

Beraborrow LP Pricing Bug

1. Context

- **Beraborrow** = Liquity V1 fork on Berachain.
 - Lets users deposit **BEX LP tokens** (Balancer-style) as collateral to borrow NECT stablecoin.
 - Needs a safe formula to price LP tokens.
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2. Two LP Pricing Methods

A. Naive Pricing (manipulable)

```
naive pricing = (V1 + V2) / LP_totalSupply
```

- `V1`, `V2` = value of pool assets.
 - Problem: Easily inflated with flashloans or reserve imbalance → overvalues LP tokens.
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B. Fair Reserve Pricing (lower bound)

```
fair price = ( 2 * sqrt(r0 * r1 * p0 * p1) ) / totalSupply
```

- `r0`, `r1` = pool reserves.
 - `p0`, `p1` = fair prices from oracle.
 - Safe for **borrowing** (prevents manipulation).
 - **Risk**: Undervalues LP tokens in **redemption** if pool is imbalanced → value leak.
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3. The Vulnerability

Beraborrow used **Fair Reserve Pricing** for:

1. **Borrowing power**  good.
2. **Redemption**  risky.

Why it's a problem:

- Fair pricing = *minimum* value.
 - Actual redemption returns the **real reserves**, which can be worth more than the fair price.
 - The difference = **free profit** for redeemer → protocol loses value.
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4. Small Example

Pool: USDC / USDT LP token

- Ideal balanced: 1.0 USDC + 1.0 USDT .
- Actual reserves: 1.10 USDC + 0.91 USDT .

Fair price = $\min(1.10, 0.91) * 2 = \$2.00$
Redemption output = $1.10 + 0.91 = \$2.01$
Leak per LP = \$0.01

→ With large LP positions & repeated cycles = massive loss.

5. How Fuzzing Escalated the Bug

- **Setup:** Forked Balancer factory, deployed real pool, exposed handlers to:
 - Add/remove liquidity
 - Swap tokens
 - Withdraw LP
 - **Target function:** Compare *fair price* vs. *actual redemption value* → return difference.
 - **Echidna optimization mode:** Maximized the gap.
 - Found extreme hypothetical case: $\sim 1.81e21$ difference (test env, unclamped inputs).
 - Real-world gap smaller but still exploitable.
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6. Impact



- Without a **high redemption fee**, attackers can continuously:
 - Supply imbalanced LPs → redeem for more than priced.
 - Repeat for arbitrage profit.

- Risk: Continuous drain of collateral value from protocol.
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7. Fixes & Mitigation

- Stopped using **on-chain fair reserve pricing** for redemptions.
 - Switched to **Chronicle oracle** for LP pricing.
 - Increased **minimum redemption fee** to cover potential inaccuracy.
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8. Key Lessons

1. **Correct formula in wrong context** can still be a bug.
2. Fair Reserve Pricing →
 -  Borrowing: safe.
 -  Redemption: value leak.
3. Manual review + fuzzing = best combo:
 - Manual: find novel logic flaw.
 - Fuzzing: quantify worst-case impact.