Malicious APK File Creation No. 16

1. Analyzing the .apk file using androgaurd.

```
- $ python3 cli.py analyze malware.apk
2022-i1-14 21:33:18.958 | IMFO | androguard.session:_init_:58 - Opening database <Database(sqlite:///androguard.db)>
2022-i1-14 21:33:18.968 | IMFO | androguard.session:_init_:67 - Creating new session [1]
2022-i1-14 21:33:18.970 | IMFO | anin:androlyze_main:257 - Please be patient, this might take a while.
2022-i1-14 21:33:18.971 | IMFO | anin:androlyze_main:257 - Please be patient, this might take a while.
2022-i1-14 21:33:18.971 | IMFO | androguard.session:addAFK:140- add AFK malware.apk:d3c950ae2adde51127f27lea99931e823b70970279c0501525fd96e3aa2a10fc
2022-i1-14 21:33:19.010 | IMFO | androguard.core.apk:_apk_analysis:337 - AFK file analysis on AndroidManifest.xml
2022-i1-14 21:33:19.026 | IMFO | androguard.session:addDEX:174 - add DEX:7e665b2c0d1d03ddedaf414c6ea576a635675bbca9998059dee64da2250404c
2022-i1-16 21:33:19.310 | IMFO | androguard.session:addDEX:180 - added DEX:7e66440EX:180 - added DEX:7e663b2c0d1d03ddedaf414c6ea576a635675bbca9998059dee64da2250404c
2022-i1-16 21:33:19.330 | IMFO | androguard.core.analysis.analysis:add11455 - Added DEX: file version 35
2022-i1-14 21:33:21.339 | IMFO | androguard.core.analysis.analysis:create_xref:1492 - End of creating cross references (XBET) run time: Omin 09s
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2022-i1-14 21:33:21.339 | IMFO | androguard.core.analysis.analysis:create_xref:1492 - End of creating cross references (XBET) run time: Omin 09s
2022-i1-14 21:33:21.339 | IMFO | androguard.core.analys
```

Command: a.get_signature_name()
Signature name: 'META-INF/CERT.RSA'

2. Permissions for the .apk

```
In [3]: a.get_permissions()
Out[3]:
['android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW',
    'android.permission.INTERNET',
    'com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT',
    'android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE',
    'android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE',
    'android.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS',
    'android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE',
    'android.permission.REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS',
    'android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED',
    'android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE',
    'android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE',
    'android.permission.MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS',
    'android.permission.VIBRATE',
    'android.permission.WAKE_LOCK',
    'android.permission.GET_TASKS',
    'android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE']
```

Command: a.get_permissions()

3. what app does (Normal part)

```
Todation personants over a part of other the splications or parts of the user interface. They may interface with year'n use of the interface in any application, or change what you think you are'n seeing in other a parts of the user interface. They may interface with year'n use of the interface in any application, or change what you think you are'n seeing in other a parts of the user interface. They may interface with year'n use of the interface in any application, or change what you think you are'n seeing in other a part of the user interface. They may interface with year'n use of the interface, so think no permission is not required to seed data to the interface. They may be created any interface of the content of t
```

As we can see the ['normal'] in the screen shot. The permissions act normally and don't steal the user data or access.

- Read external storage
- Access network location
- Write settings
- Battery optimization
- Phones vibrate
- Booting
- Wake lock
- Get tasks running on the mobile.

4. What app does (dangerous part)

In the above screenshot we can see ["Dangerous"]. The listed permissions can harm user device or can steal data or access.

- Alert window
- Internet full access
- Change wifi state
- Read phone state
- Write external storage.

5. The picture tells about the services.

Command: a.get_services()

```
In [1]: a.get_services()
Out[1]:
['trikita.talalarmo.alarm.AlarmService',
   'com.tiffany.webbtech.core.UpdateService',
   'com.xdandroid.hellodaemon.AbsWorkService$WorkNotificationService',
   'com.xdandroid.hellodaemon.JobSchedulerService',
   'com.xdandroid.hellodaemon.WatchDogService',
   'com.xdandroid.hellodaemon.WatchDogService$WatchDogNotificationService']
```

6. The picture tells about the android version code, name and sdk version of min, max and target.


```
In [4]: a.get_androidversion_code()
Out[4]: '1'
In [5]: a.get_androidversion_name()
Out[5]: '1.2.170920'
In [6]:
In [6]: a.get_min_sdk_version()
Out[6]: '15'
In [7]: a.get_max_sdk_version()
In [8]: a.get_target_sdk_version()
Out[8]: '22'
```

7. Activities performed by the app.

```
In [1]: a.get_activities()
Out[1]:
['trikita.talalarmo.MainActivity',
   'trikita.talalarmo.AgentActivity',
   'trikita.talalarmo.SettingsActivity',
   'trikita.talalarmo.alarm.AlarmActivity',
   'com.google.android.gms.ads.AdActivity',
   'com.tiffany.webbtech.core.WebViewActivity']
```

8. Decomplie the .apk file using apktool

Command: apktool d malware.apk




After analyzing the decompiled .apk we can see WatchDogService files which allow malicious activites.

Watchdog is a rogue anti-spyware program from Rogue. FakeVimes family of computer infections.

