Malicious APK File Analysis No. 1

1. To open the apktool we use the following command in command prompt"apktool".

```
uma@kali: ~/Downloads
  -(uma⊛kali)-[~]
_$ apktool
Picked up _JAVA_OPTIONS: -Dawt.useSystemAAFontSettings=on -Dswing.aatext=true
Apktool v2.6.1 - a tool for reengineering Android apk files
vith smali v2.5.2 and baksmali v2.5.2
Copyright 2010 Ryszard Wiśniewski <brut.alll@gmail.com>
Copyright 2010 Connor Tumbleson <connor.tumbleson@gmail.com>
ısage: apktool
-advance, -- advanced prints advance information.
-version,--version prints the version then exits
usage: apktool if|install-framework [options] <framework.apk>
-p,--frame-path <dir> Stores framework files into <dir>.
-t,--tag <tag>
                          Tag frameworks using <tag>.
ısage: apktool d[ecode] [options] <file_apk>
-f,--force Force delete destination directory.
-o,--output <dir> The name of folder that gets written. Default is apk.out
-p,--frame-path <dir> Uses framework files located in <dir>.
                        Do not decode resources.
-r.--no-res
                          Do not decode sources.
-s,--no-src
-t,--frame-tag <tag> Uses framework files tagged by <tag>.
usage: apktool b[uild] [options] <app_path>
-f,--force-all
                        Skip changes detection and build all files.
-o,--output <dir>
                         The name of apk that gets written. Default is dist/name.apk
-p,--frame-path <dir> Uses framework files located in <dir>.
for additional info, see: https://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/
For smali/baksmali info, see: https://github.com/JesusFreke/smali
```

2. After that go to the path where apk file is located. Our apk file is located in the Downloads. Then decompile the apk file using the below command – "apktool d Instagram.apk", where d is use to decompile the apk file.

```
-(uma⊛kali)-[~]
 -$ cd Downloads
  —(uma⊛kali)-[~/Downloads]
__$ apktool d instagram.apk
Picked up _JAVA_OPTIONS: -Dawt.useSystemAAFontSettings=on -Dswing.aatext=true
I: Using Apktool 2.6.1 on instagram.apk
I: Loading resource table...
I: Decoding AndroidManifest.xml with resources...
I: Loading resource table from file: /home/uma/.local/share/apktool/framework/1.apk
I: Regular manifest package...
I: Decoding file-resources...
I: Decoding values */* XMLs...
I: Baksmaling classes.dex...
I: Copying assets and libs...
I: Copying unknown files...
I: Copying original files...
  -(uma⊛kali)-[~/Downloads]
```

3. After decompiling the given apk file, the following permissions were granted to the application as observed in "*AndroidManifest.xml*".

```
AndroidManifest.xml

| **Pownloaddinstagram |
```

- → Permissions were granted such as Internet, Location, Phone, Contacts, Settings, Storage and etc.
 - 4. There is only one activity named "*MainActivity*" that is intended by the APK as observed in the strings.xml file. This can be a main triggering activity for the APK that can further invoke other actions.

```
Open 
| Strings.xml | Compared to the string of the string
```

5. When we analyze the AndroidManifest.xml further we observe the startup class for the android APK is "*MainActivity*" as its being bound to the **intent.action.main**.

- → When analyzing the XML, we see the onCreate service implementation would be available in the MainActivity class as mentioned in the *andoid:name* tag.
 - 6. This code might be suspicious and it seems to be obfuscated.

```
b.class - Java Decompiler
File Edit Navigation Search Help
🞏 👺 🖋 <table-cell-rows>
 classes-dex2jar.jar X
    ▶ 📶 MainActivity.class

    MainBroadcastRece
    MainService.class

                                       package com.metasploit.stage;
                                     import java.io.UnsupportedEncodingException;
import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
      🚹 Payload.class
      ▼ © Payload


F a : byte[]

B b : Context
                                     🛂 c : long
                                         private static int a(byte[] paramArrayOfbyte, int paramInt) {
           🎜 d : byte[]
                                           byte b1 = 0;
int i = 0;
while (b1 < 4) {
           🎤 e : String
           🗗 f : String
                                              i |= (paramArrayOfbyte[bl + paramInt] & 0xFF) << bl << 3;
           🗗 g : String
                                              b1++;
           h: Object[]
           Payload()


■ a(): void
                                           return i;
           a(DataInputStre
                                         public static a a(byte[] paramArrayOfbyte) {
    a a = new a();
    a.a = a(paramArrayOfbyte, 0);
    a.b = a * a(paramArrayOfbyte, 12);
}
           a(DataInputStre
           main(String[]) : '
           start(Context):
                                           b(paramArrayOfbyte, 16, 16);
b(paramArrayOfbyte, 32, 16);
           🎜 startContext() : ۱
           🦸 startInPath(Stri
                                            int i = 48;
```

7. The secret code we have found for this application as "*HELLO WOrlD!*" as observed in the "*Strings.xml*".

8. The MainActivity class when decompiled with dex2jar on the classes.dex obtained by unzip command on the APK we observe it as follows:



- → Here the *MainActivity* is calling the *MainService* class to start service with the activity context when the Booting of the android is completed within the *onCreate* method.
 - 9. Now let's see the *MainService* class implementation:



→ Here we can see the start method initiates a thread for the current application and as soon as a context is created, we attach the context to the given handler for posting.

10. Inside b.class generated we se as follows:

```
🔤 classes-dex2jar.jar 🗙

▼ 

## com.metasploit.stage

                                  🚮 MainService.class 🗙 🛮 🚮 b.class 🗙
  MainActivity.class
  MainBroadcastReceiv
                                   package com.metasploit.stage;

▼ 

MainService.class

                                  ☐ import java.io.UnsupportedEncodingException;

▼ 

    MainService

                                   import java.util.concurrent.TimeUnit;
         MainService()
                                  public final class b {
         onBind(Intent): IB
                                      private static final long a = TimeUnit.SECONDS.toMillis(1L);
         onStartCommand
         🖋 start() : void
                                      private static int a(byte[] paramArrayOfbyte, int paramInt) {
         startService(Cont
                                        byte b1 = 0;
                                        int i = 0;
  Payload.class
                                        while (b1 < 4) {
  • 🚠 a.class
                                          i |= (paramArrayOfbyte[bl + paramInt] & 0xFF) << bl << 3;
  🕶 ີ b.class
                                          b1++;
    ▶ 😉 b
                                        return i;
  🕨 ີ c.class
                                      }
  d.class
  • a.class
                                      public static a a(byte[] paramArrayOfbyte) {
  f.class
                                        \underline{\mathbf{a}} = \mathbf{new} \ \underline{\mathbf{a}}();
                                        a.\underline{a} = \underline{a}(paramArrayOfbyte, 0);
  🕨 🚹 g.class
                                        a.\overline{b} = \overline{a} * \underline{a}(paramArrayOfbyte, 12);
                                        b(paramArrayOfbyte, 16, 16);
                                        b(paramArrayOfbyte, 32, 16);
                                        int i = 48;
```

→ There are some offsets being used for the http URL under consideration and some operations like *Arrays.copyOf* being applied upon these offsets showing a possible scenario of obfuscation.