


ORIE 4742 - Info Theory and Bayesian ML

Chapter 6: Intro to Bayesian Statistics

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marginals and conditionals

let X and Y be discrete rvs taking values in \mathbb{N} . denote the joint pmf:

$$p_{XY}(x, y) = \mathbb{P}[X = x, Y = y]$$

marginalization: computing individual pmfs from joint pmfs as

$$p_X(x) = \sum_{y \in \mathbb{N}} p_{XY}(x, y) \quad p_Y(y) = \sum_{x \in \mathbb{N}} p_{XY}(x, y)$$

conditioning: pmf of X given $Y = y$ (with $p_Y(y) > 0$) defined as:

$$\mathbb{P}[X = x | Y = y] \triangleq p_{X|Y}(x|y) = \frac{p_{XY}(x, y)}{p_Y(y)}$$

joint ↙
marginal ↘

more generally, can define $\mathbb{P}[X \in \mathcal{A} | Y \in \mathcal{B}]$ for sets $\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{B} \subseteq \mathbb{N}$

see also this **visual demonstration**

the basic ‘rules’ of Bayesian inference

let X and Y be discrete rvs taking values in \mathbb{N} , with joint pmf $p(x, y)$

product rule $h(x, y) = h(x) + h(y|x)$, $H(x, y) = H(Y) + H(x|Y)$

for $x, y \in \mathbb{N}$, we have: $p_{XY}(x, y) = p_X(x)p_{Y|X}(y|x) = p_Y(y)p_{X|Y}(x|y)$

sum rule $H(x) = H(Y) + \sum_y p(y) H(x|Y=y)$

for $x \in \mathbb{N}$, we have: $p_X(x) = \sum_{y \in \mathbb{N}} p_{X|Y}(x|y)p_Y(y)$

and most importantly!

Bayes rule

for any $x, y \in \mathbb{N}$, we have:

$$p_{X|Y}(x|y) = \frac{p_X(x)p_{Y|X}(y|x)}{\sum_{x \in \mathbb{N}} p_{Y|X}(y|x)p_X(x)}$$



see also [this video](#) for an intuitive take on Bayes rule

fundamental principle of Bayesian statistics

- assume the world arises via an underlying probabilistic generative model \mathcal{M}
- use random variables to model all unknown parameters θ
- incorporate all that is known by conditioning on data D
- use Bayes rule to update prior beliefs into posterior beliefs

$$p(\theta|D, \mathcal{M}) \propto p(\theta|\mathcal{M})p(D|\theta, \mathcal{M})$$

Note : Bayesian ML DOES NOT believe that
the θ are random
- This is only for 'convenience'

pros and cons

in praise of Bayes

- conceptually simple and easy to interpret
- works well with small sample sizes and overparametrized models
- can handle all questions of interest: no need for different estimators, hypothesis testing, etc.

why isn't everybody Bayesian

- they need priors (subjectivity...) (but all methods are subjective...)
- they may be more computationally expensive: computing normalization constant and expectations, and updating priors, may be difficult
- Eg - NCMC (however - anytime you use a Bayesian ML method, you get much more info)

the likelihood principle

(often hidden)

given model \mathcal{M} with parameters Θ , and data D , we define:

- the prior $p(\Theta|\mathcal{M})$: what you believe before you see data
 - the posterior $p(\Theta|D, \mathcal{M})$: what you believe after you see data
 - the marginal likelihood or evidence $p(D|\mathcal{M})$: how probable is the data under our prior and model
- both are distrib^ over Θ*
- hot distn*
- ~~these three are probability distributions; the next is not~~
- the likelihood: $\mathcal{L}(\Theta) \triangleq p(D|\mathcal{M}, \Theta)$: function of Θ summarizing data

the likelihood principle (main axiomatic basis for Bayesian ML)

given model \mathcal{M} , all evidence in data D relevant to parameters Θ is contained in the likelihood function $\mathcal{L}(\Theta)$

this is not without controversy; see Wikipedia article

REMEMBER THIS!!

given model \mathcal{M} with parameters Θ , and data D , we define:

- the prior $p(\Theta|\mathcal{M})$: what you believe before you see data
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- the marginal likelihood or evidence $p(D|\mathcal{M})$: how probable is the data under our prior and model
- the likelihood: $\mathcal{L}(\Theta) \triangleq p(D|\mathcal{M}, \Theta)$: function of Θ summarizing the data

the fundamental formula of Bayesian statistics

$$\text{posterior} = \frac{\text{likelihood} \times \text{prior}}{\text{evidence}} \quad p(\theta|D, \mathcal{M}) = \frac{p(D|\theta, \mathcal{M})}{p(D|\mathcal{M})} p(\theta|\mathcal{M})$$

also see: Sir David Spiegelhalter on Bayes vs. Fisher

Most often (>90%)
 $P(\theta|D, \mathcal{M}) \propto p(D|\theta, \mathcal{M}) p(\theta|\mathcal{M})$

Notes

- likelihood, evidence are not distributions ($L(\theta)$ is just a fn of θ)
which summarizes the data