9. Unzip the malware.apk using unzip command.

```
santoku@santoku-VirtualBox: ~/Downloads
                                                                          - + ×
File Edit Tabs Help
santoku@santoku-VirtualBox:~/Downloads$ unzip malware.apk -d malware un
Archive: malware.apk
 inflating: malware un/AndroidManifest.xml
 inflating: malware_un/META-INF/CERT.RSA
 inflating: malware_un/META-INF/CERT.SF
 inflating: malware un/META-INF/MANIFEST.MF
 inflating: malware_un/META-INF/services/javax.ws.rs.ext.MessageBodyReader
 inflating: malware_un/META-INF/services/javax.ws.rs.ext.MessageBodyWriter
 inflating: malware un/assets/armeabi-v7a/skysea
 inflating: malware un/assets/armeabi/skysea
 inflating: malware un/classes.dex
extracting: malware un/res/drawable-hdpi-v4/ic launcher.png
extracting: malware un/res/drawable-mdpi-v4/ic launcher.png
extracting: malware un/res/drawable-xhdpi-v4/ic launcher.png
extracting: malware un/res/drawable-xxhdpi-v4/app icon.png
extracting: malware un/res/drawable-xxhdpi-v4/close m.png
extracting: malware un/res/drawable-xxhdpi-v4/ic launcher.png
extracting: malware un/res/drawable-xxxhdpi-v4/ic launcher.png
 inflating: malware un/res/drawable/dialog bg m.xml
 inflating: malware_un/res/layout/activity_browser.xml
 inflating: malware_un/res/layout/activity_main.xml
  inflating: malware_un/res/layout/rect_dialog.xml
  inflating: malware_un/res/menu/overflow_popup.xml
 extracting: malware un/res/mipmap-hdpi-v4/ic launcher.png
```

10. After unzipping, we can see some. small files which are responsible for triggering malicious activities with the original functionality of the app.



11. Now, we can see classes.dex file in the malware_uz folder.

We can open the classes.dex2jar.jar file using JD-GUI.

Command: dex2jar classes.dex

```
santoku@santoku-VirtualBox: ~/Downloads/malware_un — + ×

File Edit Tabs Help

extracting: malware_un/res/drawable-xxhdpi-v4/close_m.png

extracting: malware_un/res/drawable-xxhdpi-v4/ic_launcher.png

extracting: malware_un/res/drawable-xxxhdpi-v4/ic_launcher.png

inflating: malware_un/res/drawable/dialog bg_m.xml

inflating: malware_un/res/layout/activity_browser.xml

inflating: malware_un/res/layout/activity_main.xml

inflating: malware_un/res/layout/rect_dialog.xml

inflating: malware_un/res/menu/overflow popup.xml

extracting: malware_un/res/mipmap-hdpi-v4/ic_launcher.png

extracting: malware_un/res/mipmap-xxhdpi-v4/ic_launcher.png


extracting: malware_un/res/mipmap-xxhdpi-v4/ic_launcher.png

extracting: malware_un/res/mipmap-xxxhdpi-v4/ic_launcher.png

extracting: malware_un/res/mipmap-xxhdpi-v4/ic_launcher.png

extracting: malware_un/res/mipmap-xxhdpi-v4/ic_laun
```

12. We didn't see any obfuscation in the code. Everything is clear but, some objects and classes are unclear like a,b and so on.



13. We found the MainActivity file was in the .jar file where the program starts.



14. Created control graph of the .apk file using androgaurd.

```
-(sudha_gudla&Kali)-[~/Downloads]
sandroguard decompile -o test3 -f png -i malware.apk --limit "trikita/.*"
         ] androguard.apk: Starting analysis on AndroidManifest.xml
[INFO
         ] androguard.apk: APK file was successfully validated!
[INFO
         ] androguard.analysis: Adding DEX file version 35
         ] androguard.analysis: Reading bytecode took : Omin Ols
] androguard.analysis: End of creating cross references (XREF) run t
[INFO
[INFO
ime: 0min 01s
Dump information malware.apk in test3
Create directory test3
Decompilation ... End
Dump Ltrikita/a/a; <init> (Ljava/lang/Enum;)V ... png ... source codes ... by
Dump Ltrikita/a/a; <init> (Ljava/lang/Enum; Ljava/lang/Object;)V ... png ...
bytecodes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/a; toString ()Ljava/lang/String; ... png ... bytecodes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/c$a; a (Ltrikita/a/c; Ljava/lang/Object; Ltrikita/a/c$b;)V ..
. png ... source codes ... bytecodes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/b; <init> (Ljava/lang/String;)V ... png ... source codes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/b; a (Ltrikita/a/c; Ljava/lang/Object; Ltrikita/a/c$b;)V ...
png ... bytecodes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/c$1; <init> (Ltrikita/a/c;)V ... png ... source codes ... byt
ecodes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/c$1; a (Ltrikita/a/c; Ljava/lang/Object; Ltrikita/a/c$b;)V ..
. png ... bytecodes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/c$b; a (Ljava/lang/Object;)V ... png ... source codes ... byt
ecodes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/c$2; <init> (Ltrikita/a/c;)V ... png ... source codes ... byt
ecodes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/c$2; a (Ljava/lang/Object;)V ... png ... bytecodes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/c$3; <init> (Ltrikita/a/c; Ltrikita/a/c$a; Ltrikita/a/c$b;)V
... png ... source codes ... bytecodes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/c$3; a (Ljava/lang/Object;)V ... png ... bytecodes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/c$4; <init> (Ltrikita/a/c; Ljava/lang/Runnable;)V ... png ...
source codes ... bytecodes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/c$4; run ()V ... png ... bytecodes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/c$c; a (Ljava/lang/Object; Ljava/lang/Object;)Ljava/lang/Obje
ct; ... png ... source codes ... bytecodes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/c; <init> (Ltrikita/a/c$c; Ljava/lang/Object; [Ltrikita/a/c$a
;)V ... png ... source codes ... bytecodes ...
Dump Ltrikita/a/c; a (Ltrikita/a/c;)Ljava/lang/Object; ... png ... bytecodes
```

Command: androgaurd decompile -o outputfolder -f format png -I .apk file —limit "file where you wanter the graph"

15. The graph of the main activity tells about the classes and objects which are accessible

