

DIGITAL FORENSICS LAB


Exercise 14	
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Date	30 th November, 2021

AIM


Employing memory forensic tool to analyse a memory dump.

PROCEDRE

1. Go to the folder where Volatility is downloaded and open the terminal there.



2. Download a memory image file or create your own using 'Magnet RAM Capture'. Here I have downloaded a memory file with the Cridex malware.



- Now run the following command to get more info about the memory file.

```

C:\DigForensics\Volatility>volatility-2.3.1.standalone.exe -f "C:\Files\Academics\VIT\Lab\Digital Forensics\Lab15\crindex.vmem" imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.3.1
Determining profile based on KDBG search...

Suggested Profile(s) : WinXPSP2x86, WinXPSP3x86 (Instantiated with WinXPSP2x86)
AS Layer1 : IA32PagedMemoryPae (Kernel AS)
AS Layer2 : FileAddressSpace (C:\Files\Academics\VIT\Lab\Digital Forensics\Lab15\crindex.vmem)
PAE type : PAE
DTB : 0x2fe000L
KDBG : 0x80545ae0L
Number of Processors : 1
Image Type (Service Pack) : 3
KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xffdf000L
KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xffdf000L
Image date and time : 2012-07-22 02:45:08 UTC+0000
Image local date and time : 2012-07-21 22:45:08 -0400

C:\DigForensics\Volatility>

```

This gives us a list of suggested profiles to use for the crindex.vmem image.

- Now we see what were the processes running in the memory with the following command.

```

C:\DigForensics\Volatility>volatility-2.3.1.standalone.exe -f crindex.vmem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 pslist
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.3.1
Offset(V)  Name                PID  PPID  Thds  Hnds  Sess  Wow64  Start                Exit
-----
0x823c89c8 System                4    0     53   240  -----  0  0 2012-07-22 02:42:31 UTC+0000
0x822f1020 smss.exe           368  4      3    19  -----  0  0 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
0x822a0598 csrss.exe           584  368    9   326  0  0 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
0x82298700 winlogon.exe      608  368   23   519  0  0 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
0x81e2ab28 services.exe      652  608   16   243  0  0 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
0x81e2a3b8 lsass.exe         664  608   24   330  0  0 2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
0x82311360 svchost.exe      824  652   20   194  0  0 2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
0x81e29ab8 svchost.exe      908  652    9   226  0  0 2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
0x823001d0 svchost.exe     1004 652   64  1118  0  0 2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
0x821dfda0 svchost.exe     1056 652    5    60  0  0 2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
0x82295650 svchost.exe     1220 652   15   197  0  0 2012-07-22 02:42:35 UTC+0000
0x821dea70 explorer.exe     1484 1464   17   415  0  0 2012-07-22 02:42:36 UTC+0000
0x81eb17b8 spoolsv.exe     1512 652   14   113  0  0 2012-07-22 02:42:36 UTC+0000
0x81e7bda0 reader_sl.exe   1640 1484    5    39  0  0 2012-07-22 02:42:36 UTC+0000
0x820e8da0 alg.exe         788  652    7   104  0  0 2012-07-22 02:43:01 UTC+0000
0x821fcda0 wuauclt.exe     1136 1004    8   173  0  0 2012-07-22 02:43:46 UTC+0000
0x8205bda0 wuauclt.exe     1588 1004    5   132  0  0 2012-07-22 02:44:01 UTC+0000

C:\DigForensics\Volatility>

