0 && errno == EEXIST) {
    fd = adb_open_mode(path, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC, mode);
}
if (fd < 0) {
    SendSyncFailErrno(s, "couldn't create file");
    goto fail;
} else {
    if (fchown(fd, uid, gid) == -1) {
        SendSyncFailErrno(s, "fchown failed");
        goto fail;
    }

    // Not all filesystems support setting SELinux labels. http://b/23530370.
    selinux_android_restorecon(path, 0);

    // fchown clears the setuid bit - restore it if present.
    // Ignore the result of calling fchmod. It's not supported
    // by all filesystems. b/12441485
    fchmod(fd, mode);
}
// ...
}

```

NOTE：由于RPi 2B使用的Linux kernel为4.1的版本，而DragonBoard 410c使用的kernel版本为3.10，也许由于版本的改变，kernel在做 security – capability check的行为也改变：

a. DragonBoard 410c使用firewalld service punch TCP hole之所以会成功，是因为修改了qcom-msm-3.10/security/commoncap.c文件，包含如下patch(在进行capability check的时候，通过检查当前进程的用户组)：

```

commit 775d748ba7a4c68d02c1410c39bce8750394344c
Author: Chia-chi Yeh <chiachi@android.com>
Date: Fri Jun 19 07:15:05 2009 +0800

    security: Add AID_NET_RAW and AID_NET_ADMIN capability check in cap_capable().

Signed-off-by: Chia-chi Yeh <chiachi@android.com>

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index c44b6fe..3e81aa9 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -31,6 +31,10 @@
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>

+#ifdef CONFIG_ANDROID_PARANOID_NETWORK
+#include <linux/android_aid.h>
+#endif
+
/*
 * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
 * !secure(SEURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
@@ -78,6 +82,11 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
{
    struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns;

+    if (cap == CAP_NET_RAW && in_egroup_p(AID_NET_RAW))
+        return 0;
+    if (cap == CAP_NET_ADMIN && in_egroup_p(AID_NET_ADMIN))
+        return 0;
+
    /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace
     * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target
     * user namespace's parents.

```

b. 同样的brillo-m8-dev分支中，brilloemulator_x86使用的kernel为android-3.18, 也包含上述patch，所以也能正常punch TCP hole。

[2016-11-03 22:48:43] 看来google也发现的这个问题，在master分支上已经有相关的patch来fix这个问题：

```

commit 32c60b4ced8ca0d0eaa3e32f04436a7246ad18f8
Author: Elliott Hughes <enh@google.com>
Date: Tue Jun 7 17:18:25 2016 -0700

    Set file capabilities on adb sync/push.

    Bug: http://b/29180022
    Change-Id: Ia21ebf0972af41b0a3becc1189ed836fd74ae5c8
---
adb/file_sync_service.cpp | 53 ++++++-----
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

```

• 关于external/minijail

由于kernel 4.3+又定义了一个新的secure bit, 而brillo-m10-dev-rpi3b使用的kernel版本为4.1 , 所以在使用minijail的时候 , 可能会出现kernel crash的情况 :

```
04-10 05:33:20.103 206 206 E chkcap : libminijail: prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS): Operation not permitted
----- beginning of crash
04-10 05:33:20.103 206 206 F libc : Fatal signal 6 (SIGABRT), code -6 in tid 206 (chkcap)
04-10 05:33:20.115 207 207 F DEBUG : *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
04-10 05:33:20.116 207 207 F DEBUG : Build fingerprint: 'Brillo/rpi3b/rpi3b:6.0.1/MASTER/hzak04082209:eng/test-keys'
04-10 05:33:20.116 207 207 F DEBUG : Revision: '0'
04-10 05:33:20.116 207 207 F DEBUG : ABI: 'arm'
04-10 05:33:20.116 207 207 F DEBUG : pid: 206, tid: 206, name: try_to_jail >>> try_to_jail <<<
04-10 05:33:20.117 207 207 F DEBUG : signal 6 (SIGABRT), code -6 (SI_TKILL), fault addr -----
04-10 05:33:20.117 207 207 F DEBUG :      r0 00000000 r1 000000ce r2 00000006 r3 00000008
04-10 05:33:20.117 207 207 F DEBUG :      r4 76f7f56c r5 00000006 r6 76f7f514 r7 0000010c
04-10 05:33:20.117 207 207 F DEBUG :      r8 7e988d70 r9 00000000 sl 00000000 fp 7e988ddc
04-10 05:33:20.117 207 207 F DEBUG :      ip 00000001 sp 7e987c70 lr 76bb028f pc 76bb2adc cpsr 20000010
```

附代码 :

```
// ...
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
    brillo::Minijail* m = brillo::Minijail::GetInstance();
    minijail* jail = m->New();

    m->DropRoot(jail, "system", "system");

    m->UseCapabilities(jail, kIpTablesCapMask);
    m->Enter(jail);

    return 0;
}
```

如果出现这个情况 , 可以将这个patch合入brillo-dev-m10分支中 :

```
commit f783b5273d66d19a78705276a38ae68ef2e3e165
Author: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@google.com>
Date: Mon Mar 14 14:34:10 2016 -0700

    Fix use of SECURE_ALL_BITS/SECURE_ALL_LOCKS.

    Kernels 4.3+ define a new securebit (SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE),
    so using the SECURE_ALL_BITS and SECURE_ALL_LOCKS masks from newer
    kernel headers will return EPERM on older kernels. Detect this, and
    retry with the right mask for older (2.6.26-4.2) kernels.

    Also add a compile-time assert to make sure we identify these changes
    sooner going forward.

    Bug: 27632733

    Change-Id: I6cf9c56fec222347575bd0d1147287aac6572e67
```

• 相关的参考文档 :

- 1. <http://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/system-hardening>
- 2. <https://lwn.net/Articles/211883/> (File-based capabilities)
- 3. <https://lwn.net/Articles/632520/> (Inheriting capabilities)
- 4. <http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/cn/linux/l-posixcap.html?ca=drs-cn>

相关文档 :

- 1. **Android: 超级好用的adb forward命令**
- 2. **Brillo: Android客户端开发 - 查找服务 , 调用API**
- 3. **Android/Brillo selinux domain/context**
- 4. **Brillo: 使用iw命令设置无线网卡工作模式**
- 5. **Brillo开发: 关于google breakpad – macrodump**

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