

39th International Conference on Automated Software Engineering

SNOPY: Bridging Sample Denoising with Causal Graph Learning for Effective Vulnerability Detection

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¹ Yangzhou University ² Singapore Management University ³ China Academy of Engineering Physics ⁴ Zhejiang University










Software Vulnerability







Vulnerabilities by type & year






Timely and Accurate

Detection is **Urgent!**


Vulnerability Detection Advancement





Challenge 1: Noisy Program Semantics

```
Vulnerability-Fixing Commit (fe9c8426) of CVE-2018-9518
   diff --git a/net/nfc/llcp_commands.c b/net/nfc/llcp_commands.c
   index 367d8c0..2ceefa1 100644
   --- a/net/nfc/llcp_commands.c
  +++ b/net/nfc/llcp_commands.c
   @@ -149,6 +149,10 @@ struct nfc_llcp_sdp_tlv
                         *nfc_llcp_build_sdreq_tlv(u8 tid, char *uri,
                                                    size_t uri_len)
8
       struct nfc_llcp_sdp_tlv *sdreq;
       pr_debug("uri: %s, len: %zu\n", uri, uri_len);
10 +
       if (WARN_ON_ONCE(uri_len > U8_MAX - 4))
11 +
               return NULL:
       sdreg = kzalloc(sizeof(struct nfc_llcp_sdp_tlv), GFP_KERNEL);
12
13
       if (sdreg == NULL)
14
               return NULL;
15
       sdrea->tlv_len = uri_len + 3; -----
16
       if (uri[uri_len - 1] == 0)
              sdrea->tlv_len--:
17
       sdrea->tlv = kzalloc(sdrea->tlv_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
18
19
     if (sdreg->tlv == NULL) {
20
              kfree(sdreg);
21
              return NULL:
22
23
       sdreq->tlv[0] = LLCP_TLV_SDREO;
24
       sdreq->tlv[1] = sdreq->tlv_len - 2;
25
      | sdrea->tlv[2] = tid:
26
       sdreq->tid = tid;
27
       sdreq->uri = sdreq->tlv + 3;
28
     memcpy(sdreq->uri, uri, uri_len);
29
       sdrea->time = jiffies;
                                                         Point of Interest
30
       INIT_HLIST_NODE(&sdreg->node);
                                                         Affected Fragments
31
       return sdrea:
32 }
                                                  ----- Data-flow
```




Motivating Example



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
Motivating Example





Challenge 1: Noisy Program Semantics


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Motivating Example




Challenge 2: Learning Spurious Correlations






Challenge 2: Learning Spurious Correlations



Our approach: SNOPY


How to capture real vulnerability patterns from vulnerable samples with numerous noise for effective detection?



Workflow of Snopy


Sample Denoising

How to localize vulnerability-related code snippets?




Sample Denoising

How to localize vulnerability-related code snippets?




- Rule1: Performing data-flow slicing as targets statements receive variables/parameters assigned or checked by vulnerable lines.
- **Rule2:** If the previous forward data-flow slicing result is empty, performing control-flow slicing.




$$\alpha_{c_v}$$
, $\alpha_{s_v} = \operatorname{softmax} \left(\operatorname{MLP}_{\text{node}}(h_v) \right)$

$$\beta_{c_{vu}}, \beta_{s_{vu}} = \operatorname{softmax}\left(\operatorname{MLP}_{edge}(h_v||h_u)\right)$$




$$h_{\mathcal{G}_c} = \varphi \big(\mathsf{GPL}(A \odot M_c, X \odot F_c) \big)$$

$$h_{\mathcal{G}_S} = \varphi \big(\mathrm{GPL}(A \odot M_S, X \odot F_S) \big)$$



$$\mathcal{L}_{CE} = -\frac{1}{\mathcal{D}} \sum_{G \in \mathcal{D}} y_G^{\mathsf{T}} \log \left(\Phi(h_{\mathcal{G}_c}) \right)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{unif} = -\frac{1}{\mathcal{D}} \sum_{\mathcal{G} \in \mathcal{D}} \text{KL} \left(y_{unif}, \Phi(h_{\mathcal{G}_s}) \right)$$



$$\mathcal{L}_{cau} = -\frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}| \cdot |\mathcal{S}|} \sum_{\mathcal{G} \in \mathcal{D}} \sum_{\mathcal{S}' \in \mathcal{S}} y_{\mathcal{G}}^{\mathsf{T}} \log \left(\Phi \left(h_{\mathcal{G}_c} \oplus h_{\mathcal{G}_{\mathcal{S}'}} \right) \right)$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{total} = \mathcal{L}_{CE} + \lambda_1 \mathcal{L}_{unif} + \lambda_2 \mathcal{L}_{cau}$$

Performance of SNOPY

Research Questions

- RQ1: How does SNOPY perform compared to the state-of-the-art baselines on vulnerability detection?
- RQ2: How effective is SNOPY for detecting different types of vulnerabilities?
- RQ3: How do various components of SNOPY affect its overall performance?