```

- To see it in another format, we replace pslist with pstree.

```

C:\DigForensics\Volatility>volatility-2.3.1.standalone.exe -f crindex.vmem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 pstree
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.3.1
Name                Pid  PPid  Thds  Hnds  Time
-----
0x823c89c8: System                4    0     53   240  1970-01-01 00:00:00 UTC+0000
. 0x822f1020: smss.exe           368  4      3    19  2012-07-22 02:42:31 UTC+0000
.. 0x82298700: winlogon.exe      608  368   23   519  2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
... 0x81e2ab28: services.exe      652  608   16   243  2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
.... 0x821dfda0: svchost.exe     1056 652    5    60  2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
.... 0x81e29ab8: svchost.exe      908  652    9   226  2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
.... 0x823001d0: svchost.exe     1004 652   64  1118  2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
..... 0x8205bda0: wuauclt.exe     1588 1004    5   132  2012-07-22 02:44:01 UTC+0000
..... 0x821fcda0: wuauclt.exe     1136 1004    8   173  2012-07-22 02:43:46 UTC+0000
.... 0x82311360: svchost.exe      824  652   20   194  2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
.... 0x820e8da0: alg.exe         788  652    7   104  2012-07-22 02:43:01 UTC+0000
.... 0x82295650: svchost.exe     1220 652   15   197  2012-07-22 02:42:35 UTC+0000
... 0x81e2a3b8: lsass.exe         664  608   24   330  2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
.. 0x822a0598: csrss.exe           584  368    9   326  2012-07-22 02:42:32 UTC+0000
. 0x821dea70: explorer.exe     1484 1464   17   415  2012-07-22 02:42:36 UTC+0000
. 0x81e7bda0: reader_sl.exe   1640 1484    5    39  2012-07-22 02:42:36 UTC+0000

C:\DigForensics\Volatility>

```

6. To see more about the tool's options and get some help, we execute this:

```
Command Prompt
C:\DigForensics\Volatility>volatility-2.3.1.standalone.exe -h
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.3.1
Usage: Volatility - A memory forensics analysis platform.

Options:
  -h, --help                list all available options and their default values.
                           Default values may be set in the configuration file
                           (/etc/volatilityrc)
  --conf-file=.volatilityrc User based configuration file
  -d, --debug               Debug volatility
  --plugins=PLUGINS         Additional plugin directories to use (semi-colon
                           separated)
```

7. To uncover any hidden process, use psxview as below.

```
C:\DigForensics\Volatility>volatility-2.3.1.standalone.exe -f cridex.vmem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 psxview
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.3.1
Offset(P)  Name                PID  pslist  psscan  thrdproc  pspcid  csrss  session  deskthrd
-----
0x02498700 winlogon.exe         608  True    True     True      True    True    True     True
0x02511360 svchost.exe          824  True    True     True      True    True    True     True
0x022e8da0 alg.exe              788  True    True     True      True    True    True     True
0x020b17b8 spoolsv.exe          1512 True    True     True      True    True    True     True
0x0202ab28 services.exe         652  True    True     True      True    True    True     True
0x02495650 svchost.exe          1220 True    True     True      True    True    True     True
0x0207bda0 reader_sl.exe    1640 True    True     True      True    True    True     True
0x025001d0 svchost.exe          1004 True    True     True      True    True    True     True
0x02029ab8 svchost.exe           908  True    True     True      True    True    True     True
0x023fcd00 wuauclt.exe          1136 True    True     True      True    True    True     True
0x0225bda0 wuauclt.exe          1588 True    True     True      True    True    True     True
0x0202a3b8 lsass.exe             664  True    True     True      True    True    True     True
0x023dea70 explorer.exe         1484 True    True     True      True    True    True     True
0x023dfda0 svchost.exe          1056 True    True     True      True    True    True     True
0x024f1020 smss.exe             368  True    True     True      True    False   False    False
0x025c89c8 System                4    True    True     True      True    False   False    False
0x024a0598 csrss.exe             584  True    True     True      True    False   True     True
```

8. To check the running open TCP connections, we can use connscan.

```
C:\DigForensics\Volatility>volatility-2.3.1.standalone.exe -f cridex.vmem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 connscan
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.3.1
Offset(P)  Local Address          Remote Address          Pid
-----
0x02087620 172.16.112.128:1038    41.168.5.140:8080      1484
0x023a8008 172.16.112.128:1037    125.19.103.198:8080    1484
C:\DigForensics\Volatility>
```