$P(\theta)$, $P(\theta|D)$ are distributions over Θ

- $L(\theta)$ is different for discrete vs continuous parameters Θ
 - If θ discrete, $L(\theta|D) = P(\theta|D)$ (pmf)
 - If θ contin, $L(\theta|D) = f(\theta|D)$ (pdf)
- The evidence is different for discrete vs continuous D
 - If θ discrete, evidence = $P(D|M)$
 - θ continuous, evidence = $f(D|M)$

example: the mystery Bernoulli rv

- data $D = \{X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n\} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ie, $\Pr[X=1] = \theta$
- model \mathcal{M} : X_i are generated i.i.d. from a $Ber(\theta)$ distribution

fix θ ; what is $\Pr[D|\mathcal{M}]$ for any $i \in [n]$? Let $N_1 = \# \text{ of } 1\text{s in } D$
 $N_0 = \# \text{ of } 0\text{s in } D$ $N_1 + N_0 = n$

$$L(\theta) = \Pr(D|\mathcal{M}, \theta) = \Pr[X_1=x_1, X_2=x_2, \dots, X_n=x_n | \mathcal{M}, \theta] = \theta^{N_1} (1-\theta)^{N_0} \\ (= \prod_{i=1}^n \theta^{x_i} (1-\theta)^{1-x_i})$$

let $H = \# \text{ of } 1\text{'s in } \{X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n\}$; what is $\Pr[H|\mathcal{M}, \theta]$?

N_1

$$\Pr[N_1 = k | \theta, \mathcal{M}] = \binom{n}{k} \theta^k (1-\theta)^{n-k}$$

the Bernoulli likelihood function

- data $D = \{X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n\} \in \{0, 1\}^n$
- model \mathcal{M} : X_i are generated i.i.d. from a $Ber(\theta)$ distribution

likelihood: $\mathcal{L}(\theta) \triangleq p(D|\mathcal{M}, \theta)$: function of θ summarizing the data

$$\boxed{\mathcal{L}(\theta) = \theta^{N_1} (1-\theta)^{N_0}} \quad \theta \in [0, 1]$$

- Note - $\mathcal{L}(\theta)$ is NOT a distribution, ie.

$$\int_0^1 \mathcal{L}(\theta) d\theta \neq 1 !$$

log-likelihood, sufficient statistics, MLE

- $\ell(\theta) = \log L(\theta) = N_1 \log \theta + N_0 \log(1-\theta)$
for Bernoulli
- (N_1, N_0) are sufficient statistics
i.e., Given data D , $L(\theta)$ completely determined by
 $N_1(D), N_0(D)$

- MLE - max likelihood estimator

$$\underset{\theta \in [0,1]}{\operatorname{arg\,max}} \ell(\theta) = \underset{\theta \in [0,1]}{\operatorname{arg\,max}} \ell(\theta) = \frac{N_1}{N_1 + N_0}$$

cromwell's rule

how should we choose the prior?

the zeroth rule of Bayesian statistics

never set $p(\theta|M) = 0$ or $p(\theta|M) = 1$ for any θ

- Oliver Cromwell - 'I beseech you, <supplication to higher authority>, think it possible that you might be mistaken'
- connected to falsifiability

also see:

- Jacob Bronowski on Cromwell's Rule and the scientific method
- Richard Feynman on the scientific method (at Cornell!)

from where do we get a prior?

- data $D = \{X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n\} \in \{0, 1\}^n$
- model \mathcal{M} : X_i are generated i.i.d. from a $Ber(\theta)$ distribution

option 1: from the ‘problem statement’

Mackay example 2.6

- eleven urns labeled by $u \in \{0, 1, 2, \dots, 10\}$, each containing ten balls
- urn u contains u red balls and $10 - u$ blue balls
- select urn u uniformly at random and draw n balls with replacement, obtaining n_R red and $n - n_R$ blue balls

$$\theta = \frac{i}{10} \quad \text{with prob } \frac{1}{11} \quad \text{for each } i \in \{0, 1, \dots, 10\}$$

from where do we get a prior

- data $D = \{X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n\} \in \{0, 1\}^n$
- model \mathcal{M} : X_i are generated i.i.d. from a $Ber(\theta)$ distribution

option 2: the maximum entropy principle

choose $p(\theta|\mathcal{M})$ to be distribution with maximum entropy given \mathcal{M}

we know $\theta \in [0, 1]$

Eg - If we know $\theta \in [0, 1]$, then one
choice of prior $\equiv \text{MaxEnt}([0, 1])$
 $= \text{Unif}([0, 1])$

Eg - If $\theta \in \mathbb{N}_+, E[\theta] = \mu \stackrel{(\geq 1)}{\Rightarrow} \text{Geom}\left(\frac{1}{\mu}\right)$

from where do we get the prior, take 2

- data $D = \{X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n\} \in \{0, 1\}^n$
- model \mathcal{M} : X_i are generated i.i.d. from a $Ber(\theta)$ distribution

option 3: easy updates via conjugate priors

- prior $p(\theta)$ is said to be conjugate to likelihood $p(D|\theta)$ if corresponding posterior $p(\theta|D)$ has same functional form as $p(\theta)$
- natural conjugate prior: $p(\theta)$ has same functional form as $p(D|\theta)$
- conjugate prior family: closed under Bayesian updating

Note - One obvious family = set of all distributions
(not useful ...)

Want - 'smallest' family which is closed under Bayesian updates

the Beta distribution

Beta distribution

- $x \in [0, 1]$, parameters: $\Theta = (\alpha, \beta) \in \mathbb{R}^+$ ('# ones'+1, '# zeros'+1)
- pdf: $p(x) \propto x^{\alpha-1}(1-x)^{\beta-1}$ ← same form as the Bernoulli likelihood!
- normalizing constant: $\frac{1}{B(\alpha, \beta)} = \frac{\Gamma(\alpha+\beta)}{\Gamma(\alpha)\Gamma(\beta)}$