Dataset

Dataset	Vul	Non-vul	Ratio	VFCs	VCCs
	12,460	14,858	1:1.2	6,611	6,439
Big-Vul	10,900	177,736	1:16.3	3,754	3,385
DiverseVul	18,945	311,547	1:16.4	7,514	7,022

Baselines

DNN-based

- VulDeePecker (NDSS'18) ReVeal (TSE'21)
- SySeVR (TDSC'21)

- IVDetect (ESEC/FSE'21)
- Devign (NeurIPS'19)

LLM-based

• LineVul (MSR'22)

• SVulD (ESEC/FSE'23)

RQ1: Detection Performance

Datase Metrics (%)	et F	FFmpeg+QEMU [5]			Big-Vul [<u>17]</u>			DiverseVul [7]				
Approach	Accuracy	Precision	Recall	F1	Accuracy	Precision	Recall	F1	Accuracy	Precision	Recall	F1
VulDeePecker	48.55	33.96	27.47	30.37	83.27	16.56	22.95	19.24	87.44	11.30	24.55	15.48
SySeVR	44.63	35.70	61.87	45.28	82.45	19.63	28.91	23.38	86.16	7.69	14.28	10.00
Devign	51.37	48.15	80.42	60.24	85.64	27.32	13.04	17.65	87.16	24.49	28.07	26.16
REVEAL	53.05	54.19	75.32	63.03	83.79	15.34	30.05	20.31	85.32	20.69	33.19	25.49
IVDETECT	56.85	51.33	68.82	58.80	86.97	24.96	32.57	28.26	88.52	17.34	35.26	23.25
DeepWukong	54.61	52.70	71.96	60.84	79.64	13.08	32.55	18.66	82.39	21.64	29.30	24.89
AMPLE	62.88	55.06	77.34	64.33	85.95	28.40	36.11	31.79	88.79	26.35	34.01	29.69
LineVul	63.74	52.44	65.39	58.21	80.26	12.96	38.32	19.37	90.52	36.18	26.98	30.91
SVulD	60.51	54.99	83.48	66.30	92.81	33.24	41.65	36.97	91.16	31.44	40.17	35.27
Snopy	67.33	59.64	78.72	67.86	90.75	38.12	46.39	41.85	89.61	33.76	42.53	37.64


The performance improvements of SNOPY over the state-of-the-art approaches are positive. Particularly, SNOPY outperforms the best-performing baseline SVulD by 2.35%,13.20%, and 6.72% in F1-score on the three datasets, respectively.

RQ2: Classification Performance


Dataset	Rank	Type	Ratio	SVulD	SNOPY
	1	CWE-787	2.25%	69.44	73.89
	4	CWE-416	3.76%	54.71	68.32
	6	CWE-20	13.62%	62.99	61.43
/ul	7	CWE-125	7.12%	56.38	69.47
<u> </u>	12	CWE-476	2.45%	37.59	75.23
Big-Vul	14	CWE-190	3.50%	68.53	72.06
	17	CWE-119	24.22%	45.77	69.28
	21	CWE-362	3.17%	60.28	65.33
		Average	56.96	69.38	
	1	CWE-787	17.98%	60.47	56.99
	4	CWE-416	6.24%	53.58	66.29
	6	CWE-20	8.16%	44.39	55.83
,	7	CWE-125	11.60%	49.51	62.30
Ę	8	CWE-22	1.25%	33.65	26.74
$\mathbf{E}\mathbf{V}$	12	CWE-476	6.05%	22.01	58.14
DiverseVul	13	CWE-287	0.67%	8.24	13.59
	14	CWE-190	4.86%	61.77	48.25
	17	CWE-119	10.14%	56.74	64.82
	21	CWE-362	2.84%	38.13	55.94
	22	CWE-269	1.22%	6.99	13.34
	23	CWE-94	0.87%	11.37	17.55
		Average	37.24	44.98	

On two large-scale vulnerability datasets with CWE information, SNOPY produces substantial improvements of up to 21.80% and 20.78% in terms of F1-score on average over the previous best-performing baseline in detecting different types of real-world vulnerabilities.

RQ3: Ablation Study & Sensitivity Analysis




Both sample denoising and causal graph learning are essential for the performance of SNOPY. The most important component of SNOPY is the causal intervention module that results in at most 30.51% improvement in F1-score. Different weights of loss coefficients have varying impart on SNOPY's performance, and the larger capacity of FCS may not always guarantee better performance.




Conclusion

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


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


Causal Graph Learning





RQ3: Ablation Study & Sensitivity Analysis





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Thanks for listening!

- sicongcao1996@gmail.com
- https://github.com/SnopyArtifact/Snopy