9. To view both TCP and UDP connections, use 'sockets'

```

C:\DigForensics\Volatility>volatility-2.3.1.standalone.exe -f cridex.vmem --profile=WinXPSP2x86 socket
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.3.1
Offset(V)      PID      Port      Proto Protocol      Address      Create Time
-----
0x81ddb780     664      500       17  UDP           0.0.0.0      2012-07-22 02:42:53 UTC+0000
0x82240d08     1484     1038      6   TCP           0.0.0.0      2012-07-22 02:44:45 UTC+0000
0x81dd7618     1220     1900      17  UDP           172.16.112.128 2012-07-22 02:43:01 UTC+0000
0x82125610     788      1028      6   TCP           127.0.0.1     2012-07-22 02:43:01 UTC+0000
0x8219cc08      4        445      6   TCP           0.0.0.0      2012-07-22 02:42:31 UTC+0000
0x81ec23b0     908      135       6   TCP           0.0.0.0      2012-07-22 02:42:33 UTC+0000
0x82276878      4        139      6   TCP           172.16.112.128 2012-07-22 02:42:38 UTC+0000
0x82277460      4        137      17  UDP           172.16.112.128 2012-07-22 02:42:38 UTC+0000
0x81e76620     1004     123       17  UDP           127.0.0.1     2012-07-22 02:43:01 UTC+0000
0x82172808     664      0         255 Reserved      0.0.0.0      2012-07-22 02:42:53 UTC+0000
0x81e3f460      4        138      17  UDP           172.16.112.128 2012-07-22 02:42:38 UTC+0000
0x821f0630     1004     123       17  UDP           172.16.112.128 2012-07-22 02:43:01 UTC+0000
0x822cd2b0     1220     1900      17  UDP           127.0.0.1     2012-07-22 02:43:01 UTC+0000
0x82172c50     664      4500      17  UDP           0.0.0.0      2012-07-22 02:42:53 UTC+0000
0x821f0d00      4        445      17  UDP           0.0.0.0      2012-07-22 02:42:31 UTC+0000
C:\DigForensics\Volatility>

```

10. FOR THE FOLLOWING, USE VOLATILITY 2.6. This was saved in another folder called “Volatility2.6” in “DigForensics” folder.



To display the commandline arguments of each process, use cmdline:

```

C:\DigForensics\Volatility2.6\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone -f cridex.vmem cmdline
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
*****
System pid:      4
*****
smss.exe pid:    368
Command line :  \SystemRoot\System32\smss.exe
*****
csrss.exe pid:   584
Command line :  C:\WINDOWS\system32\csrss.exe ObjectDirectory=\Windows SharedSection=1024,3072,512 Windows=On SubSystemType=Windows ServerDll=basesrv,1 ServerDll=winsrv:UserServerDllInitialization,3 ServerDll=winsrv:ConServerDllInitialization,2 ProfileControl=Off MaxRequestThreads=16
*****
winlogon.exe pid: 608

```

Scrolling down we see the command line arguments and the path where reader_sl was stored. It is found using its process id 1640.


```


*****
reader_sl.exe pid: 1640
Command line : "C:\Program Files\Adobe\Reader 9.0\Reader\Reader_sl.exe"
*****
alg.exe pid: 788

```

11. We now create a dump of this process and check it out. The command for this is given below using procdump and specifying the PID of the process.

Command run: volatility_2.6_win64_standalone -f cridex.vmem procdump -p 1640 --dump-dir .

NOTE: DO NOT DOUBLE CLICK OR RUN THIS NEWLY CREATED EXE/DUMP FILE!





```

C:\DigForensics\Volatility2.6\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone>volatility_2.6_win64_standalone -f cridex.vmem procdump -p 1640 --dump-dir .
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.6
Process(V) ImageBase Name Result
-----
0x81e7bda0 0x00400000 reader_sl.exe OK: executable.1640.exe
C:\DigForensics\Volatility2.6\volatility_2.6_win64_standalone>

```

12. Now, go to virustotal.com and upload this newly created exe file.





From the image above, we see that VirusTotal recognized this file as a Trojan malware. Thus, reader_sl.exe is a malware.

OBSERVATIONS

In the fifth image, we see that there is a process named “reader_sl.exe” with “explorer.exe” as its parent process. Upon checking the connections and sockets, we see in image 8 that its parent process 1484 makes a connection to some location with address 41.168.140:8080. This is a bit suspicious as the name says it is a process of Adobe Reader but there is no reason why Adobe reader would have to make a connection to some remote location.

Thus, this process’s dump was made and uploaded to VirusTotal which recognized this file as a malware.

CONCLUSION

We have used a memory image to figure out which process was the malware.