## Malicious APK File Analysis No. 4

1. After extracting the APK file given, the following are the permissions granted to the application as observed in the **AndroidManifest.xml**:

```
uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"/
cuses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE"/>
cuses-permission android:name="android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE"/>
  ses-permission android:name= android.permission.Change_miri_state />
ses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE"/>
ses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION"/>
ses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION"/>
ses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE"/>
ses-permission android:name="android.permission.SEND_SMS"/>
ses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS"/>
uses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS",
cuses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO"/>
cuses-permission android:name="android.permission.CALL_PHONE"
cuses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_CONTACTS"/
suses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_CONTACTS"/
suses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS"/>
cuses-permission android:name="android.permission.CAMERA",
cuses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_SMS"/
suses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
suses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED"/>
uses-permission android:name="android.permission.SET_WALLPAPER"
uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_CALL_LOG"
cuses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE CALL LOG"/>
uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WAKE_LOCK",
suses-permission android:name="android.permission.REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS"/>
cuses-feature android:name="android.hardware.camera",
  es-feature android:name="android.hardware.camera.autofocus"/>
      -feature android:name="android.hardware.microphone"/
application android:label="@string/app_name"
    <activity android:label="@string/app_name" android:name=".MainActivity" android:theme="@android</p>
```

The applications use permissions such as Coarse location, Audio recording, read and write contacts, read SMS, and Camera.

 There is only one activity named "MainActivity" that is intended by the APK as observed in the strings.xml file. This can be a main triggering activity for the APK that can further invoke other actions.

3. When we analyze the AndroidManifest.xml further we observe the startup class for the android APK is "*MainActivity*" as its being bound to the **intent.action.main.** 

When analyzing the XML, we see the onCreate service implementation would be available in the MainActivity class as mentioned in the *andoid:name* tag.

4. The MainActivity class when decompiled with dex2jar on the classes.dex obtained by unzip command on the APK we observe it as follows:

```
🚠 d.class 🛭
                       🚮 e.class 🏻
                                  🚮 f. class 🛭
🚠 c. class 🕮
                                             🚠 g. class 🛭
                                                        🔝 MainActivity.class 🕮
                                                    🔝 MainService.class 🏻
          🔝 MainBroadcastReceiver.class 🛭
                                                                                   l (iii
 package com.metasploit.stage;
import android.app.Activity;
 import android.content.Context;
 import android.os.Bundle;
public class MainActivity extends Activity {
   protected void onCreate(Bundle paramBundle) {
     super.onCreate(paramBundle);
     MainService.startService((Context)this);
     finish();
   }
```

Here the *MainActivity* is calling the *MainService* class to start service with the activity context when the Booting of the android is completed within the *onCreate* method.

5. Now let's see the *MainService* class implementation:

```
MainBroadcastReceiver.class 

                                                                           🔝 Payl
                                               🔝 MainService.class 🏻
import android.os.IBinder;
import android.os.Looper;
import java.lang.reflect.Method;
public class MainService extends Service {
  public static void start() {
    try {
       <u>c</u> c;
       Class<?> clazz = Class.forName("android.app.ActivityThread");
      Method method = clazz.getMethod("currentApplication", new Class[0]);
       Context context = (Context)method.invoke(null, null);
      if (context == null) {
         Handler handler = new Handler();
         this(Looper.getMainLooper());
         c = new c();
         this(method);
         handler.post(c);
         return:
      startService((Context)c);
     } catch (ClassNotFoundException classNotFoundException) {
    } catch (Exception exception) {}
   }
  public static void startService(Context paramContext) {
    paramContext.startService(new Intent(paramContext, MainService.class));
  public IBinder onBind(Intent paramIntent) {
     return null;
   }
```

Here we can see the start method initiates a thread for the current application and as soon as a context is created, we attach the context to the given handler for posting.

6. Inside the b.class generated we see:

```
🚮 b.class 🏻
             🚠 c.class 🏻
                           🚠 d.class 🏻
                                          🚮 e.class 🏻
                                                        🚮 f.class 🌣
                                                                      🚠 g.class 🏻
   public static a a(byte[] paramArrayOfbyte) {
      \underline{\mathbf{a}} = \mathbf{new} \ \underline{\mathbf{a}}();
      a.\underline{a} = \underline{a}(paramArrayOfbyte, 0);
      a.\underline{b} = \underline{a} * \underline{a}(paramArrayOfbyte, 12);
      b(paramArrayOfbyte, 16, 16);
      b(paramArrayOfbyte, 32, 16);
      int i = 48;
      int j = i;
      if ((a.<u>a</u> & 0x1) != 0) {
         a.\underline{c} = \underline{a}(paramArrayOfbyte, 8000, 100);
         j = i;
      while (paramArrayOfbyte[j] != 0) {
        \underline{\mathbf{g}} \ \mathbf{g} = \mathbf{new} \ \underline{\mathbf{g}}();
         g.\underline{a} = \underline{a}(paramArrayOfbyte, j, 512);
         j = j + 512 + 4;
         g.\underline{b} = \underline{a} * \underline{a}(paramArrayOfbyte, j);
         j += 4;
         g.\underline{c} = \underline{a} * \underline{a}(paramArrayOfbyte, j);
         i = j + 4;
         j = i;
         if (g.a.startsWith("http")) {
           StringBuilder stringBuilder;
            a(paramArrayOfbyte, i, 128);
            j = i + 128;
           a(paramArrayOfbyte, j, 64);
            j += 64;
           a(paramArrayOfbyte, j, 64);
            j += 64;
            g.\underline{d} = \underline{a}(paramArrayOfbyte, j, 256);
           j += 256;
            g.e = null;
            byte[] arrayOfByte = b(paramArrayOfbyte, j, 20);
            i = j + 20;
```

There are some offsets being used for the http URL under consideration and some operations like *Arrays.copyOf* being applied upon these offsets showing a possible scenario of obfuscation.

7. There is no secret code being discovered inside the APK after analyzing the XML, small files, and the dex2jar output classes.